Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US)</a> fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/compose/insight/49670/Bank%20Credit%20Weekly:%20US%20Capital%20Buffer%20Risk%20&amp;%20Q1%20Earnings%20Reports-%20JPMorgan%20Looks%20Slightly%20Overbought.%20Read%20more:%20https:/skr.ma/uQHaQ" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.</a>The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US) fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Strong Man Strikes Again: Lighting has struck again, not five months since his hiring, Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) Governor Agbal has now been dismissed for raising interest rates. President Erdogan handpicked Sahap Kavcioglu as new CBT Governor. He is the fourth CBT Governor in two years, and a banking professor and newspaper columnist who has argued for lower interest rates, after serving a a lawmaker in Erdogan’s AKP party. We all know what happens when academics are in charge; and*Watch Your Risk: The TRL’s decline is troublesome, and the potential for a TRL gray market would NOT be of surprise at this stage. We continue to worry about counterparty risks should defaults rise. It’s probably not a bad time to start thinking about purchasing CDS protection on single name securities and on the Turkish sovereign.

*Strong Man Strikes Again: Lighting has struck again, not five months since his hiring, Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) Governor Agbal has now been dismissed for raising interest rates. President Erdogan handpicked Sahap Kavcioglu as new CBT Governor. He is the fourth CBT Governor in two years, and a banking professor and newspaper columnist who has argued for lower interest rates, after serving a a lawmaker in Erdogan’s AKP party. We all know what happens when academics are in charge; and*Watch Your Risk: The TRL’s decline is troublesome, and the potential for a TRL gray market would NOT be of surprise at this stage. We continue to worry about counterparty risks should defaults rise. It’s probably not a bad time to start thinking about purchasing CDS protection on single name securities and on the Turkish sovereign.

Equity Bottom-Up

China Merchants Bank H / Equity Bottom-Up

*Weak 4Q20 Bottom-Line: China Merchants Bank (3968.HK) [CMB] pre-announced a poor set of 4Q20 results. On March 19, 2020, the finals were disclosed and the results were even uglier than anticipated. While its true that net profit declined CNY 6.1 bn (22.7%) on a linked quarter basis to CNY 20.9 bn –despite having its tax rate decline 790 bp to 15.6% over the period, core operating results came in at just CNY 13.9 bn – declining CNY 9.3 bn or 40.0% linked quarter;  and *Best Retail Franchise Hitting Credit Wall: While CMB has the best retail franchise in mainland China, credit risk has substantially increased in 4Q20. More worrisome is the net new NPL increase of CNY 14.8 bn, representing an annualized increase in net new NPLs of 104.7%. Provided (and its not a stretch) that the net new NPL ratio trajectory holds, reserve cover of NPLs will drop to 213% - suggesting even the mighty are falling.

*Weak 4Q20 Bottom-Line: China Merchants Bank (3968.HK) [CMB] pre-announced a poor set of 4Q20 results. On March 19, 2020, the finals were disclosed and the results were even uglier than anticipated. While its true that net profit declined CNY 6.1 bn (22.7%) on a linked quarter basis to CNY 20.9 bn –despite having its tax rate decline 790 bp to 15.6% over the period, core operating results came in at just CNY 13.9 bn – declining CNY 9.3 bn or 40.0% linked quarter;  and *Best Retail Franchise Hitting Credit Wall: While CMB has the best retail franchise in mainland China, credit risk has substantially increased in 4Q20. More worrisome is the net new NPL increase of CNY 14.8 bn, representing an annualized increase in net new NPLs of 104.7%. Provided (and its not a stretch) that the net new NPL ratio trajectory holds, reserve cover of NPLs will drop to 213% - suggesting even the mighty are falling. 

China Merchants Bank – Pulling On All Levers

As the fallout from the Greensill affair continues, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/credit-suisse-group-ag-f4b24f0c-c294-40b3-b491-759f0cb277e9" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27915:1" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW)</a> acknowledged 3 items regarding this situation:First, the Pillar 2 capital buffer requirement may be impacted by the Greensill affair. This may have long lasting negative implications for the valuation of CS contingent capital Tier 1 bonds.Second, certain notes underlying the Supply Chain Finance (SCF) funds will not be repaid when they fall due. The nonpayment creates considerable uncertainty regarding the valuation of a significant part of the remaining US$6.9bn. of assets in the SCF funds.Third, certain investors have already threatened litigation and, CS also stated that it “might also suffer reputational harm associated with these matters that might cause client departures or loss of assets under management.” This is what we warned when the Greensill news broke two weeks ago. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-greensill-sows-reputation-risks-underweight-cs-bonds" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48839" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds</a> for more details. In the intervening time-period, CS equity and credit have materially underperformed their respective indexes.At this point, investors’ main concern should be the amount or level of additional Pillar 2 capital which the firm may need to retain. The is not currently factored into CS’ debt or equity valuations.To its credit, the bank is taking prompt corrective action in restructuring the leadership, transparency, and compensation of the Asset Management division. However, we remain skeptical with whether the worst is past in this affair. Alternative assets require greater oversight as they are harder to manage and value. Combining risk management and compliance functions across CS stills seems like a mistake when it comes to asset management. However, the segmental separation of the Asset Management division may be a first step to unloading the relatively undersized entity. Distancing the unit from the Wealth Management operations may limit client departures.We continue to believe that the pricing of Credit Suisse bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-perfection-priced-into-long-dated-at1" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48461" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1</a> for more details.   We suspect that credit may continue to follow equity and underperform over the near term. Longer-term, Pillar 2 considerations suggest that an even lower capital buffer as a cushion for AT1 investors, unless hidden capital is realized, or shareholders receive less in returns. Taken together, we remain comfortable with our recommendation that investors underweight Credit Suisse.

As the fallout from the Greensill affair continues, Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW) acknowledged 3 items regarding this situation:First, the Pillar 2 capital buffer requirement may be impacted by the Greensill affair. This may have long lasting negative implications for the valuation of CS contingent capital Tier 1 bonds.Second, certain notes underlying the Supply Chain Finance (SCF) funds will not be repaid when they fall due. The nonpayment creates considerable uncertainty regarding the valuation of a significant part of the remaining US$6.9bn. of assets in the SCF funds.Third, certain investors have already threatened litigation and, CS also stated that it “might also suffer reputational harm associated with these matters that might cause client departures or loss of assets under management.” This is what we warned when the Greensill news broke two weeks ago. Please see Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds for more details. In the intervening time-period, CS equity and credit have materially underperformed their respective indexes.At this point, investors’ main concern should be the amount or level of additional Pillar 2 capital which the firm may need to retain. The is not currently factored into CS’ debt or equity valuations.To its credit, the bank is taking prompt corrective action in restructuring the leadership, transparency, and compensation of the Asset Management division. However, we remain skeptical with whether the worst is past in this affair. Alternative assets require greater oversight as they are harder to manage and value. Combining risk management and compliance functions across CS stills seems like a mistake when it comes to asset management. However, the segmental separation of the Asset Management division may be a first step to unloading the relatively undersized entity. Distancing the unit from the Wealth Management operations may limit client departures.We continue to believe that the pricing of Credit Suisse bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1 for more details.   We suspect that credit may continue to follow equity and underperform over the near term. Longer-term, Pillar 2 considerations suggest that an even lower capital buffer as a cushion for AT1 investors, unless hidden capital is realized, or shareholders receive less in returns. Taken together, we remain comfortable with our recommendation that investors underweight Credit Suisse. 

Credit Suisse: Greensill's Capital Implications Outweigh Asset Management Corrective Action

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings' (HSBA LN)</a> A2 Senior Unsecured and A3 Tier 2 ratings are on review for downgrade by Moody’s Investors Service. The Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds are NOT on review for downgrade. We see this as more a case of Moody’s adjusting its ratings to the market, rather than a market making event. However, negative headline risk could nudge AT1 and Tier 2 bond prices lower. We would buy these dips.We believe the agency is mistaken to pre-judge the recent strategic update. Even if HSBC’s profitability suffers, short-term, the firm holds excess capital which it intends to invest in its future, rather than simply return to shareholders. Furthermore, Moody’s is clearly comfortable with HSBC’s lower capital target or it would also put the AT1 rating on review. Placing the Tier 2 rating on review for downgrade while stating that HSBC has a sufficient capital buffer to support its AT1 rating is a non-sequitur. Moody’s Tier 2 ratings are mechanically, rather than fundamentally, driven.Once a credit is placed on review for a downgrade, the likelihood of it occurring is greater than 50%. Irrespective, we are not convinced that this deserves to be reflected in the value of HSBC’s Tier 2 notes as this should be driven by the buffer of capital over the Point of Non-Viability. This buffer is enormous at HSBC. In fact, it is higher than that of the Singapore-based banks alongside of which HSBC’s Tier 2 bonds trade. Moody’s review for downgrade may create a buying opportunity in the Tier 2 space.

HSBC Holdings' (HSBA LN) A2 Senior Unsecured and A3 Tier 2 ratings are on review for downgrade by Moody’s Investors Service. The Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds are NOT on review for downgrade. We see this as more a case of Moody’s adjusting its ratings to the market, rather than a market making event. However, negative headline risk could nudge AT1 and Tier 2 bond prices lower. We would buy these dips.We believe the agency is mistaken to pre-judge the recent strategic update. Even if HSBC’s profitability suffers, short-term, the firm holds excess capital which it intends to invest in its future, rather than simply return to shareholders. Furthermore, Moody’s is clearly comfortable with HSBC’s lower capital target or it would also put the AT1 rating on review. Placing the Tier 2 rating on review for downgrade while stating that HSBC has a sufficient capital buffer to support its AT1 rating is a non-sequitur. Moody’s Tier 2 ratings are mechanically, rather than fundamentally, driven.Once a credit is placed on review for a downgrade, the likelihood of it occurring is greater than 50%. Irrespective, we are not convinced that this deserves to be reflected in the value of HSBC’s Tier 2 notes as this should be driven by the buffer of capital over the Point of Non-Viability. This buffer is enormous at HSBC. In fact, it is higher than that of the Singapore-based banks alongside of which HSBC’s Tier 2 bonds trade. Moody’s review for downgrade may create a buying opportunity in the Tier 2 space.

HSBC: On Review for Downgrade, Buy the Dips

United Kingdom

HSBC Holdings plc is the holding company for the HSBC Group. The Company provides a variety of international banking and financial services, including retail and corporate banking, trade, trusteeship, securities, custody, capital markets, treasury, private and investment banking, and insurance. HSBC Holdings operates worldwide.

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HSBC Holdings (HSBC US)

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

JPM’s fortress foundation needs repair. It has the lowest SLR buffer, and its Tier 1 suffers from this. Leverage slimming and a deeper capital...

Hank Calenti, CFA

Turkey - YELP!

TURKEY: Not five months since his hiring, the CBT Governor has been replaced. The TRL’s decline is troublesome, and a TRL gray market would NOT be...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Merchants Bank – Pulling On All Levers

CHINA MERCHANTS BANK: CMB's core operating results came in at just CNY 13.9 bn – declining 40.0% linked quarter. Negative operating jaws, and net...

Thomas J. Monaco

Credit Suisse: Greensill's Capital Implications Outweigh Asset Management Corrective Action

Additional Pillar 2 capital requirements are not currently factored into valuations. CS bonds do not reflect the risks, complexity, and low...

Hank Calenti, CFA

HSBC: On Review for Downgrade, Buy the Dips

The capital buffer over the Point of Non-Viability matters most to Tier 2 investors. Moody’s Tier 2 ratings are mechanically, rather than...

Hank Calenti, CFA

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