Private Markets, Angel and Secondary Investing, Sacra

Sacra

Bringing transparency to private markets so investors, founders, and employees can build on conviction.

Sacra delivers deeply researched insights on the private companies shaping tomorrow's markets. By surfacing the data, context, and operator perspective that are missing from private markets today, we help secondary buyers and sellers price equity accurately and unlock liquidity for the people building these businesses.

Private Markets, Angel and Secondary Investing

Bringing transparency to private markets so investors, founders, and employees can build on conviction. Sacra delivers deeply researched insights on the private companies shaping tomorrow's markets. By surfacing the data, context, and operator perspective that are missing from private markets today, we help secondary buyers and sellers price equity accurately and unlock liquidity for the people building these businesses.

Private Capital Markets

<ul><li dir="ltr">Even before OpenAI announced the shutdown of Sora 2 (March 2026), Seeddance (Bytedance), Veo (Google) &amp; Kling (Kuaishou) had taken the lead on video foundation models, each owning a large video property—TikTok, YouTube and Kwai / Snack Video, respectively—with 1,000 terabytes/day of new videos serving as training data both in terms of raw video data volume and engagement metadata, doing in-house what OpenAI was forced to do via deals with Shutterstock and Disney ($1B investment).</li><li dir="ltr">Meanwhile, network effect social platforms Instagram (Meta) with 3B monthly active users (MAUs) and TikTok with 2B (ByteDance) dominated where consumers actually watched AI videos and where they went viral, versus the Sora app (~5M MAUs) which peaked at #1 in the App Store (October 2025) before falling out of the top 100 by January 2026, with monthly downloads dropping from ~3.3M in November to ~1M in February.</li><li dir="ltr">Burning $15M/day on video generation alone ($5.4B annualized) at ~$1.30 and ~40 min of GPU time per every 10-second clip and, with video requiring ~100x the compute of text and $225B+ in projected inference costs through 2030, OpenAI is increasingly redirecting GPUs toward Codex &amp; the strategic battleground of AI coding and the enterprise where they compete with Anthropic, leaving foundation model development in video to long-duration, profitable &amp; cash-generating players Google &amp; ByteDance.</li></ul>

Even before OpenAI announced the shutdown of Sora 2 (March 2026), Seeddance (Bytedance), Veo (Google) &amp; Kling (Kuaishou) had taken the lead on video foundation models, each owning a large video property—TikTok, YouTube and Kwai / Snack Video, respectively—with 1,000 terabytes/day of new videos serving as training data both in terms of raw video data volume and engagement metadata, doing in-house what OpenAI was forced to do via deals with Shutterstock and Disney ($1B investment).Meanwhile, network effect social platforms Instagram (Meta) with 3B monthly active users (MAUs) and TikTok with 2B (ByteDance) dominated where consumers actually watched AI videos and where they went viral, versus the Sora app (~5M MAUs) which peaked at #1 in the App Store (October 2025) before falling out of the top 100 by January 2026, with monthly downloads dropping from ~3.3M in November to ~1M in February.Burning $15M/day on video generation alone ($5.4B annualized) at ~$1.30 and ~40 min of GPU time per every 10-second clip and, with video requiring ~100x the compute of text and $225B+ in projected inference costs through 2030, OpenAI is increasingly redirecting GPUs toward Codex &amp; the strategic battleground of AI coding and the enterprise where they compete with Anthropic, leaving foundation model development in video to long-duration, profitable &amp; cash-generating players Google &amp; ByteDance.

OpenAI

Why Sora Failed