Global Healthcare Analyst

Tina Banerjee

Equity Bottom-Up

Hisamitsu Pharmaceutical Co / Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>For the near-term, focus will be on the marketing partnership for ATS, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder treatment patch. FDA action date is in late December.</li>
<li>Lower domestic sales of OTC pharmaceuticals due to the lack of sports events remains the major downside risk for Hisamitsu. Revenue from its largest selling Rx brand is also declining.</li>
<li>Management reiterated FY22 guidance and announced a buyback plan worth ¥12 billion.</li>
</ul>


For the near-term, focus will be on the marketing partnership for ATS, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder treatment patch. FDA action date is in late December.
Lower domestic sales of OTC pharmaceuticals due to the lack of sports events remains the major downside risk for Hisamitsu. Revenue from its largest selling Rx brand is also declining.
Management reiterated FY22 guidance and announced a buyback plan worth ¥12 billion.


Hisamitsu Pharmaceutical (4530 JP): Focus Shifts to ADHD Treatment Patch and Other Upcoming Launches

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Quantitative Analysis

The GPIF is the world's largest pension fund at what was $1.6 trillion-plus at the end of December 2019. The management of the GPIF has made remarkable strides in recent years, moving towards market targets for returns of all assets (no more FILP bonds), creating a win-win profitability structure for active managers on multi-year mandates (up to five to seven years it seems), and demanding accountability on stewardship policies and efforts. In March 2010, the GPIF lowered its domestic bond portfolio bogey from 67% to 60% (which was good because it was already there),  and raised its domestic equity, foreign bond, and foreign equity allocation mix midpoints to 12%/11%/12% from 11%/8%/9%. Short Term Assets were set at 5%. In June 2013, they realized they needed to be more aggressive, and so the GPIF spent more than a year studying the problem, having experts in, looking at allocation mixes and trying to be more professional about assessing their liability profile and curve, and decided in October 2014 to implement a much different mix, moving domestic bonds to 35% ±10%, domestic equities to 25% ±9%, foreign bonds to 15% ±4%, and foreign equities to 25% ±8%. There was no bogey for Short Term Assets, but that was assumed to be wrapped up in the domestic bonds portion as a concept.That meant buying equities, and they did.They had already been buying and by the time they announced the new policy in October 2014 officially, they had already gone through the old limits on domestic equities and were at 18.2% (the old upper limit was 18.0%). It took them until March 2015 to get to 22%, and by June they were at 23.4%. Basically, they then let it ride, with some small changes here and there. The big changes were constant reductions in the domestic bond allocation. However in FY15 (year to March 2016) there was an episode of equity buying. That is probably something those interested in flows should study now. The GPIF is currently said to be in the process of conducting an Investment Policy Review. The lead-up to this has seen a number of changes which hint at what could come.<ol>
<li>
The GPIF has become very ESG-focussed. Some of that is the G portion where they talk about being long-term investors, and they have made it mandatory for their investment managers to have a stewardship policy and report on how they execute that policy. They are also looking very much at the longer-term, and CIO Mizuno has blasted short-sellers and any number of other market participants for being short-term (I had issues with a bunch of the comments reported in the FT so got a <a href="https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/01/14/1579000419000/The-GPIF-and-the-complexity-of-stewardship/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">letter to Alphaville</a> published - Thanks Jamie!).</li>
<li>The GPIF has started looking at real estate.</li>
<li>
The GPIF has decided that foreign credit which is yen-hedged can be put into the domestic bonds allocation bucket. This means a higher allocation to foreign issuer risk than the old limit.</li>
<li>
The GPIF has stopped lending stocks. This reduces fee income to passive portfolios (foreign equity, as domestic equity lending has never been done, or at least not in many, many years) but it means more pressure on company management.</li>
<li>
The GPIF has changed the way contracts work for active managers. The base concept, according to interviews and articles, is that the active manager gets the same very low management fee on AUM as a passive manager does, but the active manager shares in the upside over the life of the contract, which will be "one market cycle" (i.e. five years, or seven years, or whatever they settle on with the GPIF). This should, ceteris paribus, lead to further outperformance. </li>
</ol>All of these things would, in my mind, point to a higher domestic equity allocation, a higher foreign bond allocation, and a shift to more active management and less passive management in domestic equities (last year the split was 90% passive 10% active). But there are shorter-term factors investors should be looking at. More discussion below.

The GPIF is the world's largest pension fund at what was $1.6 trillion-plus at the end of December 2019. The management of the GPIF has made remarkable strides in recent years, moving towards market targets for returns of all assets (no more FILP bonds), creating a win-win profitability structure for active managers on multi-year mandates (up to five to seven years it seems), and demanding accountability on stewardship policies and efforts. In March 2010, the GPIF lowered its domestic bond portfolio bogey from 67% to 60% (which was good because it was already there),  and raised its domestic equity, foreign bond, and foreign equity allocation mix midpoints to 12%/11%/12% from 11%/8%/9%. Short Term Assets were set at 5%. In June 2013, they realized they needed to be more aggressive, and so the GPIF spent more than a year studying the problem, having experts in, looking at allocation mixes and trying to be more professional about assessing their liability profile and curve, and decided in October 2014 to implement a much different mix, moving domestic bonds to 35% ±10%, domestic equities to 25% ±9%, foreign bonds to 15% ±4%, and foreign equities to 25% ±8%. There was no bogey for Short Term Assets, but that was assumed to be wrapped up in the domestic bonds portion as a concept.That meant buying equities, and they did.They had already been buying and by the time they announced the new policy in October 2014 officially, they had already gone through the old limits on domestic equities and were at 18.2% (the old upper limit was 18.0%). It took them until March 2015 to get to 22%, and by June they were at 23.4%. Basically, they then let it ride, with some small changes here and there. The big changes were constant reductions in the domestic bond allocation. However in FY15 (year to March 2016) there was an episode of equity buying. That is probably something those interested in flows should study now. The GPIF is currently said to be in the process of conducting an Investment Policy Review. The lead-up to this has seen a number of changes which hint at what could come.

The GPIF has become very ESG-focussed. Some of that is the G portion where they talk about being long-term investors, and they have made it mandatory for their investment managers to have a stewardship policy and report on how they execute that policy. They are also looking very much at the longer-term, and CIO Mizuno has blasted short-sellers and any number of other market participants for being short-term (I had issues with a bunch of the comments reported in the FT so got a letter to Alphaville published - Thanks Jamie!).
The GPIF has started looking at real estate.

The GPIF has decided that foreign credit which is yen-hedged can be put into the domestic bonds allocation bucket. This means a higher allocation to foreign issuer risk than the old limit.

The GPIF has stopped lending stocks. This reduces fee income to passive portfolios (foreign equity, as domestic equity lending has never been done, or at least not in many, many years) but it means more pressure on company management.

The GPIF has changed the way contracts work for active managers. The base concept, according to interviews and articles, is that the active manager gets the same very low management fee on AUM as a passive manager does, but the active manager shares in the upside over the life of the contract, which will be "one market cycle" (i.e. five years, or seven years, or whatever they settle on with the GPIF). This should, ceteris paribus, lead to further outperformance. 
All of these things would, in my mind, point to a higher domestic equity allocation, a higher foreign bond allocation, and a shift to more active management and less passive management in domestic equities (last year the split was 90% passive 10% active). But there are shorter-term factors investors should be looking at. More discussion below.

Event-Driven

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Event-Driven

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:
<ol>
<li>What might supply look like?</li>
<li>What might demand look like?</li>
</ol>
The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:

What might supply look like?
What might demand look like?

The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One, Periscope Analytics

Brian Freitas

Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One

The short notional in the market for the week ended 30 August is US$24.65bn with the largest short positions in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/itochu-corp" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18448:1">Itochu Corp (8001 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toyota-motor-corp" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:73:1">Toyota Motor (7203 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/taiyo-yuden-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9924:1">Taiyo Yuden (6976 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/canon-inc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1:1">Canon Inc (7751 JP)</a>,  and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sumitomo-mitsui-financial-gr" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:217:1">Sumitomo Mitsui Financial (8316 JP)</a> . Most shorted stocks as a percentage of free float are Amazia, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/taiyo-yuden-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9924:1">Taiyo Yuden (6976 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/leopalace21-corp" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8244:1">Leopalace21 Corp (8848 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/extreme-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5311:1">Extreme Co Ltd (6033 JP)</a>, while the stocks with the highest days to cover are <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/katakura-industries-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2007:1">Katakura Industries (3001 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/vital-ksk-holdings-inc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7398:1">Vital Ksk Holdings (3151 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mirait-holdings-corp" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7034:1">Mirait Holdings (1417 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/j-trust-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20246:1">J Trust Co Ltd (8508 JP)</a>. The largest increases in short notional over the week were <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nippon-steel-corporation" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:961:1">Nippon Steel Corporation (5401 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sumitomo-dainippon-pharma-co" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1935:1">Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co (4506 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cosmos-pharmaceutical-corp" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:3797:1">Cosmos Pharmaceutical (3349 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/gmo-payment-gateway-inc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1492:1">GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP)</a> while shorts were covered in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ricoh-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15359:1">Ricoh Co Ltd (7752 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sumco-corp" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:379:1">Sumco Corp (3436 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/m3-inc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13316:1">M3 Inc (2413 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rakuten-inc" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:31:1">Rakuten Inc (4755 JP)</a>.   <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/fast-retailing-co-ltd" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:751:1"></a>Sectorally, new short positions were built in Consumer Staples and Health Care, while shorts were covered in Communication Services, Information Technology and Consumer Discretionary.

The short notional in the market for the week ended 30 August is US$24.65bn with the largest short positions in Itochu Corp (8001 JP), Toyota Motor (7203 JP), Taiyo Yuden (6976 JP), Canon Inc (7751 JP),  and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial (8316 JP) . Most shorted stocks as a percentage of free float are Amazia, Taiyo Yuden (6976 JP), Leopalace21 Corp (8848 JP) and Extreme Co Ltd (6033 JP), while the stocks with the highest days to cover are Katakura Industries (3001 JP), Vital Ksk Holdings (3151 JP), Mirait Holdings (1417 JP) and J Trust Co Ltd (8508 JP). The largest increases in short notional over the week were Nippon Steel Corporation (5401 JP), Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co (4506 JP), Cosmos Pharmaceutical (3349 JP) and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) while shorts were covered in Ricoh Co Ltd (7752 JP), Sumco Corp (3436 JP), M3 Inc (2413 JP) and Rakuten Inc (4755 JP).   Sectorally, new short positions were built in Consumer Staples and Health Care, while shorts were covered in Communication Services, Information Technology and Consumer Discretionary.

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/686/original/2019-02-02_09-34-42.png?1549067763" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77686"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div><div style="text-align: left;" class="content-caption">
Note: The Results &amp; Revision Score is the average of our Results Score and Forecasts/Revision Score and is updated daily for each company and then cap-weighted-aggregated into Peer Groups, Sectors and the Market Composite. Both scores have a maximum of +30 and a minimum of -30 for each period. The Results Score is calculated quarterly, using the most recent eight quarters of company data for revenues, operating income and operating margin and measures the rate, degree and consistency of change for each metric. The Forecast/Revision Score is based on Annual and Interim period company forecasts and compares changes from previous forecasts as well as against the trailing twelve-month or previous first-half results, with annual forecasts being double-weighted.</div>DRIP, DRIP, DRIP - We 'lead' this fortnight's update with our All-Market Composite Results &amp; Revision Score. Calculated daily, the score is a 'real-time' measure of the state of, and the outlook for, listed Japanese corporations. As the scoring methodology includes earnings momentum 'factors', the data series can be a useful leading indicator of forward earnings. The correlation with the market over the last four years is 0.578, with the indicator leading more often than lagging.   Since peaking on 16th November 2017, the Results &amp; Revisions Score has fallen by 62% and has now returned to the level of May 2017. In the last ten years, the score has only been lower than at present one-third of the time - mostly during the fiscal year ended March 2017 when the total market value averaged ¥550t, close to the December 2018 low. If we are to repeat the relatively-mild cyclical downturn of 2016, the Results &amp; Revision Score will turn negative in May of this year, and the 25th December 2018 low will be retested.<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/701/original/2019-02-02_14-11-25.png?1549084295" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77701"></figure>Source: Japan Analytics
</div>PAST THE PEAK - Our earnings indicator peaked 14 months ago, two months ahead of the market's high point on 26th January 2018. It now appears that aggregate reported earnings, as well as aggregate company forecasts for the current year, are now turning decisively lower after nine quarters of uninterrupted growth. Forecast Net Income for the current year is now 7% below the high point in trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Net Income from this cycle, which was reached two months ago. Operating Income is, as usual, 'lagging' and forecasts are still marginally ahead of TTM. The TTM all-market price-earnings ratio reached 11.5 times on Christmas Day, which will prove to be the cycle low point. We expect the return to median levels, to be achieved more through lower 'E' as opposed to a higher 'P'.  Mr Market is currently implying that Japanese corporate profits are due to fall by 23% on average from the cycle peak, or by 30% if we are to revisit the December low-point. <figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/746/original/2019-02-03_07-23-31.png?1549146223" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77746"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>THE FIRST CUT - 23% of listed companies reported their most recent quarterly earnings results in the last two weeks. For these companies, TTM revenues grew by 5.1% year-on-year, but only by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter, the lowest qoq growth rate in over a year. TTM Operating Income is now 0.8% lower than the TTM total of one year ago and declined by 4.4% qoq. Operating margins fell by 49bps year-on-year.  Current forecasts for this group of companies imply 3.1% yoy top line growth, but only 0.3% compared to the quarter just declared. For Operating Income, the rates are -2.0% and 0.6%, reflecting the normal TTM-to-forecast 'lag'. Corporate Japan's profits are now rolling over and will be in a 'recession' by the fiscal year-end.  <figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/722/original/2019-02-02_18-25-46.png?1549099572" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77722"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>INTERREGNUM - Our bear market rally has paused to look at and digest the earnings-announcement news flow and will likely be trendless for the next few weeks as 'good' reactions offset 'bad'. In due course, we expect the preponderance of negative momentum to tip the scales.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/077/724/original/2019-02-02_18-41-12.png?1549100508" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="77724"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>TORAKU @110 - The Toraku advance-decline indicator has continued to recover and is within ten points of the overbought zone, which has only been breached once since the market peak of January 2018. This signal is 'amber' and could be 'red' by the end of next week. <div class="content-highlight">
OUTLOOK &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS
<ul>
<li>We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios.</li>
<li>The equity market decline at the end of last year was well in advance of the underlying trends in the economy and corporate profits; the recent 10% rally has corrected that imbalance. Nevertheless, the global cycle has turned down sharply, and many economies will be in a recession by the end of this quarter. We expect Japanese corporate earnings to follow suit.  </li>
<li>Although some of the coming decline in aggregate earnings has been well-discounted, our Results &amp; Revision Score has yet to turn negative. Accordingly, we expect the market to retest the December 2018 low, probably in May when the FY2020 forecasts are announced and our score starts 'seeing red'.</li>
<li>In the near term and despite the rally in the more cyclical sectors, we continue to favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short Banks and Non-Bank Finance.</li>
</ul>
</div>In the DETAIL section below, we will review Sector performance over the last two weeks, and, in addition to our regular roundup of results, revisions and stock performance including brief comments on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/3700" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:3700:1">Anritsu (6754 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/12001" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12001:1">Alps Alpine (6770 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/24540" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24540:1">SanBio (4592 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/454" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:454:1">Lixil (5938 JP)</a> (yes, again), <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/752" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:752:1">Fanuc (6954 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/219" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:219:1">Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP)</a> , and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/8197" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8197:1">Cyberagent (4751 JP)</a>.

Source: Japan Analytics
Note: The Results &amp; Revision Score is the average of our Results Score and Forecasts/Revision Score and is updated daily for each company and then cap-weighted-aggregated into Peer Groups, Sectors and the Market Composite. Both scores have a maximum of +30 and a minimum of -30 for each period. The Results Score is calculated quarterly, using the most recent eight quarters of company data for revenues, operating income and operating margin and measures the rate, degree and consistency of change for each metric. The Forecast/Revision Score is based on Annual and Interim period company forecasts and compares changes from previous forecasts as well as against the trailing twelve-month or previous first-half results, with annual forecasts being double-weighted.DRIP, DRIP, DRIP - We 'lead' this fortnight's update with our All-Market Composite Results &amp; Revision Score. Calculated daily, the score is a 'real-time' measure of the state of, and the outlook for, listed Japanese corporations. As the scoring methodology includes earnings momentum 'factors', the data series can be a useful leading indicator of forward earnings. The correlation with the market over the last four years is 0.578, with the indicator leading more often than lagging.   Since peaking on 16th November 2017, the Results &amp; Revisions Score has fallen by 62% and has now returned to the level of May 2017. In the last ten years, the score has only been lower than at present one-third of the time - mostly during the fiscal year ended March 2017 when the total market value averaged ¥550t, close to the December 2018 low. If we are to repeat the relatively-mild cyclical downturn of 2016, the Results &amp; Revision Score will turn negative in May of this year, and the 25th December 2018 low will be retested.
Source: Japan Analytics
PAST THE PEAK - Our earnings indicator peaked 14 months ago, two months ahead of the market's high point on 26th January 2018. It now appears that aggregate reported earnings, as well as aggregate company forecasts for the current year, are now turning decisively lower after nine quarters of uninterrupted growth. Forecast Net Income for the current year is now 7% below the high point in trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Net Income from this cycle, which was reached two months ago. Operating Income is, as usual, 'lagging' and forecasts are still marginally ahead of TTM. The TTM all-market price-earnings ratio reached 11.5 times on Christmas Day, which will prove to be the cycle low point. We expect the return to median levels, to be achieved more through lower 'E' as opposed to a higher 'P'.  Mr Market is currently implying that Japanese corporate profits are due to fall by 23% on average from the cycle peak, or by 30% if we are to revisit the December low-point. Source: Japan AnalyticsTHE FIRST CUT - 23% of listed companies reported their most recent quarterly earnings results in the last two weeks. For these companies, TTM revenues grew by 5.1% year-on-year, but only by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter, the lowest qoq growth rate in over a year. TTM Operating Income is now 0.8% lower than the TTM total of one year ago and declined by 4.4% qoq. Operating margins fell by 49bps year-on-year.  Current forecasts for this group of companies imply 3.1% yoy top line growth, but only 0.3% compared to the quarter just declared. For Operating Income, the rates are -2.0% and 0.6%, reflecting the normal TTM-to-forecast 'lag'. Corporate Japan's profits are now rolling over and will be in a 'recession' by the fiscal year-end.  Source: Japan AnalyticsINTERREGNUM - Our bear market rally has paused to look at and digest the earnings-announcement news flow and will likely be trendless for the next few weeks as 'good' reactions offset 'bad'. In due course, we expect the preponderance of negative momentum to tip the scales.Source: Japan AnalyticsTORAKU @110 - The Toraku advance-decline indicator has continued to recover and is within ten points of the overbought zone, which has only been breached once since the market peak of January 2018. This signal is 'amber' and could be 'red' by the end of next week. 
OUTLOOK &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS

We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios.
The equity market decline at the end of last year was well in advance of the underlying trends in the economy and corporate profits; the recent 10% rally has corrected that imbalance. Nevertheless, the global cycle has turned down sharply, and many economies will be in a recession by the end of this quarter. We expect Japanese corporate earnings to follow suit.  
Although some of the coming decline in aggregate earnings has been well-discounted, our Results &amp; Revision Score has yet to turn negative. Accordingly, we expect the market to retest the December 2018 low, probably in May when the FY2020 forecasts are announced and our score starts 'seeing red'.
In the near term and despite the rally in the more cyclical sectors, we continue to favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short Banks and Non-Bank Finance.

In the DETAIL section below, we will review Sector performance over the last two weeks, and, in addition to our regular roundup of results, revisions and stock performance including brief comments on Anritsu (6754 JP), Alps Alpine (6770 JP), SanBio (4592 JP), Lixil (5938 JP) (yes, again), Fanuc (6954 JP), Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) , and Cyberagent (4751 JP).

Japan Fortnightly Update: Drip, Drip, Drip...

Japan

Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co., Ltd. mainly manufactures and markets pharmaceuticals for human and veterinary use. The Company also produces and sells livestock feeds, food additives, and chemical products, as well as conducts clinical pathology tests for animals. Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma conducts businesses across worldwide.

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Sumitomo Pharma (4506 JP)

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