Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Negative Jaws:  Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 4Q20 net profit of SGD 1.1 bn, a SGD 102 mn (9.9%) increase on a linked quarter basis. Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line performance would have come in at SGD 994 mn  - down SGD 34 mn (3.3%). In addition, OCBC continues to suffer from negative operating jaws, with revenues declining 2.6% and costs increasing 2.3%;*Credit Improving In Reality: We have become more optimistic. By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth continued to be negative on an annualized basis at SGD 78 mn or 8.0% annualized (versus 2.3% annualized).  We also find that reserves are now where they need to be, which is a far cry from where currently DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20.

*Negative Jaws:  Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 4Q20 net profit of SGD 1.1 bn, a SGD 102 mn (9.9%) increase on a linked quarter basis. Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line performance would have come in at SGD 994 mn  - down SGD 34 mn (3.3%). In addition, OCBC continues to suffer from negative operating jaws, with revenues declining 2.6% and costs increasing 2.3%;*Credit Improving In Reality: We have become more optimistic. By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth continued to be negative on an annualized basis at SGD 78 mn or 8.0% annualized (versus 2.3% annualized).  We also find that reserves are now where they need to be, which is a far cry from where currently DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20. 

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Mixed Bag, But AQ Improving

*Continued Weak Great Eastern Core Returns: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20; and*Poor Readacross to Regional Insurers: Higher overall costs at Great Eastern during the half driven by claims and a change in contract liability increases would imply a negative readacross to AIA (1299.HK), Prudential (PRU.LN), ManuLife (MFC.CN), and of course the mainland Chinese insurers.

*Continued Weak Great Eastern Core Returns: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20; and*Poor Readacross to Regional Insurers: Higher overall costs at Great Eastern during the half driven by claims and a change in contract liability increases would imply a negative readacross to AIA (1299.HK), Prudential (PRU.LN), ManuLife (MFC.CN), and of course the mainland Chinese insurers. 

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Great Eastern HOH Operating Results Flop

*Negative Operating Remain Troubling: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 4Q20 results of SGD 1.0 bn, declining SGD 285 mn (22.0%) on a linked quarter basis. Results remain troubling across the board, as this is the second consecutive quarter that DBS reported negative operating jaws whilst the decline in loss provisions reversed course on weaker credit;*Credit Risk Challenges Management: We remain unconvinced that the moratorium exits are anything more than additional reliance on government schemes and relief programs, as this improvement would appear to be in contravention to the stress being experienced regionally. By our calculation, we find that net new NPLs continue to increase – up SGD 631 mn or increasing 41.7% on an annualized basis – more than doubling the figures of SGD 272 mn or 18.9% on an annualized basis for 3Q20. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 2.8bn – amounting now to three plus full quarters of results, comparing very unfavorably to the SGD 1.3 bn calculated (one quarter of results) just a quarter earlier and suggest that Lakshmi Vilas Bank’s (LVB) risk is not under the control; and *India Deal Poses Significant Challenges: : By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent to the tune of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion. LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al.  DBS expects DBS India to return to profitability and that the LVB deal will be ROE accretive over the next 12-24 months. We’d like some of what management is smoking.

*Negative Operating Remain Troubling: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 4Q20 results of SGD 1.0 bn, declining SGD 285 mn (22.0%) on a linked quarter basis. Results remain troubling across the board, as this is the second consecutive quarter that DBS reported negative operating jaws whilst the decline in loss provisions reversed course on weaker credit;*Credit Risk Challenges Management: We remain unconvinced that the moratorium exits are anything more than additional reliance on government schemes and relief programs, as this improvement would appear to be in contravention to the stress being experienced regionally. By our calculation, we find that net new NPLs continue to increase – up SGD 631 mn or increasing 41.7% on an annualized basis – more than doubling the figures of SGD 272 mn or 18.9% on an annualized basis for 3Q20. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 2.8bn – amounting now to three plus full quarters of results, comparing very unfavorably to the SGD 1.3 bn calculated (one quarter of results) just a quarter earlier and suggest that Lakshmi Vilas Bank’s (LVB) risk is not under the control; and *India Deal Poses Significant Challenges: : By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent to the tune of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion. LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al.  DBS expects DBS India to return to profitability and that the LVB deal will be ROE accretive over the next 12-24 months. We’d like some of what management is smoking. 

DBS Group Holdings – COVID & India Not A Good Combo

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

*Third Indian Bank Failure In 15 Months: For the third time in 15 months, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) took over a failing regional bank - announcing that it would limit deposit withdrawals and replace the board of directors at Lakshm Vilas Bank (LVB.IN) due to a "serious deterioration" in its finances. After the failure of Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank and Yes Bank (YES.IN); and 12 consecutive quarters of posting losses it should come as no surprise that the RBI placed LVB under moratorium through December 16, 2020; and*Not Letting Cash Burn A Hole In Its Pocket: On Novenber 17, 2020, the RBI also announced a draft scheme to merge LVB with DBS Bank India Limited, the 100%-owned subsidiary of DBS Bank Holdings (DBS.SP), which will infuse INR 25 bn into its subsidiary to absorb and recapitalize LVB. This transaction is riddled with problems and will certainly cost DBS far greater than its initial investment.

*Third Indian Bank Failure In 15 Months: For the third time in 15 months, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) took over a failing regional bank - announcing that it would limit deposit withdrawals and replace the board of directors at Lakshm Vilas Bank (LVB.IN) due to a "serious deterioration" in its finances. After the failure of Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank and Yes Bank (YES.IN); and 12 consecutive quarters of posting losses it should come as no surprise that the RBI placed LVB under moratorium through December 16, 2020; and*Not Letting Cash Burn A Hole In Its Pocket: On Novenber 17, 2020, the RBI also announced a draft scheme to merge LVB with DBS Bank India Limited, the 100%-owned subsidiary of DBS Bank Holdings (DBS.SP), which will infuse INR 25 bn into its subsidiary to absorb and recapitalize LVB. This transaction is riddled with problems and will certainly cost DBS far greater than its initial investment.  

Indonesia

PT Bank OCBC NISP Tbk is an Indonesian publicly listed banking and financial services company that provides a comprehensive suite of services including consumer and business banking, treasury, and sharia banking. It offers various products such as savings accounts, loans, credit cards, wealth management, and digital banking solutions. The company was founded in 1941 in Bandung, Indonesia, and is headquartered in South Jakarta, Indonesia.

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Bank OCBC NISP (NISP IJ)

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Mixed Bag, But AQ Improving

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING CORP: Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line would've declined...

Thomas J. Monaco

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Great Eastern HOH Operating Results Flop

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING CORP: Great Eastern reported hefty 2H20 core operating losses. Higher overall costs HOH imply a negative readacross to...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – COVID & India Not A Good Combo

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: DBS reported a 4Q20 results decline of 22.0% linked quarter. Results remain troubling across the board. India deal poses...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – Dumb India Deal

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: Transaction For Lakshmi Vilas Bank In India At INR 25 BN Is Way Too Pricey For Risk DBS Is Taking On. Price Will Ultimately Be...

Thomas J. Monaco

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