Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<ul>
<li>Four weeks ago, the sovereign wealth fund of the UAE sold out of a 15% position in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cosmo-energy-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26565:1" rel="noopener">Cosmo Energy Holdings (5021 JP)</a> they'd held for 15yrs. </li>
<li>Today we see noted Japanese activist Murakami Yoshiaki and affiliates have purchased 5+% of the company, including a large chunk the day after the block trade.</li>
<li>Oftentimes he buys stakes in industries where consolidation is overdue and/or natural. Construction has been one such sector. Refiners probably need consolidation too, but it's not clear it's easy here.</li>
</ul>


Four weeks ago, the sovereign wealth fund of the UAE sold out of a 15% position in Cosmo Energy Holdings (5021 JP) they'd held for 15yrs. 
Today we see noted Japanese activist Murakami Yoshiaki and affiliates have purchased 5+% of the company, including a large chunk the day after the block trade.
Oftentimes he buys stakes in industries where consolidation is overdue and/or natural. Construction has been one such sector. Refiners probably need consolidation too, but it's not clear it's easy here.


Activist Murakami-San Goes Substantial on Cosmo Oil (5021)

<h3>The Idemitsu bid for Toa Oil looks bumpity. It is a weird situation though.</h3>In mid-December, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/idemitsu-kosan-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1" rel="noopener">Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)</a> - one of the two large refinery groups in Japan, formed from the merger of Idemitsu Kosan and Showa Shell Oil KK (the other large one being <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/eneos-holdings-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:638:1" rel="noopener">ENEOS Holdings (5020 JP)</a> formed from JX and Tonen General) - announced a Tender Offer for the minority portion of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toa-oil-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11021:1" rel="noopener">Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP)</a>.Idemitsu had "inherited" the majority portion in the acquisition of Showa Shell a couple years ago, and had not wrapped it up yet. Toa Oil has for years been considered a jewel of an asset because of its extraordinarily high Nelson Complexity Index among refineries in Japan. This allows the company to get more, and more interesting products, out of every barrel of oil put in, and it allows the use of very heavy oil which is less expensive. Because the company gets 90% of its revenue acting as an outsourced refinery for Idemitsu's raw materials and output, it carries little inventory and earns a tolling spread, which normally would be negotiated on an arms' length basis. Given the replacement value of the asset, and the market value of the use of the asset, it would appear that the current agreement with the current level of income it affords Toa is not quite arms' length. That would be a good reason to object to the pricing of the deal. If the refinery asset were sold on the open market in an auction, it would likely fetch a higher price for shareholders, including Idemitsu. The original deal and all its parameters was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/idemitsu-launches-lowball-tender-offer-for-subsidiary-toa-oil-5008" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:46384" rel="noopener">Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008)</a> and was updated in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/toa-oil-5008-tender-offer-update-looks-bumpity" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:46996" rel="noopener">Toa Oil (5008) Tender Offer Update - Looks Bumpity.</a> <h2>The NEW News</h2><ul>
<li>On 20 January, Toa Oil announced the record date for the EGM to be 10 February.</li>
<li>Since I last wrote, the largest shareholder has gotten larger, adding 2% to its position as of 21 January (and reported 28 January) and they now hold 22.98%. </li>
<li>On Friday 29 January, Toa Oil reported its <a href="https://www.toaoil.co.jp/investor/pdf/settlement_report_202103_3.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Q3 earnings</a>.</li>
<li>Toa Oil also announced a revision to its <a href="https://www.toaoil.co.jp/investor/pdf/20210129_gyousekiyosou_shusei.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">full-year forecasts</a>.  The revenue forecast was revised by +7.7%. OP was revised by +509.8%. Net Profit was revised by +418.9%. Those are very big numbers. </li>
<li>Based on that revision, Toa Oil had to revise its <a href="https://www.toaoil.co.jp/investor/pdf/20210129_ikenhyoumei_henkou_english.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Target Opinion Statement</a>.</li>
<li>And because Toa Oil revised its Target Opinion Statement, pursuant to Article 27-8 Para 8 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Idemitsu had to <a href="https://ssl4.eir-parts.net/doc/5019/ir_material9/153752/00.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">extend the Tender Offer</a> so there were 10 business days between the announcement and the tender close. The old close was 2 February. The new close is 15 February. </li>
<li>I expect that means Toa Oil will amend the record date for the EGM because Toa and Idemitsu would not want the EGM record date to be before Idemitsu had secured the extra shares.</li>
</ul>The quantum of the net change in the revision in earnings forecast should merit a little complaint by shareholders. The change in net income this year alone vs forecast is 5.1% of the Tender Offer Price Market Cap. Even if there is no change to future earnings EVER, that is 5.1% more. Given that the Tender Offer Price was the wrong price in the first place, I imagine shareholders who have seen the price trade above the Tender Offer Price every day since the shares were free to trade (on the first day after the announcement, the shares closed limit up but below the tender offer price), will be even less inclined to accept a low-ball price. More discussion below.

The Idemitsu bid for Toa Oil looks bumpity. It is a weird situation though.In mid-December, Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP) - one of the two large refinery groups in Japan, formed from the merger of Idemitsu Kosan and Showa Shell Oil KK (the other large one being ENEOS Holdings (5020 JP) formed from JX and Tonen General) - announced a Tender Offer for the minority portion of Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP).Idemitsu had "inherited" the majority portion in the acquisition of Showa Shell a couple years ago, and had not wrapped it up yet. Toa Oil has for years been considered a jewel of an asset because of its extraordinarily high Nelson Complexity Index among refineries in Japan. This allows the company to get more, and more interesting products, out of every barrel of oil put in, and it allows the use of very heavy oil which is less expensive. Because the company gets 90% of its revenue acting as an outsourced refinery for Idemitsu's raw materials and output, it carries little inventory and earns a tolling spread, which normally would be negotiated on an arms' length basis. Given the replacement value of the asset, and the market value of the use of the asset, it would appear that the current agreement with the current level of income it affords Toa is not quite arms' length. That would be a good reason to object to the pricing of the deal. If the refinery asset were sold on the open market in an auction, it would likely fetch a higher price for shareholders, including Idemitsu. The original deal and all its parameters was discussed in Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008) and was updated in Toa Oil (5008) Tender Offer Update - Looks Bumpity. The NEW News
On 20 January, Toa Oil announced the record date for the EGM to be 10 February.
Since I last wrote, the largest shareholder has gotten larger, adding 2% to its position as of 21 January (and reported 28 January) and they now hold 22.98%. 
On Friday 29 January, Toa Oil reported its Q3 earnings.
Toa Oil also announced a revision to its full-year forecasts.  The revenue forecast was revised by +7.7%. OP was revised by +509.8%. Net Profit was revised by +418.9%. Those are very big numbers. 
Based on that revision, Toa Oil had to revise its Target Opinion Statement.
And because Toa Oil revised its Target Opinion Statement, pursuant to Article 27-8 Para 8 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Idemitsu had to extend the Tender Offer so there were 10 business days between the announcement and the tender close. The old close was 2 February. The new close is 15 February. 
I expect that means Toa Oil will amend the record date for the EGM because Toa and Idemitsu would not want the EGM record date to be before Idemitsu had secured the extra shares.
The quantum of the net change in the revision in earnings forecast should merit a little complaint by shareholders. The change in net income this year alone vs forecast is 5.1% of the Tender Offer Price Market Cap. Even if there is no change to future earnings EVER, that is 5.1% more. Given that the Tender Offer Price was the wrong price in the first place, I imagine shareholders who have seen the price trade above the Tender Offer Price every day since the shares were free to trade (on the first day after the announcement, the shares closed limit up but below the tender offer price), will be even less inclined to accept a low-ball price. More discussion below.

Toa Oil (5008) Tender Offer Updated Update - STILL Looks Bumpity

On 15 December, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/idemitsu-kosan-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1" rel="noopener">Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)</a> launched a Tender Offer for subsidiary <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toa-oil-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11021:1" rel="noopener">Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP)</a> at what was an extraordinarily opportunistic price - JPY 2450/share.Some might call this price insultingly low.It was apparently deemed "fair" because the non-arms' length contract signed with the parent (and Tender Offeror) provides for an exceptionally low ROA, and the next few years involves some shutdowns for longer-term maintenance, which will lower FCF. This pricing process fairness problem was discussed in some detail in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/idemitsu-launches-lowball-tender-offer-for-subsidiary-toa-oil-5008" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:46384" rel="noopener">Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008)</a>. There have been a few developments since the announcement.<ul><li>Just prior to the offer being made, large shareholder Cornwall Capital had been increasing their stake and coincidentally announced an increased stake of 18.22% on the same day as the announcement. Since the offer has been made, they have filed two more amendments to quantity to lift their stake to 20.83% as of 24 December (reported 4 January). As seen from the chart, the shares have not traded below terms since they first freely traded pre-announcement, and Cornwall increased their stake by 2.6+% from 15-Dec to 24-Dec 2020 at prices ABOVE terms.</li></ul><section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/182/218/original/Screenshot+2021-01-13+at+12.28.45+PM.png?1610512414" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="182218"></figure></section><ul>
<li>Since the 25th of December, another 5% of shares out have traded at prices above terms. Nobody else has yet announced a 5+% position. </li>
<li>Around year-end, specialty "business-politics" magazine Sentaku published an article talking about the oil refining business in Japan, JXTG/ENEOS's leading place in it, the Idemitsu deal for Toa which was termed odd, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/fuji-oil-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12970:1" rel="noopener">Fuji Oil Co Ltd (5017 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cosmo-energy-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26565:1" rel="noopener">Cosmo Energy Holdings (5021 JP)</a>, and some speculation about what might be behind the Idemitsu deal for Toa. The conclusions of the article in that regard are striking. 
</li>
</ul><div class="content-highlight">
In the meantime, after a single day limit up ending below terms which saw 20,400 shares trade, the next 1.46mm shares (11.8% of shares out) have all traded above terms.
If one adds the 20.8% held by Cornwall Capital (including the 2.6% purchased above terms since announcement) plus the 9.2% which have traded above terms not purchased by Cornwall, that gets one to 30.4%, which is reasonably close to a blocking stake. 
</div>Discussion continues below.

On 15 December, Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP) launched a Tender Offer for subsidiary Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP) at what was an extraordinarily opportunistic price - JPY 2450/share.Some might call this price insultingly low.It was apparently deemed "fair" because the non-arms' length contract signed with the parent (and Tender Offeror) provides for an exceptionally low ROA, and the next few years involves some shutdowns for longer-term maintenance, which will lower FCF. This pricing process fairness problem was discussed in some detail in Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008). There have been a few developments since the announcement.Just prior to the offer being made, large shareholder Cornwall Capital had been increasing their stake and coincidentally announced an increased stake of 18.22% on the same day as the announcement. Since the offer has been made, they have filed two more amendments to quantity to lift their stake to 20.83% as of 24 December (reported 4 January). As seen from the chart, the shares have not traded below terms since they first freely traded pre-announcement, and Cornwall increased their stake by 2.6+% from 15-Dec to 24-Dec 2020 at prices ABOVE terms.
Since the 25th of December, another 5% of shares out have traded at prices above terms. Nobody else has yet announced a 5+% position. 
Around year-end, specialty "business-politics" magazine Sentaku published an article talking about the oil refining business in Japan, JXTG/ENEOS's leading place in it, the Idemitsu deal for Toa which was termed odd, Fuji Oil Co Ltd (5017 JP), Cosmo Energy Holdings (5021 JP), and some speculation about what might be behind the Idemitsu deal for Toa. The conclusions of the article in that regard are striking. 


In the meantime, after a single day limit up ending below terms which saw 20,400 shares trade, the next 1.46mm shares (11.8% of shares out) have all traded above terms.
If one adds the 20.8% held by Cornwall Capital (including the 2.6% purchased above terms since announcement) plus the 9.2% which have traded above terms not purchased by Cornwall, that gets one to 30.4%, which is reasonably close to a blocking stake. 
Discussion continues below.

Toa Oil (5008) Tender Offer Update - Looks Bumpity.

When one looks upon the landscape of Japan's oil refineries - a delightful vista of 20th century industrialisation being left by the wayside in the move to EVs, solar power, "green" investment, etc, one small refinery stands out - the Keihin refinery of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toa-oil-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11021:1" rel="noopener">Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP)</a>. 
<section class="figure">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/178/791/original/history-img12.jpg?1608048627" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="178791"></figure>
</section>
Toa Oil's Keihin Refinery has a Nelson Complexity Index higher than any other refinery in Japan to my knowledge (the Nelson Complexity Index provides a measure of the ability of a refinery to process inputs into lighter product. The lighter the end product, the higher the complexity score on that particular line/output (crude goes into an atmospheric distillation process and comes out as several products which are subsequently treated by hydro- or merox treaters, subject to secondary distillation, or gas processing, then subject to FCC feeds, cokers, hydrocracking, isomerization, reformer stages, etc). The complexity score of a refinery is the weighted average complexity of its output lines. Toa Oil is in the very high teens whereas most major refiners just get to double digits or slightly above.
Generically, a refinery's Nelson Complexity Index/Score is a measure of the value of the refinery - both in cost terms and in terms of value-add. 
Toa Oil effectively sold itself to Showa Shell in 1979 then Showa Shell consolidated it in 2005 when activists were knocking on the door of cheap stocks and Toa placed shares with Showa Shell taking their ownership to 50.1%. Since then, Showa Shell (and now Idemitsu) has effectively used it as an outsourced capital asset. Huge sums were invested, and subsequently depreciated, and now the "book value" of the assets is effectively below 20% of the investment cost, and the book value of the refinery portion (not including the land or some of the financial assets related to the oil business in Japan (oil refining taxes stream through companies like this as both assets and liabilities because of the methodology applied)) is probably on the order of 10-15% of its replacement value. 
But Showa Shell used it, and now Idemitsu uses it, as a rented asset. Toa sells 90% of its output to Idemitsu, and generates electricity with much of the rest, which it sells to TEPCO. The business with Idemitsu is just a tolling charge. Idemitsu supplies crude, uses the refinery for a fee, then takes the product. If spreads are good, Idemitsu benefits. If spreads are low, Idemitsu effectively has the low-cost producer on tap at a low price. How is that tolling charge set? It's not clear. The arithmetic doesn't add up to arms' length or market pricing. The board of Toa is a couple of inexpert independents, a former customer (who is described as independent), one or two internal people, and four people from Idemitsu and Showa Shell. It would be surprising if it were NOT Idemitsu determining for Toa how much Toa was going to charge. Toa could, of course, negotiate fiercely. The CEO (a former Idemitsu man) who gets paid by the board (full of Idemitsu people) to rent its asset to Idemitsu at a rate which is completely uneconomic long-term and ignores the value built up over the years by shareholders. 
Today, after years of speculation, Idemitsu announced that it would launch a Tender Offer for Toa Oil to take out the minorities. It comes at ¥2450/share which is a 23% premium to last, a slight premium to book, a discount to the land value under the refinery, and a tiny fraction of the replacement value of the asset, but the "fair value" assessed by the independent valuation agent based on numbers supplied by the Target Company based on its contract with the parent company shows that the price is not too far off "fair", as long as the contract with its parent is fair, and one ignores what the real world value is.
The Tender Offer starts today and goes for 30 days. 
Because this was a clear situation of informational edge owned by the Acquiror, who controls the company and its board, in a highly technical industry, with highly-regulated processes and somewhat complex valuation methodologies, it would make total sense that the inexpert independent board members seek out expert help to value the complex asset in a complex business. Obviously, with the social demands of the Corporate Governance Code and last year's METI Fair M&amp;A Guidelines weighing heavily on the Toa directors, they would have ensured that they were extra careful to establish a fair process, including a market check, expert valuation, a majority of minority investor agreement, and separate advisors for the Special Committee. They would have gotten a fairness opinion.
Toa Oil minority shareholders, unfortunately, are left without any of that. 
There is a large foreign shareholder who has been buying who, given their buying activity, and their long-term average purchase price, is unlikely to be ecstatic with this price. But to see this get a bump, it probably needs more people getting upset.

When one looks upon the landscape of Japan's oil refineries - a delightful vista of 20th century industrialisation being left by the wayside in the move to EVs, solar power, "green" investment, etc, one small refinery stands out - the Keihin refinery of Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP). 



Toa Oil's Keihin Refinery has a Nelson Complexity Index higher than any other refinery in Japan to my knowledge (the Nelson Complexity Index provides a measure of the ability of a refinery to process inputs into lighter product. The lighter the end product, the higher the complexity score on that particular line/output (crude goes into an atmospheric distillation process and comes out as several products which are subsequently treated by hydro- or merox treaters, subject to secondary distillation, or gas processing, then subject to FCC feeds, cokers, hydrocracking, isomerization, reformer stages, etc). The complexity score of a refinery is the weighted average complexity of its output lines. Toa Oil is in the very high teens whereas most major refiners just get to double digits or slightly above.
Generically, a refinery's Nelson Complexity Index/Score is a measure of the value of the refinery - both in cost terms and in terms of value-add. 
Toa Oil effectively sold itself to Showa Shell in 1979 then Showa Shell consolidated it in 2005 when activists were knocking on the door of cheap stocks and Toa placed shares with Showa Shell taking their ownership to 50.1%. Since then, Showa Shell (and now Idemitsu) has effectively used it as an outsourced capital asset. Huge sums were invested, and subsequently depreciated, and now the "book value" of the assets is effectively below 20% of the investment cost, and the book value of the refinery portion (not including the land or some of the financial assets related to the oil business in Japan (oil refining taxes stream through companies like this as both assets and liabilities because of the methodology applied)) is probably on the order of 10-15% of its replacement value. 
But Showa Shell used it, and now Idemitsu uses it, as a rented asset. Toa sells 90% of its output to Idemitsu, and generates electricity with much of the rest, which it sells to TEPCO. The business with Idemitsu is just a tolling charge. Idemitsu supplies crude, uses the refinery for a fee, then takes the product. If spreads are good, Idemitsu benefits. If spreads are low, Idemitsu effectively has the low-cost producer on tap at a low price. How is that tolling charge set? It's not clear. The arithmetic doesn't add up to arms' length or market pricing. The board of Toa is a couple of inexpert independents, a former customer (who is described as independent), one or two internal people, and four people from Idemitsu and Showa Shell. It would be surprising if it were NOT Idemitsu determining for Toa how much Toa was going to charge. Toa could, of course, negotiate fiercely. The CEO (a former Idemitsu man) who gets paid by the board (full of Idemitsu people) to rent its asset to Idemitsu at a rate which is completely uneconomic long-term and ignores the value built up over the years by shareholders. 
Today, after years of speculation, Idemitsu announced that it would launch a Tender Offer for Toa Oil to take out the minorities. It comes at ¥2450/share which is a 23% premium to last, a slight premium to book, a discount to the land value under the refinery, and a tiny fraction of the replacement value of the asset, but the "fair value" assessed by the independent valuation agent based on numbers supplied by the Target Company based on its contract with the parent company shows that the price is not too far off "fair", as long as the contract with its parent is fair, and one ignores what the real world value is.
The Tender Offer starts today and goes for 30 days. 
Because this was a clear situation of informational edge owned by the Acquiror, who controls the company and its board, in a highly technical industry, with highly-regulated processes and somewhat complex valuation methodologies, it would make total sense that the inexpert independent board members seek out expert help to value the complex asset in a complex business. Obviously, with the social demands of the Corporate Governance Code and last year's METI Fair M&amp;A Guidelines weighing heavily on the Toa directors, they would have ensured that they were extra careful to establish a fair process, including a market check, expert valuation, a majority of minority investor agreement, and separate advisors for the Special Committee. They would have gotten a fairness opinion.
Toa Oil minority shareholders, unfortunately, are left without any of that. 
There is a large foreign shareholder who has been buying who, given their buying activity, and their long-term average purchase price, is unlikely to be ecstatic with this price. But to see this get a bump, it probably needs more people getting upset. 

Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008)

In July 2015, after 7 months of speculation that #2 Japanese refiner by sales <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/109" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1">Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd (5019 JP)</a> and #4 <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/108" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:108:1">Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002 JP)</a> would join together, the two companies announced an MOU whereby Idemitsu would buy a 33% stake in Showa Shell from Royal Dutch Shell, and then would look to merge.Five months later in early December 2015, #1 Japanese refiner <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/638" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:638:1">JX Holdings Inc (5020 JP)</a> and #3-by-sales-#2-by-refining-capacity <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/20116" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20116:1">Tonengeneral Sekiyu Kk (5012 JP)</a> announced an MOU to merge.…

In July 2015, after 7 months of speculation that #2 Japanese refiner by sales Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd (5019 JP) and #4 Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002 JP) would join together, the two companies announced an MOU whereby Idemitsu would buy a 33% stake in Showa Shell from Royal Dutch Shell, and then would look to merge.Five months later in early December 2015, #1 Japanese refiner JX Holdings Inc (5020 JP) and #3-by-sales-#2-by-refining-capacity Tonengeneral Sekiyu Kk (5012 JP) announced an MOU to merge.…

Japan Refiner Mergers:  Antitrust Approvals Grouped Together

Japan

Fuji Oil Company Ltd a holding company which was established through the merger of Arabian Oil Co and Fuji Oil Co.  The Company operates mining and refining crude oil, natural gas, and minerals.  AOC Holding manages subsidiarieswhich produce and sell crude oil and coal products.

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Fuji Oil Co Ltd (5017 JP)

Activist Murakami-San Goes Substantial on Cosmo Oil (5021)

Murakami-san seems to have bailed on construction names recently and is now in two refiners, having gone substantial on Cosmo Oil (5021) after the...

Travis Lundy

Toa Oil (5008) Tender Offer Updated Update - STILL Looks Bumpity

Toa Oil reported Q3 results, and a HUGE jump in FY forecasts. OP+500%. Net Profit +400%. Oil demand is better, and the recent spike in electricity...

Travis Lundy

Toa Oil (5008) Tender Offer Update - Looks Bumpity.

The trade is still to be long Toa Oil. This looks bumpity. The right outcome is still to sell Toa to JXTG but barring that, the trade is to get...

Travis Lundy

Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008)

Idemitsu is 90% of revs, 50% of the ownership of Toa Oil. The business is not conducted at an arms' length basis so value has been transferred. Now...

Travis Lundy

Japan Refiner Mergers: Antitrust Approvals Grouped Together

In July 2015, after 7 months of speculation that #2 Japanese refiner by sales Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd (5019 JP) and #4 Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002...

Travis Lundy

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