External broker reports(aggregated public sources), Topline Securities

Topline Securities

External broker reports(aggregated public sources)

Topline Securities is one of the fastest growing brokerage houses in Pakistan. It has strong equity brokerage, economic / equity research, mutual fund distribution, commodity trading and corporate finance & advisory functions. Content available is external broker reports authored by a third party outside the Smartkarma network and has been aggregated by an online aggregator through publicly available sources and is displayed by Smartkarma in this format for user's convenience and general informational purposes only. Content does not constitute investment or financial advice and Smartkarma makes no representation or warranty regarding its accuracy or contents. Original third party author retains all copyright and other proprietary rights in the content. Access or use of third party links not controlled by Smartkarma are at the user's own risk.

Macroeconomics

<ul><li>The United States of America (USA) has announced revised reciprocal tariffs on trading partners on Jul 31, 2025. This was as per the Aug 01, 2025 deadline announced by the US government for making negotiations with trade partners over tariffs.</li><li>To recap, Pakistan exports US$6bn goods to USA (18%) and is country’s largest trading partner.</li><li>Last night, revised tariffs were announced by the US government, wherein Pakistan will now face reciprocal tariffs of 19% compared to earlier rate of 29%, reducing the impact by around 10ppts. However, some of the peer countries who were at much higher bracket before are almost at par with Pakistan now.</li></ul>

The United States of America (USA) has announced revised reciprocal tariffs on trading partners on Jul 31, 2025. This was as per the Aug 01, 2025 deadline announced by the US government for making negotiations with trade partners over tariffs.To recap, Pakistan exports US$6bn goods to USA (18%) and is country’s largest trading partner.Last night, revised tariffs were announced by the US government, wherein Pakistan will now face reciprocal tariffs of 19% compared to earlier rate of 29%, reducing the impact by around 10ppts. However, some of the peer countries who were at much higher bracket before are almost at par with Pakistan now.

Pakistan Market - Pakistan To Face 19% Reciprocal US Tariffs; Better Than India, But Largely At Par With Vietnam And Bangladesh

Chief Economist & Political Strategist, CrossASEAN Research

Prasenjit K. Basu

Chief Economist & Political Strategist

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

<ul>
<li>Dissanayake, representing the communist JVP (which has never won more than 10% of any nationwide vote) has 48% support in the latest poll before today's presidential election. </li>
<li>IMF's EFF is Sri Lanka's economic lifeline. Via it, President Wickremasinghe has restored 5% real GDP growth, lowered inflation, swung the current account to surplus and rebuilt FX reserves. </li>
<li>External debt is 10x FX reserves, so Dissanayake's plans to cut tax rates, eliminate VAT on food/health/education would jeopardize the IMF program. Hopefully the election outcome differs from that poll. </li>
</ul>


Dissanayake, representing the communist JVP (which has never won more than 10% of any nationwide vote) has 48% support in the latest poll before today's presidential election. 
IMF's EFF is Sri Lanka's economic lifeline. Via it, President Wickremasinghe has restored 5% real GDP growth, lowered inflation, swung the current account to surplus and rebuilt FX reserves. 
External debt is 10x FX reserves, so Dissanayake's plans to cut tax rates, eliminate VAT on food/health/education would jeopardize the IMF program. Hopefully the election outcome differs from that poll. 


Sri Lanka: Election Could Jeopardise Hard-Earned Economic Gains, but Hopefully Won't

Sri Lanka's public debt was 100% of GDP in 2020, and its primary fiscal deficit is officially estimated to be 4% of GDP this year, implying that the government has chosen to stay on an unsustainable fiscal path. External debt is even more precarious, with foreign reserves (US$4.8bn in January 2021) far below short-term external debt, and a deteriorating basic balance (with large portfolio outflows in recent quarters, and negligible FDI inflow). Without an IMF program, the RBI declined to roll-over a currency swap in February 2021, although China provided an additional RMB10 billion swap on 23 March 2021. China's support is a poisoned chalice (with an "unequal treaty" already handing one port, Hambantota, to China's control), but even with that Sri Lanka will struggle to make the US$4 billion of external debt repayments this year, and larger ones in the next 4 years. We recommend staying well clear of Sri Lanka bonds due in 2022 and beyond. Sovereign defaults are rare in Asia, and Sri Lanka prides itself on never having defaulted on its external debts. But with foreign reserves down to US$4.8 billion in January 2021 (of which US$1.37 billion comprised currency swaps with other central banks), while short term external debt was estimated at US$9 billion, Sri Lanka's external liquidity situation was extremely precarious. On 23 March 2021, Sri Lanka signed a RMB10 billion (over US$1.5 billion) swap facility with China, which should enable repayment of the US$1 billion sovereign bond that matures on 27 July 2021. But the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had declined to roll-over a US$400 million swap in February 2021, and the Rajapaksa government has ruled out turning to the IMF, leaving it with very few other options. External debt repayments for each of the next 5 years are US$4-5 billion annually, and total external debt is 285% of Sri Lanka's annual exports of goods &amp; services (far above the average of 110% for all developing economies). The external debt service ratio has been above 30% for the past two years, well above the 25% level that is considered risky. Public debt reached 100% of GDP in 2020 (up from 79.9% in 2017 and 86.3% in 2019), and the primary fiscal deficit is officially expected to be 2.5% of GDP in 2020 and 4% of GDP in 2021. So the public debt will stay on an unsustainable path, rising (by Fitch's estimate) to 116% of GDP in 2022. In 2020, the domestic public debt was financed primarily through a huge 62.7% YoY increase in net credit to government (81% of it from commercial banks), which caused M2 money supply to expand 23.4% YoY in 2020, the fastest expansion in more than 25 years. Rapid monetary expansion didn't cause inflation to rise much in 2020 (with recession causing a large output gap that would have depressed price levels). Money supply will perforce decelerate in 2021 as the economy returns to normalcy, and net credit to government must decelerate sharply too. Massive government borrowings will cause domestic bond yields to rise, making public debt even more unsustainable. The Rajapaksa government has spoken of two approaches to meeting its external obligations -- using non-debt capital flows to finance the current account deficit (which is relatively small at 2% of GDP), and the "Malaysia template" (1998) of capital controls (supplemented by import controls). The Malaysia template is irrelevant, because Malaysia had a much more diversified export base (huge electronics exports, not just commodities like palm-oil, rubber, crude oil which responded very strongly to the depreciated ringgit), much larger ongoing FDI inflows (4% of GDP, while Sri Lanka rarely receives more than 1% of GDP worth of FDI), and used the capital controls to rapidly resolve its banks' bad-loan problem; Malaysia did not have public or external debt challenges remotely as large as Sri Lanka does. FDI as a source of funding for Sri Lanka's current account deficit has diminished rapidly (to just US$743 million, 0.8% of GDP, in 2019, and US$434 million, or 0.5% of GDP in 2020), and foreign portfolio outflows have grown steadily in each of the past 6 quarters (to US$1,149 million in 4Q 2020, a quarter in which FDI inflow was just US$ 89 million). Apart from a tyre-manufacturing proposal from a mid-sized Chinese producer (not among the top-30 in the world or the top-5 in China), no significant FDI is in the pipeline. So foreign reserves are likely to continue declining, and Sri Lanka will face an external payments crisis by October 2021 in the absence of even larger lending by China -- which (like in Hambantota port) will involve covenants that give China ownership of Sri Lankan land and other assets in the event of non-payment.

Sri Lanka's public debt was 100% of GDP in 2020, and its primary fiscal deficit is officially estimated to be 4% of GDP this year, implying that the government has chosen to stay on an unsustainable fiscal path. External debt is even more precarious, with foreign reserves (US$4.8bn in January 2021) far below short-term external debt, and a deteriorating basic balance (with large portfolio outflows in recent quarters, and negligible FDI inflow). Without an IMF program, the RBI declined to roll-over a currency swap in February 2021, although China provided an additional RMB10 billion swap on 23 March 2021. China's support is a poisoned chalice (with an "unequal treaty" already handing one port, Hambantota, to China's control), but even with that Sri Lanka will struggle to make the US$4 billion of external debt repayments this year, and larger ones in the next 4 years. We recommend staying well clear of Sri Lanka bonds due in 2022 and beyond. Sovereign defaults are rare in Asia, and Sri Lanka prides itself on never having defaulted on its external debts. But with foreign reserves down to US$4.8 billion in January 2021 (of which US$1.37 billion comprised currency swaps with other central banks), while short term external debt was estimated at US$9 billion, Sri Lanka's external liquidity situation was extremely precarious. On 23 March 2021, Sri Lanka signed a RMB10 billion (over US$1.5 billion) swap facility with China, which should enable repayment of the US$1 billion sovereign bond that matures on 27 July 2021. But the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had declined to roll-over a US$400 million swap in February 2021, and the Rajapaksa government has ruled out turning to the IMF, leaving it with very few other options. External debt repayments for each of the next 5 years are US$4-5 billion annually, and total external debt is 285% of Sri Lanka's annual exports of goods &amp; services (far above the average of 110% for all developing economies). The external debt service ratio has been above 30% for the past two years, well above the 25% level that is considered risky. Public debt reached 100% of GDP in 2020 (up from 79.9% in 2017 and 86.3% in 2019), and the primary fiscal deficit is officially expected to be 2.5% of GDP in 2020 and 4% of GDP in 2021. So the public debt will stay on an unsustainable path, rising (by Fitch's estimate) to 116% of GDP in 2022. In 2020, the domestic public debt was financed primarily through a huge 62.7% YoY increase in net credit to government (81% of it from commercial banks), which caused M2 money supply to expand 23.4% YoY in 2020, the fastest expansion in more than 25 years. Rapid monetary expansion didn't cause inflation to rise much in 2020 (with recession causing a large output gap that would have depressed price levels). Money supply will perforce decelerate in 2021 as the economy returns to normalcy, and net credit to government must decelerate sharply too. Massive government borrowings will cause domestic bond yields to rise, making public debt even more unsustainable. The Rajapaksa government has spoken of two approaches to meeting its external obligations -- using non-debt capital flows to finance the current account deficit (which is relatively small at 2% of GDP), and the "Malaysia template" (1998) of capital controls (supplemented by import controls). The Malaysia template is irrelevant, because Malaysia had a much more diversified export base (huge electronics exports, not just commodities like palm-oil, rubber, crude oil which responded very strongly to the depreciated ringgit), much larger ongoing FDI inflows (4% of GDP, while Sri Lanka rarely receives more than 1% of GDP worth of FDI), and used the capital controls to rapidly resolve its banks' bad-loan problem; Malaysia did not have public or external debt challenges remotely as large as Sri Lanka does. FDI as a source of funding for Sri Lanka's current account deficit has diminished rapidly (to just US$743 million, 0.8% of GDP, in 2019, and US$434 million, or 0.5% of GDP in 2020), and foreign portfolio outflows have grown steadily in each of the past 6 quarters (to US$1,149 million in 4Q 2020, a quarter in which FDI inflow was just US$ 89 million). Apart from a tyre-manufacturing proposal from a mid-sized Chinese producer (not among the top-30 in the world or the top-5 in China), no significant FDI is in the pipeline. So foreign reserves are likely to continue declining, and Sri Lanka will face an external payments crisis by October 2021 in the absence of even larger lending by China -- which (like in Hambantota port) will involve covenants that give China ownership of Sri Lankan land and other assets in the event of non-payment. 

Sri Lanka: Closer to Being Asia's Argentina Despite Swaps from PRC's Poisoned Chalice

Sri Lanka

Singer (Sri Lanka) PLC operates as a retail and consumer finance company that provides household consumer durables and transactional financial services in Sri Lanka.

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Singer Sri Lanka (SINS SL)

Pakistan Market - Pakistan To Face 19% Reciprocal US Tariffs; Better Than India, But Largely At Par With Vietnam And Bangladesh

The United States of America (USA) has announced revised reciprocal tariffs on trading partners on Jul 31, 2025. This was as per the Aug 01, 2025...

Topline Securities

Sri Lanka: Election Could Jeopardise Hard-Earned Economic Gains, but Hopefully Won't

Communist JVP's Dissanayake has 48% support in last poll, substituting SLPP. Unless electoral outcome differs, SL's IMF program would be...

Prasenjit K. Basu

Sri Lanka: Closer to Being Asia's Argentina Despite Swaps from PRC's Poisoned Chalice

Sri Lanka's public debt is 100% of GDP, & 2021 primary fiscal deficit 4% of GDP. External debt is 440% of goods exports, foreign reserves are...

Prasenjit K. Basu

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)

Pakistan Market - Pakistan To Face 19% Reciprocal US Tariffs; Better Than India, But Largely At Par With Vietnam And Bangladesh

The United States of America (USA) has announced revised reciprocal tariffs on trading partners on Jul 31, 2025. This was as per the Aug 01, 2025...

Topline Securities

Sri Lanka: Election Could Jeopardise Hard-Earned Economic Gains, but Hopefully Won't

​Communist JVP's Dissanayake has 48% support in last poll, substituting SLPP. Unless electoral outcome differs, SL's IMF program would be...

Prasenjit K. Basu

Sri Lanka: Closer to Being Asia's Argentina Despite Swaps from PRC's Poisoned Chalice

Sri Lanka's public debt is 100% of GDP, & 2021 primary fiscal deficit 4% of GDP. External debt is 440% of goods exports, foreign reserves are...

Prasenjit K. Basu

Communist JVP's Dissanayake has 48% support in last poll, substituting SLPP. Unless electoral outcome differs, SL's IMF program would be...