Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Just under two years ago, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cocokara-fine-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15447:1" rel="noopener">Cocokara Fine (3098 JP)</a> was being courted by multiple suitors, and in early Q3 after the Independent Review Committee decided to negotiate with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/matsumotokiyoshi-holdings-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2259:1" rel="noopener">Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP)</a> rather than <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sugi-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9255:1" rel="noopener">Sugi Holdings (7649 JP)</a>, it looked like a deal was forthcoming. However in early 2020, it was announced that the decision on a ratio was put off and the two companies agreed to a delayed-vs-expectations integration process.Rather than push a deal forward at that moment, the two companies agreed at the end of January 2020 that MatsuKiyo would put up funds (which turned out to be ¥38.4bn) to buy shares of cocokara in a third-party placement of 20% of the company (<a href="https://corp.cocokarafine.co.jp/news/pdf/20200331_TD01.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">completed 31 March</a>), and the two companies would work on a plan to introduce synergies, and then the ratio would be decided when management teams at both firms had a better idea of what effect the synergies might have on future management profit forecasts.Subsequent earnings announcements have suggested that synergies have been found. <div>
<table class="table table-striped"><tbody>
<tr><td colspan="3" style="width: 724px;"><h2>The Schedule of the Integration</h2></td></tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">Date</td>
<td style="width: 330px;">Detail</td>
<td style="width: 224px;">Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">31 Jan 2020</td>
<td style="width: 330px;">Business Integration &amp; Capital Alliance Announcement</td>
<td style="width: 224px;">The New Deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">31 Jan to 30 April 2020</td>
<td style="width: 330px;">Submission of Capital Alliance/Integration to JFTC, JFTC Approval, Cocokara Share Issuance, Equity Affiliate status</td>
<td style="width: 224px;">JFTC Approval, and investment made March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">THE NEXT YEAR</td>
<td colspan="2" style="width: 330px;">The two companies will work on the synergies and discuss their vision, plans, etc, and come up with a Merger Ratio, which will be in part dependent on the new management profit forecasts built up after several months or a year's worth of effort at finding synergies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">Feb 2021</td>
<td style="width: 330px;">Execution of definitive agreement related to the Business Integration</td>
<td style="width: 224px;">The Merger Ratio Announcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">June 2021</td>
<td style="width: 330px;">Ordinary general meetings of shareholders of both companies (resolution regarding approval of the Business Integration)</td>
<td style="width: 224px;">The Approvals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 128px;">1 Oct 2021</td>
<td style="width: 330px;">Effective Date of the Business Integration</td>
<td style="width: 224px;">The Merger</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
The cocokara/MatsuKiyo price ratio fell to 1.28 and that was a great time to buy. My trade recommendations on the ratio are marked in the chart below.
Then covid-19 effects knocked markets for a loop and the ratio dropped from 1.43 a month later to 1.20 in mid-March to 1.40 again at end-March as share prices fluctuated wildly. The ratio stabilized in the 1.37-1.43 range until end-May when the ratio jumped. It then moved up steadily to 1.80 last week before dropping to 1.76 where it was in September when I recommended buying both names, noting that Matsumoto Kiyoshi had underperformed its peers.
<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/186/347/original/Screenshot+2021-02-02+at+9.09.30+PM.png?1612271389" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="186347"></figure></section>
The ratio has fallen since then but both stocks are up, MatsuKiyo up more.
<h3>Where We Are Now</h3>
Just over a week ago, on 22 January 2021, cocokara fine announced that because of the announcement of the state of emergency related to covid-19, workers and service providers working from home might experience some delay in preparing the financial releases and therefore the announcement of Q3 earnings would be put off from the regularly scheduled date of 29 January to 12 February 2021. The statement says no analyst meeting to discuss Q3 results will be held. 
A decision on the definitive agreement on Business Integration is due in February 2021.
Now cocokara is releasing earnings on 12 February, and I believe one should expect Matsumoto Kiyoshi results on the same day. 
Hmmm...
</div>

Just under two years ago, Cocokara Fine (3098 JP) was being courted by multiple suitors, and in early Q3 after the Independent Review Committee decided to negotiate with Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) rather than Sugi Holdings (7649 JP), it looked like a deal was forthcoming. However in early 2020, it was announced that the decision on a ratio was put off and the two companies agreed to a delayed-vs-expectations integration process.Rather than push a deal forward at that moment, the two companies agreed at the end of January 2020 that MatsuKiyo would put up funds (which turned out to be ¥38.4bn) to buy shares of cocokara in a third-party placement of 20% of the company (completed 31 March), and the two companies would work on a plan to introduce synergies, and then the ratio would be decided when management teams at both firms had a better idea of what effect the synergies might have on future management profit forecasts.Subsequent earnings announcements have suggested that synergies have been found. 

The Schedule of the Integration

Date
Detail
Comment


31 Jan 2020
Business Integration &amp; Capital Alliance Announcement
The New Deal


31 Jan to 30 April 2020
Submission of Capital Alliance/Integration to JFTC, JFTC Approval, Cocokara Share Issuance, Equity Affiliate status
JFTC Approval, and investment made March 2020


THE NEXT YEAR
The two companies will work on the synergies and discuss their vision, plans, etc, and come up with a Merger Ratio, which will be in part dependent on the new management profit forecasts built up after several months or a year's worth of effort at finding synergies.


Feb 2021
Execution of definitive agreement related to the Business Integration
The Merger Ratio Announcement


June 2021
Ordinary general meetings of shareholders of both companies (resolution regarding approval of the Business Integration)
The Approvals


1 Oct 2021
Effective Date of the Business Integration
The Merger


The cocokara/MatsuKiyo price ratio fell to 1.28 and that was a great time to buy. My trade recommendations on the ratio are marked in the chart below.
Then covid-19 effects knocked markets for a loop and the ratio dropped from 1.43 a month later to 1.20 in mid-March to 1.40 again at end-March as share prices fluctuated wildly. The ratio stabilized in the 1.37-1.43 range until end-May when the ratio jumped. It then moved up steadily to 1.80 last week before dropping to 1.76 where it was in September when I recommended buying both names, noting that Matsumoto Kiyoshi had underperformed its peers.

The ratio has fallen since then but both stocks are up, MatsuKiyo up more.
Where We Are Now
Just over a week ago, on 22 January 2021, cocokara fine announced that because of the announcement of the state of emergency related to covid-19, workers and service providers working from home might experience some delay in preparing the financial releases and therefore the announcement of Q3 earnings would be put off from the regularly scheduled date of 29 January to 12 February 2021. The statement says no analyst meeting to discuss Q3 results will be held. 
A decision on the definitive agreement on Business Integration is due in February 2021.
Now cocokara is releasing earnings on 12 February, and I believe one should expect Matsumoto Kiyoshi results on the same day. 
Hmmm...


Cocokara/​MatsuKiyo Deal Finally Coming?

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets, JapanConsuming

Michael Causton

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets

Real Insight on Japanese Consumer Markets

JapanConsuming

JapanConsuming is a specialist research firm producing intelligence on Japanese retail and consumer markets. Founded in 2000, JapanConsuming has become the leading provider of insights on Japanese retailers and consumer trends to retailers, brands, government agencies and investors. As well as a highly regarded monthly report on the market, JapanConsuming produces in-depth reports on retail sectors, seminars on key trends and telephone consulting to investors on trends and retailers.

JapanConsuming was founded by Michael Causton and Roy Larke. 

Equity Bottom-Up

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/aeon-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:3:1" rel="noopener">Aeon Co Ltd (8267 JP)</a> is Japan’s largest retail conglomerate by revenues but it struggles to make respectable profits.Now, as with Seven-Eleven at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/seven-i-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1041:1" rel="noopener">Seven &amp; I Holdings (3382 JP)</a>, Aeon may have found the high margin star subsidiary it has been looking for: Welcia Holdings.Welcia is the country’s leading drugstore chain and is growing strongly, exceeding ¥1 trillion in sales for the first time and forecasting an increase to ¥1.8 trillion through 2023.Last year, it made almost as much profit as the whole of Aeon combined but there are plenty of opportunities to extract more profit from this sector.Like most Japanese drugstore stocks, Welcia is currently trading at historically high levels thanks to a surge in sales from March onwards (see below for details)  but with more consolidation coming in the sector led by the leaders, Welcia is a solid buy when dips in the market provide an opportunity.

Aeon Co Ltd (8267 JP) is Japan’s largest retail conglomerate by revenues but it struggles to make respectable profits.Now, as with Seven-Eleven at Seven &amp; I Holdings (3382 JP), Aeon may have found the high margin star subsidiary it has been looking for: Welcia Holdings.Welcia is the country’s leading drugstore chain and is growing strongly, exceeding ¥1 trillion in sales for the first time and forecasting an increase to ¥1.8 trillion through 2023.Last year, it made almost as much profit as the whole of Aeon combined but there are plenty of opportunities to extract more profit from this sector.Like most Japanese drugstore stocks, Welcia is currently trading at historically high levels thanks to a surge in sales from March onwards (see below for details)  but with more consolidation coming in the sector led by the leaders, Welcia is a solid buy when dips in the market provide an opportunity.

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Event-Driven

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:
<ol>
<li>What might supply look like?</li>
<li>What might demand look like?</li>
</ol>
The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:

What might supply look like?
What might demand look like?

The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

On 26 April 2019, just before the start of the Golden Week holiday, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/matsumotokiyoshi-holdings-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2259:1" rel="noopener">Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP)</a> (hereafter "MatsuKiyo" or "MK") and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cocokara-fine-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15447:1" rel="noopener">Cocokara Fine (3098 JP)</a> (hereafter "Cocokara") released an announcement that they were going to commence discussions on a possible business partnership which could include business planning and procurement, and which could also include a capital tie-up such as each company holding shares in the other. A couple of days later, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sugi-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9255:1" rel="noopener">Sugi Holdings (7649 JP)</a> said that it was interested in a merger with Cocokara, and MatsuKiyo said it could be interested in going that far too, so Cocokara Fine put it to an Independent Committee ("IC") they set up to advise on this, and each company made its pitch to that IC. At the end of July 2019, the IC met with Cocokara's board and said that MatsuKiyo was the better match. The board deliberated, came to the same conclusion, and announced an exclusive negotiation period with MatsuKiyo for the next several months, with details of a tie-up to be announced in January 2020. This was confirmed as on-track by the CEOs of both MatsuKiyo and Cocokara at the Q2 earnings releases in November 2019 and in subsequent interviews with major media in Japan. This potential for a tie-up has been discussed in several insights by myself and by Michael Causton on the platform. The expectation since the August announcement has been that a merger would be announced for Effective Date 1 October 2020. On Friday 31 January at around 1pm local time, an article appeared on the Nikkei website in Japanese saying that the two companies would announce something on the same day, which would include joining together in October 2021 but MatsuKiyo buying 20% of Cocokara before that to make it an equity method affiliate at an early stage. Cocokara shares spiked and I was flummoxed. Partial Tender or Third Party Offering? October 2021? Why wait so long after 5+mos of exclusive negotiation? The shares in both companies were quickly suspended, then started trading again, and after the close we got the official news.<div class="content-highlight">
<h2>The New News</h2>
The companies yesterday entered into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Business Integration of the two companies and of a Capital Alliance related to said Business Integration.
Together the companies will have about ¥1 trillion in annual sales and 3,000 stores, representing the largest business of its kind in Japan. 
</div>It's big, but this announcement is different than what people were expecting. It is at a time disappointing, and not disappointing.

On 26 April 2019, just before the start of the Golden Week holiday, Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) (hereafter "MatsuKiyo" or "MK") and Cocokara Fine (3098 JP) (hereafter "Cocokara") released an announcement that they were going to commence discussions on a possible business partnership which could include business planning and procurement, and which could also include a capital tie-up such as each company holding shares in the other. A couple of days later, Sugi Holdings (7649 JP) said that it was interested in a merger with Cocokara, and MatsuKiyo said it could be interested in going that far too, so Cocokara Fine put it to an Independent Committee ("IC") they set up to advise on this, and each company made its pitch to that IC. At the end of July 2019, the IC met with Cocokara's board and said that MatsuKiyo was the better match. The board deliberated, came to the same conclusion, and announced an exclusive negotiation period with MatsuKiyo for the next several months, with details of a tie-up to be announced in January 2020. This was confirmed as on-track by the CEOs of both MatsuKiyo and Cocokara at the Q2 earnings releases in November 2019 and in subsequent interviews with major media in Japan. This potential for a tie-up has been discussed in several insights by myself and by Michael Causton on the platform. The expectation since the August announcement has been that a merger would be announced for Effective Date 1 October 2020. On Friday 31 January at around 1pm local time, an article appeared on the Nikkei website in Japanese saying that the two companies would announce something on the same day, which would include joining together in October 2021 but MatsuKiyo buying 20% of Cocokara before that to make it an equity method affiliate at an early stage. Cocokara shares spiked and I was flummoxed. Partial Tender or Third Party Offering? October 2021? Why wait so long after 5+mos of exclusive negotiation? The shares in both companies were quickly suspended, then started trading again, and after the close we got the official news.
The New News
The companies yesterday entered into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Business Integration of the two companies and of a Capital Alliance related to said Business Integration.
Together the companies will have about ¥1 trillion in annual sales and 3,000 stores, representing the largest business of its kind in Japan. 
It's big, but this announcement is different than what people were expecting. It is at a time disappointing, and not disappointing.

Cocokara/MatsuKiyo - Disappointing But Not Disappointing

Just before Golden Week last year, specialty drugstore retailers <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/matsumotokiyoshi-holdings-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2259:1" rel="noopener">Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP)</a> (#4 or #5 in sales) and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cocokara-fine-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15447:1" rel="noopener">Cocokara Fine (3098 JP)</a> (#7 in sales) announced the start of talks aimed at a possible eventual merger of drugstore operations to become the largest drugstore operator in Japan with annual pro-forma net revenues nearing ¥1 trillion (beating leader <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/welcia-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20895:1" rel="noopener">Welcia Holdings (3141 JP)</a>'s 2019 result of ¥780bn, with an eventual capital merger possible. Talks were set to conclude by September.<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sugi-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9255:1" rel="noopener">Sugi Holdings (7649 JP)</a> saw that news and not long afterwards threw their hat into the ring. cocokara fine decided they would convene a special committee to review the plans and interview the suitors, then the board would consult the committee and seek to negotiate with the preferred party. The independent committee in July decided to go with Matsumoto Kiyoshi, and an MOU was announced in mid-August which gave them an exclusive negotiating right until the end of January 2020, with the stated expectation, subsequently reiterated around earnings time in November, that they would reach a negotiated conclusion sometime in January.My immediate reaction, published in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/cocokara-3098-going-with-matsukiyo-3088-but-ratio-overextended" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:31733" rel="noopener">Cocokara (3098) Going With MatsuKiyo (3088) But Ratio Overextended</a> (in mid-August 2019) was that the cocokara/MatsuKiyo ratio was overextended and it was worth buying but only if the ratio fell from then-current 1.69 down to below 1.50, preferably in the 1.45-ish area. It got to 1.48 in late August, then 1.465 in early October, bounced to 1.60 in November, then drifted back down to the 1.50 area around which it has traded since mid-December 2019.It IS, now, "sometime in January."It is time for a last look at the story, its context, and what the odds are for this "guess the ratio" trade.

Just before Golden Week last year, specialty drugstore retailers Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) (#4 or #5 in sales) and Cocokara Fine (3098 JP) (#7 in sales) announced the start of talks aimed at a possible eventual merger of drugstore operations to become the largest drugstore operator in Japan with annual pro-forma net revenues nearing ¥1 trillion (beating leader Welcia Holdings (3141 JP)'s 2019 result of ¥780bn, with an eventual capital merger possible. Talks were set to conclude by September.Sugi Holdings (7649 JP) saw that news and not long afterwards threw their hat into the ring. cocokara fine decided they would convene a special committee to review the plans and interview the suitors, then the board would consult the committee and seek to negotiate with the preferred party. The independent committee in July decided to go with Matsumoto Kiyoshi, and an MOU was announced in mid-August which gave them an exclusive negotiating right until the end of January 2020, with the stated expectation, subsequently reiterated around earnings time in November, that they would reach a negotiated conclusion sometime in January.My immediate reaction, published in Cocokara (3098) Going With MatsuKiyo (3088) But Ratio Overextended (in mid-August 2019) was that the cocokara/MatsuKiyo ratio was overextended and it was worth buying but only if the ratio fell from then-current 1.69 down to below 1.50, preferably in the 1.45-ish area. It got to 1.48 in late August, then 1.465 in early October, bounced to 1.60 in November, then drifted back down to the 1.50 area around which it has traded since mid-December 2019.It IS, now, "sometime in January."It is time for a last look at the story, its context, and what the odds are for this "guess the ratio" trade. 

Japan

SUGI HOLDINGS CO., LTD. operates a chain of drug stores located mainly in Aichi Prefecture.  The Company sells prescription and nonprescription medicine, cosmetics, health foods, and general merchandise.

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Sugi Holdings (7649 JP)

Cocokara/MatsuKiyo Deal Finally Coming?

10 days ago cocokara fine (3098) announced a delay in Q3 earnings because of the coronavirus emergency measures - to the same day as MatsuKiyo...

Travis Lundy

Welcia: Aeon’s Profit Machine

Aeon Co Ltd (8267 JP) is Japan’s largest retail conglomerate by revenues but it struggles to make respectable profits.Now, as with Seven-Eleven at...

Michael Causton

A Potential Asian LBO Screening System

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the...

Travis Lundy

Cocokara/MatsuKiyo - Disappointing But Not Disappointing

On 26 April 2019, just before the start of the Golden Week holiday, Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) (hereafter "MatsuKiyo" or "MK") and...

Travis Lundy

Gotta Go With Cocokara

Just before Golden Week last year, specialty drugstore retailers Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) (#4 or #5 in sales) and Cocokara Fine (3098...

Travis Lundy

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)

Cocokara/​MatsuKiyo Deal Finally Coming?

10 days ago cocokara fine (3098) announced a delay in Q3 earnings because of the coronavirus emergency measures - to the same day as MatsuKiyo...

Travis Lundy

Welcia: Aeon’s Profit Machine

Aeon Co Ltd (8267 JP) is Japan’s largest retail conglomerate by revenues but it struggles to make respectable profits.Now, as with Seven-Eleven at...

Michael Causton

A Potential Asian LBO Screening System

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the...

Travis Lundy

Cocokara/MatsuKiyo - Disappointing But Not Disappointing

On 26 April 2019, just before the start of the Golden Week holiday, Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) (hereafter "MatsuKiyo" or "MK") and...

Travis Lundy

Gotta Go With Cocokara

Just before Golden Week last year, specialty drugstore retailers Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co (3088 JP) (#4 or #5 in sales) and Cocokara Fine (3098...

Travis Lundy

Cocokara/MatsuKiyo Deal Finally Coming?