Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

In summer of 2016, I warned on Smartkarma that the BOJ was going to have to shift its ETF buy basket away from Nikkei 225. It did so in late 2016. I warned again in early 2018 that it was going to get worse, and suggested a revision to the Nikkei 225 Average methodology in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/the-boj-s-ongoing-etf-impact-is-a-nikkei-225-reshuffle-in-the-cards" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:17331" rel="noopener">The BOJ's Ongoing ETF Impact - Is a Nikkei 225 Reshuffle in the Cards?</a> (followed by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-passive-boj-heading-for-trouble-with-nikkei-225" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:21980" rel="noopener">JAPAN PASSIVE:  BOJ Heading For Trouble with Nikkei 225</a>) whereby there would be a deemed minimum shares outstanding quantity so that Deemed Minimum Shares Out / Shares out multiplied by Existing Deemed Par Value would become NEW Deemed Par Value.
This would mean that some names would see lower weights, but on the whole, the Nikkei 225 basket would be much more liquid. 
Nothing was done. The BOJ again lowered its use of Nikkei 225 ETFs, then recently finally stopped using the average altogether. 
The Nikkei 225 had been made largely irrelevant by the Nikkei's refusal to adapt to the times.
<h2>The NEW News</h2>
Today after the close, the Nikkei Index Team announced the first proposed revision to the methodology of the Nikkei 225 Average in twenty years, and a consultation over the next five weeks. Because the concept of Par Value is no longer used in Japan in the Companies Act, it would get rid of the "Presumed Par Value" or "Deemed Par Value" for members and potential members of the Average, and replace it with a Price Adjustment Factor ("PAF") which is an inverse multiplier of the Deemed Par Value. 
In short.... it would do nothing to the index and its constituents as they stand today.
And new additions would be assigned a PAF which would presumably be related to their previously understood Deemed Par Value. But in any case, new constituents would be capped at 1% weightings so would see their Price Adjustment Factor.... adjusted. 
There are other changes proposed which change the rebalancing possibilities, and there is a note that the Average would only include members of TSE Prime (such that existing TSE1 and Nikkei 225 members which chose not to become members of TSE Prime would find themselves booted from the Nikkei 225. 
This is highly disappointing. A 20-year review could have been so much more interesting and the Nikkei could have rescued itself from effective oblivion. Alas, this misses the mark, by a wide margin. 
But details are details so we look at them below.

In summer of 2016, I warned on Smartkarma that the BOJ was going to have to shift its ETF buy basket away from Nikkei 225. It did so in late 2016. I warned again in early 2018 that it was going to get worse, and suggested a revision to the Nikkei 225 Average methodology in The BOJ's Ongoing ETF Impact - Is a Nikkei 225 Reshuffle in the Cards? (followed by JAPAN PASSIVE:  BOJ Heading For Trouble with Nikkei 225) whereby there would be a deemed minimum shares outstanding quantity so that Deemed Minimum Shares Out / Shares out multiplied by Existing Deemed Par Value would become NEW Deemed Par Value.
This would mean that some names would see lower weights, but on the whole, the Nikkei 225 basket would be much more liquid. 
Nothing was done. The BOJ again lowered its use of Nikkei 225 ETFs, then recently finally stopped using the average altogether. 
The Nikkei 225 had been made largely irrelevant by the Nikkei's refusal to adapt to the times.
The NEW News
Today after the close, the Nikkei Index Team announced the first proposed revision to the methodology of the Nikkei 225 Average in twenty years, and a consultation over the next five weeks. Because the concept of Par Value is no longer used in Japan in the Companies Act, it would get rid of the "Presumed Par Value" or "Deemed Par Value" for members and potential members of the Average, and replace it with a Price Adjustment Factor ("PAF") which is an inverse multiplier of the Deemed Par Value. 
In short.... it would do nothing to the index and its constituents as they stand today.
And new additions would be assigned a PAF which would presumably be related to their previously understood Deemed Par Value. But in any case, new constituents would be capped at 1% weightings so would see their Price Adjustment Factor.... adjusted. 
There are other changes proposed which change the rebalancing possibilities, and there is a note that the Average would only include members of TSE Prime (such that existing TSE1 and Nikkei 225 members which chose not to become members of TSE Prime would find themselves booted from the Nikkei 225. 
This is highly disappointing. A 20-year review could have been so much more interesting and the Nikkei could have rescued itself from effective oblivion. Alas, this misses the mark, by a wide margin. 
But details are details so we look at them below. 

After 20yrs, Nikkei 225 Proposes Minor Impact Rule Changes (Nintendo Disappointment?)

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks, Windamee Research

J. Brian Waterhouse

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks

Windamee Research

Japanese Banks

Equity Bottom-Up

Prestidigitation, or sleight of hand, is what stage magicians use to create their illusions, to the delight of the onlookers who are beguiled into looking elsewhere at a crucial moment in the conjuring trick when they might otherwise spot what the ‘magician’ is really doing.FY3/2021 results for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hachijuni-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20244:1" rel="noopener">Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP)</a> are, at first glance, impressive.  In difficult trading conditions, consolidated net profits sailed past the bank’s guidance by over 24% to ¥22.3 billion (a +1.4% YoY improvement over FY3/2020).  Management has generously raised the final dividend by 33% from ¥6/share to ¥8/share. But this was simply continuing a dividend policy that management has practiced most years since FY3/2017: a ¥6/share interim dividend and an ¥8/share final dividend.  Let us not forget that guidance for FY3/2021 was withheld by management until 30 October 2020, so well into the financial year.  And bottom-line profits relied heavily on ¥6.3 billion in 2nd Half gains from  ‘selling the family silver’, namely realizing gains on part of the bank’s share portfolio as global stock markets fortuitously rose.  Moreover, trading gains of ¥9.9 billion were needed to offset a six-fold rise in credit costs from ¥1.4 billion to ¥9.3 billion because the bank’s collection of non-performing loans rose by 29.3% to ¥101.1 billion in a single year: primarily in loans in ‘high risk’ categories.  The quality of reported profits is indeed strained.In terms of balance-sheet efficiency, the bank’s return on assets (RoA) has deteriorated further to just 20bps, while its return on equity (RoE) is a risible 2.70%.  With flat profits being forecast for FY3/2022, and trading on an unremarkable PER of 8.1x, there are far better investments in the Japanese banking sector than this.  For those who are not yet holders of Hachijuni Bank stock but may have noticed the apparent strong recovery in the bank’s profitability according to its FY3/2021 financial statements, our position is clear: Caveat emptor! (May the buyer beware!)

Prestidigitation, or sleight of hand, is what stage magicians use to create their illusions, to the delight of the onlookers who are beguiled into looking elsewhere at a crucial moment in the conjuring trick when they might otherwise spot what the ‘magician’ is really doing.FY3/2021 results for Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP) are, at first glance, impressive.  In difficult trading conditions, consolidated net profits sailed past the bank’s guidance by over 24% to ¥22.3 billion (a +1.4% YoY improvement over FY3/2020).  Management has generously raised the final dividend by 33% from ¥6/share to ¥8/share. But this was simply continuing a dividend policy that management has practiced most years since FY3/2017: a ¥6/share interim dividend and an ¥8/share final dividend.  Let us not forget that guidance for FY3/2021 was withheld by management until 30 October 2020, so well into the financial year.  And bottom-line profits relied heavily on ¥6.3 billion in 2nd Half gains from  ‘selling the family silver’, namely realizing gains on part of the bank’s share portfolio as global stock markets fortuitously rose.  Moreover, trading gains of ¥9.9 billion were needed to offset a six-fold rise in credit costs from ¥1.4 billion to ¥9.3 billion because the bank’s collection of non-performing loans rose by 29.3% to ¥101.1 billion in a single year: primarily in loans in ‘high risk’ categories.  The quality of reported profits is indeed strained.In terms of balance-sheet efficiency, the bank’s return on assets (RoA) has deteriorated further to just 20bps, while its return on equity (RoE) is a risible 2.70%.  With flat profits being forecast for FY3/2022, and trading on an unremarkable PER of 8.1x, there are far better investments in the Japanese banking sector than this.  For those who are not yet holders of Hachijuni Bank stock but may have noticed the apparent strong recovery in the bank’s profitability according to its FY3/2021 financial statements, our position is clear: Caveat emptor! (May the buyer beware!)  

Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP):  A Case of Prestidigitation?

Concordia Financial Group, Ltd / Equity Bottom-Up

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/concordia-financial-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22704:1" rel="noopener">Concordia Financial Group, Ltd (7186 JP)</a>, or CFG, has slashed its FY3/3021 guidance by 36.7% to ¥25.3 billion and is now expecting EPS of just ¥20.97 against previous guidance of ¥33.15.  There are two principal causes: writing down an investment in a bear fund that went dramatically wrong in a rising market to the tune of ¥16.1 billion; and a significant increase in credit costs of ¥9.0 billion, largely at subsidiary Higashi-Nippon Bank (HNPB).Lingering investor memories of past management scandals and disappointing financial performance at HNPB in particular have caused CFG to significantly underperform its peers over the last 12 months, with its stock price up only +23.5% against an average of 35.5% for the other Top 5 regional banks in terms of market capitalisation.Yet aggregate foreign ownership in CFG remains high at around 31.5%.  Foreign investors view CFG as a liquid alternative to the ‘crowded trade’ of simply buying megabanks for exposure to the Japanese financial sector.  Moreover, CFG offers a cash dividend payment policy of 33% of net profits, a total shareholder return policy target of 50%, conducts frequent share buybacks, and regularly cancels part of its Treasury Stock to boost overall shareholder returns.  Even so, within the regional banking sector, we much prefer <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/chiba-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1048:1" rel="noopener">Chiba Bank (8331 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/iyo-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:6869:1" rel="noopener">Iyo Bank (8385 JP)</a> for their strong management and stable fundamentals, or <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bank-of-kyoto-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5248:1" rel="noopener">Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP)</a> as an interesting thematic play.

Concordia Financial Group, Ltd (7186 JP), or CFG, has slashed its FY3/3021 guidance by 36.7% to ¥25.3 billion and is now expecting EPS of just ¥20.97 against previous guidance of ¥33.15.  There are two principal causes: writing down an investment in a bear fund that went dramatically wrong in a rising market to the tune of ¥16.1 billion; and a significant increase in credit costs of ¥9.0 billion, largely at subsidiary Higashi-Nippon Bank (HNPB).Lingering investor memories of past management scandals and disappointing financial performance at HNPB in particular have caused CFG to significantly underperform its peers over the last 12 months, with its stock price up only +23.5% against an average of 35.5% for the other Top 5 regional banks in terms of market capitalisation.Yet aggregate foreign ownership in CFG remains high at around 31.5%.  Foreign investors view CFG as a liquid alternative to the ‘crowded trade’ of simply buying megabanks for exposure to the Japanese financial sector.  Moreover, CFG offers a cash dividend payment policy of 33% of net profits, a total shareholder return policy target of 50%, conducts frequent share buybacks, and regularly cancels part of its Treasury Stock to boost overall shareholder returns.  Even so, within the regional banking sector, we much prefer Chiba Bank (8331 JP) and Iyo Bank (8385 JP) for their strong management and stable fundamentals, or Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP) as an interesting thematic play.

Concordia Financial Group (7186 JP): Asset Quality Issues

Japan/Asia Long-Short, LightStream Research

Mio Kato

Japan/Asia Long-Short

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

Bloomberg has reported on a number of developments for Nintendo and the Switch recently. It has highlighted the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-04/nintendo-plans-switch-model-with-bigger-samsung-oled-display" target="_blank" rel="noopener">procurement of OLED panels from Samsung</a>, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-23/nintendo-to-use-new-nvidia-graphics-chip-in-2021-switch-upgrade" target="_blank" rel="noopener">implementation of DLSS in the new “Switch Pro”</a> (which we flagged in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/nintendo-pay-attention-to-nvidia-and-dlss-as-well-as-switch-momentum-and-pokemon" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Jun last year</a>) and that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-15/nintendo-is-said-to-target-record-year-in-switch-game-sales" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nintendo is targeting positive growth for HW and SW next year</a>.

Bloomberg has reported on a number of developments for Nintendo and the Switch recently. It has highlighted the procurement of OLED panels from Samsung, the implementation of DLSS in the new “Switch Pro” (which we flagged in Jun last year) and that Nintendo is targeting positive growth for HW and SW next year.

Nintendo – Reviewing Prospects for a Peak in Light of Bloomberg’s Recent Coverage

Consensus is at ¥40bn. Consensus is Jon Snow.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/197/968/original/image_86592491321617026335735.png?1617026336" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="197968"></figure>We believe that not only will Monster Hunter Rise demonstrate strong "legs" and continue to sell in large volumes well into 2021, but that RE8 will make a run at becoming the best selling RE title ever, AND that Monster Hunter Stories 2 will set right many of the mistakes of its predecessor.

Consensus is at ¥40bn. Consensus is Jon Snow.We believe that not only will Monster Hunter Rise demonstrate strong "legs" and continue to sell in large volumes well into 2021, but that RE8 will make a run at becoming the best selling RE title ever, AND that Monster Hunter Stories 2 will set right many of the mistakes of its predecessor.

Capcom – We Are Starting to Think… ¥100bn in OP Is Not Impossible Next Year

Japan

Nintendo Co., Ltd. globally develops, manufactures and sells home-use video game hardware and software in home entertainment business.  The company also produces home-game products including cards.

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Nintendo (7974 JP)

After 20yrs, Nikkei 225 Proposes Minor Impact Rule Changes (Nintendo Disappointment?)

TWENTY YEARS after its last major index methodology review, the Nikkei has proposed changes to the Nikkei 225. Existing constituents are not...

Travis Lundy

Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP): A Case of Prestidigitation?

Prestidigitation, or sleight of hand, is what magicians use to create their illusions. Onlookers are beguiled into looking elsewhere at a crucial...

J. Brian Waterhouse

Concordia Financial Group (7186 JP): Asset Quality Issues

Concordia Financial Group (7186 JP) has slashed its FY3/3021 guidance by 36.7% to ¥25.3 billion on higher credit costs and after writing down a...

J. Brian Waterhouse

Nintendo – Reviewing Prospects for a Peak in Light of Bloomberg’s Recent Coverage

We review recent Nintendo news regarding OLED panel procurement from Samsung, incorporating Nvidia's DLSS in the New Switch and bullish volume...

Mio Kato

Capcom – We Are Starting to Think… ¥100bn in OP Is Not Impossible Next Year

We believe that Monster Hunter Rise, Resident Evil Village and Monster Hunter Stories 2 could combine to drive unprecedented profitability at...

Mio Kato

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