Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)’s decision to grant a 1-year <a href="https://ir.rblbank.com/pdfs/regulatory/ReappointmentofMDCEOMrVishwavirAhujaFinal2021.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">extension</a> to  Vishwavir Ahuja, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rbl-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22856:1" rel="noopener">RBL Bank Ltd (RBK IN)</a> is similar to the 1-year extensions it provided to <a href="https://www.dcbbank.com/pdfs/BSENSEReAppointmentOfMDANDCEOApril2021.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Murali Natarajan</a>, CEO, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/dcb-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1557:1" rel="noopener">Dcb Bank Ltd (DCBB IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/d8768272-3bd1-4d07-808b-43b725fcdc69.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Shyam Srinivasan</a>, CEO <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/federal-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11784:1" rel="noopener">Federal Bank (FB IN)</a>. In recent times, Udak Kotak, CEO-founder, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kotak-mahindra-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:126:1" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)</a>(KMB) enjoys the unique distinction of getting a <a href="https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachLive/d5faa2b3-1886-42a9-af9d-960ff207a4ce.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">3-year</a>  extension by the regulator, despite having been a CEO for over 15 years, contradicting RBI’s <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=12078&amp;Mode=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">policy</a>  regarding the maximum tenure for bank CEOs.There are three issues raised by RBI’s conduct. Firstly, the decision to favour Uday Kotak and KMB is plainly <a href="https://thewire.in/banking/uday-kotak-ceo-kotak-mahindra-bank-rbi" target="_blank" rel="noopener">partisan</a>, undermining the credibility of the banking regulator. Secondly, by granting three private bank CEOs only a 1-year extension, is the regulator indicating to the banks its displeasure with the existing CEOs and the need to find a replacement in the course of the year? Although the RBI granted Shyam Srinivasan a second 1-year extension last year, the Federal Bank board of directors has <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/federal-bank-board-seeks-another-3-year-term-for-ceo/articleshow/81639243.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sought</a>  a 3-year extension when his term ends on September 29, 2021, indicating that the bank has chosen not to read the regulator’s tea leaves – or that the RBI did not give any such indication to the bank to look for a successor. If the RBI were to approve a further term to Shyam Srinivasan, it would raise questions about the regulator’s competence; what was the justification for repeated 1-year extensions? Thirdly, RBI’s policy of renewing CEOs with 1-year tenures unnecessarily introduces uncertainty in a bank’s future strategy: the existing CEO and the bank can plan for only one year, as the RBI may insist on a replacement at the end of the year.   Such short-term planning, especially in the current environment of economic stress, can be disruptive to the bank and its stakeholders, and it is unfortunate that it is being caused by the regulator’s decision to approve only 1-year extensions, without any explanation to the public.The capital market plays an important role for private banks, and the regulator must either be more transparent in explaining its decisions or it should reconsider its policy of granting 1-year extensions even when the candidates are conforming to the regulator’s norms of age and tenure for the CEOs. It is tragic that the RBI’s credibility as an impartial regulator has reached a nadir. Latest developments -- the favoured treatment it has meted to Uday Kotak, and its inability to comprehend the significance of its decision to renew CEO tenures for only  one year -- take its credibility even lower.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)’s decision to grant a 1-year extension to  Vishwavir Ahuja, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), RBL Bank Ltd (RBK IN) is similar to the 1-year extensions it provided to Murali Natarajan, CEO, Dcb Bank Ltd (DCBB IN) and Shyam Srinivasan, CEO Federal Bank (FB IN). In recent times, Udak Kotak, CEO-founder, Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)(KMB) enjoys the unique distinction of getting a 3-year  extension by the regulator, despite having been a CEO for over 15 years, contradicting RBI’s policy  regarding the maximum tenure for bank CEOs.There are three issues raised by RBI’s conduct. Firstly, the decision to favour Uday Kotak and KMB is plainly partisan, undermining the credibility of the banking regulator. Secondly, by granting three private bank CEOs only a 1-year extension, is the regulator indicating to the banks its displeasure with the existing CEOs and the need to find a replacement in the course of the year? Although the RBI granted Shyam Srinivasan a second 1-year extension last year, the Federal Bank board of directors has sought  a 3-year extension when his term ends on September 29, 2021, indicating that the bank has chosen not to read the regulator’s tea leaves – or that the RBI did not give any such indication to the bank to look for a successor. If the RBI were to approve a further term to Shyam Srinivasan, it would raise questions about the regulator’s competence; what was the justification for repeated 1-year extensions? Thirdly, RBI’s policy of renewing CEOs with 1-year tenures unnecessarily introduces uncertainty in a bank’s future strategy: the existing CEO and the bank can plan for only one year, as the RBI may insist on a replacement at the end of the year.   Such short-term planning, especially in the current environment of economic stress, can be disruptive to the bank and its stakeholders, and it is unfortunate that it is being caused by the regulator’s decision to approve only 1-year extensions, without any explanation to the public.The capital market plays an important role for private banks, and the regulator must either be more transparent in explaining its decisions or it should reconsider its policy of granting 1-year extensions even when the candidates are conforming to the regulator’s norms of age and tenure for the CEOs. It is tragic that the RBI’s credibility as an impartial regulator has reached a nadir. Latest developments -- the favoured treatment it has meted to Uday Kotak, and its inability to comprehend the significance of its decision to renew CEO tenures for only  one year -- take its credibility even lower.

RBI’s 1-Year Extensions to Bank CEOs: Creating Uncertainty and Short-Termism

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Are We Even Looking At The Same Bank As Management: A competitor hosted a recent conference call with the CFO of HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] to give a post-quarter update. On the conference call, however, management instead decided to focus on numerous items not having to do with credit, the elephant in the room. HDFCB management has more than a tendency to put a completely unwarranted positive spin on nearly every aspect of its business  -  completely ignoring the medium-term challenges; and*Watch Your Credit: We calculate that net new NPLs actually increased INR 49.2 bn or 130.4% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome – especially considering the challenges at HDFCB’s NBFC subsidiary, HDB Financial Services.  By our calculation, loss reserves are currently short by nearly INR 242 bn or nearly a half year of core operating results.

*Are We Even Looking At The Same Bank As Management: A competitor hosted a recent conference call with the CFO of HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] to give a post-quarter update. On the conference call, however, management instead decided to focus on numerous items not having to do with credit, the elephant in the room. HDFCB management has more than a tendency to put a completely unwarranted positive spin on nearly every aspect of its business  -  completely ignoring the medium-term challenges; and*Watch Your Credit: We calculate that net new NPLs actually increased INR 49.2 bn or 130.4% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome – especially considering the challenges at HDFCB’s NBFC subsidiary, HDB Financial Services.  By our calculation, loss reserves are currently short by nearly INR 242 bn or nearly a half year of core operating results.

*Poor Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported a FY 4Q21 loss of INR 10.5 bn, quite a reversal of fortune from the gains of INR 10.6 bn in FY 3Q21. Several factors drove BOB’s poor performance: a) net interest income declined INR 3.7 bn (5.0%) linked quarter driven by NIM expansion of 5 bp to 2.72% while the loan book only grew 0.2%; b) a loss provision increase of INR 1.5 bn (4.4%) despite further weakness in lending; an operating expense increase of INR 3.9 bn (7.3%) driven primarily by other costs which increased INR 3.1 bn (13.8%) – pushing BOB’s C/I ratio 3.2% higher to 63.2%; and the write-down of INR 33.1 bn in un-utilized DTAs; and*Poor Reserve Cover: Further, net new NPLs remain elevated at INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized. Keep in mind, a bank with over 8% of NPLs is typically considered an insolvent institution. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 293 bn or nearly 12 quarters of pre-tax earnings.

*Poor Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported a FY 4Q21 loss of INR 10.5 bn, quite a reversal of fortune from the gains of INR 10.6 bn in FY 3Q21. Several factors drove BOB’s poor performance: a) net interest income declined INR 3.7 bn (5.0%) linked quarter driven by NIM expansion of 5 bp to 2.72% while the loan book only grew 0.2%; b) a loss provision increase of INR 1.5 bn (4.4%) despite further weakness in lending; an operating expense increase of INR 3.9 bn (7.3%) driven primarily by other costs which increased INR 3.1 bn (13.8%) – pushing BOB’s C/I ratio 3.2% higher to 63.2%; and the write-down of INR 33.1 bn in un-utilized DTAs; and*Poor Reserve Cover: Further, net new NPLs remain elevated at INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized. Keep in mind, a bank with over 8% of NPLs is typically considered an insolvent institution. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 293 bn or nearly 12 quarters of pre-tax earnings.

Bank of Baroda – No Light In This Tunnel

In a little-publicised step, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has directed the first 1,000 companies by market capitalisation on the Indian bourses to disclose voluminous information in their <a href="https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/may-2021/sebi-issues-circular-on-business-responsibility-and-sustainability-reporting-by-listed-entities-_50097.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">business responsibility and sustainability</a> reporting. For FY2022 this is voluntary, but from FY2023 it is to be mandatory. This largely non-financial data may provide significant insights into large cap companies’ impact on the welfare of stakeholders (communities, employees, customers and channel partners) and the environment.Since 2012 the SEBI had mandated the disclosure of a Business Responsibility Report containing Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) parameters; however, the data was not standardised. The recent SEBI directive will standardise the data, facilitating its aggregation and its comparison across companies and industries. Even though they may not appear to be directly relevant to shareholders, these disclosures will shed light on how other stakeholders’ concerns are being addressed; and that can be relevant to the shareholders as well over the medium term. For the private sector banking and financial intermediaries, this data will reveal the near absence of trade unionism amongst their employees, and the high turnover of staff, especially at the lower levels. This turnover at the branches engaged in retail banking appears to be on account of ambitious sales targets set by the management. Such issues have typically been ignored by institutional investors, and indeed they often applaud such a policy, as it restrict wages and delivers higher profits.The disclosures stipulated by SEBI will also cover how the communities, customers, channel partners and employees view the company. Will this mean that companies will not be able to focus solely on shareholder interest, but will also have to pay attention to stakeholders’ concerns? In some cases, anti-corporate campaigners (representing workers, project-affected communities, or consumers) may find in such reports revelations that are embarrassing to the firm.The media and sell-side research have not reacted to these new requirements, as the disclosures are mainly non-financial. However, analysing and aggregating the data will provide valuable insights into companies and industries. In future, the cost of compliance for companies will increase. They will have to create separate departments, or outsource the function, in order to manage the voluminous data. It yet has to be seen how far the corporate sector cooperates, and the quality of the data provided. Nevertheless the step is likely to be helpful for understanding some aspects of the dynamics of corporate businesses in India.

In a little-publicised step, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has directed the first 1,000 companies by market capitalisation on the Indian bourses to disclose voluminous information in their business responsibility and sustainability reporting. For FY2022 this is voluntary, but from FY2023 it is to be mandatory. This largely non-financial data may provide significant insights into large cap companies’ impact on the welfare of stakeholders (communities, employees, customers and channel partners) and the environment.Since 2012 the SEBI had mandated the disclosure of a Business Responsibility Report containing Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) parameters; however, the data was not standardised. The recent SEBI directive will standardise the data, facilitating its aggregation and its comparison across companies and industries. Even though they may not appear to be directly relevant to shareholders, these disclosures will shed light on how other stakeholders’ concerns are being addressed; and that can be relevant to the shareholders as well over the medium term. For the private sector banking and financial intermediaries, this data will reveal the near absence of trade unionism amongst their employees, and the high turnover of staff, especially at the lower levels. This turnover at the branches engaged in retail banking appears to be on account of ambitious sales targets set by the management. Such issues have typically been ignored by institutional investors, and indeed they often applaud such a policy, as it restrict wages and delivers higher profits.The disclosures stipulated by SEBI will also cover how the communities, customers, channel partners and employees view the company. Will this mean that companies will not be able to focus solely on shareholder interest, but will also have to pay attention to stakeholders’ concerns? In some cases, anti-corporate campaigners (representing workers, project-affected communities, or consumers) may find in such reports revelations that are embarrassing to the firm.The media and sell-side research have not reacted to these new requirements, as the disclosures are mainly non-financial. However, analysing and aggregating the data will provide valuable insights into companies and industries. In future, the cost of compliance for companies will increase. They will have to create separate departments, or outsource the function, in order to manage the voluminous data. It yet has to be seen how far the corporate sector cooperates, and the quality of the data provided. Nevertheless the step is likely to be helpful for understanding some aspects of the dynamics of corporate businesses in India.

Newly Mandated Disclosures for India’s Top Corporates May Yield a Gold Mine of Information

*Bottom-line Overstated And Of Poor Quality: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 4Q21 results of INR 61.3 bn, declining INR 0.5 bn (0.8%) linked quarter. Despite the loss provision increase of INR 7.2 bn (6.7%); this is not nearly enough given the continued credit stress. SBI’s fee revenues grew INR 61.6 bn (10.5%) linked quarter, likely attributed to non-core gains which should not be repeatable going forward; and*Reserve Challenge Should Lead To Capital Raise: Net new NPLs increased INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% on an annualized versus – accelerating over the awful FY 3Q21 result of INR 145.7 bn and 41.6%.  These figures are quite troublesome - even for an Indian SOE bank. Given the capital challenges even prior to the Yes Bank (YES.IN) risk, SBI needs to prepare for additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

*Bottom-line Overstated And Of Poor Quality: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 4Q21 results of INR 61.3 bn, declining INR 0.5 bn (0.8%) linked quarter. Despite the loss provision increase of INR 7.2 bn (6.7%); this is not nearly enough given the continued credit stress. SBI’s fee revenues grew INR 61.6 bn (10.5%) linked quarter, likely attributed to non-core gains which should not be repeatable going forward; and*Reserve Challenge Should Lead To Capital Raise: Net new NPLs increased INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% on an annualized versus – accelerating over the awful FY 3Q21 result of INR 145.7 bn and 41.6%.  These figures are quite troublesome - even for an Indian SOE bank. Given the capital challenges even prior to the Yes Bank (YES.IN) risk, SBI needs to prepare for additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – No Let Up On Credit

India

iShares MSCI India Index ETF is an exchange-traded fund registered in Singapore. The Fund seeks to provide investment results that, before expenses, closely correspond to the performance of the MSCI India Index. The Fund invests all or substantially all of its assets in shares comprising the MSCI India Index in substantially the same weightings as constituted in the underlying index.

iShares MSCI India Index ETF (INDIA SP)

RBI’s 1-Year Extensions to Bank CEOs: Creating Uncertainty and Short-Termism

The favoured treatment RBI has meted to Uday Kotak, and its inability to comprehend the significance of its decision to renew CEO tenures for only ...

Hemindra Hazari

HDFC Bank – Rose Colored Glasses

HDFC BANK: A competitor hosted a recent conference call with HDFCB. It chose to focus on numerous items not having to do with credit. The longer...

Thomas J. Monaco

Bank of Baroda – No Light In This Tunnel

BANK OF BARODA: BOB reported a FY 4Q21 loss of INR 10.5 bn. Net new NPLs remain elevated at 11.2% annualized. BOB’s reserves still remain light by...

Thomas J. Monaco

Newly Mandated Disclosures for India’s Top Corporates May Yield a Gold Mine of Information

It is true that the explosion of ESG funds worldwide has not so far resulted in an improvement in ESG itself, but at least SEBI’s move may provide...

Hemindra Hazari

State Bank of India – No Let Up On Credit

STATE BANK OF INDIA: SBI reported a QOQ FY 4Q21 results decline of 0.8% - supported by gains. Net new NPLs accelerated to 65.9% from 41.6%. SBI...

Thomas J. Monaco