Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7797:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)</a> has, for over a decade, been restructuring itself by selling subsidiaries here and buying them in there. There are two remaining after the somewhat recent sale of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-chemical-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14457:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Chemical (4217 JP)</a>, de-consolidation of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-capital-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14410:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Capital (8586 JP)</a>, and buy-in of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-high-tech-corporation" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7046:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi High-Tech (8036 JP)</a> (after a flurry of other deals to sell out stakes in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-kokusai-electric-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2523:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Kokusai Electric (6756 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-koki-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18359:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Koki (6581 JP)</a>, Hitachi Maxell and Clarion in the previous few years).
In October last year, I addressed the issue of the selldown of the last two <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-metals-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8561:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Metals (5486 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-construction-machinery" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19433:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP)</a> in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/the-right-trade-may-be-hitachi" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:44551" rel="noopener">The Right Trade May Be Hitachi</a>, which argued that Hitachi itself was probably the better deal than the subs. Since then, Hitachi is up 39.3%, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-construction-machinery" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19433:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP)</a> is up 3.6%, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-metals-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8561:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Metals (5486 JP)</a> is up 23%. 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/profiles/mio-kato" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="accounts:713" rel="noopener">Mio Kato</a> has written a few times about Hitachi Metals and about how one might not be able to expect a very high takeout price through the sale process that Hitachi was running. I wholly agreed with Mio, because I think it is not an easy asset to sell later, but I couldn't come up with a reason to sell the stock because I expect funding is available, costs can be cut, Hitachi might keep 20% and sell a call option to help with funding, and if a company needs a lot of work to restructure, I am sure that Bain Consulting could be prevailed upon to provide their consulting services for a price (one of the dirty little secrets of private equity is that GPs get management and incentive fees on assets and sales, but profits in the interim come with costs, and some of those costs can be allocated to the GP as well).
Hitachi took in bids earlier this spring after running an auction process and three weeks ago an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/659a5857-9369-4f9b-8595-06bb89888772" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> in the FT hit the tape saying "Bain nears $8bn deal to buy Hitachi Metals." That was around current market price give or take net debt so people were thinking there might not be a premium.
<div class="content-highlight">
Today, we got a deal announcement. Indeed, Bain is paying near US$8bn, but it is structured in such a way that Bain pays ¥1675/share to Hitachi and ¥2181/share to minorities, which produces a combined price just over ¥1900/share.
This approximates a decent result for everyone involved.  
</div>
More below the fold.

Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) has, for over a decade, been restructuring itself by selling subsidiaries here and buying them in there. There are two remaining after the somewhat recent sale of Hitachi Chemical (4217 JP), de-consolidation of Hitachi Capital (8586 JP), and buy-in of Hitachi High-Tech (8036 JP) (after a flurry of other deals to sell out stakes in Hitachi Kokusai Electric (6756 JP), Hitachi Koki (6581 JP), Hitachi Maxell and Clarion in the previous few years).
In October last year, I addressed the issue of the selldown of the last two Hitachi Metals (5486 JP) and Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP) in The Right Trade May Be Hitachi, which argued that Hitachi itself was probably the better deal than the subs. Since then, Hitachi is up 39.3%, Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP) is up 3.6%, and Hitachi Metals (5486 JP) is up 23%. 
Mio Kato has written a few times about Hitachi Metals and about how one might not be able to expect a very high takeout price through the sale process that Hitachi was running. I wholly agreed with Mio, because I think it is not an easy asset to sell later, but I couldn't come up with a reason to sell the stock because I expect funding is available, costs can be cut, Hitachi might keep 20% and sell a call option to help with funding, and if a company needs a lot of work to restructure, I am sure that Bain Consulting could be prevailed upon to provide their consulting services for a price (one of the dirty little secrets of private equity is that GPs get management and incentive fees on assets and sales, but profits in the interim come with costs, and some of those costs can be allocated to the GP as well).
Hitachi took in bids earlier this spring after running an auction process and three weeks ago an article in the FT hit the tape saying "Bain nears $8bn deal to buy Hitachi Metals." That was around current market price give or take net debt so people were thinking there might not be a premium.

Today, we got a deal announcement. Indeed, Bain is paying near US$8bn, but it is structured in such a way that Bain pays ¥1675/share to Hitachi and ¥2181/share to minorities, which produces a combined price just over ¥1900/share.
This approximates a decent result for everyone involved.  

More below the fold. 

Bain Bids Up BIG For Hitachi Metals (5486) - Now We Wait

In May 2016, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7797:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)</a>  <a href="https://www.hitachi.com/New/cnews/month/2016/05/f_160513a.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> a transaction whereby they sold a stake in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-capital-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14410:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Capital (8586 JP)</a> to <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-financial-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-lease-finance" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1467:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Lease &amp; Finance (8593 JP)</a> to de-consolidate their holding, but would retain a 'negative control' stake of 33.4%. The result was a business and capital alliance designed to achieve more scale for the leasing companies and to improve the capital efficiency of Hitachi itself. The moves by Hitachi to improve its capital efficiency have come fast and furious the last few years with sales of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-kokusai-electric-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2523:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Kokusai Electric (6756 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-koki-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18359:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Koki (6581 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-chemical-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14457:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Chemical (4217 JP)</a>, a buy-in of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-high-tech-corporation" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7046:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi High-Tech (8036 JP)</a>, and a selldown to de-consolidate <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-transport-system-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2395:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Transport System (9086 JP)</a> in 2016, and now more recently there is media speculation about the eventual disposition of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-metals-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8561:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Metals (5486 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-construction-machinery" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19433:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP)</a>.When earnings were presented in May this year, there was a small section in the presentation deck on the bottom half of p15 of the Update on the Mid-Term Management Plan <a href="http://www.hitachi.com/New/cnews/month/2020/05/200529a/f_200529apre.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">presentation </a>(the <a href="http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/month/2020/05/0529a/f_0529apre.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japanese</a> version has an extra word which helps clarify) talking about sales of property and assets and this got people excited. I went through it in some detail in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/hitachi-s-capital-case-liquidating-land-policy-holdings-what-about-the-subs" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:39920" rel="noopener">Hitachi's Capital Case - Liquidating Land &amp; Policy Holdings? What About the Subs?</a> and that indicated there was time for the remaining subs.<h2>The NEW News</h2>Today during business hours, there was a news story out on Diamond Online followed by a quick story on Bloomberg saying that <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-capital-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14410:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Capital (8586 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-lease-finance" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1467:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Lease &amp; Finance (8593 JP)</a> had decided to merge, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20668:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-financial-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)</a> would each own 20% of the new merged company. The <a href="https://www.hitachi-capital.co.jp/hcc/english/newsrelease/2020/20200924e.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announcement</a> came after the close. The two companies would merge at a share exchange ratio of 1.0:5.1, with the effective date of the Merger on 1 April 2021, and shareholder meetings for each company to approve the deal in late February 2021, but it does not discuss the idea of Mitsubishi Corp owning 20% of the combined company (it already owns 20% of MUFJ Lease but its stake would be diluted in the merger.As always, more below the fold.

In May 2016, Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)  announced a transaction whereby they sold a stake in Hitachi Capital (8586 JP) to Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP) and Mitsubishi UFJ Lease &amp; Finance (8593 JP) to de-consolidate their holding, but would retain a 'negative control' stake of 33.4%. The result was a business and capital alliance designed to achieve more scale for the leasing companies and to improve the capital efficiency of Hitachi itself. The moves by Hitachi to improve its capital efficiency have come fast and furious the last few years with sales of Hitachi Kokusai Electric (6756 JP), Hitachi Koki (6581 JP), Hitachi Chemical (4217 JP), a buy-in of Hitachi High-Tech (8036 JP), and a selldown to de-consolidate Hitachi Transport System (9086 JP) in 2016, and now more recently there is media speculation about the eventual disposition of Hitachi Metals (5486 JP) and Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP).When earnings were presented in May this year, there was a small section in the presentation deck on the bottom half of p15 of the Update on the Mid-Term Management Plan presentation (the Japanese version has an extra word which helps clarify) talking about sales of property and assets and this got people excited. I went through it in some detail in Hitachi's Capital Case - Liquidating Land &amp; Policy Holdings? What About the Subs? and that indicated there was time for the remaining subs.The NEW NewsToday during business hours, there was a news story out on Diamond Online followed by a quick story on Bloomberg saying that Hitachi Capital (8586 JP) and Mitsubishi UFJ Lease &amp; Finance (8593 JP) had decided to merge, and Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP) and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP) would each own 20% of the new merged company. The announcement came after the close. The two companies would merge at a share exchange ratio of 1.0:5.1, with the effective date of the Merger on 1 April 2021, and shareholder meetings for each company to approve the deal in late February 2021, but it does not discuss the idea of Mitsubishi Corp owning 20% of the combined company (it already owns 20% of MUFJ Lease but its stake would be diluted in the merger.As always, more below the fold.

Hitachi's Hitachi Capital Capital Case - A Merger With MUFG Lease

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Event-Driven

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:
<ol>
<li>What might supply look like?</li>
<li>What might demand look like?</li>
</ol>
The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:

What might supply look like?
What might demand look like?

The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

Senior Technology Analyst, Japanese Equities, LightStream Research

Scott Foster

Senior Technology Analyst, Japanese Equities

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>Hitachi High-Tech's share price has risen by 2.4x over the past year, reaching a new high at least partially in anticipation of Hitachi Ltd. (6501 JP) buying the 48.4% of shares outstanding that it doesn't already own.</li>
<li>This would likely be in preparation for a division and partial sale of the company along the lines of Hitachi Kokusai (formerly 6756 JP). Hitachi Kokusai's semiconductor equipment division was sold to KKR in 2017. Hitachi High-Tech is an important supplier of semiconductor inspection and etch equipment.</li>
<li>This is speculation, but reasonable speculation. Hitachi High-Tech's sales and profits have been broken out as a separate segment in Hitachi Ltd.'s consolidated financial statements, suggesting that it is in line - perhaps next in line - for restructuring as part of the parent company's ongoing rationalization program.</li>
<li>Hitachi High-Tech has also changed its segment classifications, which would make it easier to divide into three parts: bio-medical and analytical systems, which would presumably kept by Hitachi Ltd.; semiconductor process and metrology equipment, which would presumably be sold; and industrial equipment, parts and materials sales, which might also be sold.  </li>
<li>At ¥7,920 (January 10 closing price), Hitachi High-Tech is selling at 25x management's EPS guidance for FY Mar-20, 11x projected EV/EBITDA and 2.5x book value at the end of September. These multiples are high for Hitachi High-Tech, but not in comparison with those of Hitachi Chemical (4217 JP), which is being sold to Showa Denko (see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/showa-denko-pays-big-money-for-hitachi-chem-4217" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:35354" rel="noopener">Showa Denko Pays BIG MONEY for Hitachi Chem (4217)</a> by Travis Lundy). </li>
</ul>


Hitachi High-Tech's share price has risen by 2.4x over the past year, reaching a new high at least partially in anticipation of Hitachi Ltd. (6501 JP) buying the 48.4% of shares outstanding that it doesn't already own.
This would likely be in preparation for a division and partial sale of the company along the lines of Hitachi Kokusai (formerly 6756 JP). Hitachi Kokusai's semiconductor equipment division was sold to KKR in 2017. Hitachi High-Tech is an important supplier of semiconductor inspection and etch equipment.
This is speculation, but reasonable speculation. Hitachi High-Tech's sales and profits have been broken out as a separate segment in Hitachi Ltd.'s consolidated financial statements, suggesting that it is in line - perhaps next in line - for restructuring as part of the parent company's ongoing rationalization program.
Hitachi High-Tech has also changed its segment classifications, which would make it easier to divide into three parts: bio-medical and analytical systems, which would presumably kept by Hitachi Ltd.; semiconductor process and metrology equipment, which would presumably be sold; and industrial equipment, parts and materials sales, which might also be sold.  
At ¥7,920 (January 10 closing price), Hitachi High-Tech is selling at 25x management's EPS guidance for FY Mar-20, 11x projected EV/EBITDA and 2.5x book value at the end of September. These multiples are high for Hitachi High-Tech, but not in comparison with those of Hitachi Chemical (4217 JP), which is being sold to Showa Denko (see Showa Denko Pays BIG MONEY for Hitachi Chem (4217) by Travis Lundy). 


Hitachi High-Tech (8036 JP): Next in Line for Break-Up and Sale?

Japan Equity Analyst, all sectors

David Rubenstein

Motozo Research

We find the company’s products attractive and stock price significantly undervalued. Hitachi High Technologies (HHT) has arguably a large “call option” on a potential M&amp;A event involving its parent <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/7797" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7797:1">Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)</a>. The parent has promised investors to divest its subsidiaries that lack synergy with other group companies.
41% of market cap is net cash (Y227bn of Y548bn).
PE is 12x, and PB is 1.4x.
Our target price is at a minimum 20x PE, 53% upside to Y6,100. The stock closed at an all-time high of Y5,410 on January 29, and has tapered 26% since then. This target price would put PB at 2.2x, still a discount to the semiconductor peer group, albeit a massive discount to the medical group. The average medical peer PE is 36x and average PB is 4.7x.
<table class="table table-striped">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">　</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">metrics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">market cap.</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">Y548bn ($4.9bn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">Dividend yield</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">PE</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">12x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">PB</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">1.4x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">ROE</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 314px;">net cash</td>
<td style="width: 361.167px;">Y227bn ($2.1bn)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div class="content-caption">source: Bloomberg</div>

We find the company’s products attractive and stock price significantly undervalued. Hitachi High Technologies (HHT) has arguably a large “call option” on a potential M&amp;A event involving its parent Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP). The parent has promised investors to divest its subsidiaries that lack synergy with other group companies.
41% of market cap is net cash (Y227bn of Y548bn).
PE is 12x, and PB is 1.4x.
Our target price is at a minimum 20x PE, 53% upside to Y6,100. The stock closed at an all-time high of Y5,410 on January 29, and has tapered 26% since then. This target price would put PB at 2.2x, still a discount to the semiconductor peer group, albeit a massive discount to the medical group. The average medical peer PE is 36x and average PB is 4.7x.



　
metrics


market cap.
Y548bn ($4.9bn)


Dividend yield
2.4%


PE
12x


PB
1.4x


ROE
10.5%


net cash
Y227bn ($2.1bn)



source: Bloomberg

Japan

Hitachi Kokusai Electric Inc., affiliated with Hitachi Ltd, manufactures mobile phones and other wireless communication equipment, and has mass production capacity for computer terminals.  The Company has unique know-how in semiconductor manufacturing equipment and processes its semiconductors at its subsidiary, Akita Denshi.

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Hitachi Kokusai Electric (6756 JP)

Bain Bids Up BIG For Hitachi Metals (5486) - Now We Wait

Hitachi has agreed to sell Hitachi Metals to Bain/JIP/JIS. It is a complex transaction designed to get Hitachi out, get minorities a premium, get...

Travis Lundy

Hitachi's Hitachi Capital Capital Case - A Merger With MUFG Lease

In May 2016, Hitachi

Travis Lundy

A Potential Asian LBO Screening System

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the...

Travis Lundy

Hitachi High-Tech (8036 JP): Next in Line for Break-Up and Sale?

Hitachi High-Tech's share price has risen by 2.4x over the past year, reaching a new high at least partially in anticipation of Hitachi Ltd. (6501...

Scott Foster

Hitachi's Hidden Gem

We find the company’s products attractive and stock price significantly undervalued. Hitachi High Technologies (HHT) has arguably a large “call...

David Rubenstein

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