Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme.

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme. 

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

*Results Down, Credibility Up: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line of INR 7.9 bn, declining INR 266 mn (3.3%) on a linked period basis. LIC’s conservatism with respect to provisioning – especially relative to the rest of the Indian financial sector – is quite admirable;*Credit On The Mend: During the period, we note that Stage 3 NPLs declined INR 625 mn (1.1%) to INR 58.8 bn and represent 2.79% of total loans – down 4 bp linked quarter. In addition, we note that net new NPLs at LIC were negative as well – declining INR 586 mn for an annualized rate of NPL decline of 4.0%. Coupled with NCOs of just INR 39 mn  - which amount to just 1 bp of total loans on an annualized basis, we find that reserves improved INR 1.0 bn or 4.0% linked quarter. While we admire LIC’s conservatism relative to peer, we would still be comfortable with reserves being INR 3.3 bn (11.8%) higher. That said, at this pace, LIC should get there within three quarters; and        *Competition Intensifying: Increasing competition could impact profitability, however, with both housing lenders and private banks significantly cutting interest rates.

*Results Down, Credibility Up: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line of INR 7.9 bn, declining INR 266 mn (3.3%) on a linked period basis. LIC’s conservatism with respect to provisioning – especially relative to the rest of the Indian financial sector – is quite admirable;*Credit On The Mend: During the period, we note that Stage 3 NPLs declined INR 625 mn (1.1%) to INR 58.8 bn and represent 2.79% of total loans – down 4 bp linked quarter. In addition, we note that net new NPLs at LIC were negative as well – declining INR 586 mn for an annualized rate of NPL decline of 4.0%. Coupled with NCOs of just INR 39 mn  - which amount to just 1 bp of total loans on an annualized basis, we find that reserves improved INR 1.0 bn or 4.0% linked quarter. While we admire LIC’s conservatism relative to peer, we would still be comfortable with reserves being INR 3.3 bn (11.8%) higher. That said, at this pace, LIC should get there within three quarters; and        *Competition Intensifying: Increasing competition could impact profitability, however, with both housing lenders and private banks significantly cutting interest rates.

LIC Housing Finance – Doing The Right Thing

SBI (State Bank of India) / Equity Bottom-Up

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

India

Punjab National Bank provides financial services such as corporate and personal banking, industrial finance, agricultural finance, financing of trade and international banking. The Company provides services to domestic conglomerates, medium and small industrial units, exporters, non-resident Indians and multinational companies.

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Punjab National Bank (PNB IN)

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: New Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the...

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: Certain Borrowers Are Dis-Satisfied With "Interest On Interest Waiver" And Proposed Additional Modifications To RBI...

Thomas J. Monaco

LIC Housing Finance – Doing The Right Thing

LIC HOUSING FINANCE: Although Results Were Weaker Linked Quarter, They Were Driven By Higher Credit Costs. This Was Unnecessary Given Credit...

Thomas J. Monaco

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

STATE BANK OF INDIA: Costs Increasing, Credit Deteriorating, Reserve Cover Declining. This Is A Recipe For A Massive Capital Raise.

Thomas J. Monaco

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