Chief Economist & Political Strategist, CrossASEAN Research

Prasenjit K. Basu

Chief Economist & Political Strategist

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

Macroeconomics

China has been the biggest beneficiary of the global glut of central bank liquidity created since the Global Financial Crisis of Sept 2008 -- which was multiplied further in 2020 with renewed central bank aggression amid the Covid pandemic. In 2007, China already had massive industrial over-capacity. But China rode the tide of global liquidity since 4Q 2008, with China's M2 money supply expanding from US$6.56 trillion in August 2008 to US$34.96 trillion in April 2021 (more than a 5-fold increase in 13 years) -- while US M2 expanded from US$7.75 trillion to US$20.11 trillion over the same period (a 2.5-fold increase).  Now, with US core CPI inflation at 3% and the core PCE deflator up 3.1% YoY in April 2021, it will be impossible for the Fed to keep adding US$120 billion of assets to its balance sheet monthly. Global liquidity conditions are bound to tighten. China will find it difficult to export its overcapacity, as the world has become more wary of allowing China to dump (i.e., export production below cost), especially as production ramps up in the rest of the world amid the full reopening from the pandemic. We recommend staying cautious on the China market, avoiding its tech titans particularly, as they run into political challenges from Xi Jinping.

China has been the biggest beneficiary of the global glut of central bank liquidity created since the Global Financial Crisis of Sept 2008 -- which was multiplied further in 2020 with renewed central bank aggression amid the Covid pandemic. In 2007, China already had massive industrial over-capacity. But China rode the tide of global liquidity since 4Q 2008, with China's M2 money supply expanding from US$6.56 trillion in August 2008 to US$34.96 trillion in April 2021 (more than a 5-fold increase in 13 years) -- while US M2 expanded from US$7.75 trillion to US$20.11 trillion over the same period (a 2.5-fold increase).  Now, with US core CPI inflation at 3% and the core PCE deflator up 3.1% YoY in April 2021, it will be impossible for the Fed to keep adding US$120 billion of assets to its balance sheet monthly. Global liquidity conditions are bound to tighten. China will find it difficult to export its overcapacity, as the world has become more wary of allowing China to dump (i.e., export production below cost), especially as production ramps up in the rest of the world amid the full reopening from the pandemic. We recommend staying cautious on the China market, avoiding its tech titans particularly, as they run into political challenges from Xi Jinping. 

China Has Been the Global Winner from the Liquidity Glut of 2008-21; Now Comes Pain

China has had a spectacular 1Q 2021, with exports and industrial output soaring relative to the low base in Jan-Feb 2020 (the one quarter in which China's economy shrank last year), but also growing at a good clip relative to 2019 (+33% for exports and +1.9% for industrial output); imports were up 17.3% in Jan-Feb 2021 relative to 2 years ago. This suggests that real GDP should grow about 12% YoY in 1Q 2021, or expand 4.7% relative to 1Q 2019.   While the current account surplus widened to 1.8% of GDP in 2020 (the largest in dollar terms globally at US$301 billion), and the surplus for April-December 2020 was US$335 billion, foreign reserves only increased by US$156 billion during that 9 month period. So net capital outflows were substantial, at US$179 billion in April-December 2020, at a time when the RMB was appreciating, and China should normally have attracted net capital inflows. Chinese residents continue to find ways of taking capital out of China. During Jan-Feb 2021, net services and capital outflows were US$115 billion (with foreign reserves down US$12billion). Despite massive overcapacity across most industrial sectors, China did not shed its addiction to fixed asset investment (FAI), which increased by 2.9% in 2020, even as the rest of the world was in recession. In Jan-Feb 2021, FAI surged by a further 35.1% YoY -- thus expanding 16.9% relative to its level in Jan-Feb 2019. The surge in FAI is adding more capacity to industries already burdened by overcapacity, at a time when external demand is set to weaken as the rest of the world's economies gradually reopen, reducing demand for China's exports. With external and domestic demand likely to slow (the latter weakened by capital flight), the rest of 2021 will be increasingly difficult for China's economy.

China has had a spectacular 1Q 2021, with exports and industrial output soaring relative to the low base in Jan-Feb 2020 (the one quarter in which China's economy shrank last year), but also growing at a good clip relative to 2019 (+33% for exports and +1.9% for industrial output); imports were up 17.3% in Jan-Feb 2021 relative to 2 years ago. This suggests that real GDP should grow about 12% YoY in 1Q 2021, or expand 4.7% relative to 1Q 2019.   While the current account surplus widened to 1.8% of GDP in 2020 (the largest in dollar terms globally at US$301 billion), and the surplus for April-December 2020 was US$335 billion, foreign reserves only increased by US$156 billion during that 9 month period. So net capital outflows were substantial, at US$179 billion in April-December 2020, at a time when the RMB was appreciating, and China should normally have attracted net capital inflows. Chinese residents continue to find ways of taking capital out of China. During Jan-Feb 2021, net services and capital outflows were US$115 billion (with foreign reserves down US$12billion). Despite massive overcapacity across most industrial sectors, China did not shed its addiction to fixed asset investment (FAI), which increased by 2.9% in 2020, even as the rest of the world was in recession. In Jan-Feb 2021, FAI surged by a further 35.1% YoY -- thus expanding 16.9% relative to its level in Jan-Feb 2019. The surge in FAI is adding more capacity to industries already burdened by overcapacity, at a time when external demand is set to weaken as the rest of the world's economies gradually reopen, reducing demand for China's exports. With external and domestic demand likely to slow (the latter weakened by capital flight), the rest of 2021 will be increasingly difficult for China's economy. 

China: Large Net Capital Outflows Presage Trouble as Excess Capacity Begins to Bite

Exports were the key driver of China's acceleration in GDP in 4Q 2020, but FAI had been the key factor buoying the economy in April-December 2020. The low base will help power a substantial acceleration in YoY growth in 1Q 2021, but the impact of the FAI surge will hurt in 2H 2021, as export opportunities shrink once the rest of the world's production normalizes. In the interim, however, we recommend staying tactically overweight China. China's industrial growth of 7.3% YoY in December 2020 was the fastest in 3.5 years, while the 7.1% YoY growth in 4Q 2020 was the fastest since 3Q 2014. In turn, that powered the 6.5% YoY growth in real GDP during 4Q 2020, the fastest growth pace since 3Q 2018.  The key driver of the faster growth was a surge in fixed-asset investment (FAI) in April-November 2020 (+9.6% YoY), and a sharp acceleration in exports (+16.9% YoY) in 4Q 2020. The record trade surplus of US$212 billion in 4Q 2020 was accompanied by only a modest US$74 billion increase in foreign reserves, reflecting continued net capital outflow even amid the strengthening RMB. Given that China has massive industrial over-capacity, the sustainable response would have been to stimulate domestic consumption to take up that capacity. Retail sales did improve in 2H 2020, but still grew only 4.6% YoY in December and in 4Q 2020. Instead China added hugely to excess capacity (particularly physical infrastructure) with a boom in FAI, up 9.2% YoY in Apr-Dec 2020, the fastest pace since 1H 2016. This approach didn't hurt China in 2020, because the rest of the world's industrial capacity was inoperative, and China's exports consequently soared.      Full year real GDP growth was only 2.3% in 2020, the slowest in 3 decades, primarily because of the steep contraction in 1Q 2020 (the only quarter in which China was partially locked down on account of the Wuhan coronavirus). Consequently, 1Q 2021 will see spectacular YoY growth in all China's economic numbers -- exports, industrial output, FAI, retail sales, EPS growth -- helped by the artificially-depressed base. From 2Q 2021 onwards, real GDP growth will slow significantly (we estimate 5% YoY for 2Q-4Q 2021), as the reopening global economy reduces demand for China's exports, and industrial overcapacity resumes biting. In the near-term (1Q 2021) we recommend staying tactically overweight China.

Exports were the key driver of China's acceleration in GDP in 4Q 2020, but FAI had been the key factor buoying the economy in April-December 2020. The low base will help power a substantial acceleration in YoY growth in 1Q 2021, but the impact of the FAI surge will hurt in 2H 2021, as export opportunities shrink once the rest of the world's production normalizes. In the interim, however, we recommend staying tactically overweight China. China's industrial growth of 7.3% YoY in December 2020 was the fastest in 3.5 years, while the 7.1% YoY growth in 4Q 2020 was the fastest since 3Q 2014. In turn, that powered the 6.5% YoY growth in real GDP during 4Q 2020, the fastest growth pace since 3Q 2018.  The key driver of the faster growth was a surge in fixed-asset investment (FAI) in April-November 2020 (+9.6% YoY), and a sharp acceleration in exports (+16.9% YoY) in 4Q 2020. The record trade surplus of US$212 billion in 4Q 2020 was accompanied by only a modest US$74 billion increase in foreign reserves, reflecting continued net capital outflow even amid the strengthening RMB. Given that China has massive industrial over-capacity, the sustainable response would have been to stimulate domestic consumption to take up that capacity. Retail sales did improve in 2H 2020, but still grew only 4.6% YoY in December and in 4Q 2020. Instead China added hugely to excess capacity (particularly physical infrastructure) with a boom in FAI, up 9.2% YoY in Apr-Dec 2020, the fastest pace since 1H 2016. This approach didn't hurt China in 2020, because the rest of the world's industrial capacity was inoperative, and China's exports consequently soared.      Full year real GDP growth was only 2.3% in 2020, the slowest in 3 decades, primarily because of the steep contraction in 1Q 2020 (the only quarter in which China was partially locked down on account of the Wuhan coronavirus). Consequently, 1Q 2021 will see spectacular YoY growth in all China's economic numbers -- exports, industrial output, FAI, retail sales, EPS growth -- helped by the artificially-depressed base. From 2Q 2021 onwards, real GDP growth will slow significantly (we estimate 5% YoY for 2Q-4Q 2021), as the reopening global economy reduces demand for China's exports, and industrial overcapacity resumes biting. In the near-term (1Q 2021) we recommend staying tactically overweight China. 

China's 2021 Will Look Spectacular in 1Q, but Overcapacity Will Bite Thereafter

Even in 2020, China's M2 grew more than the US and EU; thus, despite a soaring trade surplus, foreign reserves were largely unchanged, suggesting large capital flight. Once the US$ stops depreciating, China will have to tighten monetary conditions. And with the rest of the world returning to near-normal by mid-2021, China's ability to export the excess capacity to which it added in Apr-Nov 2020 (with 9.6% YoY growth in FAI) will increasingly be constrained. Real GDP will decelerate to below 5% YoY growth in April-December 2021. Trim China holdings. Total Social Financing (TSF) has expanded by RMB 33 trillion (US$5.05 trillion) in January-November 2020, 56% YoY faster than the pace of new TSF in Jan-Nov 2019. The massive expansion in TSF enabled fixed asset investment (FAI) to rebound sharply after 1Q 2020, growing 9.7% YoY in April-November 2020 (much faster than the pace of FAI growth in 2019).  China was thus adding to its mountain of overcapacity in infrastructure, industry and real-estate in 2020. With much of the rest of the world locked down (especially in April-June, and only partially reopening thereafter), China has had an excellent 2020 -- using its excess capacity to export PPE (personal protective equipment), electronics/computers/parts to enable work-from-home, and also fill other gaps in global demand that other nations were unable to fill for much of the year. Steel is illustrative: in April 2020, China's steel output expanded 0.2% YoY, while the rest of the world's steel output declined 28.7% YoY. In October 2020, China's steel output rose 12.7% YoY, while the rest of the world's increased 2.3% YoY; in November, however, China's steel output decelerated to 8% YoY growth, while the rest of the world's accelerated to 5% YoY (although steel output was still declining in the US, Japan and South Korea). In 2021, once the rest of the world begins to operate nearer normal capacity, China's ability to grow abnormally fast will be severely constrained. China's M2 has not only expanded nearly 5-fold since August 2008 (while the US's has only expanded 2.5-fold over that period), it has also expanded more in Feb-Nov 2020 (by US$3.9 trillion) than US M2 (which rose by US$3.58 trillion in Feb-Nov 2020) or EU M2 (up by only US$2.2 trillion). The continued debasing of the RMB has led to capital flight -- despite an appreciating RMB (which should have made foreign-currency assets unattractive); the symptom was that foreign reserves stayed largely unchanged despite an ever-widening trade surplus. Once the US$ resumes strengthening, the PBOC will be obliged to rein in TSF by 2Q 2021, causing an economic deceleration, particularly of FAI. As trading partners erect barriers to China's dumping of its excess capacity, China's economic problems will be exacerbated, and real GDP will grow less 5% YoY in 2Q-4Q 2021, with financial-sector problems rising anew.  We recommend trimming China's weight in investor portfolios by March 2021.

Even in 2020, China's M2 grew more than the US and EU; thus, despite a soaring trade surplus, foreign reserves were largely unchanged, suggesting large capital flight. Once the US$ stops depreciating, China will have to tighten monetary conditions. And with the rest of the world returning to near-normal by mid-2021, China's ability to export the excess capacity to which it added in Apr-Nov 2020 (with 9.6% YoY growth in FAI) will increasingly be constrained. Real GDP will decelerate to below 5% YoY growth in April-December 2021. Trim China holdings. Total Social Financing (TSF) has expanded by RMB 33 trillion (US$5.05 trillion) in January-November 2020, 56% YoY faster than the pace of new TSF in Jan-Nov 2019. The massive expansion in TSF enabled fixed asset investment (FAI) to rebound sharply after 1Q 2020, growing 9.7% YoY in April-November 2020 (much faster than the pace of FAI growth in 2019).  China was thus adding to its mountain of overcapacity in infrastructure, industry and real-estate in 2020. With much of the rest of the world locked down (especially in April-June, and only partially reopening thereafter), China has had an excellent 2020 -- using its excess capacity to export PPE (personal protective equipment), electronics/computers/parts to enable work-from-home, and also fill other gaps in global demand that other nations were unable to fill for much of the year. Steel is illustrative: in April 2020, China's steel output expanded 0.2% YoY, while the rest of the world's steel output declined 28.7% YoY. In October 2020, China's steel output rose 12.7% YoY, while the rest of the world's increased 2.3% YoY; in November, however, China's steel output decelerated to 8% YoY growth, while the rest of the world's accelerated to 5% YoY (although steel output was still declining in the US, Japan and South Korea). In 2021, once the rest of the world begins to operate nearer normal capacity, China's ability to grow abnormally fast will be severely constrained. China's M2 has not only expanded nearly 5-fold since August 2008 (while the US's has only expanded 2.5-fold over that period), it has also expanded more in Feb-Nov 2020 (by US$3.9 trillion) than US M2 (which rose by US$3.58 trillion in Feb-Nov 2020) or EU M2 (up by only US$2.2 trillion). The continued debasing of the RMB has led to capital flight -- despite an appreciating RMB (which should have made foreign-currency assets unattractive); the symptom was that foreign reserves stayed largely unchanged despite an ever-widening trade surplus. Once the US$ resumes strengthening, the PBOC will be obliged to rein in TSF by 2Q 2021, causing an economic deceleration, particularly of FAI. As trading partners erect barriers to China's dumping of its excess capacity, China's economic problems will be exacerbated, and real GDP will grow less 5% YoY in 2Q-4Q 2021, with financial-sector problems rising anew.  We recommend trimming China's weight in investor portfolios by March 2021.  

China Has Had a Great 2020, but Over-Capacity Will Cause Headaches in 2021

Deputy Chief Economist

Sharmila Whelan

Independent and original Asian investment research

Aletheia Capital

Aletheia Capital (HK) Ltd. (previously known as Asianomics) combines the extensive knowledge of its experienced team with technology and regulatory changes to disrupt Global Markets business in Asia. The firm is completely independent with no conflicts of interest either on Investment Banking advisory or Capital Markets execution.

Last week we wrote that accelerating economic integration in the Greater Bay Area is  lies at the heart of China’s strategy to win the battle for economic supremacy.  It is key to China’s future economic prosperity and, directly counters America’s China containment strategy. Beijing recognises China containment will remain the lynchpin of US foreign policy. A Biden US presidency ensures that development of the GBA is only set to speed up. Companies are investing in next generation industries to meet the wants of the GBA’s tech-savvy consumers and are optimistic about revenue growth over the next three years. For investors seeking superior returns the case for investing in GBA companies has never looked stronger.

Last week we wrote that accelerating economic integration in the Greater Bay Area is  lies at the heart of China’s strategy to win the battle for economic supremacy.  It is key to China’s future economic prosperity and, directly counters America’s China containment strategy. Beijing recognises China containment will remain the lynchpin of US foreign policy. A Biden US presidency ensures that development of the GBA is only set to speed up. Companies are investing in next generation industries to meet the wants of the GBA’s tech-savvy consumers and are optimistic about revenue growth over the next three years. For investors seeking superior returns the case for investing in GBA companies has never looked stronger. 

Biden Vs. Xi - What Are Businesses Doing?

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China Treasury (CHINA GOVT)

China Has Been the Global Winner from the Liquidity Glut of 2008-21; Now Comes Pain

China rode the global liquidity wave since 4Q 2008. Now that the tide is turning (amid soaring US core inflation), industrial overcapacity and anti...

Prasenjit K. Basu

China: Large Net Capital Outflows Presage Trouble as Excess Capacity Begins to Bite

Net capital outflows were US$179bn in Apr-Dec 2020 despite the rising RMB; in Jan-Feb 2021, outflows were $115bn. The surge in FAI is creating...

Prasenjit K. Basu

China's 2021 Will Look Spectacular in 1Q, but Overcapacity Will Bite Thereafter

FAI surge of 9.2%YoY in Apr-Dec 2020 will hurt once global economy normalizes in 2H 2021. But in the interim, 1Q 2021 will be spectacular for...

Prasenjit K. Basu

China Has Had a Great 2020, but Over-Capacity Will Cause Headaches in 2021

TSF (Jan-Nov 2020) expanded by 56% YoY, enabling FAI to grow 9.6% YoY in Apr-Nov20. But this exacerbated excess capacity. By mid-'21, tighter...

Prasenjit K. Basu

Biden Vs. Xi - What Are Businesses Doing?

The case for investing in GBA companies has never looked stronger. Companies are investing in next generation industries and are optimistic about...

Sharmila Whelan

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