Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

Risk-on sentiment resulted in more spread tightening than widening in Asia’s US$-denominated bank bonds (x-Japan) during the month of November. In fact, only 4 securities widened in G-Spread terms out of the 100 bonds that we track in the region. Meanwhile, the largest widening was only 15 basis points (bps) month-on-month.India-headquartered bank bonds led in terms of spread tightening over November and dominate our top 10 list. Amongst the India-headquartered banks, several non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) led advances. Relative to year-end spread levels, there is limited upside remaining amongst the top 10 performers of November.In a positive sign, from a momentum perspective, the positive spread movement amongst India’s NBFCs was continuous throughout November. Coronavirus vaccine news, a Goldilocks US election outcome, and the Janet Yellen effect propelled riskier asset prices higher in most markets and India was no exception.   While the trend is your friend, ordinarily thin trading markets could meet concerns that economic recovery is fully priced, and profit-taking may ensue during December. In addition, there is the risk that the market has gotten ahead of itself as bank management’s loss expectations are yet to be tested. Post-COVID-19, India’s operating environment starts from an already high level of non-performing assets and each bank’s loan loss predictive ability has significant room for improvement. The same could be said for the other outperforming bank bonds in our top 10 list.

Risk-on sentiment resulted in more spread tightening than widening in Asia’s US$-denominated bank bonds (x-Japan) during the month of November. In fact, only 4 securities widened in G-Spread terms out of the 100 bonds that we track in the region. Meanwhile, the largest widening was only 15 basis points (bps) month-on-month.India-headquartered bank bonds led in terms of spread tightening over November and dominate our top 10 list. Amongst the India-headquartered banks, several non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) led advances. Relative to year-end spread levels, there is limited upside remaining amongst the top 10 performers of November.In a positive sign, from a momentum perspective, the positive spread movement amongst India’s NBFCs was continuous throughout November. Coronavirus vaccine news, a Goldilocks US election outcome, and the Janet Yellen effect propelled riskier asset prices higher in most markets and India was no exception.   While the trend is your friend, ordinarily thin trading markets could meet concerns that economic recovery is fully priced, and profit-taking may ensue during December. In addition, there is the risk that the market has gotten ahead of itself as bank management’s loss expectations are yet to be tested. Post-COVID-19, India’s operating environment starts from an already high level of non-performing assets and each bank’s loan loss predictive ability has significant room for improvement. The same could be said for the other outperforming bank bonds in our top 10 list.

Bank Credit Compass: Asia’s November Performance and December Expectations

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

Even though non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) dedicated to providing loans against gold ornaments are highly profitable and enjoy significant net interest margins (NIMs), stakeholders should be concerned about the vulnerability of their branches to robberies. The spate of robberies indicates that thieves are specifically targeting branches because they follow inadequate security protocols for the substantial gold ornaments they hold in custody for their customers. Examining the robberies reported in the media indicates that each of the targeted branches held gold valued at a minimum of Rs 100 mn (equivalent to atleast 25 kgs of gold ornaments). The fact that a robbery of a single branch can yield so much, and that they have poor security protocols in place, makes them an attractive target for thieves. The average metropolitan bank branches (excluding currency chests), in contrast, have superior security protocols, while normally holding far less amounts of cash in their branches (as excess cash is immediately transferred to currency chests).While the gold ornaments held in NBFC branches are insured, robberies are a law and order issue, especially when staff and members of the public are injured or killed during such robberies. If such robberies continue because NBFCs do not want to improve the security arrangements (for cost reasons), the police will be compelled to intervene and insist NBFCs invest in the necessary security protocols (strongrooms, armed guards, CCTVs being operational 24x7, technology) failing which the police will close branches to maintain law and order.In general, in the business of loans against gold, the credit, market and liquidity risks are taken care of by the nature of the commodity gold, and management therefore are to focus on operational risk management. The spate of robberies and the poor state of security protocols indicate that managements, for cost reasons, are ignoring these critical issues as they believe insurance will cover the risk. Stakeholders in NBFCs specialising in gold lending should be cognizant of the poor operational risk management, especially the poor security arrangements in the branches, which are attracting robberies. They must insist that these companies invest in the necessary protocols before the state decides to intervene.

Even though non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) dedicated to providing loans against gold ornaments are highly profitable and enjoy significant net interest margins (NIMs), stakeholders should be concerned about the vulnerability of their branches to robberies. The spate of robberies indicates that thieves are specifically targeting branches because they follow inadequate security protocols for the substantial gold ornaments they hold in custody for their customers. Examining the robberies reported in the media indicates that each of the targeted branches held gold valued at a minimum of Rs 100 mn (equivalent to atleast 25 kgs of gold ornaments). The fact that a robbery of a single branch can yield so much, and that they have poor security protocols in place, makes them an attractive target for thieves. The average metropolitan bank branches (excluding currency chests), in contrast, have superior security protocols, while normally holding far less amounts of cash in their branches (as excess cash is immediately transferred to currency chests).While the gold ornaments held in NBFC branches are insured, robberies are a law and order issue, especially when staff and members of the public are injured or killed during such robberies. If such robberies continue because NBFCs do not want to improve the security arrangements (for cost reasons), the police will be compelled to intervene and insist NBFCs invest in the necessary security protocols (strongrooms, armed guards, CCTVs being operational 24x7, technology) failing which the police will close branches to maintain law and order.In general, in the business of loans against gold, the credit, market and liquidity risks are taken care of by the nature of the commodity gold, and management therefore are to focus on operational risk management. The spate of robberies and the poor state of security protocols indicate that managements, for cost reasons, are ignoring these critical issues as they believe insurance will cover the risk. Stakeholders in NBFCs specialising in gold lending should be cognizant of the poor operational risk management, especially the poor security arrangements in the branches, which are attracting robberies. They must insist that these companies invest in the necessary protocols before the state decides to intervene.

Why Have Gold Loan NBFCs Become Low Hanging Fruit for Robbers?

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme.

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme. 

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

*Results Down, Credibility Up: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line of INR 7.9 bn, declining INR 266 mn (3.3%) on a linked period basis. LIC’s conservatism with respect to provisioning – especially relative to the rest of the Indian financial sector – is quite admirable;*Credit On The Mend: During the period, we note that Stage 3 NPLs declined INR 625 mn (1.1%) to INR 58.8 bn and represent 2.79% of total loans – down 4 bp linked quarter. In addition, we note that net new NPLs at LIC were negative as well – declining INR 586 mn for an annualized rate of NPL decline of 4.0%. Coupled with NCOs of just INR 39 mn  - which amount to just 1 bp of total loans on an annualized basis, we find that reserves improved INR 1.0 bn or 4.0% linked quarter. While we admire LIC’s conservatism relative to peer, we would still be comfortable with reserves being INR 3.3 bn (11.8%) higher. That said, at this pace, LIC should get there within three quarters; and        *Competition Intensifying: Increasing competition could impact profitability, however, with both housing lenders and private banks significantly cutting interest rates.

*Results Down, Credibility Up: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line of INR 7.9 bn, declining INR 266 mn (3.3%) on a linked period basis. LIC’s conservatism with respect to provisioning – especially relative to the rest of the Indian financial sector – is quite admirable;*Credit On The Mend: During the period, we note that Stage 3 NPLs declined INR 625 mn (1.1%) to INR 58.8 bn and represent 2.79% of total loans – down 4 bp linked quarter. In addition, we note that net new NPLs at LIC were negative as well – declining INR 586 mn for an annualized rate of NPL decline of 4.0%. Coupled with NCOs of just INR 39 mn  - which amount to just 1 bp of total loans on an annualized basis, we find that reserves improved INR 1.0 bn or 4.0% linked quarter. While we admire LIC’s conservatism relative to peer, we would still be comfortable with reserves being INR 3.3 bn (11.8%) higher. That said, at this pace, LIC should get there within three quarters; and        *Competition Intensifying: Increasing competition could impact profitability, however, with both housing lenders and private banks significantly cutting interest rates.

LIC Housing Finance – Doing The Right Thing

India

Manappuram Finance Ltd. is a non-banking finance company. The Company offers loans against gold collateral, business loans, vehicle loans, foreign exchange and money transfer services; and sells gold coins.

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Manappuram Finance (MGFL IN)

Bank Credit Compass: Asia’s November Performance and December Expectations

India-headquartered bank bonds led spread tightening over November. Ordinarily thin markets could meet concerns that economic recovery is fully...

Hank Calenti, CFA

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

Why Have Gold Loan NBFCs Become Low Hanging Fruit for Robbers?

The spate of robberies indicates that thieves are specifically targeting branches because they follow inadequate security protocols for the gold...

Hemindra Hazari

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: Certain Borrowers Are Dis-Satisfied With "Interest On Interest Waiver" And Proposed Additional Modifications To RBI...

Thomas J. Monaco

LIC Housing Finance – Doing The Right Thing

LIC HOUSING FINANCE: Although Results Were Weaker Linked Quarter, They Were Driven By Higher Credit Costs. This Was Unnecessary Given Credit...

Thomas J. Monaco

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