Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Bottom-Up

SBI Cards & Payment Services / Equity Bottom-Up

<div><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sbi-cards-payment-services-limited" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28662:1" rel="noopener">SBI Cards (SBICARD IN)</a> is India's second largest credit card issuer with a market share of 18.7% in terms of number of cards outstanding. SBI Cards is a subsidiary of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/state-bank-of-india" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:160:1" rel="noopener">State Bank Of India (SBIN IN)</a>, India’s largest commercial bank, and has Carlyle as its second largest share holder.</div><div>The stock made a tepid debut in the market in Mar 2020, owing to the timing being closely aligned with the COVID-19 onslaught. Its now trading above its listing price, and its operations are normalising. Furthermore, its largest competitor and the market leader in credit cards, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hdfc-bank-ltd-4b6b7a92-9087-468d-9dbe-ab169e77f014" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:558:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN)</a> was recently barred by the banking regulator from issuing credit cards.</div>

SBI Cards (SBICARD IN) is India's second largest credit card issuer with a market share of 18.7% in terms of number of cards outstanding. SBI Cards is a subsidiary of State Bank Of India (SBIN IN), India’s largest commercial bank, and has Carlyle as its second largest share holder.The stock made a tepid debut in the market in Mar 2020, owing to the timing being closely aligned with the COVID-19 onslaught. Its now trading above its listing price, and its operations are normalising. Furthermore, its largest competitor and the market leader in credit cards, HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN) was recently barred by the banking regulator from issuing credit cards.

2021 High Conviction - SBI Cards & Payments - Multiple Tailwinds, Including Biggest Peers Recent Ban

Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

In this, the fourth of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we adjust Liquidity Coverage Ratios (LCR) for anticipated cash inflows which may not materialize in the current COVID-19 environment. We then append this result to deposits that are not captured in LCR reports derive a COVID-19 adjusted LCR.LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a>. One of the many assumptions is that cash inflows from performing loans can offset projected deposit outflows in a stressed situation. However, in an environment of widespread payment moratoriums or interest-only repayments, projected cashflow may be materially overstated. This could result in misleadingly higher LCR ratios. At the same time, some banks report non-lending related cash inflows at higher levels than projected loan-related amounts. This is surprising. As such, we remove all cash inflows to derive a cash inflow adjusted LCR. We also incorporate deposits that are not captured by the LCR report to derive a COVID-19 stressed LCR ratio and assess this ratio to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-bank-deposit-flight-risk-lessons-from-yes-bank" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:37617" rel="noopener">Lessons from Yes Bank</a>, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted as per recent experience.In our first insight, we derived the amount of stable deposits at each major India-headquartered bank and determined if a stable deposit franchise is priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-stable-deposits-and-costs-1-year-after-the-yes-bank-silent-run" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43981" rel="noopener">Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run</a>. In our second, we adjusted deposit flight assumption to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank. We then determined if this “Yes-stressed” LCR is priced-in. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-yes-stressed-deposit-flight-simulation" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:44213" rel="noopener">Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation</a>.   In our third insight, we incorporated deposits that are not captured in LCR reports. This is the analysis required to understand what broke Yes Bank. We then determined if the Missing Deposit LCR is priced-in from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-missing-deposit-miasma-1-year-after-yes-bank-s-silent-run" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:45438" rel="noopener">Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run</a>.  In follow-up insights we intend to assess extraordinary government actions that recently inflated LCR ratios and then adjust for all of these elements for apocalyptic scenario analysis.

In this, the fourth of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we adjust Liquidity Coverage Ratios (LCR) for anticipated cash inflows which may not materialize in the current COVID-19 environment. We then append this result to deposits that are not captured in LCR reports derive a COVID-19 adjusted LCR.LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at Yes Bank (YES IN). One of the many assumptions is that cash inflows from performing loans can offset projected deposit outflows in a stressed situation. However, in an environment of widespread payment moratoriums or interest-only repayments, projected cashflow may be materially overstated. This could result in misleadingly higher LCR ratios. At the same time, some banks report non-lending related cash inflows at higher levels than projected loan-related amounts. This is surprising. As such, we remove all cash inflows to derive a cash inflow adjusted LCR. We also incorporate deposits that are not captured by the LCR report to derive a COVID-19 stressed LCR ratio and assess this ratio to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in Lessons from Yes Bank, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted as per recent experience.In our first insight, we derived the amount of stable deposits at each major India-headquartered bank and determined if a stable deposit franchise is priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run. In our second, we adjusted deposit flight assumption to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank. We then determined if this “Yes-stressed” LCR is priced-in. Please see Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation.   In our third insight, we incorporated deposits that are not captured in LCR reports. This is the analysis required to understand what broke Yes Bank. We then determined if the Missing Deposit LCR is priced-in from a credit perspective. Please see Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run.  In follow-up insights we intend to assess extraordinary government actions that recently inflated LCR ratios and then adjust for all of these elements for apocalyptic scenario analysis.

India-Headquartered Banks: COVID-19 Adjusted Liquidity Coverage Ratios

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

Credit risk markets remained decoupled between the US and Asia as spreads on US Caa-rated entities continued to defy gravity. The risk-on wave continued to swell through US risk asses on additional positive vaccine news. Combined with a Goldilocks election outcome whereby President Trump loses the election, but Joe Biden does not win a mandate, spreads on the US Caa-rated complex tightened to inside Asia’s HY index for the first time since 2014. Is it time to sell the Caa bull market?  Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s decision to cancel several underutilized emergency Fed programs at the end of the year may raise expectations for the Fed to expand its asset purchase program or target its purchases more directly along the Treasury curve at its December meeting. We are set-up for disappointment.  Against this background, Asia’s HY Additional Tier 1 underperformed Subordinated and Senior Unsecured securities as near-term global growth concerns outweighed vaccine progress. Most of the underperforming bond were issued over the last three months. This suggests these may have been issued at the top of the market, in spread terms. Amongst Additional Tier 1 bonds, Hong Kong-headquartered banks led advances. <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bank-of-east-asia-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:341:1" rel="noopener">Bank of East Asia's (23 HK)</a> announcement that it would call its 5.5% coupon December-callable AT1 bond aided sentiment. We first recommended that investors overweight this security in mid-February within <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/bank-of-east-asia-overweight-short-call-at1-on-refinancing-ability" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:36787" rel="noopener">Bank of East Asia: Overweight Short-Call AT1 on Refinancing Ability</a> and recently re-iterated this call within <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/bank-of-east-asia-buy-the-inefficient-capital-securities" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:42753" rel="noopener">Bank of East Asia: Buy the Inefficient Capital Securities</a>. Victory lap over.Concurrently, Turkish HY Senior Unsecured bank bonds again materially outperformed their global peers following delivery of a more orthodox monetary policy regime. Nonetheless, Turkish bank bonds continue to trade wide of similarly rated entities in other emerging markets.  Given the starting point for a potential Turkish bank bond rally, we anticipate a virus versus vaccine market immunity in Turkish-bank bonds returns over the near term.   Over US$13 billion was raised by financial institutions in USD, Euros and Sterling across the credit continuum. Amongst higher-yield issued securities, the UK Co-operative Bank’s Caa1 rated bond makes India’s <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/iifl-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20197:1" rel="noopener">IIFL Finance's (IIFL IN)</a> US$-bond look cheap in comparison. However, unlike India where every bank rescue requires a liability moratorium, the Co-operative Bank resolution three years ago was not damaging to the financial system. India’s rescue of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/lakshmi-vilas-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17552:1" rel="noopener">Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB IN)</a> this week is no exception. For our views on this please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/lakshmi-vilas-bank-dbs-rescue-is-a-wasted-option" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:45471" rel="noopener">Lakshmi Vilas Bank: DBS Rescue Is a Wasted Option</a>.US$-debt issuance should be slowed by the upcoming US holiday on Thursday. We could see a short-lived resurgence in early December and then drift sideways until heavy issuance re-emerges in January.Market Outlook: Over the near term, tension between longer-term optimism from vaccine driven economies and the shorter-term reality of increasing Coronavirus lockdowns are likely to weigh on the market in the coming weeks. Positive vaccine news combined with a goldilocks US election outcome lowers the likelihood of excessive US federal stimulus. This should cap additional upward pressure on US Treasury yields until vision increases on likely H2 ’21 US economic growth, post-vaccine distribution. Reflation remains on hold. This could limit US dollar weakness and limit positive impacts on reflationary beneficiaries such as bank valuations and Emerging Markets (EM) assets.

Credit risk markets remained decoupled between the US and Asia as spreads on US Caa-rated entities continued to defy gravity. The risk-on wave continued to swell through US risk asses on additional positive vaccine news. Combined with a Goldilocks election outcome whereby President Trump loses the election, but Joe Biden does not win a mandate, spreads on the US Caa-rated complex tightened to inside Asia’s HY index for the first time since 2014. Is it time to sell the Caa bull market?  Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s decision to cancel several underutilized emergency Fed programs at the end of the year may raise expectations for the Fed to expand its asset purchase program or target its purchases more directly along the Treasury curve at its December meeting. We are set-up for disappointment.  Against this background, Asia’s HY Additional Tier 1 underperformed Subordinated and Senior Unsecured securities as near-term global growth concerns outweighed vaccine progress. Most of the underperforming bond were issued over the last three months. This suggests these may have been issued at the top of the market, in spread terms. Amongst Additional Tier 1 bonds, Hong Kong-headquartered banks led advances. Bank of East Asia's (23 HK) announcement that it would call its 5.5% coupon December-callable AT1 bond aided sentiment. We first recommended that investors overweight this security in mid-February within Bank of East Asia: Overweight Short-Call AT1 on Refinancing Ability and recently re-iterated this call within Bank of East Asia: Buy the Inefficient Capital Securities. Victory lap over.Concurrently, Turkish HY Senior Unsecured bank bonds again materially outperformed their global peers following delivery of a more orthodox monetary policy regime. Nonetheless, Turkish bank bonds continue to trade wide of similarly rated entities in other emerging markets.  Given the starting point for a potential Turkish bank bond rally, we anticipate a virus versus vaccine market immunity in Turkish-bank bonds returns over the near term.   Over US$13 billion was raised by financial institutions in USD, Euros and Sterling across the credit continuum. Amongst higher-yield issued securities, the UK Co-operative Bank’s Caa1 rated bond makes India’s IIFL Finance's (IIFL IN) US$-bond look cheap in comparison. However, unlike India where every bank rescue requires a liability moratorium, the Co-operative Bank resolution three years ago was not damaging to the financial system. India’s rescue of Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB IN) this week is no exception. For our views on this please see: Lakshmi Vilas Bank: DBS Rescue Is a Wasted Option.US$-debt issuance should be slowed by the upcoming US holiday on Thursday. We could see a short-lived resurgence in early December and then drift sideways until heavy issuance re-emerges in January.Market Outlook: Over the near term, tension between longer-term optimism from vaccine driven economies and the shorter-term reality of increasing Coronavirus lockdowns are likely to weigh on the market in the coming weeks. Positive vaccine news combined with a goldilocks US election outcome lowers the likelihood of excessive US federal stimulus. This should cap additional upward pressure on US Treasury yields until vision increases on likely H2 ’21 US economic growth, post-vaccine distribution. Reflation remains on hold. This could limit US dollar weakness and limit positive impacts on reflationary beneficiaries such as bank valuations and Emerging Markets (EM) assets.

Bank Credit Weekly: Virus Vs. Vaccine: Time to Sell the Caa-Bull?

India

State Bank of India provides a wide range of banking and financial services to corporate, institutional, commercial, agricultural, industrial and individual customers throughout India.  The Bank also provides international banking to its Indian customers and has operations in other countries.

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State Bank of India (SBID LI)

2021 High Conviction - SBI Cards & Payments - Multiple Tailwinds, Including Biggest Peers Recent Ban

SBI Cards is India's second largest credit card issuer with a market share of 18.7%. SBI Cards is a subsidiary of State Bank Of India (SBIN IN)...

Sumeet Singh

India-Headquartered Banks: COVID-19 Adjusted Liquidity Coverage Ratios

COVID-19 adjusted LCRs exhibit an almost perfectly negative correlation with India-headquartered bank bond spreads. This is the 4’th of several...

Hank Calenti, CFA

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: New Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the...

Thomas J. Monaco

Bank Credit Weekly: Virus Vs. Vaccine: Time to Sell the Caa-Bull?

Is it time to sell the Caa-bull market? Some AT1 bonds seem to be at a market top. We are set-up for disappointment. Nonetheless, we anticipate...

Hank Calenti, CFA

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