Research and consultancy, Tabbush Report

Daniel Tabbush

Research and consultancy

Tabbush Report

We provide research and consultancy on Asian banks. Our focus is on what we call “Asian bank research, without the noise.” We are interested in the most critical swing-factors for banks, the NPL and credit cycle, and where we believe there is a gap between perception and reality. We often focus on the less studied components of bank financial statements.  Our research is highly thematic, sometimes examining unlisted banks and companies as a window on mainstream banks. 

Being independent allows us to look at smaller banks, often overlooked by others. Analysis of BIS bank guidelines in the context of Asia, is also a focal point, while we also analyze global banks operating in the region. We use what we believe is the most comprehensive, reliable financials database, SNL Financial. S&P Capital IQ augments our database, with corporate data and CEIC, with economics. 

Asian bank research, without the noise.

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

Many of Asia’s banks have high levels of fixed deposits, and as these mature, they will re-price at lower rates. The scope for margin expansion is considerable. Vietnam’s banks stand out here, as does AMMB and Tisco.

Many of Asia’s banks have high levels of fixed deposits, and as these mature, they will re-price at lower rates. The scope for margin expansion is considerable. Vietnam’s banks stand out here, as does AMMB and Tisco. 

Asian Banks – Funding Costs Can Surprise

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Another Poor Showing: Hang Seng Bank (11.HK) [Hang Seng] reported a 1H21 result of HKD 8.8 bn, improving HKD 1.2 bn (16.3%) HOH. However, core operating results improved only nominally by HKD 52 mn or 0.8% over the period. Were it not for the unreasonable decline of HKD 639 mn (65.3%) in loss provisions as credit deteriorated, results would have been far worse;  and*Provisions Now Significantly Understated: While the current NPL ratio is not alarming on its face, the HOH increase in net new NPLs is HKD 1.7 bn or 23.5% annualized - decelerating from the HKD 3.0 bn or 201% annualized at 2H20. We find Hang Seng under-provided for to the tune of HKD 10.6 bn or nearly 1.5x the bank’s core operating result.

*Another Poor Showing: Hang Seng Bank (11.HK) [Hang Seng] reported a 1H21 result of HKD 8.8 bn, improving HKD 1.2 bn (16.3%) HOH. However, core operating results improved only nominally by HKD 52 mn or 0.8% over the period. Were it not for the unreasonable decline of HKD 639 mn (65.3%) in loss provisions as credit deteriorated, results would have been far worse;  and*Provisions Now Significantly Understated: While the current NPL ratio is not alarming on its face, the HOH increase in net new NPLs is HKD 1.7 bn or 23.5% annualized - decelerating from the HKD 3.0 bn or 201% annualized at 2H20. We find Hang Seng under-provided for to the tune of HKD 10.6 bn or nearly 1.5x the bank’s core operating result.

Hang Seng Bank – Wuihfung Remains In Full Control

*Poor 2Q21 Result: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 2Q21 results of SGD 1.7 bn, decreasing SGD 304  mn (15.1%) on a linked quarter basis. The weaker results were driven primarily by an overall revenue decline, a loan provision increase, and a higher tax rate;*Watch Your Credit: We struggle continue to believe that DBS’ due diligence had actually caught all of LVB’s risk (see discussion below), and remain unconvinced that the moratorium exits are anything more than additional reliance on government schemes and relief programs. DBS has disclosed absolutely nothing about Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank’s (SRCB) fundamentals. By our calculation, and given the NCOs of SGD 69 mn, we find that net new NPLs have re-accelerated – up SGD 266 mn or increasing 18.0% annualized versus SGD 85 mn or 5.6% in 1Q21. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 2.5bn – amounting now to about two quarters of operating results; and *Deal Distractions Mount:  While SRCB dos not appear to be riddled with problems the way LVB is, no doubt there will be issues to contend with.  DBS apparently isn’t done with its shopping spree, being in the running for parts of Citigroup's (C.US) consumer business in Asia. Frankly, DBS needs to focus on improving its own legacy issues before it starts both taking on those of other financial institutions.

*Poor 2Q21 Result: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 2Q21 results of SGD 1.7 bn, decreasing SGD 304  mn (15.1%) on a linked quarter basis. The weaker results were driven primarily by an overall revenue decline, a loan provision increase, and a higher tax rate;*Watch Your Credit: We struggle continue to believe that DBS’ due diligence had actually caught all of LVB’s risk (see discussion below), and remain unconvinced that the moratorium exits are anything more than additional reliance on government schemes and relief programs. DBS has disclosed absolutely nothing about Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank’s (SRCB) fundamentals. By our calculation, and given the NCOs of SGD 69 mn, we find that net new NPLs have re-accelerated – up SGD 266 mn or increasing 18.0% annualized versus SGD 85 mn or 5.6% in 1Q21. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 2.5bn – amounting now to about two quarters of operating results; and *Deal Distractions Mount:  While SRCB dos not appear to be riddled with problems the way LVB is, no doubt there will be issues to contend with.  DBS apparently isn’t done with its shopping spree, being in the running for parts of Citigroup's (C.US) consumer business in Asia. Frankly, DBS needs to focus on improving its own legacy issues before it starts both taking on those of other financial institutions.

With full data out from Singapore’s banks, it is becoming even clearer, how loan mix can impact net interest income, and margins. It is also a stark reminder of the inherent relative weakness at HSBC.

With full data out from Singapore’s banks, it is becoming even clearer, how loan mix can impact net interest income, and margins. It is also a stark reminder of the inherent relative weakness at HSBC.

*Kick In The Pants: On July 21, 2021, HSBC Holdings plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] and many of the other major Hong Banks finally had the epiphany of declining mortgages to borrowers on two of Evergrande Group’s (3333.HK) residential developments in Hong Kong. On July 22, 2021, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) hauled HSBC and its colleagues in to explain the no lend decision on Evergrande’s two Hong Kong in process property  developments. Wouldn’t you know it, this subtle re-think request caused the banks to reverse course; and*Daisy Chain:This move by the HKMA and clearly prompted by authorities in mainland China intimates that Evergrande poses significant systemic risk for mainland China. Government officials in Shenyang are prompting SOEs to increase their ownership in Shengjing Bank (2966.HK), which is 36% owned by Evergrande and lent it an estimated USD 15.5 bn.

*Kick In The Pants: On July 21, 2021, HSBC Holdings plc (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] and many of the other major Hong Banks finally had the epiphany of declining mortgages to borrowers on two of Evergrande Group’s (3333.HK) residential developments in Hong Kong. On July 22, 2021, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) hauled HSBC and its colleagues in to explain the no lend decision on Evergrande’s two Hong Kong in process property  developments. Wouldn’t you know it, this subtle re-think request caused the banks to reverse course; and*Daisy Chain:This move by the HKMA and clearly prompted by authorities in mainland China intimates that Evergrande poses significant systemic risk for mainland China. Government officials in Shenyang are prompting SOEs to increase their ownership in Shengjing Bank (2966.HK), which is 36% owned by Evergrande and lent it an estimated USD 15.5 bn.    

HSBC Holdings Plc – Strong Armed By The HKMA

Hong Kong

Standard Chartered plc is an international banking group operating principally in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.  The Company offers its products and services in the personal, consumer, corporate, institutional and treasury areas.

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Standard Chartered (2888 HK)

Asian Banks – Funding Costs Can Surprise

Many banks have high levels of fixed deposits. As these mature, they re-price at lower rates. The scope for margin expansion is considerable....

Daniel Tabbush

Hang Seng Bank – Wuihfung Remains In Full Control

HANG SENG BANK: Hang Seng reported a poor 1H21 HOH operating result. If provisions didn't decline 65%, results would have been worse. It under...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – Bad Print

DBS: DBS QOQ 2Q21 results declined 15.1% due to poor revenues and higher provisions. We worry that DBS has not caught the LVB risk, net new NPLs re...

Thomas J. Monaco

Banks – Margins

With full data out from Singapore’s banks, it is becoming even clearer, how loan mix can impact net interest income, and margins. It is also a...

Daniel Tabbush

HSBC Holdings Plc – Strong Armed By The HKMA

HSBC HOLDINGS: HSBC had an epiphany of declining mortgages on two of Evergrande’s local developments. The HKMA wanted an explanation and wouldn’t...

Thomas J. Monaco

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