Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Weak Results Showing No Signs Of Improvement: Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] reported results for 1Q21, coming in at CNY 27.2 bn which declined CNY 12.9 bn (32.0%) linked quarter. Ping An was pelted on two fronts this quarter: a) investment income declined CNY 55.8 bn (77.9%) linked quarter as the gross investment yield was cut in half to 3.1% - impacted by a CNY 18.2 bn impairment loss related to China Fortune Land (600340.CH); and b) expenses increased CNY 21.5 bn (8.5%), driven by claims which increased CNY 38.8 bn (25.8%); andBank Improvement:  Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], reported reported results of CNY 10.1 bn – increasing CNY 3.6 bn (55.2%) on a linked quarter basis. By our analysis, we find that credit weakness continues to occur as net new NPLs have increased CNY 4.2 bn or 53.6% on an annualized basis. In fairness, however, this is far better than the CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) increase on an annualized basis. We find that PAB’s reserves still remain light by CNY 19 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio – but sub stantially better than 4Q20.

*Weak Results Showing No Signs Of Improvement: Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] reported results for 1Q21, coming in at CNY 27.2 bn which declined CNY 12.9 bn (32.0%) linked quarter. Ping An was pelted on two fronts this quarter: a) investment income declined CNY 55.8 bn (77.9%) linked quarter as the gross investment yield was cut in half to 3.1% - impacted by a CNY 18.2 bn impairment loss related to China Fortune Land (600340.CH); and b) expenses increased CNY 21.5 bn (8.5%), driven by claims which increased CNY 38.8 bn (25.8%); andBank Improvement:  Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], reported reported results of CNY 10.1 bn – increasing CNY 3.6 bn (55.2%) on a linked quarter basis. By our analysis, we find that credit weakness continues to occur as net new NPLs have increased CNY 4.2 bn or 53.6% on an annualized basis. In fairness, however, this is far better than the CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) increase on an annualized basis. We find that PAB’s reserves still remain light by CNY 19 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio – but sub stantially better than 4Q20.

*Stake Purchase In Mainland Bank: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] for the second time in five months announced a transaction. The latest being its intention to acquire a 13% stake in the privately-held Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank (SRCB) for CNY 5.29 bn (USD 814.3 mn), in a move that will accelerate its Greater Bay Area expansion strategy;*Very Expensive Transaction: DBS did disclose that this stake will be priced at a stated P/BV of 1.01x. By our calculation, the post-money P/BV amounts to 0.92x – which is still 41.5% (USD 338 mn) higher than the average valuation (0.65x P/BV) for a mainland Chinese bank; and*Deal Distractions Mount: On November 17, 2020, the RBI also announced a draft scheme to merge LVB with DBS Bank India Limited, the 100%-owned subsidiary of DBS Bank Holdings (DBS.SP), which will infuse INR 25 bn into its subsidiary to absorb and recapitalize LVB. While SRCB dos not appear to be riddled with problems the way LVB is, no doubt there will be issues to contend with.  DBS apparently isn’t done with its shopping spree, being in the running for parts of Citigroup's (C.US) consumer business in Asia. Frankly, DBS needs to focus on improving its own legacy issues before it starts both taking on that of other financial institutions.

*Stake Purchase In Mainland Bank: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] for the second time in five months announced a transaction. The latest being its intention to acquire a 13% stake in the privately-held Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank (SRCB) for CNY 5.29 bn (USD 814.3 mn), in a move that will accelerate its Greater Bay Area expansion strategy;*Very Expensive Transaction: DBS did disclose that this stake will be priced at a stated P/BV of 1.01x. By our calculation, the post-money P/BV amounts to 0.92x – which is still 41.5% (USD 338 mn) higher than the average valuation (0.65x P/BV) for a mainland Chinese bank; and*Deal Distractions Mount: On November 17, 2020, the RBI also announced a draft scheme to merge LVB with DBS Bank India Limited, the 100%-owned subsidiary of DBS Bank Holdings (DBS.SP), which will infuse INR 25 bn into its subsidiary to absorb and recapitalize LVB. While SRCB dos not appear to be riddled with problems the way LVB is, no doubt there will be issues to contend with.  DBS apparently isn’t done with its shopping spree, being in the running for parts of Citigroup's (C.US) consumer business in Asia. Frankly, DBS needs to focus on improving its own legacy issues before it starts both taking on that of other financial institutions.

*Results Materially Supported By Provision Reversals and Principal Transactions: Citigroup (C.US) [Citi] reported 1Q21 bottom-line results of USD 7.6 bn, increasing USD 3.7 bn (89.0%) linked quarter. Citi reversed provisions of USD 2.1 bn - increasing 43.7x versus 4Q20. In addition to the negative provision, Citi’s results were also supported by a USD 2.0 bn (99.7%) increase in principal transaction gains;*Credit Weaker But Coverage Strong: Net new NPLs came in about 1/3 of the previous quarter’s result came in at USD 635 mn or increasing 48.0% on an annualized basis – still far worse than JPM for the last three consecutive quarters. Citi’s loan loss reserve declined to 422% of NPLs and 325 bp of total loans – but still pretty darn good for the known and potential risk in the loan portfolio; and *Puzzling EM Exit: Citi also announced strategic changes in the Global Consumer Bank (GCB), where they are exiting 13 markets, of which ten are in Asia-Pacific. As rationale for the move, new CEO Jane Fraser believe that Citi "does not have the scale" to compete in those markets which account for USD 7 bn in allocated equity and USD 70 bn in loans. We await clarity on the potential restructuring costs and the capital release from these divestitures.

*Results Materially Supported By Provision Reversals and Principal Transactions: Citigroup (C.US) [Citi] reported 1Q21 bottom-line results of USD 7.6 bn, increasing USD 3.7 bn (89.0%) linked quarter. Citi reversed provisions of USD 2.1 bn - increasing 43.7x versus 4Q20. In addition to the negative provision, Citi’s results were also supported by a USD 2.0 bn (99.7%) increase in principal transaction gains;*Credit Weaker But Coverage Strong: Net new NPLs came in about 1/3 of the previous quarter’s result came in at USD 635 mn or increasing 48.0% on an annualized basis – still far worse than JPM for the last three consecutive quarters. Citi’s loan loss reserve declined to 422% of NPLs and 325 bp of total loans – but still pretty darn good for the known and potential risk in the loan portfolio; and *Puzzling EM Exit: Citi also announced strategic changes in the Global Consumer Bank (GCB), where they are exiting 13 markets, of which ten are in Asia-Pacific. As rationale for the move, new CEO Jane Fraser believe that Citi "does not have the scale" to compete in those markets which account for USD 7 bn in allocated equity and USD 70 bn in loans. We await clarity on the potential restructuring costs and the capital release from these divestitures.

*Update Confirms Weak Outlook: Negative rental reversion rates persist in Hong Kong, as do negative tenant sales. We continue to await another round of negative revaluation of property due to lower rents and/or higher cap rates; and  *No Serious Capital Management Strategy Exists: Management of Link appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value.As gearing was 19.2% at September 2020, management continues to believe that it has abundant headroom to add debt for acquisition. Instead of weighing a buyback’s return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend its shares against short-selling. Maybe a re-re-review of its acquisition strategy will occur by earnings when Link’s new mainland China acquisition strategy truly flops.

*Update Confirms Weak Outlook: Negative rental reversion rates persist in Hong Kong, as do negative tenant sales. We continue to await another round of negative revaluation of property due to lower rents and/or higher cap rates; and  *No Serious Capital Management Strategy Exists: Management of Link appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value.As gearing was 19.2% at September 2020, management continues to believe that it has abundant headroom to add debt for acquisition. Instead of weighing a buyback’s return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend its shares against short-selling. Maybe a re-re-review of its acquisition strategy will occur by earnings when Link’s new mainland China acquisition strategy truly flops.

*One Reorganization Down, One More To Go: Tencent Holdings (700.HK) [Tencent] announced a new round of organizational and employee adjustments in its Platform and Content Group (PCG) - the largest reshuffle since it began in 2018. With Alibaba Holdings (BABA] agreeing to form a financial holding company. Tencent cannot be far behind; and  *Earnings To Decline, Capital Requirements To Increase: For Tencent, WeChat Pay and the broader lending/deposit taking business are likely to be reined-in. At CNY 38.5 bn, FinTech represents a growing 28.8% of revenue – and are key component of Tencent’s current and future results.  No matter what spin that Tencent wants to place on its other businesses, an FHC represents significant downside risks. Earnings will compress, as capital requirements increase.

*One Reorganization Down, One More To Go: Tencent Holdings (700.HK) [Tencent] announced a new round of organizational and employee adjustments in its Platform and Content Group (PCG) - the largest reshuffle since it began in 2018. With Alibaba Holdings (BABA] agreeing to form a financial holding company. Tencent cannot be far behind; and  *Earnings To Decline, Capital Requirements To Increase: For Tencent, WeChat Pay and the broader lending/deposit taking business are likely to be reined-in. At CNY 38.5 bn, FinTech represents a growing 28.8% of revenue – and are key component of Tencent’s current and future results.  No matter what spin that Tencent wants to place on its other businesses, an FHC represents significant downside risks. Earnings will compress, as capital requirements increase.

Tencent Holdings – FHC Restructure On Its Way

Hong Kong

iShares MSCI Hong Kong ETF is an exchange-traded fund incorporated in the USA. The ETF's objective seeks to provide investment results that correspond to the performance of publicly traded securities in the Hong Kong market, as measured by the MSCI Hong Kong Index. The ETF invests in a representative sample of index stocks using a "portfolio sampling" technique.

iShares MSCI Hong Kong ETF (EWH US)

Ping An Insurance – It’s Magic

PING AN INSURANCE: Ping An reported a QOQ 1Q21 earnings decline of 32.0% due and investment income decline and an expense increase. Despite the...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – Pricey China Deal

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: DBS is acquiring a 13% stake in the privately-held SRCB for USD 814.3 mn. P/BV amounts to 0.92x – which is still 41.5% higher...

Thomas J. Monaco

Citigroup – Shifting Winds

CITIGROUP: Citi reported a QOQ 1Q21 bottom-line result increase of 89.0% due to provision reversals and principal transactions. Net new NPLs...

Thomas J. Monaco

Link REIT – Cash Burning Holes

LINK REIT: Negative rental reversion rates and tenant sales persist in Hong Kong, negative revaluation of property continues. Link is hellbent on...

Thomas J. Monaco

Tencent Holdings – FHC Restructure On Its Way

TENCENT HOLDINGS: Tencent announced a reorganization to its Platform and Content Group (PCG). With Alibaba Holdings (BABA] agreeing to form a...

Thomas J. Monaco