Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

<ul>
<li>We warned our readers on rising leverage in China back in April, based on cheap funding costs rather than borrower’s repayment capability. We pointed out that the music had stopped.   </li>
<li>We summarize on what has happened in the Chinese high-yield world and what is next. We believe the worst is behind us but we do have a bumpy road ahead. </li>
<li>Investors who can understand the restructuring process in China and withstand volatility of the bonds rated B or below could generate Alpha in the long run. </li>
</ul>


We warned our readers on rising leverage in China back in April, based on cheap funding costs rather than borrower’s repayment capability. We pointed out that the music had stopped.   
We summarize on what has happened in the Chinese high-yield world and what is next. We believe the worst is behind us but we do have a bumpy road ahead. 
Investors who can understand the restructuring process in China and withstand volatility of the bonds rated B or below could generate Alpha in the long run. 


The Chinese Credit Chronicle: The Below CCC Moment

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>
C’mon Guys, Where Have You Been?: S&amp;P issued a scathing report suggesting that China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] “will likely default because the company has lost its main business”;</li>
<li>
Other Pearls:S&amp;P also believes that “Evergrande’s massive debt will catch up with it”; and    </li>
<li>
Ratings Agencies Are More Than Culpable: Wouldn’t you know it, the sleepy, fee hungry ratings agencies are finally starting work on Evergrande after the market embarrasses them once again.</li>
</ul>



C’mon Guys, Where Have You Been?: S&amp;P issued a scathing report suggesting that China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] “will likely default because the company has lost its main business”;

Other Pearls:S&amp;P also believes that “Evergrande’s massive debt will catch up with it”; and    

Ratings Agencies Are More Than Culpable: Wouldn’t you know it, the sleepy, fee hungry ratings agencies are finally starting work on Evergrande after the market embarrasses them once again.


*Disposal of Shengjing Bank Stake: China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] announced that it is selling a 19.93% stake in Shengjing Bank (2066.HK) at a take-under price of CNY 5.70 per share (19.8% below market) or at a P/BV or 51.4% - representing a MTM loss of CNY 9.9 bn (USD 1.53 bn) or approximately 2.5% of Evergrande’s stated equity; and  *Systemic Banking Risk Highlighted: Evergrande is alleged to have USD 20 bn in “direct and indirect” risk due to Shengjing Bank, which would represent a true systemic challenge given the bank's size and importance. If the Evergrande exposure of CNY 129.4 bn is remotely correct, it would appear that Shenjiang Bank has been materially under-reporting NPLs. If this figure is correct, a reserve shortfall of CNY 128.4 (USD 19.9 bn) would appear to exist – representing 158% of 2Q21 stated equity and intimating Shengjing Bank is technically insolvent.

*Disposal of Shengjing Bank Stake: China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] announced that it is selling a 19.93% stake in Shengjing Bank (2066.HK) at a take-under price of CNY 5.70 per share (19.8% below market) or at a P/BV or 51.4% - representing a MTM loss of CNY 9.9 bn (USD 1.53 bn) or approximately 2.5% of Evergrande’s stated equity; and  *Systemic Banking Risk Highlighted: Evergrande is alleged to have USD 20 bn in “direct and indirect” risk due to Shengjing Bank, which would represent a true systemic challenge given the bank's size and importance. If the Evergrande exposure of CNY 129.4 bn is remotely correct, it would appear that Shenjiang Bank has been materially under-reporting NPLs. If this figure is correct, a reserve shortfall of CNY 128.4 (USD 19.9 bn) would appear to exist – representing 158% of 2Q21 stated equity and intimating Shengjing Bank is technically insolvent.

China Evergrande Group – Daisy Chain Pulled

Since our last China Credit Chronicle (CCC) on 28-April, the sentiment on high-yield credits in China has not improved, to say the least. The “3 Red Lines” requirements on Chinese property developers are proven to be a bit too draconian, in our view. The strict rule forced Chinese property developers to cut prices and may have incentivized a few to manipulate their balance sheets to lower their debt levels, in our judgment. The latest spotlight is on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> (China Evergrande Group) of which we are working on the updated report to capture additional information once the information from the group is sufficient to form a judgment.
In this flash note, we update recent events of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hna-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:25987:1" rel="noopener">HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)</a>(HNA) on its on-going bankruptcy procedure. HNA-related bonds have not been active of late on a lack of liquidity and recent updates from the group. We believe it is impossible at this stage to gauge the recovery rate of the HNA complex on its hidden liabilities and potential frauds evidenced by the embezzlement cases this year.
At 29 cents on the dollar (ask), we are not confident to recommend a Buy on the maturing SANYPH 10/21s without additional knowledge on the restructuring plan, but we believe the market prices HNA’s recovery around 12 cents on the dollar, based on HONAIR Perp’s bid price.
At the end of the day, HNA shows us that these Chinese mega corporates (i.e. <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management-26375cc4-728e-4f75-b058-64298b10f256" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28089:1" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)</a> and China Evergrande Group) have enticed international investors (and perhaps rating agencies) to ignore credit fundamentals and believe they will be supported by the local and/or central government when necessary. Liquidity of these companies are all about credit facilities with Chinese banks, many of which are state-owned. Once the state support wanes, we believe the local bank credit facilities will be reduced and that could lead to an eventual default, in our view. We believe the fall of HNA and others to come is a necessary step of the learning curve for investors in Chinese credits although we do not believe the fallout will turn into a contagion for all Chinese high-yield credits.
That said, we believe investors need to learn how to price Chinese credits on a stand-alone basis properly, and rating agencies, especially Chinese rating agencies, need to adjust their rating models. In our opinion, wishful ratings at the issuances, followed by multiple and rush downgrades simply do not work and have left investors unprepared to sell bonds.

Since our last China Credit Chronicle (CCC) on 28-April, the sentiment on high-yield credits in China has not improved, to say the least. The “3 Red Lines” requirements on Chinese property developers are proven to be a bit too draconian, in our view. The strict rule forced Chinese property developers to cut prices and may have incentivized a few to manipulate their balance sheets to lower their debt levels, in our judgment. The latest spotlight is on Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) (China Evergrande Group) of which we are working on the updated report to capture additional information once the information from the group is sufficient to form a judgment.
In this flash note, we update recent events of HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)(HNA) on its on-going bankruptcy procedure. HNA-related bonds have not been active of late on a lack of liquidity and recent updates from the group. We believe it is impossible at this stage to gauge the recovery rate of the HNA complex on its hidden liabilities and potential frauds evidenced by the embezzlement cases this year.
At 29 cents on the dollar (ask), we are not confident to recommend a Buy on the maturing SANYPH 10/21s without additional knowledge on the restructuring plan, but we believe the market prices HNA’s recovery around 12 cents on the dollar, based on HONAIR Perp’s bid price.
At the end of the day, HNA shows us that these Chinese mega corporates (i.e. China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH) and China Evergrande Group) have enticed international investors (and perhaps rating agencies) to ignore credit fundamentals and believe they will be supported by the local and/or central government when necessary. Liquidity of these companies are all about credit facilities with Chinese banks, many of which are state-owned. Once the state support wanes, we believe the local bank credit facilities will be reduced and that could lead to an eventual default, in our view. We believe the fall of HNA and others to come is a necessary step of the learning curve for investors in Chinese credits although we do not believe the fallout will turn into a contagion for all Chinese high-yield credits.
That said, we believe investors need to learn how to price Chinese credits on a stand-alone basis properly, and rating agencies, especially Chinese rating agencies, need to adjust their rating models. In our opinion, wishful ratings at the issuances, followed by multiple and rush downgrades simply do not work and have left investors unprepared to sell bonds.

The China Credit Chronicle:  Hazardous National Anecdote

China Huarong Asset Management / Equity Bottom-Up

*Stress All Around: China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] still continues to teeter on the edge of insolvency and ongoing silence from Beijing has materially impacted funding costs. The USD 23.3 bn in Huarong debt, however, still risks crippling the USD credit market in mainland China. As Huarong is one of mainland China's largest issuers in offshore markets, this would be by far the largest credit default to date of an important state-owned company. Potential contagion risks via higher a cost of funding for offshore borrowing are occurring;  and *Evergrande Harbinger: Mainland Chinese authorities are going to great lengths to prevent a systemic daisy chain impact of a China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] default on the mainland Chinese financial system. Given the systemic risks also posed by Huarong, we believe the mainland Chinese will construct some form of bailout. Distressed investors should consider picking away at Huarong’s debt; we’ll believe it when see Beijing imposing losses SOEs.

*Stress All Around: China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] still continues to teeter on the edge of insolvency and ongoing silence from Beijing has materially impacted funding costs. The USD 23.3 bn in Huarong debt, however, still risks crippling the USD credit market in mainland China. As Huarong is one of mainland China's largest issuers in offshore markets, this would be by far the largest credit default to date of an important state-owned company. Potential contagion risks via higher a cost of funding for offshore borrowing are occurring;  and *Evergrande Harbinger: Mainland Chinese authorities are going to great lengths to prevent a systemic daisy chain impact of a China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] default on the mainland Chinese financial system. Given the systemic risks also posed by Huarong, we believe the mainland Chinese will construct some form of bailout. Distressed investors should consider picking away at Huarong’s debt; we’ll believe it when see Beijing imposing losses SOEs.

China Huarong Asset Management – Preventing Another Daisy Chain

China

China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd. operates as an investment management company. The Company offers financial services, asset management services, asset management services, and more. China Huarong Asset Management serves customers worldwide.

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China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)

The Chinese Credit Chronicle: The Below CCC Moment

We summarize on what has happened in the Chinese high-yield world and what is next. We believe the worst is behind us but we do have a bumpy road...

Bondcritic

China Evergrande Group – Thanks S&P

EVERGRANDE: S&P issued a scathing report suggesting that Evergrande “will likely default because the company has lost its main business. Not...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Evergrande Group – Daisy Chain Pulled

EVERGRANDE: Evergrande is selling a 19.9% stake in Shengjing Bank, leading to a MTM loss of USD 1.53 bn or 2.5% of equity. It's risk outstanding is...

Thomas J. Monaco

The China Credit Chronicle: Hazardous National Anecdote

Here is an update on HNA, the recent fallout of more to come in the Chinese credit space. at 12c recovery, many factors remains uncertain....

Bondcritic

China Huarong Asset Management – Preventing Another Daisy Chain

CHINA HUARONG: Huarong still continues to teeter on the edge of insolvency. The USD 23.3 bn debt, however, still risks crippling the USD credit...

Thomas J. Monaco

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