Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Equity Capital Markets

Today after the close it was <a href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/10/06/2103999/0/en/Danone-intends-to-sell-its-stake-in-Yakult.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> that <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/danone-sa" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21403:1" rel="noopener">Danone SA (BN FP)</a> - currently the largest shareholder in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yakult-honsha-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17153:1" rel="noopener">Yakult Honsha (2267 JP)</a> - intended to sell down the last of its stake after a 20-year run.The press release notes "Danone's collaboration with Yakult began in 2004."That's saying it nicely. Danone bought 5% in 2000 then bought up to 20% in the market in 2003 in an effort to get Yakult to collaborate. It was not done with Yakult's permission, but it got their attention.<div>
Yakult and Danone signed an Alliance Agreement in March 2004. That agreement was renewed in 2008 so the agreement would stay in place until 2012. In 2012, negotiations on the future alliance were extended and extended and finally, in late April 2013 - after a year-plus of jawboning and speculation of a hostile bid, occasionally dampened by public promises to the contrary by Danone executives - the two companies decided they could not, in the end, agree, and they cancelled their Strategic Alliance and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Collaborative Relationship.
The lack of hostile action by Danone may have been the result of the fact that Yakult-friendly Japanese corporate investors bought shares in the meantime, lifting the share price by 60-70% in a year and lifting the friendly ownership to over 50%, making hostile action essentially futile. 
</div><div>
That relationship basically stood as a standstill agreement with 3 Danone appointees named to the Yakult board, and ongoing JV operation in their 50/50 Vietnam and 80/20 (Yakult/Danone) Joint Ventures and ongoing 'collaboration' in the probiotics business. Since the big buy in 2003, including dividends, Danone was up 500% on its investment as of February 2018 when it decided to sell down a very large stake after activist Corvex Management had taken on Danone and urged it to reduce capital assets which didn't provide much. At the time, Yakult traded at 20x EV/EBITDA and 36x PER. 
<h2>The NEW News</h2>
Danone is bailing on the rest of the stake while the existing commercial partnerships, "including joint-ventures in India and Vietnam remain in place" (according to the <a href="https://ml-eu.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/768c55f8-a7c0-4ba7-b4e8-9f01bf4bef68" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announcement</a>).
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/163/665/original/Screenshot%202020-10-06%20at%204.58.37%20PM.png?1601974734" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="163665"></figure>
The weekly chart shows they did not catch the top last time (14 Feb 2018 announcement when the stock was ¥7940/share), but they enjoyed a nice run-up from a year prior. At the time, both TOPIX and TOPIX FOOD Sector indices had taken a sharp drop.
After the announcement the last time, the shares fell 6.8% on the next day. That time was a Public Offering which required a book building phase and then delivery saw a couple of weeks of large volume. The shares traded in line with market and sector before falling in April and May 2018. Since then, the shares have largely underperformed both TOPIX and the sector.
This deal is an Accelerated Block Offering. It makes things more interesting. Valuations are different than last time and the shareholder structure is different too. 
Much more below the fold.
</div>

Today after the close it was announced that Danone SA (BN FP) - currently the largest shareholder in Yakult Honsha (2267 JP) - intended to sell down the last of its stake after a 20-year run.The press release notes "Danone's collaboration with Yakult began in 2004."That's saying it nicely. Danone bought 5% in 2000 then bought up to 20% in the market in 2003 in an effort to get Yakult to collaborate. It was not done with Yakult's permission, but it got their attention.
Yakult and Danone signed an Alliance Agreement in March 2004. That agreement was renewed in 2008 so the agreement would stay in place until 2012. In 2012, negotiations on the future alliance were extended and extended and finally, in late April 2013 - after a year-plus of jawboning and speculation of a hostile bid, occasionally dampened by public promises to the contrary by Danone executives - the two companies decided they could not, in the end, agree, and they cancelled their Strategic Alliance and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Collaborative Relationship.
The lack of hostile action by Danone may have been the result of the fact that Yakult-friendly Japanese corporate investors bought shares in the meantime, lifting the share price by 60-70% in a year and lifting the friendly ownership to over 50%, making hostile action essentially futile. 

That relationship basically stood as a standstill agreement with 3 Danone appointees named to the Yakult board, and ongoing JV operation in their 50/50 Vietnam and 80/20 (Yakult/Danone) Joint Ventures and ongoing 'collaboration' in the probiotics business. Since the big buy in 2003, including dividends, Danone was up 500% on its investment as of February 2018 when it decided to sell down a very large stake after activist Corvex Management had taken on Danone and urged it to reduce capital assets which didn't provide much. At the time, Yakult traded at 20x EV/EBITDA and 36x PER. 
The NEW News
Danone is bailing on the rest of the stake while the existing commercial partnerships, "including joint-ventures in India and Vietnam remain in place" (according to the announcement).

The weekly chart shows they did not catch the top last time (14 Feb 2018 announcement when the stock was ¥7940/share), but they enjoyed a nice run-up from a year prior. At the time, both TOPIX and TOPIX FOOD Sector indices had taken a sharp drop.
After the announcement the last time, the shares fell 6.8% on the next day. That time was a Public Offering which required a book building phase and then delivery saw a couple of weeks of large volume. The shares traded in line with market and sector before falling in April and May 2018. Since then, the shares have largely underperformed both TOPIX and the sector.
This deal is an Accelerated Block Offering. It makes things more interesting. Valuations are different than last time and the shareholder structure is different too. 
Much more below the fold.


Danone Sells The Last of Their Yakult - Buy the Cleanup

Equity Analyst, LightStream Research

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Equity Analyst

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>1H and 9MFY2019 earnings misses forced Calbee to revise its FY2019 estimates</li>
<li>Increased costs, slower progress in international markets and sluggish Frugra brand sales led the company to revise its FY2019 estimates</li>
<li>Nikkei POS data: average price per unit is on a decline</li>
<li>Frugra brand recovery comes at the expense of average price per unit</li>
<li>Potato chips and potato-based snacks: sluggish performance driven by declining average price per unit</li>
<li>Unable to pass the cost inflation to customers due to falling average price per unit</li>
<li>Mid-term plan: unconvinced by Calbee’s plan for its domestic business</li>
<li>Falling out of favor with the Buy Side</li>
<li>The status quo on which the investment thesis is based on is changing</li>
<li>Conclusion</li>
</ul>


1H and 9MFY2019 earnings misses forced Calbee to revise its FY2019 estimates
Increased costs, slower progress in international markets and sluggish Frugra brand sales led the company to revise its FY2019 estimates
Nikkei POS data: average price per unit is on a decline
Frugra brand recovery comes at the expense of average price per unit
Potato chips and potato-based snacks: sluggish performance driven by declining average price per unit
Unable to pass the cost inflation to customers due to falling average price per unit
Mid-term plan: unconvinced by Calbee’s plan for its domestic business
Falling out of favor with the Buy Side
The status quo on which the investment thesis is based on is changing
Conclusion


Calbee Inc: Falling Average Price Per Unit Causes Concern Among Investors

Asian Insight Provider - Actionable ideas, CrossASEAN Research

Henry Soediarko

Asian Insight Provider - Actionable ideas

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/231" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:231:1">Unilever Indonesia (UNVR IJ)</a> has long been dubbed as the proxy for the rising middle-class domestic consumption story in Indonesia and enjoyed a rich PE multiple despite less favorable externalities that could potentially reduce its margin; namely a weakening IDR, increasing competition, as well as changing consumer behavior. In this report, we will discuss the following:
<ul>
<li>Its Products and their performance</li>
<li>The Competitive Landscape</li>
<li>Premiumization and Innovation</li>
<li>Costs and Externalities</li>
<li>Changing Consumer Behavior</li>
<li>Valuation and the Investment Thesis</li>
</ul>

Unilever Indonesia (UNVR IJ) has long been dubbed as the proxy for the rising middle-class domestic consumption story in Indonesia and enjoyed a rich PE multiple despite less favorable externalities that could potentially reduce its margin; namely a weakening IDR, increasing competition, as well as changing consumer behavior. In this report, we will discuss the following:

Its Products and their performance
The Competitive Landscape
Premiumization and Innovation
Costs and Externalities
Changing Consumer Behavior
Valuation and the Investment Thesis


UNVR IJ: Stiff Competition to Reduce Unilever Indo's Lofty Valuation Premium

Global Automotive Stocks/EV Focus/Event Driven, SC Capital

SC Capital

Global Automotive Stocks/EV Focus/Event Driven

Over 22 years covering Japanese equities on both the sell side and the buy side. 

Bottom-up Japan Equities Research

<ul><li>Meiji Holdings will get slammed by government price cuts on pharmaceuticals in Japan from this April and then begin to see a massive decline in profitability of its anti-psychosis drug once its patent expires in December.</li><li>Combined, this should be at least a 10% drag on FY3/19 OP, raising the risks that the company guides for substantially lower numbers than consensus. Our estimates are for FY3/19 OP of Y94bn (-4% YoY), while consensus is at Y102bn (+4% YoY).</li><li>While this gap is not large and we expect management to guide for roughly flat profits YoY in FY3/19 (but miss in the end), the difference between OP growth and OP decline should be a big psychological swing factor for the share price. Meiji's share price has gone up by 3.9x over the past five years, as earnings have grown by a CAGR of +34% over that time.</li><li>Meiji's core earnings come from probiotic yogurt drinks and chocolates, which are performing well, but slowing as OP in this division has already doubled over the past 3 years. Nearly 90% of the +5% YoY OP growth seen in the Food division's 1H of FY3/18 came from cost-cutting efforts, which management says has largely run its course. Underlying sales were actually down a bit from last year's 1H.</li><li>The company announced last month that it aims to acquire a 49% stake in a blood plasma products/vaccine producer Kaketsuken, which it plans to consolidate onto its books from the 2H of FY3/19. While this could boost pharma sales by roughly 8% (based on 6 months of Kaketsuken's FY3/17 sales), the OP contribution may not be that significant as Kaketsuken had a recall of problematic plasma products in 2016. On its Japanese website (but not in the English version), Kaketsuken has a huge banner saying "Aiming to Restore Trust". </li><li>Furthermore, in recent talks with the company, they stressed that they've picked all the low-hanging fruit in terms of cost cuts and would now have to begin a multi-year phase of "investments for higher efficiencies". This sounded like a caveat that capex burdens could weigh on earnings over the next several years. Consensus estimates call for Meiji's capex falling by -4% to Y62bn in FY3/19.   </li><li>Valuations--based on our estimates, which are 7% lower than the Street but imply negative growth in FY3/19--are not demanding for a food company, with an FY3/19 PER of 22x and an EV/EBITDA of 9.8x.  But with a declining RoE (from 13.7% this fiscal year to 12.5% in FY3/19), the prospective PBR of 2.5x doesn't provide much support for the share price.</li><li>Our analysis of what Meiji could be worth if it were to sell its pharmaceutical division implies a value of at least Y12,000 per share, or 30% upside from current levels. It makes one wonder why activists haven't targeted Meiji yet but does explain why value investors like Capital have recently begun building positions.</li></ul>

Meiji Holdings will get slammed by government price cuts on pharmaceuticals in Japan from this April and then begin to see a massive decline in profitability of its anti-psychosis drug once its patent expires in December.Combined, this should be at least a 10% drag on FY3/19 OP, raising the risks that the company guides for substantially lower numbers than consensus. Our estimates are for FY3/19 OP of Y94bn (-4% YoY), while consensus is at Y102bn (+4% YoY).While this gap is not large and we expect management to guide for roughly flat profits YoY in FY3/19 (but miss in the end), the difference between OP growth and OP decline should be a big psychological swing factor for the share price. Meiji's share price has gone up by 3.9x over the past five years, as earnings have grown by a CAGR of +34% over that time.Meiji's core earnings come from probiotic yogurt drinks and chocolates, which are performing well, but slowing as OP in this division has already doubled over the past 3 years. Nearly 90% of the +5% YoY OP growth seen in the Food division's 1H of FY3/18 came from cost-cutting efforts, which management says has largely run its course. Underlying sales were actually down a bit from last year's 1H.The company announced last month that it aims to acquire a 49% stake in a blood plasma products/vaccine producer Kaketsuken, which it plans to consolidate onto its books from the 2H of FY3/19. While this could boost pharma sales by roughly 8% (based on 6 months of Kaketsuken's FY3/17 sales), the OP contribution may not be that significant as Kaketsuken had a recall of problematic plasma products in 2016. On its Japanese website (but not in the English version), Kaketsuken has a huge banner saying "Aiming to Restore Trust". Furthermore, in recent talks with the company, they stressed that they've picked all the low-hanging fruit in terms of cost cuts and would now have to begin a multi-year phase of "investments for higher efficiencies". This sounded like a caveat that capex burdens could weigh on earnings over the next several years. Consensus estimates call for Meiji's capex falling by -4% to Y62bn in FY3/19.   Valuations--based on our estimates, which are 7% lower than the Street but imply negative growth in FY3/19--are not demanding for a food company, with an FY3/19 PER of 22x and an EV/EBITDA of 9.8x.  But with a declining RoE (from 13.7% this fiscal year to 12.5% in FY3/19), the prospective PBR of 2.5x doesn't provide much support for the share price.Our analysis of what Meiji could be worth if it were to sell its pharmaceutical division implies a value of at least Y12,000 per share, or 30% upside from current levels. It makes one wonder why activists haven't targeted Meiji yet but does explain why value investors like Capital have recently begun building positions.

Meiji Holdings--Healthy Food Ops Have Heavy Drug Problems

Japan

EZAKI GLICO CO., LTD. produces and sells confections including chocolate snacks, candy bars, cookies, and chilled desserts.  The Company also produces prepared foods such as retort pouches and curry powders.

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Ezaki Glico (2206 JP)

Danone Sells The Last of Their Yakult - Buy the Cleanup

Today after the close it was announced that $Danone

Travis Lundy

Calbee Inc: Falling Average Price Per Unit Causes Concern Among Investors

1H and 9MFY2019 earnings misses forced Calbee to revise its FY2019 estimates Increased costs, slower progress in international markets and...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

UNVR IJ: Stiff Competition to Reduce Unilever Indo's Lofty Valuation Premium

Unilever Indonesia (UNVR IJ) has long been dubbed as the proxy for the rising middle-class domestic consumption story in Indonesia and enjoyed a...

Henry Soediarko

Meiji Holdings--Healthy Food Ops Have Heavy Drug Problems

Meiji Holdings will get slammed by government price cuts on pharmaceuticals in Japan from this April and then begin to see a massive decline in...

SC Capital

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