'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

Equity Bottom-Up

<div class="content-caption">

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/315/original/2019-02-09_12-04-43.png?1549681495" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78315"></figure>
Source: Japan Analytics
</div>
TUMBLING DICE - After <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/18379" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18379:1">ZOZO (3092 JP)</a> (-52%) and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/27149" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27149:1">Mercari (4385 JP)</a> (-50%), <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/8197" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8197:1">CyberAgent (4751 JP)</a> is the worst-performing large-cap Internet stock in Japan over the last seven months.  The company is the sector's leading foreigner-held stock with over 48% (60%+ of the float) held by institutional investors such as Baillie Gifford (11.9%), JP Morgan AM (6.9%), Tybourne Capital (5.1%) and Blackrock Japan (5.0%). Having outperformed the sector and the market annually over the last nine years by 38% and 25%, respectively, over the seven months since the stock peaked in terms of our Relative Price Score on 13th July, CyberAgent shares have declined by 56%, underperforming the market by 48% and the sector by 37%.
PASSIVE PERILS - We will discuss the 'perils ' of Passive TV in the DETAIL below. However, CyberAgent is yet another good example of the 'perils' of passive investing. On September 5th Nikkei Inc. announced that CyberAgent would replace <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/19521" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19521:1">Furukawa (5715 JP)</a> in the Nikkei 225 index, with the inclusion occurring on October 1st. Since the ¥6050 intraday peak of the week before inclusion in the index, the shares have declined by 49% in 90 trading days.   
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/317/original/2019-02-09_12-52-50.png?1549684397" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78317"></figure>
<div class="content-caption">Source: CyberAgent Way 2018</div>
SUMMARY - CyberAgent's business has three 'pillars', internet advertising, mobile gaming software, and media. The latter now includes the linear free-to-view AbemaTV business, which helped drive the share price to a post-listing high of ¥6930 in July 2018. Since then, business conditions for two of these 'pillars' have degraded significantly,  while the fledgeling TV business remains in 'up-front' investment mode. To cap what will be a turbulent year for CyberAgent, the company is moving into a new head office building in Shibuya called 'Abema Towers' in March. We shall refrain from making any analogies to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skyscraper_Index" target="_blank">Skyscraper Index</a>. 
<div class="content-highlight">
This Insight will review: - 
<ul>
<li class="">CyberAgent's growth strategy</li>
<li class="">The company's track profitability track record from the perspective of Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT), Comprehensive Income and Operating Profit margins </li>
<li class="">The three main business segments - Internet Advertising, Game Software, and Media</li>
<li class="">Cash Flow and Valuation</li>
</ul>
We will also attempt to value AbemaTV and will reverse-engineer some target metrics that would justify the market's current implied ¥41b valuation for this business, a valuation that reached ¥543b only seven months ago. 
</div>
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/318/original/2019-02-09_13-06-39.png?1549685220" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78318"></figure>
<div class="content-caption">Source: CyberAgent Way 2018</div>
VISION SHIFT? - In previous years, CyberAgent had a clear vision statement - 'To create the 21st century's leading company'. The company's recent performance has led to a change of tone, and CyberAgent is now rather more modestly just 'Aiming to be a company with medium to long-term supporters'.  In the vein of the lyrics from the best song on the best Rolling Stones album, Exile on Main Street, the business has recently been at 'all sixes and sevens and nines'. In the search for new 'supporters', we encourage CyberAgent to just 'keep on rolling', letting the dice fall where they may. 
<center><iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/6U8JlcB_BzA" width="963" height="722" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></center>
<div class="content-caption">Exile on Main Street/Tumbling Dice - Jagger/Richards 1972 </div>




Source: Japan Analytics

TUMBLING DICE - After ZOZO (3092 JP) (-52%) and Mercari (4385 JP) (-50%), CyberAgent (4751 JP) is the worst-performing large-cap Internet stock in Japan over the last seven months.  The company is the sector's leading foreigner-held stock with over 48% (60%+ of the float) held by institutional investors such as Baillie Gifford (11.9%), JP Morgan AM (6.9%), Tybourne Capital (5.1%) and Blackrock Japan (5.0%). Having outperformed the sector and the market annually over the last nine years by 38% and 25%, respectively, over the seven months since the stock peaked in terms of our Relative Price Score on 13th July, CyberAgent shares have declined by 56%, underperforming the market by 48% and the sector by 37%.
PASSIVE PERILS - We will discuss the 'perils ' of Passive TV in the DETAIL below. However, CyberAgent is yet another good example of the 'perils' of passive investing. On September 5th Nikkei Inc. announced that CyberAgent would replace Furukawa (5715 JP) in the Nikkei 225 index, with the inclusion occurring on October 1st. Since the ¥6050 intraday peak of the week before inclusion in the index, the shares have declined by 49% in 90 trading days.   

Source: CyberAgent Way 2018
SUMMARY - CyberAgent's business has three 'pillars', internet advertising, mobile gaming software, and media. The latter now includes the linear free-to-view AbemaTV business, which helped drive the share price to a post-listing high of ¥6930 in July 2018. Since then, business conditions for two of these 'pillars' have degraded significantly,  while the fledgeling TV business remains in 'up-front' investment mode. To cap what will be a turbulent year for CyberAgent, the company is moving into a new head office building in Shibuya called 'Abema Towers' in March. We shall refrain from making any analogies to the Skyscraper Index. 

This Insight will review: - 

CyberAgent's growth strategy
The company's track profitability track record from the perspective of Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT), Comprehensive Income and Operating Profit margins 
The three main business segments - Internet Advertising, Game Software, and Media
Cash Flow and Valuation

We will also attempt to value AbemaTV and will reverse-engineer some target metrics that would justify the market's current implied ¥41b valuation for this business, a valuation that reached ¥543b only seven months ago. 


Source: CyberAgent Way 2018
VISION SHIFT? - In previous years, CyberAgent had a clear vision statement - 'To create the 21st century's leading company'. The company's recent performance has led to a change of tone, and CyberAgent is now rather more modestly just 'Aiming to be a company with medium to long-term supporters'.  In the vein of the lyrics from the best song on the best Rolling Stones album, Exile on Main Street, the business has recently been at 'all sixes and sevens and nines'. In the search for new 'supporters', we encourage CyberAgent to just 'keep on rolling', letting the dice fall where they may. 

Exile on Main Street/Tumbling Dice - Jagger/Richards 1972 

Quantitative Analysis

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/686/original/2019-02-02_09-34-42.png?1549067763" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77686"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div><div style="text-align: left;" class="content-caption">
Note: The Results &amp; Revision Score is the average of our Results Score and Forecasts/Revision Score and is updated daily for each company and then cap-weighted-aggregated into Peer Groups, Sectors and the Market Composite. Both scores have a maximum of +30 and a minimum of -30 for each period. The Results Score is calculated quarterly, using the most recent eight quarters of company data for revenues, operating income and operating margin and measures the rate, degree and consistency of change for each metric. The Forecast/Revision Score is based on Annual and Interim period company forecasts and compares changes from previous forecasts as well as against the trailing twelve-month or previous first-half results, with annual forecasts being double-weighted.</div>DRIP, DRIP, DRIP - We 'lead' this fortnight's update with our All-Market Composite Results &amp; Revision Score. Calculated daily, the score is a 'real-time' measure of the state of, and the outlook for, listed Japanese corporations. As the scoring methodology includes earnings momentum 'factors', the data series can be a useful leading indicator of forward earnings. The correlation with the market over the last four years is 0.578, with the indicator leading more often than lagging.   Since peaking on 16th November 2017, the Results &amp; Revisions Score has fallen by 62% and has now returned to the level of May 2017. In the last ten years, the score has only been lower than at present one-third of the time - mostly during the fiscal year ended March 2017 when the total market value averaged ¥550t, close to the December 2018 low. If we are to repeat the relatively-mild cyclical downturn of 2016, the Results &amp; Revision Score will turn negative in May of this year, and the 25th December 2018 low will be retested.<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/701/original/2019-02-02_14-11-25.png?1549084295" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77701"></figure>Source: Japan Analytics
</div>PAST THE PEAK - Our earnings indicator peaked 14 months ago, two months ahead of the market's high point on 26th January 2018. It now appears that aggregate reported earnings, as well as aggregate company forecasts for the current year, are now turning decisively lower after nine quarters of uninterrupted growth. Forecast Net Income for the current year is now 7% below the high point in trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Net Income from this cycle, which was reached two months ago. Operating Income is, as usual, 'lagging' and forecasts are still marginally ahead of TTM. The TTM all-market price-earnings ratio reached 11.5 times on Christmas Day, which will prove to be the cycle low point. We expect the return to median levels, to be achieved more through lower 'E' as opposed to a higher 'P'.  Mr Market is currently implying that Japanese corporate profits are due to fall by 23% on average from the cycle peak, or by 30% if we are to revisit the December low-point. <figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/746/original/2019-02-03_07-23-31.png?1549146223" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77746"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>THE FIRST CUT - 23% of listed companies reported their most recent quarterly earnings results in the last two weeks. For these companies, TTM revenues grew by 5.1% year-on-year, but only by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter, the lowest qoq growth rate in over a year. TTM Operating Income is now 0.8% lower than the TTM total of one year ago and declined by 4.4% qoq. Operating margins fell by 49bps year-on-year.  Current forecasts for this group of companies imply 3.1% yoy top line growth, but only 0.3% compared to the quarter just declared. For Operating Income, the rates are -2.0% and 0.6%, reflecting the normal TTM-to-forecast 'lag'. Corporate Japan's profits are now rolling over and will be in a 'recession' by the fiscal year-end.  <figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/722/original/2019-02-02_18-25-46.png?1549099572" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77722"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>INTERREGNUM - Our bear market rally has paused to look at and digest the earnings-announcement news flow and will likely be trendless for the next few weeks as 'good' reactions offset 'bad'. In due course, we expect the preponderance of negative momentum to tip the scales.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/724/original/2019-02-02_18-41-12.png?1549100508" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77724"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>TORAKU @110 - The Toraku advance-decline indicator has continued to recover and is within ten points of the overbought zone, which has only been breached once since the market peak of January 2018. This signal is 'amber' and could be 'red' by the end of next week. <div class="content-highlight">
OUTLOOK &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS
<ul>
<li>We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios.</li>
<li>The equity market decline at the end of last year was well in advance of the underlying trends in the economy and corporate profits; the recent 10% rally has corrected that imbalance. Nevertheless, the global cycle has turned down sharply, and many economies will be in a recession by the end of this quarter. We expect Japanese corporate earnings to follow suit.  </li>
<li>Although some of the coming decline in aggregate earnings has been well-discounted, our Results &amp; Revision Score has yet to turn negative. Accordingly, we expect the market to retest the December 2018 low, probably in May when the FY2020 forecasts are announced and our score starts 'seeing red'.</li>
<li>In the near term and despite the rally in the more cyclical sectors, we continue to favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short Banks and Non-Bank Finance.</li>
</ul>
</div>In the DETAIL section below, we will review Sector performance over the last two weeks, and, in addition to our regular roundup of results, revisions and stock performance including brief comments on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/3700" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:3700:1">Anritsu (6754 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/12001" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12001:1">Alps Alpine (6770 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/24540" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24540:1">SanBio (4592 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/454" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:454:1">Lixil (5938 JP)</a> (yes, again), <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/752" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:752:1">Fanuc (6954 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/219" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:219:1">Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP)</a> , and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/8197" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8197:1">Cyberagent (4751 JP)</a>.

Source: Japan Analytics
Note: The Results &amp; Revision Score is the average of our Results Score and Forecasts/Revision Score and is updated daily for each company and then cap-weighted-aggregated into Peer Groups, Sectors and the Market Composite. Both scores have a maximum of +30 and a minimum of -30 for each period. The Results Score is calculated quarterly, using the most recent eight quarters of company data for revenues, operating income and operating margin and measures the rate, degree and consistency of change for each metric. The Forecast/Revision Score is based on Annual and Interim period company forecasts and compares changes from previous forecasts as well as against the trailing twelve-month or previous first-half results, with annual forecasts being double-weighted.DRIP, DRIP, DRIP - We 'lead' this fortnight's update with our All-Market Composite Results &amp; Revision Score. Calculated daily, the score is a 'real-time' measure of the state of, and the outlook for, listed Japanese corporations. As the scoring methodology includes earnings momentum 'factors', the data series can be a useful leading indicator of forward earnings. The correlation with the market over the last four years is 0.578, with the indicator leading more often than lagging.   Since peaking on 16th November 2017, the Results &amp; Revisions Score has fallen by 62% and has now returned to the level of May 2017. In the last ten years, the score has only been lower than at present one-third of the time - mostly during the fiscal year ended March 2017 when the total market value averaged ¥550t, close to the December 2018 low. If we are to repeat the relatively-mild cyclical downturn of 2016, the Results &amp; Revision Score will turn negative in May of this year, and the 25th December 2018 low will be retested.
Source: Japan Analytics
PAST THE PEAK - Our earnings indicator peaked 14 months ago, two months ahead of the market's high point on 26th January 2018. It now appears that aggregate reported earnings, as well as aggregate company forecasts for the current year, are now turning decisively lower after nine quarters of uninterrupted growth. Forecast Net Income for the current year is now 7% below the high point in trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Net Income from this cycle, which was reached two months ago. Operating Income is, as usual, 'lagging' and forecasts are still marginally ahead of TTM. The TTM all-market price-earnings ratio reached 11.5 times on Christmas Day, which will prove to be the cycle low point. We expect the return to median levels, to be achieved more through lower 'E' as opposed to a higher 'P'.  Mr Market is currently implying that Japanese corporate profits are due to fall by 23% on average from the cycle peak, or by 30% if we are to revisit the December low-point. Source: Japan AnalyticsTHE FIRST CUT - 23% of listed companies reported their most recent quarterly earnings results in the last two weeks. For these companies, TTM revenues grew by 5.1% year-on-year, but only by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter, the lowest qoq growth rate in over a year. TTM Operating Income is now 0.8% lower than the TTM total of one year ago and declined by 4.4% qoq. Operating margins fell by 49bps year-on-year.  Current forecasts for this group of companies imply 3.1% yoy top line growth, but only 0.3% compared to the quarter just declared. For Operating Income, the rates are -2.0% and 0.6%, reflecting the normal TTM-to-forecast 'lag'. Corporate Japan's profits are now rolling over and will be in a 'recession' by the fiscal year-end.  Source: Japan AnalyticsINTERREGNUM - Our bear market rally has paused to look at and digest the earnings-announcement news flow and will likely be trendless for the next few weeks as 'good' reactions offset 'bad'. In due course, we expect the preponderance of negative momentum to tip the scales.Source: Japan AnalyticsTORAKU @110 - The Toraku advance-decline indicator has continued to recover and is within ten points of the overbought zone, which has only been breached once since the market peak of January 2018. This signal is 'amber' and could be 'red' by the end of next week. 
OUTLOOK &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS

We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios.
The equity market decline at the end of last year was well in advance of the underlying trends in the economy and corporate profits; the recent 10% rally has corrected that imbalance. Nevertheless, the global cycle has turned down sharply, and many economies will be in a recession by the end of this quarter. We expect Japanese corporate earnings to follow suit.  
Although some of the coming decline in aggregate earnings has been well-discounted, our Results &amp; Revision Score has yet to turn negative. Accordingly, we expect the market to retest the December 2018 low, probably in May when the FY2020 forecasts are announced and our score starts 'seeing red'.
In the near term and despite the rally in the more cyclical sectors, we continue to favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short Banks and Non-Bank Finance.

In the DETAIL section below, we will review Sector performance over the last two weeks, and, in addition to our regular roundup of results, revisions and stock performance including brief comments on Anritsu (6754 JP), Alps Alpine (6770 JP), SanBio (4592 JP), Lixil (5938 JP) (yes, again), Fanuc (6954 JP), Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) , and Cyberagent (4751 JP).

Japan Fortnightly Update: Drip, Drip, Drip...

IPOs and Catalysts/Events, Global Equity Research Ltd

Arun George

IPOs and Catalysts/Events

Uncompromised, Independent, Conflict-Free Research

Global Equity Research Ltd

Global Equity Research was started in 2017 by a group of experienced research professionals. It was founded on a passionate belief in the importance and the need for uncompromised, independent, conflict-free research. We aim to provide differentiated and actionable primary and bottom up fundamental research.

Equity Capital Markets

Ebang International Holdings I / Equity Capital Markets

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/27247" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27247:1">Ebang (EBANG HK)</a> is a Chinese designer of bitcoin mining machines which are sold under the Ebit brand. Ebang refiled its draft prospectus with HKEX on 20 December 2018, but the IPO plans of cryptocurrency related companies are in a state of flux. Last week, the CEO of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, said that companies seeking to go public in Hong Kong should show consistency in their business models, in response to questions about the IPO applications of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/27408" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27408:1">Bitmain Technologies Ltd (1374554D CH)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/27054" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27054:1">Canaan Inc. (CANAAN HK)</a> and Ebang.<div class="content-highlight">While 1H18 results were strong, Ebang cautions that it experienced significant decreases in revenue and gross profit for 3Q18 compared to 2Q18. In the absence of any 3Q18 financial metrics, we scrutinised the financial accounts to find clues on the extent of the slowdown. Our analysis of the financial accounts' leading indicators points to a rapid slowdown.</div>

Ebang (EBANG HK) is a Chinese designer of bitcoin mining machines which are sold under the Ebit brand. Ebang refiled its draft prospectus with HKEX on 20 December 2018, but the IPO plans of cryptocurrency related companies are in a state of flux. Last week, the CEO of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, said that companies seeking to go public in Hong Kong should show consistency in their business models, in response to questions about the IPO applications of Bitmain Technologies Ltd (1374554D CH), Canaan Inc. (CANAAN HK) and Ebang.While 1H18 results were strong, Ebang cautions that it experienced significant decreases in revenue and gross profit for 3Q18 compared to 2Q18. In the absence of any 3Q18 financial metrics, we scrutinised the financial accounts to find clues on the extent of the slowdown. Our analysis of the financial accounts' leading indicators points to a rapid slowdown.

Ebang IPO Preview: Balance Sheet Indicators Point to a Significant Slowdown

<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/074/071/original/2018-12-28_11-57-31.png?1545965862" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="74071"></figure>
Source: Japan Analytics
</div>
THE <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/13631" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13631:1">GMO INTERNET (9449 JP)</a> STORY - GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.
<ul class="">
<li>
VALUE- Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.</li>
<li>
ACTIVIST - Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a 'secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate' (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.</li>
<li>'CRYPTO!' - In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node 'mining chips', and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.</li>
</ul>
OUTSTANDING - Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory - as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to 'cryptocurrencies', even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE - On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i <a href="https://ir.gmo.jp/en/pdf/irlibrary/gmo_disclose_info20181225_e.pdf" target="_blank">announced</a> that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip' and 'mining machine' development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the 'mining' centre from Scandinavia to (sic) 'a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin's 'cryptocurrency' exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK - As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/22762" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22762:1">GMO Financial (7177 JP)</a> (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/1492" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1492:1">GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP)</a> (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. <a href="https://ir.gmo.jp/en/pdf/irlibrary/gmo_disclose_info20181225_2e.pdf" target="_blank">According </a>to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out' less-than-desirable operating results.
<div class="content-highlight">
In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD - TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP
<ul>
<li>BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME</li>
<li>BOTTOM LINE No.2 - COMPREHENSIVE INCOME</li>
</ul>
II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL - THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET - NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW - DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION - TWO METHODS &gt; SAME RESULT
<ul>
<li>VALUATION METHOD No.1 - THE 'LISTCO DISCOUNT'</li>
<li>VALUATION METHOD No.2 - RESIDUAL INCOME</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="content-highlight">
CONCLUSION - For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i 'rump' is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.
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Source: Japan Analytics

THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY - GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.


VALUE- Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.

ACTIVIST - Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a 'secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate' (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
'CRYPTO!' - In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node 'mining chips', and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.

OUTSTANDING - Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory - as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to 'cryptocurrencies', even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE - On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip' and 'mining machine' development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the 'mining' centre from Scandinavia to (sic) 'a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin's 'cryptocurrency' exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK - As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out' less-than-desirable operating results.

In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD - TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP

BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
BOTTOM LINE No.2 - COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL - THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET - NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW - DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION - TWO METHODS &gt; SAME RESULT

VALUATION METHOD No.1 - THE 'LISTCO DISCOUNT'
VALUATION METHOD No.2 - RESIDUAL INCOME



CONCLUSION - For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i 'rump' is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.


GMO Internet (9447 JP) - Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

Equity Analyst, LightStream Research

Shifara Samsudeen, FCMA, CGMA

Equity Analyst

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

GMO Internet is currently trading at JPY1,485 per share which is just 7.6% above its 12-month low of JPY1,380 per share. The Group’s share price reached an all-time high of JPY3,020 in June 2018, however, it has declined by more than 50% since then following the company’s poor performance in its cryptocurrency and mining related segment led by stagnant crypto prices coupled with negative news on issues concerning advertising fraud in its Online Advertising &amp; Media segment. This was further exacerbated by news that there will be delays in shipments of two bitcoin mining rig lines with refunds already issued in November. However, we believe, the downside is limited as the weaknesses of its crypto related business will weigh little on the consolidated earnings of the business. GMO’s business is structured in a way that its two main segments, namely, the Internet Infrastructure and Online Advertising and Media businesses are not prone to much volatility with recurring revenues. Therefore, we believe the negativity surrounding the company is exhausted and we expect the company to continue its strong growth trajectory.

GMO Internet is currently trading at JPY1,485 per share which is just 7.6% above its 12-month low of JPY1,380 per share. The Group’s share price reached an all-time high of JPY3,020 in June 2018, however, it has declined by more than 50% since then following the company’s poor performance in its cryptocurrency and mining related segment led by stagnant crypto prices coupled with negative news on issues concerning advertising fraud in its Online Advertising &amp; Media segment. This was further exacerbated by news that there will be delays in shipments of two bitcoin mining rig lines with refunds already issued in November. However, we believe, the downside is limited as the weaknesses of its crypto related business will weigh little on the consolidated earnings of the business. GMO’s business is structured in a way that its two main segments, namely, the Internet Infrastructure and Online Advertising and Media businesses are not prone to much volatility with recurring revenues. Therefore, we believe the negativity surrounding the company is exhausted and we expect the company to continue its strong growth trajectory.

GMO Internet Inc. – Limited Downside as Crypto Business Weighs Little on Consolidated Performance

Japan

GMO Internet Group, Inc. provides internet related services to its corporate customers. The company offers domain, server, security and settlement services through its "WEB Infrastructure & EC" business, and assists companies in attracting web users through its "Internet Media" business. GMO Internet Group conducts businesses in Japan.

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GMO Internet is currently trading at JPY1,485 per share which is just 7.6% above its 12-month low of JPY1,380 per share. The Group’s share price...

Shifara Samsudeen, FCMA, CGMA

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52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

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