'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

Equity Bottom-Up

<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/074/071/original/2018-12-28_11-57-31.png?1545965862" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="74071"></figure>
Source: Japan Analytics
</div>
THE <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/13631" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13631:1">GMO INTERNET (9449 JP)</a> STORY - GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.
<ul class="">
<li>
VALUE- Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.</li>
<li>
ACTIVIST - Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a 'secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate' (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.</li>
<li>'CRYPTO!' - In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node 'mining chips', and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.</li>
</ul>
OUTSTANDING - Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory - as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to 'cryptocurrencies', even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE - On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i <a href="https://ir.gmo.jp/en/pdf/irlibrary/gmo_disclose_info20181225_e.pdf" target="_blank">announced</a> that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip' and 'mining machine' development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the 'mining' centre from Scandinavia to (sic) 'a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin's 'cryptocurrency' exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK - As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/22762" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22762:1">GMO Financial (7177 JP)</a> (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/1492" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1492:1">GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP)</a> (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. <a href="https://ir.gmo.jp/en/pdf/irlibrary/gmo_disclose_info20181225_2e.pdf" target="_blank">According </a>to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out' less-than-desirable operating results.
<div class="content-highlight">
In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD - TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP
<ul>
<li>BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME</li>
<li>BOTTOM LINE No.2 - COMPREHENSIVE INCOME</li>
</ul>
II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL - THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET - NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW - DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION - TWO METHODS &gt; SAME RESULT
<ul>
<li>VALUATION METHOD No.1 - THE 'LISTCO DISCOUNT'</li>
<li>VALUATION METHOD No.2 - RESIDUAL INCOME</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="content-highlight">
CONCLUSION - For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i 'rump' is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.
</div>



Source: Japan Analytics

THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY - GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.


VALUE- Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.

ACTIVIST - Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a 'secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate' (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
'CRYPTO!' - In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node 'mining chips', and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.

OUTSTANDING - Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory - as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to 'cryptocurrencies', even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE - On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip' and 'mining machine' development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the 'mining' centre from Scandinavia to (sic) 'a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin's 'cryptocurrency' exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK - As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out' less-than-desirable operating results.

In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD - TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP

BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
BOTTOM LINE No.2 - COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL - THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET - NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW - DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION - TWO METHODS &gt; SAME RESULT

VALUATION METHOD No.1 - THE 'LISTCO DISCOUNT'
VALUATION METHOD No.2 - RESIDUAL INCOME



CONCLUSION - For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i 'rump' is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.


GMO Internet (9447 JP) - Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

RELATIVE PRICE SCORE LONG PORTFOLIOS - Our recent insight <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-most-overbought-most-oversold-the-relative-price-score" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:21149">Japan: Most Overbought &amp; Most Oversold - The Relative Price Score</a> introduced our methodology for identifying overbought and oversold outliers based on their Relative Price Score (RPS).  This insight uses the RPS to generate a portfolio of long ideas based on changes in the monthly closing Relative Price Scores. <div class="content-highlight">
THE 2016 PORTFOLIO 
<ul>
<li>The 2016 average return was 40% for a 12-month holding period, and if held to the most recent peak, returns would have been significantly higher</li>
<li>21 of the 48 stocks had a market capitalisation at the time of entry of more than ¥100b and the average 12-month return for this group was 41%</li>
<li>17 positions were in Regional Banks which produced an average 12-month return of 19%</li>
<li>18 positions saw a greater than 10% decline after entry, however, this group produced an average 12-month return of 23%</li>
<li>Seven stocks declined over the period and produced an average 'loss' of 7% </li>
<li>The strategy successfully identified the opportunity in the Energy sector in early 2016 with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/109" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1">Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/2840" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2840:1">Modec (6269 JP)</a> and later, but less productively, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/12219" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12219:1">Japan Petroleum Exploration (1662 JP)</a>
</li>
<li>Other successful larger capitalisation positions were <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/1496" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1496:1">Showa Denko (4004 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/15998" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15998:1">Mitsui Mining &amp; Smelting (5706 JP)</a>
</li>
<li>The least successful position was <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/637" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:637:1">Toshiba (6502 JP)</a> which is still far from being an RPS 'long'</li>
</ul>
</div><div class="content-highlight">
THE 2017 PORTFOLIO
<ul>
<li>The average return for the first half of 2017 was 28% for a subsequent 12-month holding period. If held to the most recent peak, the average return would have grown to 50%</li>
<li>9 of the 17 stocks had a market capitalisation at the time of entry of more than ¥100b and the average 12-month return for this group was only 6% - much of this was due to the six Electric Power companies which lost 2% on average</li>
<li>Only two Regional Banks appear on the list - most Regionals are now deeply oversold</li>
<li>The best performing larger capitalisation position was <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/391" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:391:1">Sharp (6753 JP)</a> although this is now back in oversold territory</li>
</ul>
</div><div class="content-highlight">
THE CURRENT PORTFOLIO
<ul>
<li>The current portfolio is averaging a return of 19%, although most of the returns so far are from micro-caps</li>
<li>For companies with a market capitalisation of over ¥50b, double-digit gains-to-peak have been achieved from positions in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/292" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:292:1">Electric Power Dev  (9513 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/9797" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9797:1">Hyakugo Bank (8368 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/18871" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18871:1">Isetan Mitsukoshi (3099 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/10383" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:10383:1">Global One Reit (8958 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/22762" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22762:1">GMO Financial (7177 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/17934" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17934:1">Shikoku Electric Power (9507 JP)</a> , <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/4152" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:4152:1">Kadokawa Dwango (9468 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/8905" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8905:1">Nippon Chemi Con (6997 JP)</a>
</li>
<li>The most represented Sectors/Peer Groups are Utilities (6), Auto-Parts (4), REITs (4) and Commercial Printing (2)</li>
<li>The best position in the last twelve months has been <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/2935" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2935:1">Aigan (9854 JP)</a> with a return-to-peak of 186%</li>
<li>The largest companies by market capitalisation in the current portfolio are <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/13613" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13613:1">Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/14574" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14574:1">Chubu Electric Power (9502 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/19388" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19388:1">Dai Nippon Printing (7912 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/18907" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18907:1">Kansai Electric Power (9503 JP)</a>
</li>
</ul>
</div>

RELATIVE PRICE SCORE LONG PORTFOLIOS - Our recent insight Japan: Most Overbought &amp; Most Oversold - The Relative Price Score introduced our methodology for identifying overbought and oversold outliers based on their Relative Price Score (RPS).  This insight uses the RPS to generate a portfolio of long ideas based on changes in the monthly closing Relative Price Scores. 
THE 2016 PORTFOLIO 

The 2016 average return was 40% for a 12-month holding period, and if held to the most recent peak, returns would have been significantly higher
21 of the 48 stocks had a market capitalisation at the time of entry of more than ¥100b and the average 12-month return for this group was 41%
17 positions were in Regional Banks which produced an average 12-month return of 19%
18 positions saw a greater than 10% decline after entry, however, this group produced an average 12-month return of 23%
Seven stocks declined over the period and produced an average 'loss' of 7% 
The strategy successfully identified the opportunity in the Energy sector in early 2016 with Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP) and Modec (6269 JP) and later, but less productively, Japan Petroleum Exploration (1662 JP)

Other successful larger capitalisation positions were Showa Denko (4004 JP) and Mitsui Mining &amp; Smelting (5706 JP)

The least successful position was Toshiba (6502 JP) which is still far from being an RPS 'long'


THE 2017 PORTFOLIO

The average return for the first half of 2017 was 28% for a subsequent 12-month holding period. If held to the most recent peak, the average return would have grown to 50%
9 of the 17 stocks had a market capitalisation at the time of entry of more than ¥100b and the average 12-month return for this group was only 6% - much of this was due to the six Electric Power companies which lost 2% on average
Only two Regional Banks appear on the list - most Regionals are now deeply oversold
The best performing larger capitalisation position was Sharp (6753 JP) although this is now back in oversold territory


THE CURRENT PORTFOLIO

The current portfolio is averaging a return of 19%, although most of the returns so far are from micro-caps
For companies with a market capitalisation of over ¥50b, double-digit gains-to-peak have been achieved from positions in Electric Power Dev  (9513 JP), Hyakugo Bank (8368 JP), Isetan Mitsukoshi (3099 JP), Global One Reit (8958 JP), GMO Financial (7177 JP), Shikoku Electric Power (9507 JP) , Kadokawa Dwango (9468 JP) and Nippon Chemi Con (6997 JP)

The most represented Sectors/Peer Groups are Utilities (6), Auto-Parts (4), REITs (4) and Commercial Printing (2)
The best position in the last twelve months has been Aigan (9854 JP) with a return-to-peak of 186%
The largest companies by market capitalisation in the current portfolio are Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011 JP), Chubu Electric Power (9502 JP), Dai Nippon Printing (7912 JP) and Kansai Electric Power (9503 JP)




Japan: Relative Price Score Long Portfolios

Global Gaming and Casinos Industry Specialist, Casino Business Review LLC

Howard J Klein

Global Gaming and Casinos Industry Specialist

<ul><li>Offerings of equities and convertible bonds totaled 720 billion yen over the first nine months of '16 and the trend continues unabated. Its the lowest level of new offerings in four years.</li><li>Meanwhile, stock buybacks have soared to a record 4.35 trillion yen (USD$41.8 bn)--the most in history presumably to shore up capital efficiency.</li><li>Opponents in principle claim buybacks inhibit growth, and investment and also impede wage growth which in turn, keeps spending sluggish.</li><li>Do Japan's persistent low GDP numbers reflect some of this corporate policy strategies? Does the same phenomenon apply to the US? </li></ul>

Offerings of equities and convertible bonds totaled 720 billion yen over the first nine months of '16 and the trend continues unabated. Its the lowest level of new offerings in four years.Meanwhile, stock buybacks have soared to a record 4.35 trillion yen (USD$41.8 bn)--the most in history presumably to shore up capital efficiency.Opponents in principle claim buybacks inhibit growth, and investment and also impede wage growth which in turn, keeps spending sluggish.Do Japan's persistent low GDP numbers reflect some of this corporate policy strategies? Does the same phenomenon apply to the US? 

Could Japan's Aggressive Stock Buyback Spree Slow an Economic Rebound?

Leading Independent Investment Research, Morningstar, Inc.

Morningstar

Leading Independent Investment Research

Morningstar, Inc.

Morningstar, Inc. is a leading provider of independent investment research in North America, Europe, Australia, and Asia. We offer an extensive line of products and services for individual investors, financial advisors, asset managers, and retirement plan providers and sponsors. 

Morningstar provides data on more than 500,000 investment offerings, including stocks, mutual funds, and similar vehicles, along with real-time global market data on more than 16 million equities, indexes, futures, options, commodities, and precious metals, in addition to foreign exchange and Treasury markets. Morningstar also offers investment management services through its investment advisory subsidiaries, with more than $180 billion in assets under advisement or management as of June 30, 2015. We have operations in 27 countries.

Download the Morningstar Fact Sheet : http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/MarketingFactSheets/AboutMorningstarFactsheet.pdf

On Jan. 19, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/637" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:637:1">Toshiba Corp (6502 JP)</a> reported that it will likely book a combined noncash charge of up to JPY 700 billion, mainly for goodwill impairments on the U.S. nuclear business acquisition through its U.S. subsidiary, Westinghouse. The scale of impairment significantly exceeded the market expectation at the end of last year, as it is likely to push Toshiba’s thin net equity position of JPY 360 billion into a deficit, with potential delisting from the Tokyo Stock Exchange in sight.As the second-largest diversified industry group after Hitachi, Toshiba maintains a membership status within the Mitsui “zaibatsu” group, a cross-industry alliance of leading domestic companies dating back to the 16th century. According to a press report, as of the end of September 2016, Toshiba maintains a total of JPY 798.7 billion in loans outstanding, consisting of: (1) JPY 110 billion for Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/217" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:217:1">Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP)</a>); (2) JPY 110 billion for Mizuho Bank (<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/219" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:219:1">Mizuho Financial Group Inc (8411 JP)</a>); (3) JPY 102 billion for Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ and Mitsubishi UFJ Trust (<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/218" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1">Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Gro (8306 JP)</a>); and (4) JPY 75 billion for Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank (<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/19450" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19450:1">Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings (8309 JP)</a>).Anlayst: Mari Kumagai

On Jan. 19, Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) reported that it will likely book a combined noncash charge of up to JPY 700 billion, mainly for goodwill impairments on the U.S. nuclear business acquisition through its U.S. subsidiary, Westinghouse. The scale of impairment significantly exceeded the market expectation at the end of last year, as it is likely to push Toshiba’s thin net equity position of JPY 360 billion into a deficit, with potential delisting from the Tokyo Stock Exchange in sight.As the second-largest diversified industry group after Hitachi, Toshiba maintains a membership status within the Mitsui “zaibatsu” group, a cross-industry alliance of leading domestic companies dating back to the 16th century. According to a press report, as of the end of September 2016, Toshiba maintains a total of JPY 798.7 billion in loans outstanding, consisting of: (1) JPY 110 billion for Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP)); (2) JPY 110 billion for Mizuho Bank (Mizuho Financial Group Inc (8411 JP)); (3) JPY 102 billion for Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ and Mitsubishi UFJ Trust (Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Gro (8306 JP)); and (4) JPY 75 billion for Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank (Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings (8309 JP)).Anlayst: Mari Kumagai

Minimal Impact From Larger Credit Loss on Toshiba; Maintaining FVE for Major Japanese Banks

Four major banks under our coverage reported better-than-expected results, indicating an inflection point in their earning structure. In aggregate, of four major banks under our coverage, the numbers are similarly down across most metrics. On average, net income fell 11% from the year-ago period with operating income decreasing 19% from the year ago period. Momentum in trading and commission, both tracking the midcycle average, failed to offset lower net interest income, down 13% from the year-ago period to JPY 2,072 billion for the three major banks. Management for three major banks did not object to market consensus of JPY 300 billion negative earning impacts since the implementation of Bank of Japan's negative interest rate policy earlier this year. Management also maintained their full-year net profit forecast unchanged, citing their cautious stance after the election results. However, they also mentioned that further downside from the policy implementation is likely to be limited after the BoJ is transitioning its policy to control the yield curve instead.Our top pick will be <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/218" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1">Mitsubishi Ufj Financial Gro (8306 JP)</a> as it is best-positioned to benefit from its underappreciated global business exposure with about a quarter of its earning assets tied to U.S. markets. This excludes a 23% lucrative equity investment in Morgan Stanley. We will revise our fair value estimates with a detailed earnings note on each respective bank in coming weeks.Analyst: Mari Kumagai

Four major banks under our coverage reported better-than-expected results, indicating an inflection point in their earning structure. In aggregate, of four major banks under our coverage, the numbers are similarly down across most metrics. On average, net income fell 11% from the year-ago period with operating income decreasing 19% from the year ago period. Momentum in trading and commission, both tracking the midcycle average, failed to offset lower net interest income, down 13% from the year-ago period to JPY 2,072 billion for the three major banks. Management for three major banks did not object to market consensus of JPY 300 billion negative earning impacts since the implementation of Bank of Japan's negative interest rate policy earlier this year. Management also maintained their full-year net profit forecast unchanged, citing their cautious stance after the election results. However, they also mentioned that further downside from the policy implementation is likely to be limited after the BoJ is transitioning its policy to control the yield curve instead.Our top pick will be Mitsubishi Ufj Financial Gro (8306 JP) as it is best-positioned to benefit from its underappreciated global business exposure with about a quarter of its earning assets tied to U.S. markets. This excludes a 23% lucrative equity investment in Morgan Stanley. We will revise our fair value estimates with a detailed earnings note on each respective bank in coming weeks.Analyst: Mari Kumagai

1H16 Better-Than-Expected Results Suggest Earnings Inflection Points; Positive For Japanese Banks

Japan

GMO Financial Holdings, Inc. offers wealth management services. The Company provides financial trading, business renewal, investment information offering, and other services. GMO Financial Holdings provides its services throughout Japan.

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GMO Financial Holdings (7177 JP)

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