'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

Quantitative Analysis

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/342/original/2020-03-11_11-02-32.png?1583892183" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122342"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/590/original/2020-03-12_07-42-03.png?1583966536" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122590"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>CUMULATIVE CASH FLOWS - In this third and final of our series on Japanese companies that might be compromised as the Covid-19 recession unfolds,  we shall look at Cumulative Cash Flows. Our cash flow model is derived from the disclosed Balance Sheets and Statements of Comprehensive Income and balances to zero for every company for every comparable period. Variations in disclosure between the audited annual yuho and unaudited quarterly kessan tanshin reports, notably when the company is reporting under the weaker IFRS standard can result in unavoidable quarter-to-quarter variations. Consequently, our analysis will focus on year-on-year changes as of the most recent quarterly disclosure irrespective of fiscal year-end.  Our review will cover six principal cash flow metrics:-<ul>
<li>
Operating Cash Flow - Operating Cash Flow comprises all cash flow items relating to transactions with customers and suppliers except inventory cash flows.</li>
<li>
Investing Cash Flow - Investing Cash Flow comprises cash flow to or from Fixed Assets and Inventories. Unlike GAAP Cash Flows Statements, It does not include investments in financial assets.</li>
<li>
Inventory Cash Flow - A sub-set of Investing Cash Flow, inventory Cash Flow is the change in Inventory on the Balance Sheet. </li>
<li>
Free Cash Flow - Free Cash Flow the sum of Operating Cash Flow, Fixed Asset Cash Flow and Inventory Cash Flow.</li>
<li>
Financing Cash Flow - Financing Cash Flow comprises Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities, Investments and the taxation that is allocated to Financing Cash Flow. Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities includes changes in Short and Long-Term Debt and Lease Liabilities and Interest and Bond Issuance Expenses.' Investments' includes Interest &amp; Dividend Income, Purchases and Sales of Securities, Loans, Gains and Losses on Marketable Securities and Equity Earnings.</li>
<li>Change in Cash - Change in Cash is the sum of Free Cash Flow, Financing Cash Flow and Shareholder Cash Flow after including Minorities &amp; Adjustments. </li>
</ul>EXCLUDED - Four companies have been excluded from our review as they have substantial financial subsidiaries - <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/z-holdings-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19603:1" rel="noopener">Z Holdings (4689 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rakuten-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:31:1" rel="noopener">Rakuten (4755 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sony-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:563:1" rel="noopener">Sony (6758 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-post-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:359:1" rel="noopener">Japan Post (6178 JP)</a> which distort their balance sheets. We have also excluded companies with a current market cap below ¥50b, although some exceptions have been made for abnormally large movements, such as those in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-display-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8280:1" rel="noopener">Japan Display (6740 JP).</a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toshiba-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:637:1" rel="noopener">Toshiba (6502 JP)</a>-  As an example of our analysis, Toshiba has seen the largest reduction in Cash as a percentage of market value over the last twelve months of any large-cap Japanese company. Toshiba's cash balance has declined by ¥1.4 trillion since peaking in 2019-Q2 - 114% of the current market cap. 70% of the cash generated between 2018-Q4 and 2019-Q2 has been allocated to share repurchases, dividends and cash reduction. The company's net cash remains at a healthy 51% of market value and 43% of Shareholders' Equity; however, Cumulative Operating Cash Flow will fall below zero in the current quarter. There are few additional reductions in Fixed Assets and Inventories that can be sustained without irreparable damage. The logic of buying back shares in an entity that has negative residual returns is not clear to us. Despite the potential for a TOPIX re-inclusion 'bounce', fundamentally the stock should be avoided.<div class="content-highlight">In the DETAIL Section below, we shall look at the top (or bottom) thirty large-cap companies on each of the metric above scaled by market capitalisation. </div>

Source • Japan AnalyticsCUMULATIVE CASH FLOWS - In this third and final of our series on Japanese companies that might be compromised as the Covid-19 recession unfolds,  we shall look at Cumulative Cash Flows. Our cash flow model is derived from the disclosed Balance Sheets and Statements of Comprehensive Income and balances to zero for every company for every comparable period. Variations in disclosure between the audited annual yuho and unaudited quarterly kessan tanshin reports, notably when the company is reporting under the weaker IFRS standard can result in unavoidable quarter-to-quarter variations. Consequently, our analysis will focus on year-on-year changes as of the most recent quarterly disclosure irrespective of fiscal year-end.  Our review will cover six principal cash flow metrics:-

Operating Cash Flow - Operating Cash Flow comprises all cash flow items relating to transactions with customers and suppliers except inventory cash flows.

Investing Cash Flow - Investing Cash Flow comprises cash flow to or from Fixed Assets and Inventories. Unlike GAAP Cash Flows Statements, It does not include investments in financial assets.

Inventory Cash Flow - A sub-set of Investing Cash Flow, inventory Cash Flow is the change in Inventory on the Balance Sheet. 

Free Cash Flow - Free Cash Flow the sum of Operating Cash Flow, Fixed Asset Cash Flow and Inventory Cash Flow.

Financing Cash Flow - Financing Cash Flow comprises Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities, Investments and the taxation that is allocated to Financing Cash Flow. Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities includes changes in Short and Long-Term Debt and Lease Liabilities and Interest and Bond Issuance Expenses.' Investments' includes Interest &amp; Dividend Income, Purchases and Sales of Securities, Loans, Gains and Losses on Marketable Securities and Equity Earnings.
Change in Cash - Change in Cash is the sum of Free Cash Flow, Financing Cash Flow and Shareholder Cash Flow after including Minorities &amp; Adjustments. 
EXCLUDED - Four companies have been excluded from our review as they have substantial financial subsidiaries - Z Holdings (4689 JP), Rakuten (4755 JP), Sony (6758 JP), Japan Post (6178 JP) which distort their balance sheets. We have also excluded companies with a current market cap below ¥50b, although some exceptions have been made for abnormally large movements, such as those in Japan Display (6740 JP).Toshiba (6502 JP)-  As an example of our analysis, Toshiba has seen the largest reduction in Cash as a percentage of market value over the last twelve months of any large-cap Japanese company. Toshiba's cash balance has declined by ¥1.4 trillion since peaking in 2019-Q2 - 114% of the current market cap. 70% of the cash generated between 2018-Q4 and 2019-Q2 has been allocated to share repurchases, dividends and cash reduction. The company's net cash remains at a healthy 51% of market value and 43% of Shareholders' Equity; however, Cumulative Operating Cash Flow will fall below zero in the current quarter. There are few additional reductions in Fixed Assets and Inventories that can be sustained without irreparable damage. The logic of buying back shares in an entity that has negative residual returns is not clear to us. Despite the potential for a TOPIX re-inclusion 'bounce', fundamentally the stock should be avoided.In the DETAIL Section below, we shall look at the top (or bottom) thirty large-cap companies on each of the metric above scaled by market capitalisation. 

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who’s Swimming Naked? > Part 3: Cumulative Cash Flow

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/121/977/original/2020-03-09_14-29-36.png?1583731808" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="121977"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Stoxx.com</div>ALTMAN'S Z-SCORE - Dr Edward Altman's Z-Score has been in use for over 50 years as a statistical model to calculate the probability of bankruptcy which built on the work of William Beaver and R.A. Fisher. Altman's original article (attached below) was published in the September 1968 issue of the Journal of Finance when he was an assistant professor of finance at NYU Stern.  The 'classic' Z-Score sampled publically-traded manufacturing companies. Later versions were formulated for private companies, non-manufacturing companies and emerging markets.  The model is between 80% and 90% accurate in predicting bankruptcy one year ahead of the event, while the rate of false positives has been between 15% and 20%.APPLICATION TO JAPAN - We have been using Altman Z-Scores in Japan since the mid-1980s. We have found the Scores to be reasonably predictive, as has been confirmed by several academic papers, including  <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/A-Model-of-Bankruptcy-Prediction%3A-Calibration-of/5565168f75b578ba28115ef314acbdd387f82483" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Gurau (2013)</a>. The persistence of a large number of 'zombie' companies supported by banks or keiretsu 'relatives' has, however, reduced the overall 'hit' rate for larger listed companies. The following charts show a timeline of the Altman Z-Score and Market Capitalisation for several memorable Japanese corporate bankruptcies. <figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/005/original/2020-03-09_15-53-11.png?1583736804" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122005"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/006/original/2020-03-09_15-54-52.png?1583736903" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122006"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/007/original/2020-03-09_15-56-58.png?1583737032" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122007"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/009/original/2020-03-09_15-59-08.png?1583737161" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122009"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/011/original/2020-03-09_16-03-28.png?1583737425" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122011"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div><div class="content-highlight">This Insight is the second part of a three-part series attempting to highlight those Japanese companies that at the highest risk from the 2020 Covid-19 recession. The first focused on the<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-who-s-swimming-naked-part-1-audit-score" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:37265" rel="noopener">Audit Score</a>, while a forthcoming Insight will look at Cumulative Cash Flows.</div>

Source • Stoxx.comALTMAN'S Z-SCORE - Dr Edward Altman's Z-Score has been in use for over 50 years as a statistical model to calculate the probability of bankruptcy which built on the work of William Beaver and R.A. Fisher. Altman's original article (attached below) was published in the September 1968 issue of the Journal of Finance when he was an assistant professor of finance at NYU Stern.  The 'classic' Z-Score sampled publically-traded manufacturing companies. Later versions were formulated for private companies, non-manufacturing companies and emerging markets.  The model is between 80% and 90% accurate in predicting bankruptcy one year ahead of the event, while the rate of false positives has been between 15% and 20%.APPLICATION TO JAPAN - We have been using Altman Z-Scores in Japan since the mid-1980s. We have found the Scores to be reasonably predictive, as has been confirmed by several academic papers, including  Gurau (2013). The persistence of a large number of 'zombie' companies supported by banks or keiretsu 'relatives' has, however, reduced the overall 'hit' rate for larger listed companies. The following charts show a timeline of the Altman Z-Score and Market Capitalisation for several memorable Japanese corporate bankruptcies. Source • Japan AnalyticsThis Insight is the second part of a three-part series attempting to highlight those Japanese companies that at the highest risk from the 2020 Covid-19 recession. The first focused on theAudit Score, while a forthcoming Insight will look at Cumulative Cash Flows.

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who’s Swimming Naked? > Part 2: Altman Z-Score

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Event-Driven

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:
<ol>
<li>What might supply look like?</li>
<li>What might demand look like?</li>
</ol>
The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:

What might supply look like?
What might demand look like?

The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

• RELATIVE PRICE SCORE •RELATIVE PRICE SCORE OUTLIERS - The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices over the last 28 years and 24 months, respectively. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, 'Overbought' and 'Oversold' outliers and short-term changes in scoring can reveal attractive trading opportunities.<div>
The data for all 3,860Companies is cap-weight-aggregated into Relative Price Scores for our 328Peer Groups and 30 Sectors. The Overbought and Oversold outlier 'thresholds are set' at +4 &amp; -2 for Companies, +3 &amp; -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors, respectively. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom percentiles of historical observations.
With a few exceptions, mean reversion from these extreme outlying states occurs typically in a matter of weeks or months. It often coincides with the peak of market interest in a theme or investment fashion.
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/110/440/original/2019-12-15_05-25-54.png?1576355187" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="110440"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>
OVERBOUGHT MEAN REVERSION -  Some examples of large-cap RPS mean reversion from being Overbought in the last three months include <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/house-foods-group-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5964:1" rel="noopener">House Foods (2810 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/oriental-land-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13517:1" rel="noopener">Oriental Land (4661 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bandai-namco-holdings-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13435:1" rel="noopener">Bandai Namco (7832 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nomura-research-institute-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18129:1" rel="noopener">Nomura Research Institute (4307 JP)</a>, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/invesco-office-j-reit-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7414:1" rel="noopener">Invesco Office JREIT (3298 JP)</a> - all five are domestically-orientated non-manufacturing companies.
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/110/459/original/2019-12-15_05-51-43.png?1576356720" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="110459"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>
OVERSOLD MEAN REVERSION - Some examples of large-cap RPS mean reversion from being Oversold in the last three months include <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/fujikura-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:10768:1" rel="noopener">Fujikura (5803 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nishi-nippon-financial-holdi" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26192:1" rel="noopener">Nishi-Nippon Financial (7189 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/tv-asahi-holdings-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8830:1" rel="noopener">TV Asahi (9409 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/uacj-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5330:1" rel="noopener">UACJ (5741 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/agc-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2167:1" rel="noopener">AGC (5201 JP)</a> - one bank and three deep cyclical manufacturers. 
</div><div><div class="content-highlight">In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on  Sector and Peer Group trends, over the last three months and adds some stock-specific comments. A separate Insight to follow in the next few days will cover the Relative Price Scores for individual companies.</div></div>

• RELATIVE PRICE SCORE •RELATIVE PRICE SCORE OUTLIERS - The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices over the last 28 years and 24 months, respectively. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, 'Overbought' and 'Oversold' outliers and short-term changes in scoring can reveal attractive trading opportunities.
The data for all 3,860Companies is cap-weight-aggregated into Relative Price Scores for our 328Peer Groups and 30 Sectors. The Overbought and Oversold outlier 'thresholds are set' at +4 &amp; -2 for Companies, +3 &amp; -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors, respectively. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom percentiles of historical observations.
With a few exceptions, mean reversion from these extreme outlying states occurs typically in a matter of weeks or months. It often coincides with the peak of market interest in a theme or investment fashion.
Source: Japan Analytics
OVERBOUGHT MEAN REVERSION -  Some examples of large-cap RPS mean reversion from being Overbought in the last three months include House Foods (2810 JP), Oriental Land (4661 JP), Bandai Namco (7832 JP), Nomura Research Institute (4307 JP), and Invesco Office JREIT (3298 JP) - all five are domestically-orientated non-manufacturing companies.
Source: Japan Analytics
OVERSOLD MEAN REVERSION - Some examples of large-cap RPS mean reversion from being Oversold in the last three months include Fujikura (5803 JP), Nishi-Nippon Financial (7189 JP), TV Asahi (9409 JP), UACJ (5741 JP), AGC (5201 JP) - one bank and three deep cyclical manufacturers. 
In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on  Sector and Peer Group trends, over the last three months and adds some stock-specific comments. A separate Insight to follow in the next few days will cover the Relative Price Scores for individual companies.

🇯🇵 JAPAN • December Sector & Peer Group Relative Price Scores - From Defensives to Cylicals

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

The sell-off in 2H18 credit markets was widespread due to global slowdown fears and nearly culminated with Jefferies (JEF) in a Lehman-style event. The wider fissures YTD in the leverage lending market look to be much more structural and longer lasting by definition.

The sell-off in 2H18 credit markets was widespread due to global slowdown fears and nearly culminated with Jefferies (JEF) in a Lehman-style event. The wider fissures YTD in the leverage lending market look to be much more structural and longer lasting by definition. 

Risks In Leveraged Lending Skyrocketing - Watch For The Big Offload

Japan

Japan Post Holdings Co. Ltd. operates post stations, banks, and insurance business. The Company offers letters and goods transportation services, stamp sales, deposits, loans, and insurance products.

Price Gauge
52-week Range	0.00 - 0.00
Market Cap (USDm)	0.00
P/E	0.00
Dividend (Yield)	0.00

Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP)

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who’s Swimming Naked? > Part 3: Cumulative Cash Flow

CUMULATIVE CASH FLOWS - In this third and final of our series on Japanese companies that might be compromised as the Covid-19 recession unfolds, ...

Campbell Gunn

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who’s Swimming Naked? > Part 2: Altman Z-Score

ALTMAN'S Z-SCORE - Dr Edward Altman's Z-Score has been in use for over 50 years as a statistical model to calculate the probability of bankruptcy...

Campbell Gunn

A Potential Asian LBO Screening System

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the...

Travis Lundy

🇯🇵 JAPAN • December Sector & Peer Group Relative Price Scores - From Defensives to Cylicals

• RELATIVE PRICE SCORE •RELATIVE PRICE SCORE OUTLIERS - The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of price performance relative to TOPIX...

Campbell Gunn

Risks In Leveraged Lending Skyrocketing - Watch For The Big Offload

The sell-off in 2H18 credit markets was widespread due to global slowdown fears and nearly culminated with Jefferies (JEF) in a Lehman-style event....

Thomas J. Monaco

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)