Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/standard-chartered-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:193:1" rel="noopener">Standard Chartered's (StanLn)</a> decision to restart its share-buyback program while simultaneously aiming to achieve a 10% Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) is not creditor friendly. The share-buyback is also inconsistent with trying to grow revenues at a cumulative annual growth rate of 5% to 7% over the medium term, as capital constraints may mean missing revenue opportunities. This is at complete odds with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings' (HSBA LN)</a> wise decision to forgo buybacks through this year. Taken together with management’s plans toward achieving a higher ROTE, this is not credit positive. Pre-Covid-19, Standard Chartered’s problem was excess capacity in a fragmented distribution network. Covid-19 accentuated other weaknesses, including oversized net interest income reliance as well as bancassurance growth sensitivity to border crossing constraints. Underpinned by cost containment difficulties, StanLn is lost at sea, hoping for a return to higher interest rates, open borders, and greater globalization. We are in a world comprised of the exact opposite these days.Within this insight, we review StanLn’s 2020 annual and Q4 results as well as assess the firm’s plans to achieve a higher ROTE over the medium term. Our conclusion is that it is difficult to get excited about Standard Chartered’s US$-denominated Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds. In our view, most of these notes trade right where they belong, if not too dear, relative to other banks. If we had to buy a StanLn bond, we would favor the Singapore-dollar denominated AT1 note, despite the results and targets going forward.

Standard Chartered's (StanLn) decision to restart its share-buyback program while simultaneously aiming to achieve a 10% Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) is not creditor friendly. The share-buyback is also inconsistent with trying to grow revenues at a cumulative annual growth rate of 5% to 7% over the medium term, as capital constraints may mean missing revenue opportunities. This is at complete odds with HSBC Holdings' (HSBA LN) wise decision to forgo buybacks through this year. Taken together with management’s plans toward achieving a higher ROTE, this is not credit positive. Pre-Covid-19, Standard Chartered’s problem was excess capacity in a fragmented distribution network. Covid-19 accentuated other weaknesses, including oversized net interest income reliance as well as bancassurance growth sensitivity to border crossing constraints. Underpinned by cost containment difficulties, StanLn is lost at sea, hoping for a return to higher interest rates, open borders, and greater globalization. We are in a world comprised of the exact opposite these days.Within this insight, we review StanLn’s 2020 annual and Q4 results as well as assess the firm’s plans to achieve a higher ROTE over the medium term. Our conclusion is that it is difficult to get excited about Standard Chartered’s US$-denominated Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds. In our view, most of these notes trade right where they belong, if not too dear, relative to other banks. If we had to buy a StanLn bond, we would favor the Singapore-dollar denominated AT1 note, despite the results and targets going forward.

Standard Chartered Results: Lost at Sea with No Credit Catalyst

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Poor Set Of Results, Which Should Have Been Worse: Standard Chartered Plc (STAN.LN/2888.HK) [STAN] reported 2H20 losses of USD 315 mn, declining USD 1.4 bn (122.5%) HOH as it struggled across the board. Negative operating jaws for STAN are troublesome to say the least, as HOH we note that STAN’s revenues declined USD 1.4 bn (16.0%) whilst expenses increased USD 1.0 bn (20.4%); and*Credit Challenges Are Top Of Mind As Well: STAN had a HOH increase in unmarkable Level 3 assets of (20.1%), and level of net new NPLs during 2H20 amounted to USD 1.0 bn – increasing 23.8% on an annualized basis. By our analysis, STAN should not have cut provisions and instead should have ‘manned-up’and taken an addition USD 4.8 bn in provisions. This is prior to any risk assessment for its increasing level of Level 3 assets. The shortfall represents 10% of stated equity, which begs the question of why it’s paying dividends and buying back shares in this condition.

*Poor Set Of Results, Which Should Have Been Worse: Standard Chartered Plc (STAN.LN/2888.HK) [STAN] reported 2H20 losses of USD 315 mn, declining USD 1.4 bn (122.5%) HOH as it struggled across the board. Negative operating jaws for STAN are troublesome to say the least, as HOH we note that STAN’s revenues declined USD 1.4 bn (16.0%) whilst expenses increased USD 1.0 bn (20.4%); and*Credit Challenges Are Top Of Mind As Well: STAN had a HOH increase in unmarkable Level 3 assets of (20.1%), and level of net new NPLs during 2H20 amounted to USD 1.0 bn – increasing 23.8% on an annualized basis. By our analysis, STAN should not have cut provisions and instead should have ‘manned-up’and taken an addition USD 4.8 bn in provisions. This is prior to any risk assessment for its increasing level of Level 3 assets. The shortfall represents 10% of stated equity, which begs the question of why it’s paying dividends and buying back shares in this condition.     

*Poor Showing: Hang Seng Bank (11.HK) [Hang Seng] reported both a weak and low quality 2H20 result of HKD 7.5 bn, declining HKD 1.6 bn (17.5%) HOH. The decline in earnings was attributed to net interest income decline due to loan contraction, and NIM compression; and*Did HSBC Overstate Results?:While the current NPL ratio is not alarming, the HOH increase in net new NPLs is at HKD 3.0 bn  - which amounts to an alarming 201% increase on an annualized basis. This is not the first major subsidiary that HSBC is allowing to fall into the abys from a credit perspective, with HSBC North America (HSBCNA) posting net new problem loan growth at 155.4%. Like HSBCNA, we calculate Hang Seng under-provided for to the tune of HKD 6.3 bn or nearly 75% of the bank’s PBT. Combining both subsidiaries, we find that HSBC Holdings Plc overstated 2H20 results (adjusted for ownership) to the tune of USD 4.3 bn – just on these two subsidiaries alone.

*Poor Showing: Hang Seng Bank (11.HK) [Hang Seng] reported both a weak and low quality 2H20 result of HKD 7.5 bn, declining HKD 1.6 bn (17.5%) HOH. The decline in earnings was attributed to net interest income decline due to loan contraction, and NIM compression; and*Did HSBC Overstate Results?:While the current NPL ratio is not alarming, the HOH increase in net new NPLs is at HKD 3.0 bn  - which amounts to an alarming 201% increase on an annualized basis. This is not the first major subsidiary that HSBC is allowing to fall into the abys from a credit perspective, with HSBC North America (HSBCNA) posting net new problem loan growth at 155.4%. Like HSBCNA, we calculate Hang Seng under-provided for to the tune of HKD 6.3 bn or nearly 75% of the bank’s PBT. Combining both subsidiaries, we find that HSBC Holdings Plc overstated 2H20 results (adjusted for ownership) to the tune of USD 4.3 bn – just on these two subsidiaries alone.  

Hang Seng Bank – HSBC Fingerprints All Over This Print

We progressed from melt-up to full risk-on duration admiration as the week progressed. The improved risk sentiment drove spreads tighter last week, with almost all bonds tightening  globally. China’s return from Lunar New Year holidays also pushed Asia’s financial spreads materially lower. Asia’s financial indexes outperformed European notes as Additional Tier 1 bonds in both regions continued to tighten.Debt investors continue to look to banks as a means to play the economic recovery trade. Every Asia bank headquartered Additional Tier 1 (AT1), Tier 2 and X-over rated bank bond compressed over the week. Almost all High Yield bank bonds tightened globally. <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/indiabulls-housing-finance-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13086:1" rel="noopener">Indiabulls Housing Finance (IHFL IN)</a> bonds were among the few bonds that did not strengthen during the week. Meanwhile <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/standard-chartered-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:193:1" rel="noopener">Standard Chartered (STAN LN)</a> are expected to report results this week. These results may impact global bank investor sentiment.In addition, HSBC may entreat us to another strategic review. It is hard to not be cynical regarding these, given the lack of success with the last two. Nonetheless, the main risk for credit investors is that of a substantial geographic reorganization which negatively impacts holding company cash flows or attempts to push holding company bonds to less attractive subsidiary operations. While we think both outcomes are unlikely, we will be watching for any potential hints of this. Globally, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/svenska-handelsbanken-ab" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22480:1" rel="noopener">Svenska Handelsbanken's (SHBA SS)</a> 4¾% coupon 2031 callable note led Additional Tier 1 (AT1) and broader bank US$-bond performance. This bond also led global spread performance in the week prior. Other long-callable AT1 bonds also outperformed during the week, including Standard Chartered’s and UBS’s 2031 maturity bonds, as well as HSBC’s coupon 2030 maturity note. These each compressed by 13bps.Given the rate of change over the last two weeks, there are clear opportunities within the credit curves of some banks. These are potential buy or sell opportunities, depending on whether your expectations are for the current risk-on rally to continue.  We identify these by security type within.Market Outlook: Unlike 2019 when we experienced a rally that everyone loved to hate, everyone loves this rally. Combined with the strength of the risk-on moves, this makes us uneasy. Financial repression creates a market, which in its nature, is always a one-sided bet with the Fed / ECB/ BOJ. There is limited price discover as the market is simply sentiment driven. Credit value should remain driven by larger market forces. However, we may be fast approaching a point where the market outpaces the rate of expected economic recovery, and / or the market outpaces the rate that can be achieved without incurring substantial financial stability concerns. Our preference is for lower duration bonds, preferably in the belly of the curve, but the market has duration admiration. Please see our recent <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/bank-macro-manifest-risk-rally-gathers-steam-as-bad-news-more-stimulus" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bank Macro Manifest</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/bank-credit-strategy-melt-up-before-meltdown-where-to-position" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bank Credit Strategy</a> notes for more details.

We progressed from melt-up to full risk-on duration admiration as the week progressed. The improved risk sentiment drove spreads tighter last week, with almost all bonds tightening  globally. China’s return from Lunar New Year holidays also pushed Asia’s financial spreads materially lower. Asia’s financial indexes outperformed European notes as Additional Tier 1 bonds in both regions continued to tighten.Debt investors continue to look to banks as a means to play the economic recovery trade. Every Asia bank headquartered Additional Tier 1 (AT1), Tier 2 and X-over rated bank bond compressed over the week. Almost all High Yield bank bonds tightened globally. Yes Bank (YES IN) and Indiabulls Housing Finance (IHFL IN) bonds were among the few bonds that did not strengthen during the week. Meanwhile HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN) and Standard Chartered (STAN LN) are expected to report results this week. These results may impact global bank investor sentiment.In addition, HSBC may entreat us to another strategic review. It is hard to not be cynical regarding these, given the lack of success with the last two. Nonetheless, the main risk for credit investors is that of a substantial geographic reorganization which negatively impacts holding company cash flows or attempts to push holding company bonds to less attractive subsidiary operations. While we think both outcomes are unlikely, we will be watching for any potential hints of this. Globally, Svenska Handelsbanken's (SHBA SS) 4¾% coupon 2031 callable note led Additional Tier 1 (AT1) and broader bank US$-bond performance. This bond also led global spread performance in the week prior. Other long-callable AT1 bonds also outperformed during the week, including Standard Chartered’s and UBS’s 2031 maturity bonds, as well as HSBC’s coupon 2030 maturity note. These each compressed by 13bps.Given the rate of change over the last two weeks, there are clear opportunities within the credit curves of some banks. These are potential buy or sell opportunities, depending on whether your expectations are for the current risk-on rally to continue.  We identify these by security type within.Market Outlook: Unlike 2019 when we experienced a rally that everyone loved to hate, everyone loves this rally. Combined with the strength of the risk-on moves, this makes us uneasy. Financial repression creates a market, which in its nature, is always a one-sided bet with the Fed / ECB/ BOJ. There is limited price discover as the market is simply sentiment driven. Credit value should remain driven by larger market forces. However, we may be fast approaching a point where the market outpaces the rate of expected economic recovery, and / or the market outpaces the rate that can be achieved without incurring substantial financial stability concerns. Our preference is for lower duration bonds, preferably in the belly of the curve, but the market has duration admiration. Please see our recent Bank Macro Manifest and Bank Credit Strategy notes for more details.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.     

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

United Kingdom

Standard Chartered PLC is an international banking group operating principally in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The Company offers its products and services in the personal, consumer, corporate, institutional and treasury areas.

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Standard Chartered (STAN LN)

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