Articles from Caixin Global, Caixin Global

Caixin Global

Articles from Caixin Global

Caixin is a media group dedicated to providing financial and business news through periodicals, online content, mobile apps, conferences, books and TV/video programs. Caixin aims to blaze a trail that helps traditional media prosper in the new media age through integrated multimedia platforms.

News from Caixin

Cross Asset Strategy

<ul><li>Cover Story: Will a barrier to the Yangtze River save Poyang Lake?</li><li>Unimpressive results reported for China's first Covid pill candidate</li><li>China private investment fund regulations stuck in limbo for another year</li></ul>

Cover Story: Will a barrier to the Yangtze River save Poyang Lake?Unimpressive results reported for China's first Covid pill candidateChina private investment fund regulations stuck in limbo for another year

CX Daily: Will a Barrier to the Yangtze River Save Poyang Lake?

<ul><li>In Depth: Why relocating mainlanders see Singapore as a safe haven for their businesses and property</li><li>Caixin Explains: Who controls China’s health code app</li><li>Developers face mounting debt payments in coming months</li></ul>

In Depth: Why relocating mainlanders see Singapore as a safe haven for their businesses and propertyCaixin Explains: Who controls China’s health code appDevelopers face mounting debt payments in coming months

CX Daily: Why Relocating Mainlanders See Singapore as a Safe Haven for Their Businesses and Property

Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

<ul>
<li>We concluded that the worst in the Chinese property sector is behind us, but we do see a bumpy road ahead.</li>
<li>We lay down the reason to stay invested in Chinese credits and the challenges for investors to overcome.</li>
<li>We conclude our last research of 2021 with the lessons we have learned from covering Chinese credits over the years.</li>
</ul>


We concluded that the worst in the Chinese property sector is behind us, but we do see a bumpy road ahead.
We lay down the reason to stay invested in Chinese credits and the challenges for investors to overcome.
We conclude our last research of 2021 with the lessons we have learned from covering Chinese credits over the years.


The Chinese Credit Chronicle: Stay Invested in China

<ul>
<li>We warned our readers on rising leverage in China back in April, based on cheap funding costs rather than borrower’s repayment capability. We pointed out that the music had stopped.   </li>
<li>We summarize on what has happened in the Chinese high-yield world and what is next. We believe the worst is behind us but we do have a bumpy road ahead. </li>
<li>Investors who can understand the restructuring process in China and withstand volatility of the bonds rated B or below could generate Alpha in the long run. </li>
</ul>


We warned our readers on rising leverage in China back in April, based on cheap funding costs rather than borrower’s repayment capability. We pointed out that the music had stopped.   
We summarize on what has happened in the Chinese high-yield world and what is next. We believe the worst is behind us but we do have a bumpy road ahead. 
Investors who can understand the restructuring process in China and withstand volatility of the bonds rated B or below could generate Alpha in the long run. 


The Chinese Credit Chronicle: The Below CCC Moment

Here we summarize frequently asked questions (FAQs) we were asked by the press this month on China Evergrande Group ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande (3333 HK)</a> ) and recent credit events for Evergrande and other Chinese property developers.
If our last Evergrande report ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/china-evergrande-group-never-grand" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:58256" rel="noopener">China Evergrande Group:  Never Grand</a> , dated 29-Sep) is about the rationale of Evergrande’s default and the lessons learned from the event. This flash note is about the continued saga where we do not see the end in sight just yet. We maintain our opinion that Evergrande is too big for the Chinese government to ignore and even though the trigger of the saga is the Three Red Lines<a href="#_ftn1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">[1]</a>, the cause is Evergrande’s leverage itself.
The bottom line for us is that the credit crisis of Chinese property developers will be contained as we believe China’s political system empowers the regulators with heavy hands which will force collaborations among issuers, investors, and intermediaries. Oftentimes, these participants are either owned or influenced by the central or local government entities.
Evergrande missed the coupon payments on 23-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/22s) and 29-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/24s) but eventually serviced its payments within the 30-day grace period. The company also secured more than 3 months of a maturity extension of its already defaulted USD260m bonds issued by Jumbo Fortune Enterprises, Evergrande’s joint venture, The bonds, guaranteed by Evergrande, matured on 3-Oct and defaulted as there is no provision for a grace period.
We believe it is difficult to gauge Evergrande’s recovery rate and, at the price between mid 20s to 30 cents on the dollar, the EVERRE complex’s fair value is unknown. As such our UNDERWEIGHT recommendation on the complex remains unchanged.
 
 
<div>
 <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%">
<div id="ftn1">
<a href="#_ftnref1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">[1]</a>The Three Red Lines include the following: 
(1) A net gearing ratio of less than 100%; 
(2) Cash to short-term debt ratio of more than 1x; and 
(3) A total liability to total asset ratio (excluding advance receipts) of less than 70%.
 
</div>
</div>

Here we summarize frequently asked questions (FAQs) we were asked by the press this month on China Evergrande Group ( Evergrande (3333 HK) ) and recent credit events for Evergrande and other Chinese property developers.
If our last Evergrande report ( China Evergrande Group:  Never Grand , dated 29-Sep) is about the rationale of Evergrande’s default and the lessons learned from the event. This flash note is about the continued saga where we do not see the end in sight just yet. We maintain our opinion that Evergrande is too big for the Chinese government to ignore and even though the trigger of the saga is the Three Red Lines[1], the cause is Evergrande’s leverage itself.
The bottom line for us is that the credit crisis of Chinese property developers will be contained as we believe China’s political system empowers the regulators with heavy hands which will force collaborations among issuers, investors, and intermediaries. Oftentimes, these participants are either owned or influenced by the central or local government entities.
Evergrande missed the coupon payments on 23-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/22s) and 29-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/24s) but eventually serviced its payments within the 30-day grace period. The company also secured more than 3 months of a maturity extension of its already defaulted USD260m bonds issued by Jumbo Fortune Enterprises, Evergrande’s joint venture, The bonds, guaranteed by Evergrande, matured on 3-Oct and defaulted as there is no provision for a grace period.
We believe it is difficult to gauge Evergrande’s recovery rate and, at the price between mid 20s to 30 cents on the dollar, the EVERRE complex’s fair value is unknown. As such our UNDERWEIGHT recommendation on the complex remains unchanged.
 
 



[1]The Three Red Lines include the following: 
(1) A net gearing ratio of less than 100%; 
(2) Cash to short-term debt ratio of more than 1x; and 
(3) A total liability to total asset ratio (excluding advance receipts) of less than 70%.
 



China Evergrande Group:   Trick Without Treat

China

HNA Group Co. Ltd. offers airlines services. The Company provides domestic and international aviation transportation, air travel, aviation maintenance, and aviation logistics services. HNA Group also operates holding, capital, tourism, logistics, and other business.

HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)

CX Daily: Will a Barrier to the Yangtze River Save Poyang Lake?

Cover Story: Will a barrier to the Yangtze River save Poyang Lake? Unimpressive results reported for China's first Covid pill candidate

Caixin Global

CX Daily: Why Relocating Mainlanders See Singapore as a Safe Haven for Their Businesses and Property

In Depth: Why relocating mainlanders see Singapore as a safe haven for their businesses and property. Caixin Explains: Who controls China’s health...

Caixin Global

The Chinese Credit Chronicle: Stay Invested in China

Chinese credits are not over yet. Here is our take on the lessons learned from covering Chinese high-yield credits over the years.

Bondcritic

The Chinese Credit Chronicle: The Below CCC Moment

We summarize on what has happened in the Chinese high-yield world and what is next. We believe the worst is behind us but we do have a bumpy road...

Bondcritic

China Evergrande Group: Trick Without Treat

Evergrande's Saga continues and EVERRE 22s rebounded 8 points. We believe the end is not in sights and see the bottom fishing as a gamble.

Bondcritic