Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme.

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme. 

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

In this, the third of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reports to clear the miasma of really occurred at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a>.LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at Yes Bank. One major assumption is that only deposits which may be withdrawn on demand, or within the next 30 days are at risk of deposit flight. Only these deposits are captured in the LCR report. As such, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in LCR reports and compare these missing deposits to deposit costs. We then assess the “Missing Deposit” adjusted LCR ratio at each US$-issuing bank to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-bank-deposit-flight-risk-lessons-from-yes-bank" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:37617" rel="noopener">Lessons from Yes Bank</a>, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted.In our first insight on this matter, we derived the amount of stable deposits and compared this to deposit costs at each major India-headquartered bank. We then assessed these items relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-stable-deposits-and-costs-1-year-after-the-yes-bank-silent-run" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43981" rel="noopener">Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run</a> for more details.In our second insight on this matter, we adjusted LCR assumptions regarding likely deposit flight to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank to derive “Yes-stressed” resultant LCRs for each institution. We then assessed this Yes-Stressed LCR relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-yes-stressed-deposit-flight-simulation" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:44213" rel="noopener">Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation</a> for more details. In follow-up insights we further stress the reported LCRs for possible Covid-19 related payment delinquencies and then combined these elements for apocalypse scenario analysis.

In this, the third of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reports to clear the miasma of really occurred at Yes Bank (YES IN).LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at Yes Bank. One major assumption is that only deposits which may be withdrawn on demand, or within the next 30 days are at risk of deposit flight. Only these deposits are captured in the LCR report. As such, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in LCR reports and compare these missing deposits to deposit costs. We then assess the “Missing Deposit” adjusted LCR ratio at each US$-issuing bank to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in Lessons from Yes Bank, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted.In our first insight on this matter, we derived the amount of stable deposits and compared this to deposit costs at each major India-headquartered bank. We then assessed these items relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run for more details.In our second insight on this matter, we adjusted LCR assumptions regarding likely deposit flight to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank to derive “Yes-stressed” resultant LCRs for each institution. We then assessed this Yes-Stressed LCR relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation for more details. In follow-up insights we further stress the reported LCRs for possible Covid-19 related payment delinquencies and then combined these elements for apocalypse scenario analysis.

India-Headquartered Banks: Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run

Equity Bottom-Up

*Solid Quarter: IndiaBulls Housing Finance (IHFL.IN) [IndiaBulls] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 7.1 bn, increasing INR 4.4 bn (160.0%) linked quarter. Much of the linked quarter improvement can be attributed to net interest income growth of INR 4.7 bn (64.8%) resultant of INR 135.0 bn (14.5%) loan growth, NIM improvement of 137 bp (by our calculation) of 137 bp to 4.49%, and a buyback of bonds reducing debt by 9%; and*Credit Improving:During FY 2Q21, stated Stage 3 NPLs improved INR 4.3 bn (21.1%), declining 68 bp over the period to 1.52%.  Reinforcing this improvement, we find that net new NPLs were negative by a whopping INR 13.0 bn or over 100% on an annualized basis.

*Solid Quarter: IndiaBulls Housing Finance (IHFL.IN) [IndiaBulls] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 7.1 bn, increasing INR 4.4 bn (160.0%) linked quarter. Much of the linked quarter improvement can be attributed to net interest income growth of INR 4.7 bn (64.8%) resultant of INR 135.0 bn (14.5%) loan growth, NIM improvement of 137 bp (by our calculation) of 137 bp to 4.49%, and a buyback of bonds reducing debt by 9%; and*Credit Improving:During FY 2Q21, stated Stage 3 NPLs improved INR 4.3 bn (21.1%), declining 68 bp over the period to 1.52%.  Reinforcing this improvement, we find that net new NPLs were negative by a whopping INR 13.0 bn or over 100% on an annualized basis. 

IndiaBulls Housing Finance – Rocking and Rolling

SBI (State Bank of India) / Equity Bottom-Up

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

India

ICICI Bank Limited operates as a bank. The Bank offers saving accounts, loans, debit, credit cards, insurance, investments, mortgages, and online banking services. ICICI Bank serves customers worldwide.

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ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN)

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: New Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the...

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: Certain Borrowers Are Dis-Satisfied With "Interest On Interest Waiver" And Proposed Additional Modifications To RBI...

Thomas J. Monaco

India-Headquartered Banks: Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run

Deposits not captured in Liquidity Coverage Ratio reports broke Yes Bank. We stress India-headquartered banks for this miasma in the 3’rd insight...

Hank Calenti, CFA

IndiaBulls Housing Finance – Rocking and Rolling

INDIABULLS HOUSING FINANCE: IndiaBulls posted a solid set of results for FY 2Q21, as net interest income took off on the back of NIM improvement...

Thomas J. Monaco

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

STATE BANK OF INDIA: Costs Increasing, Credit Deteriorating, Reserve Cover Declining. This Is A Recipe For A Massive Capital Raise.

Thomas J. Monaco

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