Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One, Periscope Analytics

Brian Freitas

Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One

Index Rebalance

<ul>
<li>Hang Seng announced the results of the March rebalance post market close Friday. Two adds for the HSI, one set of changes for HSCEI, three sets for HSTECH.</li>
<li>An ad hoc rebalance was announced for the KOSDAQ150 following Osstem being designated an 'Administrative Issue'. In IPO world, we have LIC in India and SBI Sumishin NetBank coming up.</li>
<li>Friday was the review cutoff date for the March rebalance of the ASX200 Index. The ATO has provided Aventus with the tax ruling and that creates a timing issue.</li>
</ul>


Hang Seng announced the results of the March rebalance post market close Friday. Two adds for the HSI, one set of changes for HSCEI, three sets for HSTECH.
An ad hoc rebalance was announced for the KOSDAQ150 following Osstem being designated an 'Administrative Issue'. In IPO world, we have LIC in India and SBI Sumishin NetBank coming up.
Friday was the review cutoff date for the March rebalance of the ASX200 Index. The ATO has provided Aventus with the tax ruling and that creates a timing issue.


Index Rebalance & ETF Flow Recap: HSI, HSCEI, HSTECH, HSCI, S&P/ASX, SET50, LIC, SBI Sumishin, Crown

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>
Default: On December 6, 2021, several investors appear to have confirmed that China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] does not have the financial wherewithal to cover grace period payments;</li>
<li>
Fire Brigade Called: Evergrande established a risk-management committee (RMC) to assist in "mitigating and eliminating the future risks", in addition to Guangdong Province disseminating a team to Evergrande; and</li>
<li>
Intensified Bank Risk: Shenjing Bank (2066.HK) has CNY 129.4 bn exposure to Evergrande, implying stated NPLs of 24.4%. Other bank creditors: China Minsheng, China Zheshang, Shanghai Pudong, and Citic Trust.</li>
</ul>



Default: On December 6, 2021, several investors appear to have confirmed that China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] does not have the financial wherewithal to cover grace period payments;

Fire Brigade Called: Evergrande established a risk-management committee (RMC) to assist in "mitigating and eliminating the future risks", in addition to Guangdong Province disseminating a team to Evergrande; and

Intensified Bank Risk: Shenjing Bank (2066.HK) has CNY 129.4 bn exposure to Evergrande, implying stated NPLs of 24.4%. Other bank creditors: China Minsheng, China Zheshang, Shanghai Pudong, and Citic Trust.


*Kaisa Defaults: On November 4, 2021, Kaisa Group Holdings (1638.HK) [Kaisa], which provided a guarantee on a wealth management product (WMP), disclosed that it had missed a payment - citing that “it is facing unprecedented liquidity pressure due to a challenging property market and rating downgrades”.  While the 25th largest developer by home sales in mainland China may not appear to be significant, Kaisa does have the second largest level of short-term debt due (USD 3.2 bn) after China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] without any meaningful plan for repayment; and*We Await Evergrande’s Next Payments: We await official word on whether Evergrande’s Scenery Journey met its coupon payment of USD 82.5 mn due November 6, 2021, and we look toward the 30-day grace period expiry on a third set of bond interest payments of USD 148 mn due November 10, 2021.

*Kaisa Defaults: On November 4, 2021, Kaisa Group Holdings (1638.HK) [Kaisa], which provided a guarantee on a wealth management product (WMP), disclosed that it had missed a payment - citing that “it is facing unprecedented liquidity pressure due to a challenging property market and rating downgrades”.  While the 25th largest developer by home sales in mainland China may not appear to be significant, Kaisa does have the second largest level of short-term debt due (USD 3.2 bn) after China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] without any meaningful plan for repayment; and*We Await Evergrande’s Next Payments: We await official word on whether Evergrande’s Scenery Journey met its coupon payment of USD 82.5 mn due November 6, 2021, and we look toward the 30-day grace period expiry on a third set of bond interest payments of USD 148 mn due November 10, 2021.   

*Worries In Both Hong Kong and Mainland China: The Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 1H22, albeit slightly improving from a negative 1.8% in FY 2H21 to a barely positive low single digits. Not surprisingly, this weakness would appear to be with us for an extended period - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption.  The mainland Chinese expansion remains worrisome, given the likely carry-on impact of stress seen in the broader mainland Chinese property market and its lenders; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] management also appears hell-bent on destroying shareholder value with deals which make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offer significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

*Worries In Both Hong Kong and Mainland China: The Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 1H22, albeit slightly improving from a negative 1.8% in FY 2H21 to a barely positive low single digits. Not surprisingly, this weakness would appear to be with us for an extended period - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption.  The mainland Chinese expansion remains worrisome, given the likely carry-on impact of stress seen in the broader mainland Chinese property market and its lenders; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] management also appears hell-bent on destroying shareholder value with deals which make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offer significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling. 

*Better, But Weak Metrics: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link REIT] reported a positive FY 2H21 bottom-line result of HKD 5.3 bn, increasing HKD 9.4 bn over the HKD 4.1 bn in losses posted in FY 1H21. However, when we exclude Link’s non-cash FV marks of HKD 2.0 bn, operating performance cam in at just HKD 3.3 bn – improving just HKD 143 mn (4.5%) HOH. The positive HOH operating performance was driven by an increase in revenues from mainland China and overseas related property;  *Worries Remain In Hong Kong: Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 2H21, albeit slightly improving from a negative 2.6% in FY 1H21 to a negative 1.8%. Although not a enormous surprise, this trend would appear to be with us for an extended period in Hong Kong - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link management also appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value with deals that make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offering significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

*Better, But Weak Metrics: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link REIT] reported a positive FY 2H21 bottom-line result of HKD 5.3 bn, increasing HKD 9.4 bn over the HKD 4.1 bn in losses posted in FY 1H21. However, when we exclude Link’s non-cash FV marks of HKD 2.0 bn, operating performance cam in at just HKD 3.3 bn – improving just HKD 143 mn (4.5%) HOH. The positive HOH operating performance was driven by an increase in revenues from mainland China and overseas related property;  *Worries Remain In Hong Kong: Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 2H21, albeit slightly improving from a negative 2.6% in FY 1H21 to a negative 1.8%. Although not a enormous surprise, this trend would appear to be with us for an extended period in Hong Kong - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link management also appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value with deals that make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offering significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

Link REIT – Hong Kong “Stabilizing”

Hong Kong

Sun Hung Kai Properties is a leading diversified real estate developer in Hong Kong, specializing in the development of residential, office, and retail properties for sale and investment. The company also operates in property management, hotels, telecommunications, transport, and infrastructure. Headquartered in Wan Chai, Hong Kong, the group was founded in 1963.

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Sun Hung Kai Properties (16 HK)

Index Rebalance & ETF Flow Recap: HSI, HSCEI, HSTECH, HSCI, S&P/ASX, SET50, LIC, SBI Sumishin, Crown

This recap highlights Insights covering Asian index rebalances (announcements/ forecasts/ IPO Fast Entry/ M&A driven changes). We also highlight...

Brian Freitas

China Evergrande Group – Fire Sale

EVERGRANDE: Several investors appear to have confirmed that Evergrande failed to cover grace period payments. Shenjing Bank has CNY 129.4 bn...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Evergrande Group – Kaisa Rolled

EVERGRANDE: Kaisa missed a bond payment, and has the second largest level of short-term debt due. We await official word Evergrande’s Scenery...

Thomas J. Monaco

Link REIT – Looking For Handouts

LINK REIT: The Hong Kong's rental reversion rate remained challenged in FY 1H22 at positive single digits. Mainland expansion likely will be...

Thomas J. Monaco

Link REIT – Hong Kong “Stabilizing”

LINK REIT: Link operating results only improved 4.5% HOH, driven by mainland China and overseas. Hong Kong retail portfolio remains a challenge, as...

Thomas J. Monaco

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