'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/117/963/original/2020-02-15_09-46-55.png?1581796265" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="117963"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>A YEAR TO FORGET - The aggregate earnings of Japanese listed companies peaked on December 26th 2018 and, over the last five quarters, have declined by ¥10.5 trillion or by 22%. Net margins have declined by 135 basis points over this period to 4.5%, 224 bps below the current operating margin. Whatever the uncertainties over the impact of Covid-19, the current quarter will see a further decline. A base-case outlook for aggregate Net Income is ¥30 trillion by May 2020, which, if the total market cap were to remain at current levels, would take the  PE to a ten-year high of 22.4 times. The decline in Operating Income has been more moderate at 11%, illustrating the still all-too-frequent write-offs that Japanse corporate routinely require as penance for their mostly-overseas capital misallocations.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/117/966/original/2020-02-16_05-32-51.png?1581798783" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="117966"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/117/967/original/2020-02-16_05-28-20.png?1581798803" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="117967"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>ACCELERATING DOWNTREND -  Trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Revenues are now declining quarter-on-quarter, and the pace of decline in Operating Income has accelerated for the fourth quarter in a row. The aggregate one year forward forecasts have seen falling QoQ revenues and OP since TTM-2. With only one month to go before the end of FY2020 for the majority of companies and with many December year-end companies looking forward ten months, a degree of optimism has slowed the pace of decline in the current quarter. We expect Covid-19 to result in many of these forecasts to be revised down at the interim results to be released in August. RECESSION - With GDP shrinking by an annualised 6.3% in the fourth quarter and Covid-19 having at least a similar impact in the current quarter, Japan will be in an, albeit 'technical', recession by the spring.<div class="content-highlight">In the DETAIL below, we shall review the actual results and initial and revised forecasts by Sector and highlight the best and worst-performing companies by one-quarter revenue and margin changes. Part 2 will update our Results and Revision Scoring for the market, Sectors, Peer Groups and Companies.</div>

Source • Japan AnalyticsA YEAR TO FORGET - The aggregate earnings of Japanese listed companies peaked on December 26th 2018 and, over the last five quarters, have declined by ¥10.5 trillion or by 22%. Net margins have declined by 135 basis points over this period to 4.5%, 224 bps below the current operating margin. Whatever the uncertainties over the impact of Covid-19, the current quarter will see a further decline. A base-case outlook for aggregate Net Income is ¥30 trillion by May 2020, which, if the total market cap were to remain at current levels, would take the  PE to a ten-year high of 22.4 times. The decline in Operating Income has been more moderate at 11%, illustrating the still all-too-frequent write-offs that Japanse corporate routinely require as penance for their mostly-overseas capital misallocations.Source • Japan AnalyticsACCELERATING DOWNTREND -  Trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Revenues are now declining quarter-on-quarter, and the pace of decline in Operating Income has accelerated for the fourth quarter in a row. The aggregate one year forward forecasts have seen falling QoQ revenues and OP since TTM-2. With only one month to go before the end of FY2020 for the majority of companies and with many December year-end companies looking forward ten months, a degree of optimism has slowed the pace of decline in the current quarter. We expect Covid-19 to result in many of these forecasts to be revised down at the interim results to be released in August. RECESSION - With GDP shrinking by an annualised 6.3% in the fourth quarter and Covid-19 having at least a similar impact in the current quarter, Japan will be in an, albeit 'technical', recession by the spring.In the DETAIL below, we shall review the actual results and initial and revised forecasts by Sector and highlight the best and worst-performing companies by one-quarter revenue and margin changes. Part 2 will update our Results and Revision Scoring for the market, Sectors, Peer Groups and Companies.

🇯🇵 JAPAN • IT'S A WRAP! Part 1 - 2020-Q1 Earnings Results & Forecasts

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/118/081/original/2020-02-15_06-17-37.png?1581880049" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="118081"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/118/082/original/2020-02-17_04-10-15.png?1581880238" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="118082"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>14TH FEBRUARY ROUNDUP - With apologies to <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/trend-micro-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13172:1" rel="noopener">Trend Micro (4704 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bridgestone-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8914:1" rel="noopener">Bridgestone (5108 JP)</a> who have yet to report, this will be our last daily roundup for this 'season'. After an additional 398 results and 253 forecasts/revision announcements, our Results Score dropped by a further eight basis points to -0.84, a decline of 190 basis points since the beginning of the year. The Forecast/Revision Score added three bps to reach 0.70, forty basis point higher than at the end of December. The last time that the Forecast/Revision Score was more than 150 bps higher than the Results Score was in the first calendar quarter of 2016 and preceded a sharp market upturn. The current market value is, however, ¥160 trillion higher than at that point, assisted by the constant market intervention by the Bank of Japan. Covid-19's impact will see the 2016 playbook repeated next quarter with a lower Results Score and a 'sideways' Forecast/Results Score. We are less optimistic that the market will repeat the 14% rise seen in 2016-Q2. The cycle low point will be reached with the mostly-interim results to be released in six months.

Source • Japan Analytics14TH FEBRUARY ROUNDUP - With apologies to Trend Micro (4704 JP) and Bridgestone (5108 JP) who have yet to report, this will be our last daily roundup for this 'season'. After an additional 398 results and 253 forecasts/revision announcements, our Results Score dropped by a further eight basis points to -0.84, a decline of 190 basis points since the beginning of the year. The Forecast/Revision Score added three bps to reach 0.70, forty basis point higher than at the end of December. The last time that the Forecast/Revision Score was more than 150 bps higher than the Results Score was in the first calendar quarter of 2016 and preceded a sharp market upturn. The current market value is, however, ¥160 trillion higher than at that point, assisted by the constant market intervention by the Bank of Japan. Covid-19's impact will see the 2016 playbook repeated next quarter with a lower Results Score and a 'sideways' Forecast/Results Score. We are less optimistic that the market will repeat the 14% rise seen in 2016-Q2. The cycle low point will be reached with the mostly-interim results to be released in six months. 

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Results & Revisions Daily Roundup - 14th February ▲2212 4927 8358 ▼ 6502 6098 9435

Alpha-Centric ESG Research

Kyle Rudden

Imagine a sell-side analyst calls. You ignore it, of course, and the voicemail goes like this:
<blockquote>
This is Hunter from Barr, King, Seals. We're downgrading Atomic &amp; Fossil Power to a Potential Future Buy, our lowest rating. Key points are that fish-kill rates from plant effluents are way up, charitable giving is down year-over-year, and the Board is still just a bunch of old white men.
</blockquote>
Sounds absurd, doesn't it?
There's a very good reason for that.
The truth is, ESG information doesn't drive stock prices.
I'm not saying ESG performance isn’t accretive to long-term value; often it is. Rather, I am saying that ESG informational events don't have nearly the same sway as their financial equivalents.
Financial information – about profits, losses, mergers, write-downs, upgrades, downgrades, and CFOs pursuing other interests – has a direct and immediate impact on securities prices.
ESG information, on the other hand, creeps into valuations circuitously.
By definition as non-financial data, ESG is always one or more degrees of separation from what really matters. ESG must impact financial metrics before manifesting, indirectly in prices.
Put another way, ESG isn't value in and of itself; it's a catalyst for value.
It's not all rain on the parade though. Some ESG events do move prices. Additionally, as the quality and timeliness of ESG data continues to improve, markets will absorb it with increasing efficiency.
This topic, how ESG information is assimilated into stock prices, is so pertinent to ESG Alpha – the core leitmotif of my research – that I will address it as a quasi-series, starting with this report.
Rather than kick this off with a buzz kill (hint: ESG scores/ratings are lousy predictors of price), I'm starting with a kind of ESG information event that affects stocks materially in the here-and-now.
Fat-tail hitting-the-fan Enron-esque ESG-related news.
Herein, I analyze a few recent ESG events that make the cut as statistically-significant in terms of inferred causality – and a few that surprisingly don't. Though not a complete list, here are a few:
<ul>
<li>Single-stock events (PG&amp;E, Toshiba, Chipotle, Steinhoff, Equifax, Bausch Health, Kobe Steel)</li>
<li>The Volkswagen "Dieselgate" or "Emissionsgate" scandal (VW, Porsche, MAN SE, and others)</li>
<li>Danske Bank A/S and Swedbank AB getting caught up in the "Baltic Money Laundering Scandal"</li>
<li>U.S. pharmaceutical companies being sued for damages associated with the U.S. opioid crisis</li>
</ul>

Imagine a sell-side analyst calls. You ignore it, of course, and the voicemail goes like this:

This is Hunter from Barr, King, Seals. We're downgrading Atomic &amp; Fossil Power to a Potential Future Buy, our lowest rating. Key points are that fish-kill rates from plant effluents are way up, charitable giving is down year-over-year, and the Board is still just a bunch of old white men.

Sounds absurd, doesn't it?
There's a very good reason for that.
The truth is, ESG information doesn't drive stock prices.
I'm not saying ESG performance isn’t accretive to long-term value; often it is. Rather, I am saying that ESG informational events don't have nearly the same sway as their financial equivalents.
Financial information – about profits, losses, mergers, write-downs, upgrades, downgrades, and CFOs pursuing other interests – has a direct and immediate impact on securities prices.
ESG information, on the other hand, creeps into valuations circuitously.
By definition as non-financial data, ESG is always one or more degrees of separation from what really matters. ESG must impact financial metrics before manifesting, indirectly in prices.
Put another way, ESG isn't value in and of itself; it's a catalyst for value.
It's not all rain on the parade though. Some ESG events do move prices. Additionally, as the quality and timeliness of ESG data continues to improve, markets will absorb it with increasing efficiency.
This topic, how ESG information is assimilated into stock prices, is so pertinent to ESG Alpha – the core leitmotif of my research – that I will address it as a quasi-series, starting with this report.
Rather than kick this off with a buzz kill (hint: ESG scores/ratings are lousy predictors of price), I'm starting with a kind of ESG information event that affects stocks materially in the here-and-now.
Fat-tail hitting-the-fan Enron-esque ESG-related news.
Herein, I analyze a few recent ESG events that make the cut as statistically-significant in terms of inferred causality – and a few that surprisingly don't. Though not a complete list, here are a few:

Single-stock events (PG&amp;E, Toshiba, Chipotle, Steinhoff, Equifax, Bausch Health, Kobe Steel)
The Volkswagen "Dieselgate" or "Emissionsgate" scandal (VW, Porsche, MAN SE, and others)
Danske Bank A/S and Swedbank AB getting caught up in the "Baltic Money Laundering Scandal"
U.S. pharmaceutical companies being sued for damages associated with the U.S. opioid crisis



<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/083/132/original/2019-03-25_18-58-11.png?1553507902" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="83132"></figure>Source: Japan Analytics
</div>There are currently 241 listed Japanese companies that can be categorised as Internet businesses. Our classification overlaps with the TOPIX-33 Information &amp; Communication sub-Sector but is broader in that it encompasses all companies listed on all sections and exchanges but is also narrower in that we have excluded Telecommunications (including <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/315" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:315:1">S</a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/315" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:315:1">oftbank Group (9984 JP)</a>) and Information Technology companies. We have adopted a 'quantamental' approach which covers the long-term and current trends for Japan's Internet Sector as a whole, as well as eight sub-Sectors or Peer Groups and the Sectors' leading companies by market capitalisation.  Our focus is exclusively on the locally-listed universe and is based on disclosed financial and market data. We do not provide any forecasts, other than the companies' own forecasts and we do not attempt to make any business model or strategic judgments. Our focus is purely on financial and market performance. We do not cover unlisted and defunct companies such as Livedoor and, therefore, there is implicit survivor bias in the data. The broad themes that are developed in DETAIL below are grouped into six topics as follows: - • SUMMARY •  • FUNDAMENTAL OVERVIEW •  • SCORING - RESULTS &amp; REVISIONS / RELATIVE PRICE •  • RESULTS TRENDS •  • VALUATION • • RECOMMENDATIONS •<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/083/206/original/2019-03-25_17-46-58.png?1553565764" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="83206"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>OVERVIEW - As will be covered in greater DETAIL below, Japan has failed to evolve a substantial Internet Sector and, in many business models, has been passed by global competitors including in the home market. Although Internet Sector revenues have grown steadily and now account for close to 1% of the total for all listed companies, operating margins have declined by half in the last seven years and are now only four percentage points higher than the market average. Accordingly, as measured by our Results &amp; Revision Score, the Sector is close to a twelve-year low. The market's response is an unchanged Sector weight in the market composite despite the addition of 111 new companies in the last six years, and a Relative Price Score that has moved in a narrow range over that period. The Sector averages disguise the weak business and market performance of a handful of Sector leaders as well as the overvaluation of the Sector's more successful business models, which is partly a result of a lack of alternatives. Despite the world's most significant Internet investor - <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/315" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:315:1">Softbank Group (9984 JP)</a>'s Vision Fund - being based in Japan, this fund and other global investors in Internet business have been right to give Japan a 'pass'.


Source: Japan Analytics
There are currently 241 listed Japanese companies that can be categorised as Internet businesses. Our classification overlaps with the TOPIX-33 Information &amp; Communication sub-Sector but is broader in that it encompasses all companies listed on all sections and exchanges but is also narrower in that we have excluded Telecommunications (including Softbank Group (9984 JP)) and Information Technology companies. We have adopted a 'quantamental' approach which covers the long-term and current trends for Japan's Internet Sector as a whole, as well as eight sub-Sectors or Peer Groups and the Sectors' leading companies by market capitalisation.  Our focus is exclusively on the locally-listed universe and is based on disclosed financial and market data. We do not provide any forecasts, other than the companies' own forecasts and we do not attempt to make any business model or strategic judgments. Our focus is purely on financial and market performance. We do not cover unlisted and defunct companies such as Livedoor and, therefore, there is implicit survivor bias in the data. The broad themes that are developed in DETAIL below are grouped into six topics as follows: - • SUMMARY •  • FUNDAMENTAL OVERVIEW •  • SCORING - RESULTS &amp; REVISIONS / RELATIVE PRICE •  • RESULTS TRENDS •  • VALUATION • • RECOMMENDATIONS •Source: Japan AnalyticsOVERVIEW - As will be covered in greater DETAIL below, Japan has failed to evolve a substantial Internet Sector and, in many business models, has been passed by global competitors including in the home market. Although Internet Sector revenues have grown steadily and now account for close to 1% of the total for all listed companies, operating margins have declined by half in the last seven years and are now only four percentage points higher than the market average. Accordingly, as measured by our Results &amp; Revision Score, the Sector is close to a twelve-year low. The market's response is an unchanged Sector weight in the market composite despite the addition of 111 new companies in the last six years, and a Relative Price Score that has moved in a narrow range over that period. The Sector averages disguise the weak business and market performance of a handful of Sector leaders as well as the overvaluation of the Sector's more successful business models, which is partly a result of a lack of alternatives. Despite the world's most significant Internet investor - Softbank Group (9984 JP)'s Vision Fund - being based in Japan, this fund and other global investors in Internet business have been right to give Japan a 'pass'. 

🇯🇵 Japan • Internet Sector Review - 'Japan Passing'

Materials Analyst/Strategist, Janus Analysis

Gaius King

Materials Analyst/Strategist

Accelerating Tomorrow’s Independent Research

Boost Research

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<ul>
<li>Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies</li>
<li>LT contracts &amp; speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot price increase</li>
<li>Primary/secondary Uranium supplies currently 112% of 2017 demand</li>
<li>Uranium supply deficits extremely unlikely before 2022</li>
<li>Global Uranium demand to fall 25-40% by 2050</li>
<li> Primary Uranium sector LT SELL</li>
</ul>
We have independently audited global nuclear construction statistics in order to determine future Uranium demand.  Although near-term statistics match those in the public domain, long-term demand determined via construction pipeline illustrates substantial discrepancies.  Compiling planned plant construction, operational extensions, nameplate upgrades, versus decommissioning announcements/events, and in many cases, public policy inertia; has led us to believe that despite historical primary supply shortages, global nuclear demand peaked in 2006.
Since plateauing and despite strong Chinese growth, nuclear power generation has fallen &lt;2% over the past two decades, a decline that is predicted to accelerate as a number of developed and developing nations pursue other energy options.
The macro-trend not replacing existing nuclear infrastructure means (dependent on assumptions), according to our calculations, global uranium demand will decrease between 20 to 40% by 2050.
As opposed to signifying a fundamental change in underlying demand, we believe that recent Uranium price increases are the result of producers closing primary operations, and substituting production with purchases on the spot market to meet long-term contract obligations.  In addition, hedge funds are buying physical uranium in order to realise profits on potential future commodity price increases.  Critically, we determine that primary and secondary supplies are more than sufficient to meet forecast demand over the next four to five years; before taking into account substantial existing global uranium stocks, some of which are able to re-enter the spot market at short notice.


Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies
LT contracts &amp; speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot price increase
Primary/secondary Uranium supplies currently 112% of 2017 demand
Uranium supply deficits extremely unlikely before 2022
Global Uranium demand to fall 25-40% by 2050
 Primary Uranium sector LT SELL

We have independently audited global nuclear construction statistics in order to determine future Uranium demand.  Although near-term statistics match those in the public domain, long-term demand determined via construction pipeline illustrates substantial discrepancies.  Compiling planned plant construction, operational extensions, nameplate upgrades, versus decommissioning announcements/events, and in many cases, public policy inertia; has led us to believe that despite historical primary supply shortages, global nuclear demand peaked in 2006.
Since plateauing and despite strong Chinese growth, nuclear power generation has fallen &lt;2% over the past two decades, a decline that is predicted to accelerate as a number of developed and developing nations pursue other energy options.
The macro-trend not replacing existing nuclear infrastructure means (dependent on assumptions), according to our calculations, global uranium demand will decrease between 20 to 40% by 2050.
As opposed to signifying a fundamental change in underlying demand, we believe that recent Uranium price increases are the result of producers closing primary operations, and substituting production with purchases on the spot market to meet long-term contract obligations.  In addition, hedge funds are buying physical uranium in order to realise profits on potential future commodity price increases.  Critically, we determine that primary and secondary supplies are more than sufficient to meet forecast demand over the next four to five years; before taking into account substantial existing global uranium stocks, some of which are able to re-enter the spot market at short notice.

Uranium - About to Enter Its Own Nuclear Winter

Japan

Toshiba Corporation manufactures and markets electrical and electronic products. The Company's products include digital products such as PCs and televisions, NAND flash memories, and system LSIs (large-scale integrated), as well as social infrastructures such as power generators, medical equipment, and home appliances.

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Toshiba Corp (6502 JP)

🇯🇵 JAPAN • IT'S A WRAP! Part 1 - 2020-Q1 Earnings Results & Forecasts

A YEAR TO FORGET - The aggregate earnings of Japanese listed companies peaked on December 26th 2018 and, over the last five quarters, have declined...

Campbell Gunn

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Results & Revisions Daily Roundup - 14th February ▲2212 4927 8358 ▼ 6502 6098 9435

14TH FEBRUARY ROUNDUP - With apologies to Trend Micro (4704 JP) and Bridgestone (5108 JP) who have yet to report, this will be our last daily...

Campbell Gunn

ESG and Stock Prices: Fat-Tail Events

Imagine a sell-side analyst calls. You ignore it, of course, and the voicemail goes like this: This is Hunter from Barr, King, Seals. We're...

Kyle Rudden

🇯🇵 Japan • Internet Sector Review - 'Japan Passing'

There are currently 241 listed Japanese companies that can be categorised as Internet businesses. Our classification overlaps with the TOPIX-33...

Campbell Gunn

Uranium - About to Enter Its Own Nuclear Winter

Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies LT contracts & speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot...

Boost Research

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