Forensic Analyst

Jason Yap, CFA

Forensic Accounting

<p>The State Administration for Market Regulation, China's antitrust regulator, imposed a fine of RMB3.4 billion (USD530 million) on food delivery group <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/meituan-dianping" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26970:1" rel="noopener">Meituan (3690 HK)</a> for abusing its market position and ordered the company to rectify its operations.</p><p>Amongst other required remedial actions, Meituan was ordered to return deposit money to merchants. Merchant had reportedly used deposits, algorithms, and data to ensure that its restaurant merchants remained loyal to the platform, according to an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8862b118-75ad-45b1-85df-b3fa09d26ac3" target="_blank" rel="noopener">FT article</a>. </p><p>This begs the question. Why are merchant deposits required by e-commerce companies like Meituan, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/alibaba-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28434:1" rel="noopener">Alibaba Group (9988 HK)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/pinduoduo-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27250:1" rel="noopener">Pinduoduo (PDD US)</a>? After all, most of the merchant transactions are 3P, which means the platforms do not carry any inventory risk and therefore do not need merchant deposits to offset risks. Could it be to increase switching costs or even to hold merchants ransom as the FT article suggests. </p><p>In this Insight, we discuss how merchant deposits and merchant payables have been used as a means to pad operating cashflows (even though they are not strictly <em>free</em> cashflows), particularly for fast growing e-commerce platforms.</p><p>Further, we have seen the "<em>walled gardens</em>" of China's tech giants <a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3148572/big-techs-walled-gardens-start-crack-tencent-vows-follow-beijings" target="_blank" rel="noopener">start to crack</a> - in other words, merchants can freely switch platforms taking away merchant deposits with them, which could potentially affect cashflows.  </p>

The State Administration for Market Regulation, China's antitrust regulator, imposed a fine of RMB3.4 billion (USD530 million) on food delivery group Meituan (3690 HK) for abusing its market position and ordered the company to rectify its operations.Amongst other required remedial actions, Meituan was ordered to return deposit money to merchants. Merchant had reportedly used deposits, algorithms, and data to ensure that its restaurant merchants remained loyal to the platform, according to an FT article. This begs the question. Why are merchant deposits required by e-commerce companies like Meituan, Alibaba Group (9988 HK) and Pinduoduo (PDD US)? After all, most of the merchant transactions are 3P, which means the platforms do not carry any inventory risk and therefore do not need merchant deposits to offset risks. Could it be to increase switching costs or even to hold merchants ransom as the FT article suggests. In this Insight, we discuss how merchant deposits and merchant payables have been used as a means to pad operating cashflows (even though they are not strictly free cashflows), particularly for fast growing e-commerce platforms.Further, we have seen the "walled gardens" of China's tech giants start to crack - in other words, merchants can freely switch platforms taking away merchant deposits with them, which could potentially affect cashflows.  

Merchant Deposits and Payables to Pad Cashflows - Who's Culpable?

Equity Analyst, LightStream Research

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Equity Analyst

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

Equity Bottom-Up

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/coupang-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28425:1" rel="noopener">Coupang (CPNG US)</a>, the largest e-commerce company in South Korea with <a target="_blank">US$ 15.6bn in trailing twelve months revenue</a>, has seen its share price drop more than 61% from the post IPO peak of $69.0 per share to $26.65. Coupang is currently trading 24% below its IPO price despite beating the street revenue and EBITDA estimates over the last two quarters.</p><p>Coupang’s demise after the first day pop could be down to factors such as the antitrust investigations, legal disputes with vendors, employee health and safety concerns and the disposals of 57.0m shares by the majority owner, Softbank.</p><p>The extent of the drop in the share price suggests that there could be another factor at play here, which is the excessive IPO valuation. Coupang was able to ride the IPO wave to obtain an IPO valuation of 2.8x FY+2 revenue. During our Coupang IPO coverage, we mentioned that Coupang’s 1P heavy business model makes Coupang’s revenue multiples incomparable to peers posing significant downside risks once the market comes to realise this situation.</p>

Coupang (CPNG US), the largest e-commerce company in South Korea with US$ 15.6bn in trailing twelve months revenue, has seen its share price drop more than 61% from the post IPO peak of $69.0 per share to $26.65. Coupang is currently trading 24% below its IPO price despite beating the street revenue and EBITDA estimates over the last two quarters.Coupang’s demise after the first day pop could be down to factors such as the antitrust investigations, legal disputes with vendors, employee health and safety concerns and the disposals of 57.0m shares by the majority owner, Softbank.The extent of the drop in the share price suggests that there could be another factor at play here, which is the excessive IPO valuation. Coupang was able to ride the IPO wave to obtain an IPO valuation of 2.8x FY+2 revenue. During our Coupang IPO coverage, we mentioned that Coupang’s 1P heavy business model makes Coupang’s revenue multiples incomparable to peers posing significant downside risks once the market comes to realise this situation.

Coupang: Down 61% From the Peak, Further 60% Downside Is a Possibility

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/gome-retail-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:170:1" rel="noopener">Gome Electrical Appliances (493 HK)</a> is one of China’s largest electronic retailers with a Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) of CNY 113 billion. Due to the competition from e-commerce platforms, Gome endured a tough time during the last four years with revenue declining at an annual compound rate of 12.9%. The company’s operating losses peaked at CNY 3.8 billion in 2020.</p><p>Nevertheless, the future looks bright for Gome Retail as they have managed to transform the traditional brick and mortar retail business to an omni-channel model. In addition, the shift in government policy to eradicate unfair competition and encourage domestic consumption, especially in lower-tier cities could accelerate Gome’s omni-channel revival.</p>

Gome Electrical Appliances (493 HK) is one of China’s largest electronic retailers with a Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) of CNY 113 billion. Due to the competition from e-commerce platforms, Gome endured a tough time during the last four years with revenue declining at an annual compound rate of 12.9%. The company’s operating losses peaked at CNY 3.8 billion in 2020.Nevertheless, the future looks bright for Gome Retail as they have managed to transform the traditional brick and mortar retail business to an omni-channel model. In addition, the shift in government policy to eradicate unfair competition and encourage domestic consumption, especially in lower-tier cities could accelerate Gome’s omni-channel revival.

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Capital Markets

<div><p>TDCX Inc, a Singapore-headquartered digital customer experience (CX) provider, is looking to raise up to US$338m in its upcoming US IPO.</p></div><div><p>TDCX provides outsourcing services to clients in new economy sectors and traditional blue-chip clients undergoing digital transformation. As of Jun 21, it served 43 global clients and with 114 active campaigns. The firm has offices located in 10 geographies across Asia, Europe and Latin America, namely, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Japan, Spain, India, Columbia and Romania.</p></div><div><p>TDCX has recorded very strong growth with revenue, EBITDA and PAT having increased by 2.5x over FY18-20. In addition, Facebook and Airbnb, combined, contributed 60.4% and 62.3% of TDCX’s total revenue for FY20 and 1H21. </p></div><div><p>We have covered various aspects of the deal in our earlier note <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/tdcx-inc-pre-ipo-tearsheet" target="_blank" rel="noopener">TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO Tearsheet</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/tdcx-inc-pre-ipo-past-growth-looks-good-the-rest-is-iffy-including-the-founders-s-325m-payout" target="_blank" rel="noopener">TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO - Past Growth Looks Good, the Rest Is Iffy, Including the Founders S$325m Payout</a>.</p></div><div><p>In this note we will talk about valuations</p></div>

TDCX Inc, a Singapore-headquartered digital customer experience (CX) provider, is looking to raise up to US$338m in its upcoming US IPO.TDCX provides outsourcing services to clients in new economy sectors and traditional blue-chip clients undergoing digital transformation. As of Jun 21, it served 43 global clients and with 114 active campaigns. The firm has offices located in 10 geographies across Asia, Europe and Latin America, namely, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Japan, Spain, India, Columbia and Romania.TDCX has recorded very strong growth with revenue, EBITDA and PAT having increased by 2.5x over FY18-20. In addition, Facebook and Airbnb, combined, contributed 60.4% and 62.3% of TDCX’s total revenue for FY20 and 1H21. We have covered various aspects of the deal in our earlier note TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO Tearsheet and TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO - Past Growth Looks Good, the Rest Is Iffy, Including the Founders S$325m Payout.In this note we will talk about valuations

TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO - Largest Client Is Growing Faster and Trading Cheaper

Global Emerging Market Equities, Propitious Research

Wium Malan, CFA

Global Emerging Market Equities

Independent, Fundamental Quantitative Research

Propitious Research

Fully independent, fundamental and quantitative equity research, focused on companies in the Telecommunication, Media, Technology, Internet and Healthcare sectors in the Global Emerging Markets. Idea generation focused on Quality stocks, trading below their intrinsic Value, with sound Corporate Governance.

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/alibaba-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28434:1" rel="noopener">Alibaba Group (9988 HK)</a> has had a disastrous year, ever since the IPO of their FinTech arm, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ant-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24240:1" rel="noopener">Ant Financial Services Group (6688 HK)</a>, was pulled last minute in November 2020. Since then, they have faced continued regulatory hurdles, including an RMB18.2bn anti-monopoly fine, which has culminated in a 51% share price drop, since its November 2020 peak, which means that Alibaba is currently trading on only a 14.3x forward PE ratio. Given that this is nearly 4 standard deviations below its 5-year historical average trading range, and that this multiple would imply only a 0.72x PEG ratio, for a company with an extremely strong net cash balance sheet, delivering returns on capital well above its cost of capital, with positive free cash flow generation, and a $15bn share buyback program, indicates that there is a massive disconnect between long-term Buy-side expectations and near-term Sell-side estimates. </p><p>Looking at the reported group financials over this period it does not seem as though the regulatory impact has been that significant on core operations. The key concern, however, is that Alibaba is losing market share in its core businesses. </p><p>In this insight, I take a closer look at the broader Chinese retail market, as well as the Chinese digital advertising market (I estimate that Alibaba still generates more than 40% of its Chinese commerce revenue, and roughly 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of group revenue, from marketing activities), to analyse Alibaba’s relative revenue share loss. Finally, I also revisit current valuation levels and analyse what this implies for its Core Commerce operations.</p>

Alibaba Group (9988 HK) has had a disastrous year, ever since the IPO of their FinTech arm, Ant Financial Services Group (6688 HK), was pulled last minute in November 2020. Since then, they have faced continued regulatory hurdles, including an RMB18.2bn anti-monopoly fine, which has culminated in a 51% share price drop, since its November 2020 peak, which means that Alibaba is currently trading on only a 14.3x forward PE ratio. Given that this is nearly 4 standard deviations below its 5-year historical average trading range, and that this multiple would imply only a 0.72x PEG ratio, for a company with an extremely strong net cash balance sheet, delivering returns on capital well above its cost of capital, with positive free cash flow generation, and a $15bn share buyback program, indicates that there is a massive disconnect between long-term Buy-side expectations and near-term Sell-side estimates. Looking at the reported group financials over this period it does not seem as though the regulatory impact has been that significant on core operations. The key concern, however, is that Alibaba is losing market share in its core businesses. In this insight, I take a closer look at the broader Chinese retail market, as well as the Chinese digital advertising market (I estimate that Alibaba still generates more than 40% of its Chinese commerce revenue, and roughly 1/3rd of group revenue, from marketing activities), to analyse Alibaba’s relative revenue share loss. Finally, I also revisit current valuation levels and analyse what this implies for its Core Commerce operations.

Alibaba: How Much Core Market Share Loss Has Been Priced In?

China

PDD Holdings Inc. is a multinational commerce group that owns and operates a portfolio of businesses. The Company focuses on digital economy so that local communities and small businesses can benefit from the increased productivity and new opportunities. PDD Holdings has built a network of sourcing, logistics, and fulfillment capabilities for its underlying businesses.

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PDD Holdings (PDD US)

Merchant Deposits and Payables to Pad Cashflows - Who's Culpable?

Merchant deposits and merchant payables have been used to pad operating cashflows (even though they are not free cashflows), particularly for fast...

Jason Yap, CFA

Coupang: Down 61% From the Peak, Further 60% Downside Is a Possibility

At 0.80x, Coupang’s EV/ (Gross Merchandise Value + Retail Revenue) remains 0.58x, 0.66x and 0.64x above Alibaba’s, JD.com’s and Pinduoduo’s EV/...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Gome Retail: Time to Shop

At 1.96x price to book, Gome does not look especially cheap considering it’s current liquidity levels. However, we believe the worst has passed for...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO - Largest Client Is Growing Faster and Trading Cheaper

TDCX Inc, a Singapore-headquartered digital customer experience (CX) provider, is looking to raise up to US$338m in its upcoming US IPO.

Sumeet Singh

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52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

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Merchant Deposits and Payables to Pad Cashflows - Who's Culpable?

Merchant deposits and merchant payables have been used to pad operating cashflows (even though they are not free cashflows), particularly for fast...

Jason Yap, CFA

Coupang: Down 61% From the Peak, Further 60% Downside Is a Possibility

At 0.80x, Coupang’s EV/ (Gross Merchandise Value + Retail Revenue) remains 0.58x, 0.66x and 0.64x above Alibaba’s, JD.com’s and Pinduoduo’s EV/...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Gome Retail: Time to Shop

At 1.96x price to book, Gome does not look especially cheap considering it’s current liquidity levels. However, we believe the worst has passed for...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

TDCX Inc. Pre-IPO - Largest Client Is Growing Faster and Trading Cheaper

TDCX Inc, a Singapore-headquartered digital customer experience (CX) provider, is looking to raise up to US$338m in its upcoming US IPO.

Sumeet Singh

Alibaba: How Much Core Market Share Loss Has Been Priced In?

In this insight, I analyse Chinese retail sales and digital advertising market share changes and what is implied by Alibaba’s current valuation...

Wium Malan, CFA