Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Another Awful Result: Punjab National Bank (PNB.IN) [PNB] reported FY 4Q21 net income of INR 5.9 bn, increasing INR 803 mn  (15.9%) linked quarter. Excluding the gains in the consecutive quarters, PNB’s core operating results would have been a negative INR 3.9 bn in FY 4Q21 and negative INR 7.4 bn in FY 3Q21. Not good, but operating losses did moderately decline – or did they? Bizarrely, as gross stated NPLs increased 10.5% linked quarter, PNB in its infinite wisdom decided to cut loss provisions INR 7.5 bn (13.7%) linked quarter which was substantially additive to what appears to be an overstated bottom-line; and*Accelerating Credit Risk Leads to Technical Insolvency: Inclusive of the INR 68 bn NCO, we find that PNB’s level of net new NPLs actually increased INR 167 bn or 70.7% on an annualized basis. While we have very little confidence in PNB’s reporting of problem assets at this stage, we take their word for current NPLs and find that loss reserves are now light by at minimum of INR 1.1 bn  - or approximately 124% of stated book value. This is without accounting for the delayed or backlog provisions associated fraud accounts and ageing provisions.

*Another Awful Result: Punjab National Bank (PNB.IN) [PNB] reported FY 4Q21 net income of INR 5.9 bn, increasing INR 803 mn  (15.9%) linked quarter. Excluding the gains in the consecutive quarters, PNB’s core operating results would have been a negative INR 3.9 bn in FY 4Q21 and negative INR 7.4 bn in FY 3Q21. Not good, but operating losses did moderately decline – or did they? Bizarrely, as gross stated NPLs increased 10.5% linked quarter, PNB in its infinite wisdom decided to cut loss provisions INR 7.5 bn (13.7%) linked quarter which was substantially additive to what appears to be an overstated bottom-line; and*Accelerating Credit Risk Leads to Technical Insolvency: Inclusive of the INR 68 bn NCO, we find that PNB’s level of net new NPLs actually increased INR 167 bn or 70.7% on an annualized basis. While we have very little confidence in PNB’s reporting of problem assets at this stage, we take their word for current NPLs and find that loss reserves are now light by at minimum of INR 1.1 bn  - or approximately 124% of stated book value. This is without accounting for the delayed or backlog provisions associated fraud accounts and ageing provisions.  

* Flummoxed: A competitor hosted a virtual conference with the management of the State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI]. To say the call was a disappointment would be an understatement. Nothing meaningful was stated on credit quality, and for some reason management is “comfortable” with capital; and *Reserve Challenges Should Lead To LARGE Capital Raise: Net new NPLs increased INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% on an annualized versus – accelerating over the awful FY 3Q21 result of INR 145.7 bn and 41.6%.  These figures are quite troublesome - even for an Indian SOE bank. Given the capital challenges even prior to the Yes Bank (YES.IN) risk, SBI needs to prepare for additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

* Flummoxed: A competitor hosted a virtual conference with the management of the State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI]. To say the call was a disappointment would be an understatement. Nothing meaningful was stated on credit quality, and for some reason management is “comfortable” with capital; and *Reserve Challenges Should Lead To LARGE Capital Raise: Net new NPLs increased INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% on an annualized versus – accelerating over the awful FY 3Q21 result of INR 145.7 bn and 41.6%.  These figures are quite troublesome - even for an Indian SOE bank. Given the capital challenges even prior to the Yes Bank (YES.IN) risk, SBI needs to prepare for additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Lights On, No One Home

Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)’s decision to grant a 1-year <a href="https://ir.rblbank.com/pdfs/regulatory/ReappointmentofMDCEOMrVishwavirAhujaFinal2021.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">extension</a> to  Vishwavir Ahuja, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rbl-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22856:1" rel="noopener">RBL Bank Ltd (RBK IN)</a> is similar to the 1-year extensions it provided to <a href="https://www.dcbbank.com/pdfs/BSENSEReAppointmentOfMDANDCEOApril2021.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Murali Natarajan</a>, CEO, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/dcb-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1557:1" rel="noopener">Dcb Bank Ltd (DCBB IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/d8768272-3bd1-4d07-808b-43b725fcdc69.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Shyam Srinivasan</a>, CEO <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/federal-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11784:1" rel="noopener">Federal Bank (FB IN)</a>. In recent times, Udak Kotak, CEO-founder, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kotak-mahindra-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:126:1" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)</a>(KMB) enjoys the unique distinction of getting a <a href="https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachLive/d5faa2b3-1886-42a9-af9d-960ff207a4ce.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">3-year</a>  extension by the regulator, despite having been a CEO for over 15 years, contradicting RBI’s <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=12078&amp;Mode=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">policy</a>  regarding the maximum tenure for bank CEOs.There are three issues raised by RBI’s conduct. Firstly, the decision to favour Uday Kotak and KMB is plainly <a href="https://thewire.in/banking/uday-kotak-ceo-kotak-mahindra-bank-rbi" target="_blank" rel="noopener">partisan</a>, undermining the credibility of the banking regulator. Secondly, by granting three private bank CEOs only a 1-year extension, is the regulator indicating to the banks its displeasure with the existing CEOs and the need to find a replacement in the course of the year? Although the RBI granted Shyam Srinivasan a second 1-year extension last year, the Federal Bank board of directors has <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/federal-bank-board-seeks-another-3-year-term-for-ceo/articleshow/81639243.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sought</a>  a 3-year extension when his term ends on September 29, 2021, indicating that the bank has chosen not to read the regulator’s tea leaves – or that the RBI did not give any such indication to the bank to look for a successor. If the RBI were to approve a further term to Shyam Srinivasan, it would raise questions about the regulator’s competence; what was the justification for repeated 1-year extensions? Thirdly, RBI’s policy of renewing CEOs with 1-year tenures unnecessarily introduces uncertainty in a bank’s future strategy: the existing CEO and the bank can plan for only one year, as the RBI may insist on a replacement at the end of the year.   Such short-term planning, especially in the current environment of economic stress, can be disruptive to the bank and its stakeholders, and it is unfortunate that it is being caused by the regulator’s decision to approve only 1-year extensions, without any explanation to the public.The capital market plays an important role for private banks, and the regulator must either be more transparent in explaining its decisions or it should reconsider its policy of granting 1-year extensions even when the candidates are conforming to the regulator’s norms of age and tenure for the CEOs. It is tragic that the RBI’s credibility as an impartial regulator has reached a nadir. Latest developments -- the favoured treatment it has meted to Uday Kotak, and its inability to comprehend the significance of its decision to renew CEO tenures for only  one year -- take its credibility even lower.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)’s decision to grant a 1-year extension to  Vishwavir Ahuja, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), RBL Bank Ltd (RBK IN) is similar to the 1-year extensions it provided to Murali Natarajan, CEO, Dcb Bank Ltd (DCBB IN) and Shyam Srinivasan, CEO Federal Bank (FB IN). In recent times, Udak Kotak, CEO-founder, Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)(KMB) enjoys the unique distinction of getting a 3-year  extension by the regulator, despite having been a CEO for over 15 years, contradicting RBI’s policy  regarding the maximum tenure for bank CEOs.There are three issues raised by RBI’s conduct. Firstly, the decision to favour Uday Kotak and KMB is plainly partisan, undermining the credibility of the banking regulator. Secondly, by granting three private bank CEOs only a 1-year extension, is the regulator indicating to the banks its displeasure with the existing CEOs and the need to find a replacement in the course of the year? Although the RBI granted Shyam Srinivasan a second 1-year extension last year, the Federal Bank board of directors has sought  a 3-year extension when his term ends on September 29, 2021, indicating that the bank has chosen not to read the regulator’s tea leaves – or that the RBI did not give any such indication to the bank to look for a successor. If the RBI were to approve a further term to Shyam Srinivasan, it would raise questions about the regulator’s competence; what was the justification for repeated 1-year extensions? Thirdly, RBI’s policy of renewing CEOs with 1-year tenures unnecessarily introduces uncertainty in a bank’s future strategy: the existing CEO and the bank can plan for only one year, as the RBI may insist on a replacement at the end of the year.   Such short-term planning, especially in the current environment of economic stress, can be disruptive to the bank and its stakeholders, and it is unfortunate that it is being caused by the regulator’s decision to approve only 1-year extensions, without any explanation to the public.The capital market plays an important role for private banks, and the regulator must either be more transparent in explaining its decisions or it should reconsider its policy of granting 1-year extensions even when the candidates are conforming to the regulator’s norms of age and tenure for the CEOs. It is tragic that the RBI’s credibility as an impartial regulator has reached a nadir. Latest developments -- the favoured treatment it has meted to Uday Kotak, and its inability to comprehend the significance of its decision to renew CEO tenures for only  one year -- take its credibility even lower.

RBI’s 1-Year Extensions to Bank CEOs: Creating Uncertainty and Short-Termism

*Are We Even Looking At The Same Bank As Management: A competitor hosted a recent conference call with the CFO of HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] to give a post-quarter update. On the conference call, however, management instead decided to focus on numerous items not having to do with credit, the elephant in the room. HDFCB management has more than a tendency to put a completely unwarranted positive spin on nearly every aspect of its business  -  completely ignoring the medium-term challenges; and*Watch Your Credit: We calculate that net new NPLs actually increased INR 49.2 bn or 130.4% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome – especially considering the challenges at HDFCB’s NBFC subsidiary, HDB Financial Services.  By our calculation, loss reserves are currently short by nearly INR 242 bn or nearly a half year of core operating results.

*Are We Even Looking At The Same Bank As Management: A competitor hosted a recent conference call with the CFO of HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] to give a post-quarter update. On the conference call, however, management instead decided to focus on numerous items not having to do with credit, the elephant in the room. HDFCB management has more than a tendency to put a completely unwarranted positive spin on nearly every aspect of its business  -  completely ignoring the medium-term challenges; and*Watch Your Credit: We calculate that net new NPLs actually increased INR 49.2 bn or 130.4% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome – especially considering the challenges at HDFCB’s NBFC subsidiary, HDB Financial Services.  By our calculation, loss reserves are currently short by nearly INR 242 bn or nearly a half year of core operating results.

*Poor Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported a FY 4Q21 loss of INR 10.5 bn, quite a reversal of fortune from the gains of INR 10.6 bn in FY 3Q21. Several factors drove BOB’s poor performance: a) net interest income declined INR 3.7 bn (5.0%) linked quarter driven by NIM expansion of 5 bp to 2.72% while the loan book only grew 0.2%; b) a loss provision increase of INR 1.5 bn (4.4%) despite further weakness in lending; an operating expense increase of INR 3.9 bn (7.3%) driven primarily by other costs which increased INR 3.1 bn (13.8%) – pushing BOB’s C/I ratio 3.2% higher to 63.2%; and the write-down of INR 33.1 bn in un-utilized DTAs; and*Poor Reserve Cover: Further, net new NPLs remain elevated at INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized. Keep in mind, a bank with over 8% of NPLs is typically considered an insolvent institution. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 293 bn or nearly 12 quarters of pre-tax earnings.

*Poor Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported a FY 4Q21 loss of INR 10.5 bn, quite a reversal of fortune from the gains of INR 10.6 bn in FY 3Q21. Several factors drove BOB’s poor performance: a) net interest income declined INR 3.7 bn (5.0%) linked quarter driven by NIM expansion of 5 bp to 2.72% while the loan book only grew 0.2%; b) a loss provision increase of INR 1.5 bn (4.4%) despite further weakness in lending; an operating expense increase of INR 3.9 bn (7.3%) driven primarily by other costs which increased INR 3.1 bn (13.8%) – pushing BOB’s C/I ratio 3.2% higher to 63.2%; and the write-down of INR 33.1 bn in un-utilized DTAs; and*Poor Reserve Cover: Further, net new NPLs remain elevated at INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized. Keep in mind, a bank with over 8% of NPLs is typically considered an insolvent institution. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 293 bn or nearly 12 quarters of pre-tax earnings.

Bank of Baroda – No Light In This Tunnel

India

iShares MSCI India Index ETF is an exchange-traded fund registered in Singapore. The Fund seeks to provide investment results that, before expenses, closely correspond to the performance of the MSCI India Index. The Fund invests all or substantially all of its assets in shares comprising the MSCI India Index in substantially the same weightings as constituted in the underlying index.

iShares MSCI India Index ETF (INDIA SP)

Punjab National Bank – Cipher

PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK: PNB's operating results were a negative INR 3.9 bn in FY 4Q21. Bizarrely, as gross stated NPLs increased 10.5% linked...

Thomas J. Monaco

State Bank of India – Lights On, No One Home

STATE BANK OF INDIA: A competitor hosted a disappointing call with management. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn...

Thomas J. Monaco

RBI’s 1-Year Extensions to Bank CEOs: Creating Uncertainty and Short-Termism

The favoured treatment RBI has meted to Uday Kotak, and its inability to comprehend the significance of its decision to renew CEO tenures for only ...

Hemindra Hazari

HDFC Bank – Rose Colored Glasses

HDFC BANK: A competitor hosted a recent conference call with HDFCB. It chose to focus on numerous items not having to do with credit. The longer...

Thomas J. Monaco

Bank of Baroda – No Light In This Tunnel

BANK OF BARODA: BOB reported a FY 4Q21 loss of INR 10.5 bn. Net new NPLs remain elevated at 11.2% annualized. BOB’s reserves still remain light by...

Thomas J. Monaco