Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Negative Operating Jaws Were A Surprise: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 3Q20 results of SGD 1.3 bn, increasing SGD 50 mn (4.0%) on a linked quarter basis. Results were solely led on a justified SGD 295 mn (34.7%) reduction in loss provisions, which point to DBS’real challenges with negative operating jaws; and*Credit Risk Rising: By our calculation, and despite the net recovery of SGD 24 mn, we find that net new NPLs continue to increase – up SGD 272 mn or 18.9% on an annualized basis. Management too was less sanguine about credit quality on a go forward basis, expecting a re-acceleration of NPL formation in 2021 as COVID-19 government programs are set to expire. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 1.3 bn – amounting to a full quarter of results – and intimating this quarter was more managed than DBS would have the investment community believe.

*Negative Operating Jaws Were A Surprise: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 3Q20 results of SGD 1.3 bn, increasing SGD 50 mn (4.0%) on a linked quarter basis. Results were solely led on a justified SGD 295 mn (34.7%) reduction in loss provisions, which point to DBS’real challenges with negative operating jaws; and*Credit Risk Rising: By our calculation, and despite the net recovery of SGD 24 mn, we find that net new NPLs continue to increase – up SGD 272 mn or 18.9% on an annualized basis. Management too was less sanguine about credit quality on a go forward basis, expecting a re-acceleration of NPL formation in 2021 as COVID-19 government programs are set to expire. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 1.3 bn – amounting to a full quarter of results – and intimating this quarter was more managed than DBS would have the investment community believe.      

DBS Group Holdings – Not Trending The Right Way Yet

*Earnings Not What They Appear: HSBC Holdings Plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] reported 3Q20 results of USD 1.8 bn, a USD 1.4 bn (3.7x) increase on a linked quarter basis. The linked quarter earnings rebound is solely attributable to management cutting loss provisions by USD 3.0 bn (79.5%), which seems incongruent with the continued degradation in credit quality – especially as the globe enters its second and third wave of this economy destroying pandemic;*Credit Melt-Up: While the stated increase in NPLs on its face do not appear alarming, the rate of net new NPL growth actually is at USD 1.7 bn or 46.3% on an annualized basis. By our calculation, we find that reserves at 3Q20 were light by 100% or USD 14.6 bn which amounts to over two years of bottom-line performance  - if we assume that HSBC’s bloated 3Q20 numbers are correct; and*Don’t Hold Your Breath: The Board will consider whether to pay a dividend for 2020. How is that possible with credit worsening and coverage being so weak – not to mention the weak NIMs and challenges on the cost management front.

*Earnings Not What They Appear: HSBC Holdings Plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] reported 3Q20 results of USD 1.8 bn, a USD 1.4 bn (3.7x) increase on a linked quarter basis. The linked quarter earnings rebound is solely attributable to management cutting loss provisions by USD 3.0 bn (79.5%), which seems incongruent with the continued degradation in credit quality – especially as the globe enters its second and third wave of this economy destroying pandemic;*Credit Melt-Up: While the stated increase in NPLs on its face do not appear alarming, the rate of net new NPL growth actually is at USD 1.7 bn or 46.3% on an annualized basis. By our calculation, we find that reserves at 3Q20 were light by 100% or USD 14.6 bn which amounts to over two years of bottom-line performance  - if we assume that HSBC’s bloated 3Q20 numbers are correct; and*Don’t Hold Your Breath: The Board will consider whether to pay a dividend for 2020. How is that possible with credit worsening and coverage being so weak – not to mention the weak NIMs and challenges on the cost management front.

HSBC Holdings Plc – Chronic Underperformer

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.0%-11.5%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund restructuring  - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.0%-11.5%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund restructuring  - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.  

Bank of East Asia – Caixa Shake-Out Very Likely

*Don’t Be Misled By Better Numbers: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (1398.HK) [ICBC] reported stronger 3Q20 results than 2Q20, coming in at CNY 80.3 bn - increasing CNY 15.6 bn (24.1%) linked quarter. The linked quarter Improvement is largely attributed to three factors: a) net interest income improvement of CNY 4.0 bn (2.6%) on both a 1 bp NIM improvement to 1.92%, and 2.6% loan growth; b) a CNY 11.7 bn (17.7%) decline in loss provisioning despite marked credit weakness; and c) a 700 bp decline in ICBC’s tax rate to 15.2%; and *Credit Risk Rising: As ICBC is the benchmark name to which all mainland Chinese banks are measured, an increase of such magnitude is more than alarming – and intimates mainland Chinese bank credit risk is moving in oppositive directions to their counterparts in India. When one considers the current break in credit quality reserves would appear to be incredibly light – in the neighborhood of CNY 419 bn which amounts to over a year of pre-tax results at ICBC.

*Don’t Be Misled By Better Numbers: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (1398.HK) [ICBC] reported stronger 3Q20 results than 2Q20, coming in at CNY 80.3 bn - increasing CNY 15.6 bn (24.1%) linked quarter. The linked quarter Improvement is largely attributed to three factors: a) net interest income improvement of CNY 4.0 bn (2.6%) on both a 1 bp NIM improvement to 1.92%, and 2.6% loan growth; b) a CNY 11.7 bn (17.7%) decline in loss provisioning despite marked credit weakness; and c) a 700 bp decline in ICBC’s tax rate to 15.2%; and *Credit Risk Rising: As ICBC is the benchmark name to which all mainland Chinese banks are measured, an increase of such magnitude is more than alarming – and intimates mainland Chinese bank credit risk is moving in oppositive directions to their counterparts in India. When one considers the current break in credit quality reserves would appear to be incredibly light – in the neighborhood of CNY 419 bn which amounts to over a year of pre-tax results at ICBC.      

ICBC – Be Very Wary Of Worsening Credit

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Odd Finance Minister Commentary: A report on Bloomberg, suggests that Finance Minister Albayrak has ruled out capital controls in Turkey. This is strange, as capital controls have already been in place for well over a year given the longer settlement dates, higher taxes, limited liquidity, threats of prison, et al. These reported comments suggest a full blown crisis is a fait accompli;  *Low Rates Destroying TRY: Turkey is a slow moving train wreck thanks largely to the policies of President Erdogan. The Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) is keeping interest rates low, and failed to raise interest rates at its latest meeting – against consensus of a 200 bp increase. Despite what were punitive capital controls (in contravention to the Finance Minister’s comments), the Turkish lira (TRY) actually declined 2% on the day the CBT failed to raise rates at its last meeting – now nearing 8.2 TRY/USD and achieving another record low down 40% YTD versus the USD when most other currencies are strengthening versus the USD;  and*Risk Is High For Europe, and an EM Domino Effect Is Real: BBVA (BBVA.SM), BNP Paribas (BNPP.FP), and Unicredit (UCG.IM), and HSBC Holding (5.HK) are most exposed. With Turkish corporates/banking system F/X debt in the USD hundreds of billions, worries over counterparty risks are arising. Investors are likely to continue to take advantage an artificially high TRY by continuing to sell while the getting is still good. Geopolitical risk only adds to our concern.

*Odd Finance Minister Commentary: A report on Bloomberg, suggests that Finance Minister Albayrak has ruled out capital controls in Turkey. This is strange, as capital controls have already been in place for well over a year given the longer settlement dates, higher taxes, limited liquidity, threats of prison, et al. These reported comments suggest a full blown crisis is a fait accompli;  *Low Rates Destroying TRY: Turkey is a slow moving train wreck thanks largely to the policies of President Erdogan. The Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) is keeping interest rates low, and failed to raise interest rates at its latest meeting – against consensus of a 200 bp increase. Despite what were punitive capital controls (in contravention to the Finance Minister’s comments), the Turkish lira (TRY) actually declined 2% on the day the CBT failed to raise rates at its last meeting – now nearing 8.2 TRY/USD and achieving another record low down 40% YTD versus the USD when most other currencies are strengthening versus the USD;  and*Risk Is High For Europe, and an EM Domino Effect Is Real: BBVA (BBVA.SM), BNP Paribas (BNPP.FP), and Unicredit (UCG.IM), and HSBC Holding (5.HK) are most exposed. With Turkish corporates/banking system F/X debt in the USD hundreds of billions, worries over counterparty risks are arising. Investors are likely to continue to take advantage an artificially high TRY by continuing to sell while the getting is still good. Geopolitical risk only adds to our concern.

Turkey – Start Worrying About Counterparties

China

CSOP FTSE China A50 ETF is an exchange-traded fund incorporated in Hong Kong. The Fund seeks to track the performance of the FTSE China A50 Index. The Fund invests most of its total assets in the equities of member companies of the FTSE China A50 Index. This is a RQFII fund.

CSOP FTSE China A50 (82822 HK)

HSBC Holdings Plc – Chronic Underperformer

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: Artificially Lower Provisions As Credit Spikes Is Not Conservative Banking. Challenges Remain on NIMs and Costs. Start Expecting...

Thomas J. Monaco

Bank of East Asia – Caixa Shake-Out Very Likely

BANK OF EAST ASIA: Pro Forma CaixaBank Is Under Severe Fundamental Pressure Prior To Its Bankia Merger And In Need of Capital. BEA's Stake Likely...

Thomas J. Monaco

ICBC – Be Very Wary Of Worsening Credit

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA: Don't Believe The Hype. Numbers Manufactured, and Credit Risk Suggests Long Winter For ICBC and Mainland...

Thomas J. Monaco

Turkey – Start Worrying About Counterparties

TURKEY RISK: Odd Comments From Finance Minister Suggest Lack Of Understanding Of Capital Controls In Place. No Rate Hikes, Weak TRY/USD, And...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – Not Trending The Right Way Yet

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: Trends Are Poor. Costs Higher, Revenues Lower, and Provision Trend Likely To Be Reversed As We Head Into 2021.

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Chronic Underperformer

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: Artificially Lower Provisions As Credit Spikes Is Not Conservative Banking. Challenges Remain on NIMs and Costs. Start Expecting...

Thomas J. Monaco

Bank of East Asia – Caixa Shake-Out Very Likely

BANK OF EAST ASIA: Pro Forma CaixaBank Is Under Severe Fundamental Pressure Prior To Its Bankia Merger And In Need of Capital. BEA's Stake Likely...

Thomas J. Monaco

ICBC – Be Very Wary Of Worsening Credit

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA: Don't Believe The Hype. Numbers Manufactured, and Credit Risk Suggests Long Winter For ICBC and Mainland...

Thomas J. Monaco

Turkey – Start Worrying About Counterparties

TURKEY RISK: Odd Comments From Finance Minister Suggest Lack Of Understanding Of Capital Controls In Place. No Rate Hikes, Weak TRY/USD, And...

Thomas J. Monaco