Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

HK Type 4 license through Ballingal Investment Advisors Ltd. 

I'm a highly experienced sell-side analyst with in excess of 22 years of covering Asia Pacific equities, the past 19 years immersed in event strategies encompassing M&A risk arbitrage, directional long/short, stub trades and restructuring.  

My background also includes accountancy (liquidation/bankruptcy/receivership) earlier in my career and as a chief financial officer of a global commodity company based in the US and Mexico.

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Trina Solar: Appraisal Rights Judgment Another Setback for Dissenters

Homecoming For Chinese Companies: Appraisal Rights & Fair Value

58.com: Foregone Conclusion Amidst Proxy Advisor Pushback

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

On the 24 January last year, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/changyou-com-ltd-ads" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19287:1" rel="noopener">Changyou.com (CYOU US)</a> <a href="http://ir.changyou.com/file/New-Comet-20200124.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">entered</a> into a definitive agreement with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sohu-com-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22853:1" rel="noopener">Sohu.com Inc (SOHU US)</a> at US$5.40/share, or US$10.80/ADS in cash. On the 14 April,  Sohu <a href="http://investors.sohu.com/static-files/4f6c805d-a81c-4799-a043-3d163d5702e7" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> the filing of the definitive plan of merger.
<div>
Sohu held 67.4% of shares out in Changyou via its A and B shares and 95.3% of the voting rights given the disproportionate voting power of the B shares. As Sohu held &gt;90% of the votes, the Offer was in the form of a short-form statutory merger under Cayman Law - i.e. approval from Changyou's shareholders was not required. No vote, no dissent. Done deal.
But wait ...
In a ruling handed down on the 28 January, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands concluded that shareholders of companies that undertake a 'short-form' merger are entitled to dissent. 
<blockquote>
It would be absurd to exclude a dissentient member of a company subject to short-form merger from the protection of section 238 simply because, unlike in the case of a long-form merger, that member is not allowed to vote.
</blockquote>
The ruling has wide-ranging implications.
More below the fold.
</div>

On the 24 January last year, Changyou.com (CYOU US) entered into a definitive agreement with Sohu.com Inc (SOHU US) at US$5.40/share, or US$10.80/ADS in cash. On the 14 April,  Sohu announced the filing of the definitive plan of merger.

Sohu held 67.4% of shares out in Changyou via its A and B shares and 95.3% of the voting rights given the disproportionate voting power of the B shares. As Sohu held &gt;90% of the votes, the Offer was in the form of a short-form statutory merger under Cayman Law - i.e. approval from Changyou's shareholders was not required. No vote, no dissent. Done deal.
But wait ...
In a ruling handed down on the 28 January, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands concluded that shareholders of companies that undertake a 'short-form' merger are entitled to dissent. 

It would be absurd to exclude a dissentient member of a company subject to short-form merger from the protection of section 238 simply because, unlike in the case of a long-form merger, that member is not allowed to vote.

The ruling has wide-ranging implications.
More below the fold.


Changyou (CYOU US): 合併反対の簡易書面が認められるようになりました