Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

China Huarong Asset Management / Equity Bottom-Up

*Stress All Around: China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] still continues to teeter on the edge of insolvency and ongoing silence from Beijing has materially impacted funding costs. The USD 23.3 bn in Huarong debt, however, still risks crippling the USD credit market in mainland China. As Huarong is one of mainland China's largest issuers in offshore markets, this would be by far the largest credit default to date of an important state-owned company. Potential contagion risks via higher a cost of funding for offshore borrowing are occurring;  and *Evergrande Harbinger: Mainland Chinese authorities are going to great lengths to prevent a systemic daisy chain impact of a China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] default on the mainland Chinese financial system. Given the systemic risks also posed by Huarong, we believe the mainland Chinese will construct some form of bailout. Distressed investors should consider picking away at Huarong’s debt; we’ll believe it when see Beijing imposing losses SOEs.

*Stress All Around: China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] still continues to teeter on the edge of insolvency and ongoing silence from Beijing has materially impacted funding costs. The USD 23.3 bn in Huarong debt, however, still risks crippling the USD credit market in mainland China. As Huarong is one of mainland China's largest issuers in offshore markets, this would be by far the largest credit default to date of an important state-owned company. Potential contagion risks via higher a cost of funding for offshore borrowing are occurring;  and *Evergrande Harbinger: Mainland Chinese authorities are going to great lengths to prevent a systemic daisy chain impact of a China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] default on the mainland Chinese financial system. Given the systemic risks also posed by Huarong, we believe the mainland Chinese will construct some form of bailout. Distressed investors should consider picking away at Huarong’s debt; we’ll believe it when see Beijing imposing losses SOEs.

China Huarong Asset Management – Preventing Another Daisy Chain

*Kick In The Pants: On July 21, 2021, HSBC Holdings plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] and many of the other major Hong Banks finally had the epiphany of declining mortgages to borrowers on two of Evergrande Group’s (3333.HK) residential developments in Hong Kong. On July 22, 2021, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) hauled HSBC and its colleagues in to explain the no lend decision on Evergrande’s two Hong Kong in process property  developments. Wouldn’t you know it, this subtle re-think request caused the banks to reverse course; and*Daisy Chain:This move by the HKMA and clearly prompted by authorities in mainland China intimates that Evergrande poses significant systemic risk for mainland China. Government officials in Shenyang are prompting SOEs to increase their ownership in Shengjing Bank (2966.HK), which is 36% owned by Evergrande and lent it an estimated USD 15.5 bn.

*Kick In The Pants: On July 21, 2021, HSBC Holdings plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] and many of the other major Hong Banks finally had the epiphany of declining mortgages to borrowers on two of Evergrande Group’s (3333.HK) residential developments in Hong Kong. On July 22, 2021, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) hauled HSBC and its colleagues in to explain the no lend decision on Evergrande’s two Hong Kong in process property  developments. Wouldn’t you know it, this subtle re-think request caused the banks to reverse course; and*Daisy Chain:This move by the HKMA and clearly prompted by authorities in mainland China intimates that Evergrande poses significant systemic risk for mainland China. Government officials in Shenyang are prompting SOEs to increase their ownership in Shengjing Bank (2966.HK), which is 36% owned by Evergrande and lent it an estimated USD 15.5 bn.    

HSBC Holdings Plc – Strong Armed By The HKMA

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Document 15: Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further;  and*No Let Up In Sight: Coupled with the structural reforms of an increase in risk-based capital minimums for certain state banks, the partial bank Wealth Management Product (WMP) resolution, and the recent reserve requirement ratio (RRR) reduction, these tightening measures should act to contain some of the out of control financial risk within the mainland Chinese financial system.

*Document 15: Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further;  and*No Let Up In Sight: Coupled with the structural reforms of an increase in risk-based capital minimums for certain state banks, the partial bank Wealth Management Product (WMP) resolution, and the recent reserve requirement ratio (RRR) reduction, these tightening measures should act to contain some of the out of control financial risk within the mainland Chinese financial system.

Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

We highlighted <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management-26375cc4-728e-4f75-b058-64298b10f256" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28089:1" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)</a> (Huarong) in our debut  “The Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC)” last month on Huarong’s annual report delay. The subsequent events have stabilized Huarong’s HRINTH complex somewhat before the market fears Huarong’s debt could be restructured.
The rating downgrades by Fitch and Moody’s are less of an issue, in our view, as they are simply actions to catch up with what the market fears. Huarong’s story is less flamboyant than the HNA Group Limited (HNA) and yet it highlights the very same problem with HNA in terms of a lack of transparency and implicit support by the Chinese government. Both were eventually rescued by state-owned Chinese banks and both could be restructured down the road.
At the end of the day, we believe Huarong has been viewed as a quasi-sovereign credit and even rating agencies have been being caught by surprise as the market doubts support from the Chinese government will be certain. For Huarong, we still believe government support can be expected, but we believe the dust has not settled yet on the liabilities (and losses) that Huarong may have in store for bondholders. As a result, we cannot recommend buying Huarong’s HRINTH complex.
In a greater context, the risk we see here is that the rating agencies may revamp their methodologies to assess Chinese government-related entities (GREs). The adjustment could result in a wholesale downgrade of those GREs which are spread negative, not just for the Chinese GREs, but also other Chinese credits with implicit support from the central and local Chinese governments. We note that Chinese issuers have come a long way in terms of corporate governance improvement but transparency remains one of the key reasons why developed market USD bonds trade much tighter than Chinese USD bonds with the same rating, and this Huarong saga is a reminder that the spread will not narrow anytime in the near future.

We highlighted China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH) (Huarong) in our debut  “The Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC)” last month on Huarong’s annual report delay. The subsequent events have stabilized Huarong’s HRINTH complex somewhat before the market fears Huarong’s debt could be restructured.
The rating downgrades by Fitch and Moody’s are less of an issue, in our view, as they are simply actions to catch up with what the market fears. Huarong’s story is less flamboyant than the HNA Group Limited (HNA) and yet it highlights the very same problem with HNA in terms of a lack of transparency and implicit support by the Chinese government. Both were eventually rescued by state-owned Chinese banks and both could be restructured down the road.
At the end of the day, we believe Huarong has been viewed as a quasi-sovereign credit and even rating agencies have been being caught by surprise as the market doubts support from the Chinese government will be certain. For Huarong, we still believe government support can be expected, but we believe the dust has not settled yet on the liabilities (and losses) that Huarong may have in store for bondholders. As a result, we cannot recommend buying Huarong’s HRINTH complex.
In a greater context, the risk we see here is that the rating agencies may revamp their methodologies to assess Chinese government-related entities (GREs). The adjustment could result in a wholesale downgrade of those GREs which are spread negative, not just for the Chinese GREs, but also other Chinese credits with implicit support from the central and local Chinese governments. We note that Chinese issuers have come a long way in terms of corporate governance improvement but transparency remains one of the key reasons why developed market USD bonds trade much tighter than Chinese USD bonds with the same rating, and this Huarong saga is a reminder that the spread will not narrow anytime in the near future.

*Already On Edge:  Again in mainland China, there have been rumblings of another credit default over the past several days. The CBIRC disclosed that China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] is actively working with its auditor to complete its annual report. The issue appears to be Huarong’s legacy exposure associated with the misdeeds of its former Chairman, which still need to be addressed post-removal in 2018; and *Another Audit Delay: Huarong is delaying its 2020 earnings results beyond the April 30, 2021 deadline, which, in our view, only exacerbates concerns over a potential Huarong default. Ironic, given that Huarong was supposed to help mainland China clean up its bad debt mess. This further delay will not help bond liquidity which already appears to have disappeared. Contagion risk remains a real threat as bondholders likely sell other holdings.

*Already On Edge:  Again in mainland China, there have been rumblings of another credit default over the past several days. The CBIRC disclosed that China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] is actively working with its auditor to complete its annual report. The issue appears to be Huarong’s legacy exposure associated with the misdeeds of its former Chairman, which still need to be addressed post-removal in 2018; and *Another Audit Delay: Huarong is delaying its 2020 earnings results beyond the April 30, 2021 deadline, which, in our view, only exacerbates concerns over a potential Huarong default. Ironic, given that Huarong was supposed to help mainland China clean up its bad debt mess. This further delay will not help bond liquidity which already appears to have disappeared. Contagion risk remains a real threat as bondholders likely sell other holdings.

China Huarong Asset Management  - This Can’t Be Good

China

China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd. operates as an investment management company. The Company offers financial services, asset management services, asset management services, and more. China Huarong Asset Management serves customers worldwide.

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China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)

China Huarong Asset Management – Preventing Another Daisy Chain

CHINA HUARONG: Huarong still continues to teeter on the edge of insolvency. The USD 23.3 bn debt, however, still risks crippling the USD credit...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Strong Armed By The HKMA

HSBC HOLDINGS: HSBC had an epiphany of declining mortgages on two of Evergrande’s local developments. The HKMA wanted an explanation and wouldn’t...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Banks – Screws Tighten On LGFVs

CHINA BANKS: Recently the CBIRC issued guidance on implicit LGFV debt via Document 15 – further tightening the screws on mainland China's financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Huarong: No Confidence Motion

China Huarong could be the first domino to fall on the confidence on the implicit support by the Chinese government. Rating agencies' scramble to...

Bondcritic

China Huarong Asset Management - This Can’t Be Good

CHINA HUARONG ASSET MANAGEMENT: Huarong is delaying its 2020 earnings results beyond the April 30, 2021 deadline, which, in our view, only...

Thomas J. Monaco

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