Chief Economist & Political Strategist, CrossASEAN Research

Prasenjit K. Basu

PK Basu has 34 years experience covering Asia's economies and markets (equities, fixed income and currencies), including 20 years covering the global economy. He was Chief Economist (SE Asia & India) at Credit Suisse First Boston for 5 years, and Chief Asia (x-Jpn) Economist at Daiwa Securities for a similar period. Among other roles, he was global head of research at Maybank Kim Eng, Malaysia equity research head and chief ASEAN economist at Macquarie, ASEAN economist at UBS and the first chief economist at Khazanah Nasional (where he was co-head of research, and led all agri-business initiatives). PK Basu started his career in the Asia Service of WEFA (Wharton Econometrics) in Philadelphia in 1990, rising to be Director of their Asia Service in June 1994. 
PK's book, "Asia Reborn: A continent rises from the ravages of Colonialism and War to a New Dynamism" won the Tata Literature First Book Award (non-fiction) for 2018. It is the first single chronicle of the modern economic and political history of the whole of Asia (from Iraq and Turkey to Korea and Japan, and everything in between), told from an Asian perspective.

Chief Economist & Political Strategist

The Trade War Is Set to Worsen, as China Falls Far Short of Meeting Phase 1 Targets

Trump Is Not the Cause but an Effect of De-Globalisation; No Magical Rebound in Trade

What a Biden Presidency Will Mean for Markets, the Economy and Asia

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

Macroeconomics

Trade data for February 2021 (due next week), the first for the Biden era, will be scrutinized for bilateral deficits. In 2020, the US' bilateral deficits with only 3 of its top-10 trade partners declined -- Canada, Japan and Germany -- suggesting that Trump tariffs on steel and aluminium had worked partially. The US deficit with China declined sharply in 2019 and in Jan-Oct 2020, but mysteriously widened in the next 3 months. The US suspects that big deficits with Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia reflect transshipment of mainland-China products via those countries, and they are consequently already coming under some pressure. The trade war may not heat up further under Biden, but it will not cool down anytime soon. The US had a trade deficit of US$916 billion in 2020, 6% larger than in 2019, with exports down 14.1% YoY and imports down 6.6% YoY. But with net tourist and student inflows to the US down sharply, the current account deficit widened by as much as 35% to US$647 billion or 3.1% of GDP in 2020 (the largest in a decade, but much lower than the 2006 peak of 6% of GDP). US bilateral trade deficits with Canada, Japan and Germany (which are among top-5 trade partners) declined in 2020, suggesting that the impact of the steel and aluminium tariffs imposed early in the Trump term were beginning to finally pay off at least partly. Importantly, for the second consecutive year, the bilateral trade deficit with China declined (by a modest 3.6% YoY) to US$311 billion, the lowest since 2011. That bilateral deficit had widened in 2017 and 2018 (while Trump was only threatening but not actually imposing any tariffs). The imposition of tariffs on China's imports in 2019 (extended in 2020 to nearly half of goods imports from China) did contribute to reducing the US bilateral trade deficit with China. However, US imports from China increased 23.8% YoY in November-December 2020 (immediately after the US election), having declined in 9 of the first 10 months of 2020, and rose 17.5% YoY in Jan 2021.  The beneficiaries of export diversion from China were Vietnam, Switzerland, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia, who saw US imports from them rise significantly in 2020 -- thereby also widening the US' bilateral trade deficits with them in 2020. The US believes that at least some of these countries' widening trade surpluses with the US reflect Chinese exports being transshipped to the US via those countries. So the Biden administration is likely to pay increased attention not only to the bilateral trade deficit with China (which has mysteriously risen sharply again since the election), but also bilateral deficits with Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, etc., which may reflect the impact of transshipment of mainland-Chinese products into the US.

Trade data for February 2021 (due next week), the first for the Biden era, will be scrutinized for bilateral deficits. In 2020, the US' bilateral deficits with only 3 of its top-10 trade partners declined -- Canada, Japan and Germany -- suggesting that Trump tariffs on steel and aluminium had worked partially. The US deficit with China declined sharply in 2019 and in Jan-Oct 2020, but mysteriously widened in the next 3 months. The US suspects that big deficits with Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia reflect transshipment of mainland-China products via those countries, and they are consequently already coming under some pressure. The trade war may not heat up further under Biden, but it will not cool down anytime soon. The US had a trade deficit of US$916 billion in 2020, 6% larger than in 2019, with exports down 14.1% YoY and imports down 6.6% YoY. But with net tourist and student inflows to the US down sharply, the current account deficit widened by as much as 35% to US$647 billion or 3.1% of GDP in 2020 (the largest in a decade, but much lower than the 2006 peak of 6% of GDP). US bilateral trade deficits with Canada, Japan and Germany (which are among top-5 trade partners) declined in 2020, suggesting that the impact of the steel and aluminium tariffs imposed early in the Trump term were beginning to finally pay off at least partly. Importantly, for the second consecutive year, the bilateral trade deficit with China declined (by a modest 3.6% YoY) to US$311 billion, the lowest since 2011. That bilateral deficit had widened in 2017 and 2018 (while Trump was only threatening but not actually imposing any tariffs). The imposition of tariffs on China's imports in 2019 (extended in 2020 to nearly half of goods imports from China) did contribute to reducing the US bilateral trade deficit with China. However, US imports from China increased 23.8% YoY in November-December 2020 (immediately after the US election), having declined in 9 of the first 10 months of 2020, and rose 17.5% YoY in Jan 2021.  The beneficiaries of export diversion from China were Vietnam, Switzerland, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia, who saw US imports from them rise significantly in 2020 -- thereby also widening the US' bilateral trade deficits with them in 2020. The US believes that at least some of these countries' widening trade surpluses with the US reflect Chinese exports being transshipped to the US via those countries. So the Biden administration is likely to pay increased attention not only to the bilateral trade deficit with China (which has mysteriously risen sharply again since the election), but also bilateral deficits with Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, etc., which may reflect the impact of transshipment of mainland-Chinese products into the US. 

US: Trump's Record Card on Trade Mixed; China Trade Already Challenging Biden