Korea/Asia, Events, IPOs, Douglas Research Advisory

Douglas Kim

Korea/Asia, Events, IPOs

Event-Driven

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It has been nearly 11 months since <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/delivery-hero-se" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24416:1" rel="noopener">Delivery Hero SE (DHER GY)</a> first announced that it will acquire Korea's Woowa Brothers (Baemin), which is the largest prepared food delivery service provider in Korea. Korea's FTC finally <a href="https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2020111612044925797" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> today that Delivery Hero would need to sell Yogiyo in order to receive the final approval to acquire Woowa Brothers. Yogiyo is the second-largest prepared food delivery service provider in Korea, after Woowa Brothers.
This is a bad news for Delivery Hero since selling Yogiyo to acquire Woowa Brothers would reduce the operational and business synergies of having both companies under the same Delivery Hero umbrella. This is an initial report by the FTC and the final report on this M&amp;A deal is expected to be announced on December 9th. 
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It has been nearly 11 months since Delivery Hero SE (DHER GY) first announced that it will acquire Korea's Woowa Brothers (Baemin), which is the largest prepared food delivery service provider in Korea. Korea's FTC finally announced today that Delivery Hero would need to sell Yogiyo in order to receive the final approval to acquire Woowa Brothers. Yogiyo is the second-largest prepared food delivery service provider in Korea, after Woowa Brothers.
This is a bad news for Delivery Hero since selling Yogiyo to acquire Woowa Brothers would reduce the operational and business synergies of having both companies under the same Delivery Hero umbrella. This is an initial report by the FTC and the final report on this M&amp;A deal is expected to be announced on December 9th. 


Korea's FTC Requires Delivery Hero to Sell Yogiyo In Order to Acquire Woowa Brothers

Asian Equities Analyst, Logistics & Transport, Tracking Traffic

Daniel Hellberg

Asian Equities Analyst, Logistics & Transport

Tracking Traffic

Focusing on Asian logistics, transportation, and travel companies

Equity Capital Markets

US-based online food delivery company <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/doordash-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28881:1" rel="noopener">DoorDash Inc (0881510D US)</a> has filed to go public. In this note we describe the company's operations and compare its scale and efficiency to other online food delivery companies in the US and around the globe. 
Intensely focused and increasingly dominant in its home market, DoorDash has made admirable progress toward profitability by focusing on smaller cities and suburban areas in the US. This approach is the opposite of conventional wisdom, which suggests that only a handful of large US cities can generate the order density necessary to make online food delivery economically viable. 
DoorDash is seeking growth from new market segments adjacent to its core operation even as it faces the threat of a large, disruptive new entrant in US online food delivery. Last valued at US$16 bn in June 2020, we believe DoorDash's unorthodox approach deserves to be thoroughly understood by investors. We will write more about DoorDash as the IPO process moves forward.

US-based online food delivery company DoorDash Inc (0881510D US) has filed to go public. In this note we describe the company's operations and compare its scale and efficiency to other online food delivery companies in the US and around the globe. 
Intensely focused and increasingly dominant in its home market, DoorDash has made admirable progress toward profitability by focusing on smaller cities and suburban areas in the US. This approach is the opposite of conventional wisdom, which suggests that only a handful of large US cities can generate the order density necessary to make online food delivery economically viable. 
DoorDash is seeking growth from new market segments adjacent to its core operation even as it faces the threat of a large, disruptive new entrant in US online food delivery. Last valued at US$16 bn in June 2020, we believe DoorDash's unorthodox approach deserves to be thoroughly understood by investors. We will write more about DoorDash as the IPO process moves forward.

DoorDash IPO Context: What It Is & How It Compares to Online Food Delivery Universe

We hope <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/dida-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:29701:1" rel="noopener">Dida (DIDA HK)</a> will publish another set of updated financial statements (from Q3 2020) before it lists in Hong Kong later this year. If and when those results are published, investors should study them carefully to detect signs of a resurgent <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/didi-chuxing-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27467:1" rel="noopener">DiDi Chuxing (1284375D CH)</a> , the ride-hailing giant that exited the car pool market in late 2018 but quietly re-entered about a year ago.
The two most telling signs of a DiDi ChuXing resurgence in the car pool segment would be: 
<ol>
<li>Dida Inc's car pool revenue growing slower than its car pool ride volume or GTV</li>
<li>A sharp rise in Sales &amp; Marketing expenses relative to DiDa Inc's overall revenue</li>
</ol>
Both of the above metrics would be reflected in DiDa Inc's car pool 'take rate': the net revenue it earns on booking car pool rides after deducting any incentives paid to drivers, payments that have likely diminished dramatically in the two years since Didi ChuXing exited the market. 
We suspect that in the absence of a large, savvy competitor (like DiDi ChuXing), DiDa Inc's 'take rate' is higher and its spending on Sales &amp; Marketing is lower than it would be otherwise. Signs that DiDi ChuXing is aggressively pushing its way back into this market -- which it used to dominate, and not so long ago -- would be negative for DiDa Inc, in our view.
In fact, the 'free ride' DiDa Inc has enjoyed as the dominant (and quite profitable) player in the growing car pool segment could come to an end.

We hope Dida (DIDA HK) will publish another set of updated financial statements (from Q3 2020) before it lists in Hong Kong later this year. If and when those results are published, investors should study them carefully to detect signs of a resurgent DiDi Chuxing (1284375D CH) , the ride-hailing giant that exited the car pool market in late 2018 but quietly re-entered about a year ago.
The two most telling signs of a DiDi ChuXing resurgence in the car pool segment would be: 

Dida Inc's car pool revenue growing slower than its car pool ride volume or GTV
A sharp rise in Sales &amp; Marketing expenses relative to DiDa Inc's overall revenue

Both of the above metrics would be reflected in DiDa Inc's car pool 'take rate': the net revenue it earns on booking car pool rides after deducting any incentives paid to drivers, payments that have likely diminished dramatically in the two years since Didi ChuXing exited the market. 
We suspect that in the absence of a large, savvy competitor (like DiDi ChuXing), DiDa Inc's 'take rate' is higher and its spending on Sales &amp; Marketing is lower than it would be otherwise. Signs that DiDi ChuXing is aggressively pushing its way back into this market -- which it used to dominate, and not so long ago -- would be negative for DiDa Inc, in our view.
In fact, the 'free ride' DiDa Inc has enjoyed as the dominant (and quite profitable) player in the growing car pool segment could come to an end. 

No More 'Free Ride'? Key DiDa Inc Metrics That Could Reveal a DiDi ChuXing Resurgence

Global Emerging Market Equities, Propitious Research

Wium Malan, CFA

Global Emerging Market Equities

Equity Bottom-Up

Between early-2018 and late-2019, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/naspers-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21085:1" rel="noopener">Naspers (NPN SJ)</a> / <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/prosus-nv" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28104:1" rel="noopener">Prosus (PRX NA)</a> management took meaningful steps to attempt a narrowing of their discount to listed NAV, the most important of which was announcing the intended spin-off of all Naspers’ ex-South African internet assets into a new entity, Prosus, to be listed on Euronext Amsterdam, with a secondary listing on the JSE, which resulted in a narrowing of the discount from c.35% to c.25%. However, in the year since the listing of Prosus, we have seen a “double” discount manifest given Prosus’ c. 27% discount to its listed NAV as well as Naspers’ c. 29% discount to its listed NAV (which entirely comprises its 73% shareholding in Prosus). Intuitively, this seems excessive and, in this insight, I take a closer look at, what I believe to be, the top reasons for this discount, to find catalysts which might unlock value. I believe we will continue to see a c.25% holding company discount at Prosus, with another c.20% warranted at Naspers. I cannot, however, identify any catalysts that would cause the “double” discount to widen and have applied these values to my SOTP. I estimate fair value for Prosus at €101/share (31% upside) and Naspers at R4,404/share (47% upside).

Between early-2018 and late-2019, Naspers (NPN SJ) / Prosus (PRX NA) management took meaningful steps to attempt a narrowing of their discount to listed NAV, the most important of which was announcing the intended spin-off of all Naspers’ ex-South African internet assets into a new entity, Prosus, to be listed on Euronext Amsterdam, with a secondary listing on the JSE, which resulted in a narrowing of the discount from c.35% to c.25%. However, in the year since the listing of Prosus, we have seen a “double” discount manifest given Prosus’ c. 27% discount to its listed NAV as well as Naspers’ c. 29% discount to its listed NAV (which entirely comprises its 73% shareholding in Prosus). Intuitively, this seems excessive and, in this insight, I take a closer look at, what I believe to be, the top reasons for this discount, to find catalysts which might unlock value. I believe we will continue to see a c.25% holding company discount at Prosus, with another c.20% warranted at Naspers. I cannot, however, identify any catalysts that would cause the “double” discount to widen and have applied these values to my SOTP. I estimate fair value for Prosus at €101/share (31% upside) and Naspers at R4,404/share (47% upside).

Naspers: “Double” Discount Warranted? The Search for a Catalyst Continues

Maintaining strong revenue growth at the online food delivery companies largely depends on some combination of rising orders, increasing value per order, and higher monetization ('take') rates. 
And improvement in gross profitability at these companies depends on getting unit delivery revenues to grow faster than unit delivery costs. 
In our view, many of the drivers of recent strong revenue growth and improving gross profitability are beginning to fade for some online food delivery companies, including China's Meituan. 
This decline can be obscured by a number of temporary factors. At <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/meituan-dianping" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26970:1" rel="noopener">Meituan (3690 HK)</a> in 2020 these include a change in segment reporting, a sharp rise in 'other' operating income, and growth of  the company's food delivery advertising revenue. 
In this note we take a closer look at H1 2020 food delivery results from Meituan, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/delivery-hero-se" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24416:1" rel="noopener">Delivery Hero SE (DHER GY)</a> and newly merged <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/takeaway-com-nv" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28360:1" rel="noopener">Takeaway.com NV (TKWY NA)</a> to see how each company is faring in terms of top-line growth and gross profitability. The numbers are mixed, but in Meituan's case show a waning of momentum and stagnant margins in core food delivery activity.

Maintaining strong revenue growth at the online food delivery companies largely depends on some combination of rising orders, increasing value per order, and higher monetization ('take') rates. 
And improvement in gross profitability at these companies depends on getting unit delivery revenues to grow faster than unit delivery costs. 
In our view, many of the drivers of recent strong revenue growth and improving gross profitability are beginning to fade for some online food delivery companies, including China's Meituan. 
This decline can be obscured by a number of temporary factors. At Meituan (3690 HK) in 2020 these include a change in segment reporting, a sharp rise in 'other' operating income, and growth of  the company's food delivery advertising revenue. 
In this note we take a closer look at H1 2020 food delivery results from Meituan, Delivery Hero SE (DHER GY) and newly merged Takeaway.com NV (TKWY NA) to see how each company is faring in terms of top-line growth and gross profitability. The numbers are mixed, but in Meituan's case show a waning of momentum and stagnant margins in core food delivery activity.

Meituan: Key Drivers of Top-Line Growth &  Margin Lift Receding, Obscured By Growth of 'Other' Items

Germany

Delivery Hero SE offers e-commerce services. The Company provides online food ordering services. Delivery Hero serves customers Germany.

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Delivery Hero SE (DHER GR)

Korea's FTC Requires Delivery Hero to Sell Yogiyo In Order to Acquire Woowa Brothers

Korea's FTC finally announced today that Delivery Hero would need to sell Yogiyo in order to receive the final approval to acquire Woowa Brothers.

Douglas Kim

DoorDash IPO Context: What It Is & How It Compares to Online Food Delivery Universe

US-based on-demand food delivery company DoorDash plans to list soon. In this note we show investors how DoorDash differs from some of its peers in...

Tracking Traffic

No More 'Free Ride'? Key DiDa Inc Metrics That Could Reveal a DiDi ChuXing Resurgence

DiDa Inc has carved out a niche for itself in China's growing car pool segment. But should ride-hailing giant DiDi ChuXing re-emerge as a player,...

Tracking Traffic

Naspers: “Double” Discount Warranted? The Search for a Catalyst Continues

Since the listing of Prosus, we have seen a “double” discount to listed NAV manifest at Naspers. I take a closer look at the top reasons for this...

Wium Malan, CFA

Meituan: Key Drivers of Top-Line Growth & Margin Lift Receding, Obscured By Growth of 'Other' Items

New name Rider costs - $3690 Advertising Summary

Tracking Traffic

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