Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Adding Hubei to the Fold: Until recently AIA Group (1299.HK) [AIA] operated only five mainland Chinese provincial licenses in 30 cities with Beijing being the largest premium contributor for AIA China. With the border between mainland China and Hong Kong completely shutdown from 2020, mainland China became AIA’s largest market, contributing 35% to AIA’s VONB. Hong Kong falling on its face isn’t exactly how anyone envisioned mainland China becoming AIA’s largest business driver. AIA’s latest life insurance license approval from the CBIRC was received for Hubei province, reinforcing mainland China’s strategic importance; and*Suffocating Hong Kong Business: AIA’s core Hong Kong business has been an unmitigated disaster for during COVID-19, as it struggles with mainland Chinese visitors. Further, there is limited clarity on AIA’s legacy agents. It also has to deal with the fledgling Bank of East Asia (23.HK) business that it recently acquired.

*Adding Hubei to the Fold: Until recently AIA Group (1299.HK) [AIA] operated only five mainland Chinese provincial licenses in 30 cities with Beijing being the largest premium contributor for AIA China. With the border between mainland China and Hong Kong completely shutdown from 2020, mainland China became AIA’s largest market, contributing 35% to AIA’s VONB. Hong Kong falling on its face isn’t exactly how anyone envisioned mainland China becoming AIA’s largest business driver. AIA’s latest life insurance license approval from the CBIRC was received for Hubei province, reinforcing mainland China’s strategic importance; and*Suffocating Hong Kong Business: AIA’s core Hong Kong business has been an unmitigated disaster for during COVID-19, as it struggles with mainland Chinese visitors. Further, there is limited clarity on AIA’s legacy agents. It also has to deal with the fledgling Bank of East Asia (23.HK) business that it recently acquired.

AIA Group – Hong Kong In Rearview Mirror

*Ooo La La: HSBC Holdings Plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] announced the disposal of its French retail banking and the CCF brand to Promontoria MMB SAS (which is controlled by Cerberus Capital Management) for €1. HSBC expects to incur a loss on disposal of USD 2.3 bn, plus a goodwill write down of USD 0.7 bn which appears will be pushed out until 2022. The final peal of losses costing the Group another 15 bp of CET1 capital and pushing tangible equity lower by USD 2.2 bn or 1%;  and *Will HSBC Ever Get Serious About The US Mess: Maybe, just maybe HSBC is actually getting serious about cutting its losses in the US franchise. HSBC North America (HSBCNA) is massively short on total capital, in our view, and reserves need further support. By our numbers, HSBCNA is short upwards of USD 14 bn in capital. To put this into perspective with the HSBC France sale, a potential capital hit of this magnitude would amount to between 95-100 bp of CET1 capital – smack in line with HSBC’s target.

*Ooo La La: HSBC Holdings Plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] announced the disposal of its French retail banking and the CCF brand to Promontoria MMB SAS (which is controlled by Cerberus Capital Management) for €1. HSBC expects to incur a loss on disposal of USD 2.3 bn, plus a goodwill write down of USD 0.7 bn which appears will be pushed out until 2022. The final peal of losses costing the Group another 15 bp of CET1 capital and pushing tangible equity lower by USD 2.2 bn or 1%;  and *Will HSBC Ever Get Serious About The US Mess: Maybe, just maybe HSBC is actually getting serious about cutting its losses in the US franchise. HSBC North America (HSBCNA) is massively short on total capital, in our view, and reserves need further support. By our numbers, HSBCNA is short upwards of USD 14 bn in capital. To put this into perspective with the HSBC France sale, a potential capital hit of this magnitude would amount to between 95-100 bp of CET1 capital – smack in line with HSBC’s target.   

*New IPO Disappoints Right Out Of Gate: Waterdrop (WDH.US) [Waterdrop] provides an online insurance marketplace and related medical crowdfunding platform in mainland China. Waterdrop  reported its first set of earnings results since its IPO, coming in at a negative CNY 370.2 bn for 1Q21, declining CNY 249.4 (206.6%) YOY largely given its higher costs from a channel (third party traffic) and product mix shift to long-term insurance. Both factors have caused operating costs to increase CNY 579.1 bn (75.7%) YOY  - far outpacing revenue growth of CNY 229.6 bn (35.1%) over the period; and  *All Is Not Lost…Yet: First year premium (FYP) did increase 42.7% YOY – led by costly third party FYP which increased 51.6%. Long-term critical illness insurance grew 132% off of a low base, but still well exceeding industry average. Anecdotally, management believes that competitive pressures appear to be abating and that increases in customer acquisition costs is now decelerating. In addition, Waterdrop continues to make progress with: Waterdrop Health; Waterdrop Medicine; and with outpatient services.

*New IPO Disappoints Right Out Of Gate: Waterdrop (WDH.US) [Waterdrop] provides an online insurance marketplace and related medical crowdfunding platform in mainland China. Waterdrop  reported its first set of earnings results since its IPO, coming in at a negative CNY 370.2 bn for 1Q21, declining CNY 249.4 (206.6%) YOY largely given its higher costs from a channel (third party traffic) and product mix shift to long-term insurance. Both factors have caused operating costs to increase CNY 579.1 bn (75.7%) YOY  - far outpacing revenue growth of CNY 229.6 bn (35.1%) over the period; and  *All Is Not Lost…Yet: First year premium (FYP) did increase 42.7% YOY – led by costly third party FYP which increased 51.6%. Long-term critical illness insurance grew 132% off of a low base, but still well exceeding industry average. Anecdotally, management believes that competitive pressures appear to be abating and that increases in customer acquisition costs is now decelerating. In addition, Waterdrop continues to make progress with: Waterdrop Health; Waterdrop Medicine; and with outpatient services.

*Better, But Weak Metrics: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link REIT] reported a positive FY 2H21 bottom-line result of HKD 5.3 bn, increasing HKD 9.4 bn over the HKD 4.1 bn in losses posted in FY 1H21. However, when we exclude Link’s non-cash FV marks of HKD 2.0 bn, operating performance cam in at just HKD 3.3 bn – improving just HKD 143 mn (4.5%) HOH. The positive HOH operating performance was driven by an increase in revenues from mainland China and overseas related property;  *Worries Remain In Hong Kong: Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 2H21, albeit slightly improving from a negative 2.6% in FY 1H21 to a negative 1.8%. Although not a enormous surprise, this trend would appear to be with us for an extended period in Hong Kong - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link management also appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value with deals that make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offering significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

*Better, But Weak Metrics: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link REIT] reported a positive FY 2H21 bottom-line result of HKD 5.3 bn, increasing HKD 9.4 bn over the HKD 4.1 bn in losses posted in FY 1H21. However, when we exclude Link’s non-cash FV marks of HKD 2.0 bn, operating performance cam in at just HKD 3.3 bn – improving just HKD 143 mn (4.5%) HOH. The positive HOH operating performance was driven by an increase in revenues from mainland China and overseas related property;  *Worries Remain In Hong Kong: Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 2H21, albeit slightly improving from a negative 2.6% in FY 1H21 to a negative 1.8%. Although not a enormous surprise, this trend would appear to be with us for an extended period in Hong Kong - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link management also appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value with deals that make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offering significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

Link REIT – Hong Kong “Stabilizing”

*Competitor Call Confirms Business Is Dead: A competitor hosted a conference call with the management of HSBC Holdings plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC]. Much of the discussion centered on Hong Kong/Asia, where net interest income remains under pressure due to low spreads, credit remains benign, and now Wealth Management is again in focus; and    *Elephant In Room Not Discussed: CET 1 was 15.9% at 1Q21, and the Group continues to aim for between 14.0% -14.5%. Unfortunately there was no mention nor even a question on its US franchise, HSBC North America (HSBCNA), which if sold or even managed properly could would easily allow HSBC to realize its CET1 goal  - given the losses management still needs to take on that mess.

*Competitor Call Confirms Business Is Dead: A competitor hosted a conference call with the management of HSBC Holdings plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC]. Much of the discussion centered on Hong Kong/Asia, where net interest income remains under pressure due to low spreads, credit remains benign, and now Wealth Management is again in focus; and    *Elephant In Room Not Discussed: CET 1 was 15.9% at 1Q21, and the Group continues to aim for between 14.0% -14.5%. Unfortunately there was no mention nor even a question on its US franchise, HSBC North America (HSBCNA), which if sold or even managed properly could would easily allow HSBC to realize its CET1 goal  - given the losses management still needs to take on that mess.

HSBC Holdings Plc – Head Still Buried In The Sand

Hong Kong

CSOP FTSE China A50 ETF is an exchange-traded fund incorporated in Hong Kong. The Fund seeks to track the performance of the FTSE China A50 Index. The Fund invests most of its total assets in the equities of member companies of the FTSE China A50 Index. This is a RQFII fund.

CSOP FTSE China A50 (HKD) (2822 HK)

AIA Group – Hong Kong In Rearview Mirror

AIA GROUP: In 2020, mainland China became AIA’s largest market. AIA’s received life insurance license approval for Hubei province, reinforcing...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Banana Peal

HSBC HOLDINGS: HSBC announced the disposal of French retail bank at a loss of USD 2.3 bn. The HSBC France sale suggests HSBC US disposal could...

Thomas J. Monaco

Waterdrop – Water Fall

WATERDROP: Waterdrop reported its first set of earnings results since its IPO, declining 206.6% YOY largely due to higher costs from a channel and...

Thomas J. Monaco

Link REIT – Hong Kong “Stabilizing”

LINK REIT: Link operating results only improved 4.5% HOH, driven by mainland China and overseas. Hong Kong retail portfolio remains a challenge, as...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Head Still Buried In The Sand

HSBC HOLDINGS: A competitor call with management centered on benign Hong Kong/Asia. The Group aim is a CET1 of 14-14.5%. No mention HSBC North...

Thomas J. Monaco