Materials Analyst/Strategist, Janus Analysis

Gaius King

Materials Analyst/Strategist

Accelerating Tomorrow’s Independent Research

Boost Research

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Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<ul>
<li>Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies</li>
<li>LT contracts &amp; speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot price increase</li>
<li>Primary/secondary Uranium supplies currently 112% of 2017 demand</li>
<li>Uranium supply deficits extremely unlikely before 2022</li>
<li>Global Uranium demand to fall 25-40% by 2050</li>
<li> Primary Uranium sector LT SELL</li>
</ul>
We have independently audited global nuclear construction statistics in order to determine future Uranium demand.  Although near-term statistics match those in the public domain, long-term demand determined via construction pipeline illustrates substantial discrepancies.  Compiling planned plant construction, operational extensions, nameplate upgrades, versus decommissioning announcements/events, and in many cases, public policy inertia; has led us to believe that despite historical primary supply shortages, global nuclear demand peaked in 2006.
Since plateauing and despite strong Chinese growth, nuclear power generation has fallen &lt;2% over the past two decades, a decline that is predicted to accelerate as a number of developed and developing nations pursue other energy options.
The macro-trend not replacing existing nuclear infrastructure means (dependent on assumptions), according to our calculations, global uranium demand will decrease between 20 to 40% by 2050.
As opposed to signifying a fundamental change in underlying demand, we believe that recent Uranium price increases are the result of producers closing primary operations, and substituting production with purchases on the spot market to meet long-term contract obligations.  In addition, hedge funds are buying physical uranium in order to realise profits on potential future commodity price increases.  Critically, we determine that primary and secondary supplies are more than sufficient to meet forecast demand over the next four to five years; before taking into account substantial existing global uranium stocks, some of which are able to re-enter the spot market at short notice.


Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies
LT contracts &amp; speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot price increase
Primary/secondary Uranium supplies currently 112% of 2017 demand
Uranium supply deficits extremely unlikely before 2022
Global Uranium demand to fall 25-40% by 2050
 Primary Uranium sector LT SELL

We have independently audited global nuclear construction statistics in order to determine future Uranium demand.  Although near-term statistics match those in the public domain, long-term demand determined via construction pipeline illustrates substantial discrepancies.  Compiling planned plant construction, operational extensions, nameplate upgrades, versus decommissioning announcements/events, and in many cases, public policy inertia; has led us to believe that despite historical primary supply shortages, global nuclear demand peaked in 2006.
Since plateauing and despite strong Chinese growth, nuclear power generation has fallen &lt;2% over the past two decades, a decline that is predicted to accelerate as a number of developed and developing nations pursue other energy options.
The macro-trend not replacing existing nuclear infrastructure means (dependent on assumptions), according to our calculations, global uranium demand will decrease between 20 to 40% by 2050.
As opposed to signifying a fundamental change in underlying demand, we believe that recent Uranium price increases are the result of producers closing primary operations, and substituting production with purchases on the spot market to meet long-term contract obligations.  In addition, hedge funds are buying physical uranium in order to realise profits on potential future commodity price increases.  Critically, we determine that primary and secondary supplies are more than sufficient to meet forecast demand over the next four to five years; before taking into account substantial existing global uranium stocks, some of which are able to re-enter the spot market at short notice.

Uranium - About to Enter Its Own Nuclear Winter

Co-founder & Managing Director, Marketnomix 

Rajan Govil

Co-founder & Managing Director

Marketnomix 

Macroeconomics

Industrial production in Eurozone continues to struggle to gain momentum and came in weaker than expected in June which poses a risk to our GDP outlook of 1.3% for 2016 (lowered from 1.6% after the Brexit vote). While the weakness in factory output was seen ahead of the Brexit vote, the effect of UK’s exit is clearly felt in the aftermath, and it is expected to come in weaker going forward.Industrial Production (IPI) in the Eurozone came in at 0.4% y-o-y in June 2016 similar to the growth seen…

Industrial production in Eurozone continues to struggle to gain momentum and came in weaker than expected in June which poses a risk to our GDP outlook of 1.3% for 2016 (lowered from 1.6% after the Brexit vote). While the weakness in factory output was seen ahead of the Brexit vote, the effect of UK’s exit is clearly felt in the aftermath, and it is expected to come in weaker going forward.Industrial Production (IPI) in the Eurozone came in at 0.4% y-o-y in June 2016 similar to the growth seen…

EUROZONE: Weak Industrial Production Poses Risk to GDP Growth

Industrial Production (IPI) in the Eurozone revived in April 2016 after having recorded negligible growth in March 2016. On a seasonally and working day adjusted (swda) basis, production grew by 2% y-o-y in April 2016 compared to a rise of 0.1% y-o-y in March 2016. It grew 1.1% y-o-y on a 3-month moving average (3mma) basis in April 2016 compared to 1.6% y-o-y in March 2016.In terms of industry segments, electricity &amp; utilities increased 1.8% y-o-y in April 2016 after having recorded negative…

Industrial Production (IPI) in the Eurozone revived in April 2016 after having recorded negligible growth in March 2016. On a seasonally and working day adjusted (swda) basis, production grew by 2% y-o-y in April 2016 compared to a rise of 0.1% y-o-y in March 2016. It grew 1.1% y-o-y on a 3-month moving average (3mma) basis in April 2016 compared to 1.6% y-o-y in March 2016.In terms of industry segments, electricity &amp; utilities increased 1.8% y-o-y in April 2016 after having recorded negative…

Eurozone: Industrial Production Revives Across Most Sectors and Countries in April

Industrial Production growth in the Eurozone came in lower than expected in March 2016. On a  seasonally and working day adjusted basis, production slowed to 0.2% y-o-y in March 2016 compared to a 1.1% y-o-y increase in February 2016. It grew 1.6% y-o-y on a 3-month moving average basis in March compared to 1.7% y-o-y in February.In terms of industry segments, chemicals &amp; basic pharmaceutical production saw a decline of around 5.5% y-o-y in March compared to an increase of 0.4% y-o-y in…

Industrial Production growth in the Eurozone came in lower than expected in March 2016. On a  seasonally and working day adjusted basis, production slowed to 0.2% y-o-y in March 2016 compared to a 1.1% y-o-y increase in February 2016. It grew 1.6% y-o-y on a 3-month moving average basis in March compared to 1.7% y-o-y in February.In terms of industry segments, chemicals &amp; basic pharmaceutical production saw a decline of around 5.5% y-o-y in March compared to an increase of 0.4% y-o-y in…

Eurozone: March Industrial Production Lower than Expected

France

Areva S.A. operates as a power generation company that supplies customers with technology solutions for generating electricity. The Company offers both nuclear and renewable energy solutions to consumers world wide.

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Areva SA (AREVA FP)

Uranium - About to Enter Its Own Nuclear Winter

Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies LT contracts & speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot...

Boost Research

EUROZONE: Weak Industrial Production Poses Risk to GDP Growth

Industrial production in Eurozone continues to struggle to gain momentum and came in weaker than expected in June which poses a risk to our GDP...

Rajan Govil

Eurozone: Industrial Production Revives Across Most Sectors and Countries in April

Industrial Production (IPI) in the Eurozone revived in April 2016 after having recorded negligible growth in March 2016. On a seasonally and...

Rajan Govil

Eurozone: March Industrial Production Lower than Expected

Industrial Production growth in the Eurozone came in lower than expected in March 2016. On a seasonally and working day adjusted basis, production...

Rajan Govil

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

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