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Daily Consumer: Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations
  2. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich
  3. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?
  4. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando
  5. GUNKUL (GUNKUL TB): Solar to Drive Top-Line Growth

1. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations

Farmer

Prabhat Dairy Ltd’s quarterly result is in line with our expectation. In Q2 FY19, the company registered a growth of 8.53% YoY, EBITDA margin was 9.4% improving by 119 bps since the same period last year, EBITDA grew by 24.2% YOY; the profit margin was at 2.95%  improving by 60 bps YoY, Net Income grew by 35.86% YOY.  For more details about the company, please refer to our initiation report  Prabhat Dairy Ltd – An Emerging Star in the Indian Milky Way. B2B business contributed to 70% of revenue and the remaining 30% was driven by B2C business. Value Added Products contributed to 25% of revenue in Q2FY19.

The stock is trading at 16.3x its TTM EPS, 13.8x its FY19F EPS. Margins have improved over the past quarters due to lower cost of raw materials, we expect raw materials to continue to be lower than their historic average in short term. Lower cost of raw material along with the improving contribution from B2C will lead to higher margins in medium to long term. The company also wants to increase its B2C contribution aggressively from the current 30% to 50% by 2020.

We will monitor the stock closely to firm up our views further, albeit we remain positive on the long-term prospects of the company.

2. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich

Share%20price%2027 12 2018

Swaraj Engines (SWE IN) (SEL)is primarily manufacturing diesel engines for fitment into Swaraj tractors manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (M&M). The Company is also supplying engine components to SML Isuzu Ltd used in the assembly of commercial vehicle engines. SEL was started as a joint venture between Punjab Tractor Ltd (now acquired by M&M Ltd) and Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. M&M holds 33.3% stake in SEL and is its key client.  

We are positive about the business because:

  • SEL’s growth is correlated with M&M’s tractor business growth. SEL supplies engines to the Swaraj division of M&M. M&M expects tractor growth to be around 12% YoY in FY19E. We forecast SEL’s tractor engine volumes will grow at a CAGR of 12% for FY18-21E.
  • The growth of the company is dependent on the monsoon and rural sentiments. We expect the profitability to improve with normal rainfall and government initiatives towards the rural sector. We expect the revenue/ EBITDA/ PAT CAGR for FY18-21E to be 14%/ 15%/ 14% respectively.
  • SEL is debt free and a cash generating company. It has a healthy and stable ROCE and ROE. SEL has increased its capacity from 75,000 engines in FY16 to 120,000 engines in FY18. We expect the capacity utilisation to reach 97% by FY20E from 90% in 1HFY19. SEL funds its capex through internal accruals. We forecast a capex of Rs 600 mn for FY19E to FY21E considering the requirement of the additional capacity, R&D and testing costs for new and higher HP engines & for upgradation of engines according to the TREM IV emission norms for >50 HP engines.

We initiate coverage on SEL with a fair value objective of Rs 1,655/- over the next 12 months. This represents a potential upside of 15% from the closing price of Rs 1,435/- (as on 26-12-2018). We arrive at the fair value by applying PE multiple of 18x to EPS of Rs 87/- to the year ending December-20E and add cash of Rs 82/- per share. While the business outlook is good, we think the upside in the share price is limited due to rich valuation.

Particulars (Rs mn) (Y/E March)

FY18

FY19E

FY20E

FY21E

Revenue

 7,712

 9,210

 10,478

 11,525

PAT

 801

 906

 1,063

 1,190

EPS (Rs)

 64.5

 74.8

 87.6

 98.1

PE (x)

 22.3

 19.2

 16.4

 14.6

Source: SEL Annual Report FY18, Trivikram Consultants Research as on 26-12-2018

Note: E= Estimates

3. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

Gpa2

Source: Japan Analytics

THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.

  • VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
  • ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
  • CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.

OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.

CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 

RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.

In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-

I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP

  • BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
  • BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL

III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS

IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE

V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT

  • VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
  • VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME

CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.

4. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando

2

  • Halla Holdings is falling nearly 5% today. Holdco said it’d give a ₩2,000 div per share. This is about 4.5% div yield at yesterday’s closing price. 5% drop today shouldn’t be much as an ex-dividend date price drop. Mando fell 5%. Mando was oversold relative to the other local auto stocks, particularly to Halla Holdings. They are still close to +1 σ on a 20D MA.
  • Mando-Hella Elec has been another reason behind Holdco’s valuation divergence against Mando lately. I believe Mando-Hella is being overhyped. Mando-Hella-caused divergence should no longer be effective. I expect ‘downwardly’ mean reversion from now on. I’d go short Holdco and long Mando at this point.

5. GUNKUL (GUNKUL TB): Solar to Drive Top-Line Growth

  • Good payout ratio, good growth in core profit, and strong long-term sales growth relative to its sector
  • Acquisition of 49% stake in a 30MW solar farm in Malaysia with a commercial operation date (COD) set for 1Q20 to support revenue growth
  • High volume of solar rooftop installation projects planned for Charoen Pokphand Foods Pub (CPF TB) and other private firms to boost GUNKUL’s construction revenue
  • Attractive at 19CE* PEG ratio of 0.5 relative to ASEAN Industry at 1.6
  • Risk: Lower than expected electricity demand, unfavorable weather conditions

* Consensus Estimates

Daily Consumer: Last Week in Event SPACE: Familymart, Takeda, Harbin Electric, Motherson, Young Poong, NTT and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Familymart, Takeda, Harbin Electric, Motherson, Young Poong, NTT

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Familymart, Takeda, Harbin Electric, Motherson, Young Poong, NTT

22%20dec%20%202018

Last Week in Event SPACE …

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

M&A – ASIA-PAC

Recapping the original plan: when Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP) (“FM”) sold the remaining 60% of UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (DQ), it entered into an agreement to buy 20+% in DQ, for one of two reasons; 1) a company wants to prove to the employees of a division being sold that they are maintaining a watchful eye over them, or (as is now evident) 2) the buyer wants to gain an equity method affiliate and the income from it (including the placeholder for frontrunner status to future capital events). 

  • FM launched a Partial Tender Offer at a 20% premium to last in order to buy these shares, and in the MOU to launch the tender offer there was a clause which said that if FM did not reach the full 20%, it had made arrangements to borrow shares in order to get to 20% of the voting rights. And if FM did not manage to get to the full 20%, there was an agreement between DQ which allowed FM to buy shares in the market to get to a 20% (but not larger) position. 
    • If FM managed to get the shares, it was going to buy from the weak hands.  Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. DQ is still growing, and with UNY, DQ may grow faster than previously expected. The upshot is that everyone decided they’d stand pat – FM got nothing in the tender (0.08% of the total desired).
  • Shares in DQ could fall because of a lack of hard strategy announced by FM to buy all the shares at a higher price immediately. That shouldn’t be a big worry – it wasn’t going to happen.
  • Travis Lundy sees DQ having a performance skew which includes a “cushion of sorts” in the ¥5500-6600/share zone where he would expect FM to acquire shares. He does not see a cushion for the shares of FM, and expects them to be volatile. 

(link to Travis’ insight: FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat)  


Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) (Mkt Cap: $546mn; Liquidity: $0.4mn)

Power generation equipment manufacturer Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) is currently suspended pursuant to Hong Kong’s Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs, suggesting a privatisation offer from parent Harbin Electric Corporation (“HEC”) is pending. As HE is PRC incorporated, a privatisation by way of a merger by absorption may be proposed, similar to Advanced Semiconductor Mfg Corp Ltd. (3355 HK) as discussed in ASMC’s Merger By Absorption. 

  • It is possible this suspension is not in relation to a takeover, but a major sale of assets, for example, from the parent to the sub. This would make sense given the recent share purchase by HEC (completed in January this year), and the fact HE is playing catch-up to Dongfang Electric Corporation (1072 HK) Shanghai Electric Group Company (2727 HK). Arguably, launching a takeover shortly after subscribing for more shares is unusual.  Then again, when the two SOE railway behemoths CNR and CSR merged in 2015, a merger was disputed (at the time) when both were suspended on account of the fact CNR was only listed (on the HK exchange) in 2Q14.
  • HE has perennially traded at discount to net cash. As at its last traded price, the discount to net cash (using the 2018 interim figure of HK$12.4bn, or HK$7.27/share) was 65%.
  • “Fair” pricing to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on PER. I simply don’t see this happening. And if it doesn’t, the fiduciary duty of independent directors will be tested/scrutinised if they recommend an offer to shareholders at any price less than the net cash/share of the company.

(link to my insight: Harbin Electric Expected To Be Privatised)  


Motherson Sumi Systems (MSS IN) (Mkt Cap: $7.7bn; Liquidity: $1.6mn)

Reportedly Motherson has entered merger/acquisition talks with Leoni AG (LEO GR), a leading provider of cables and cable systems for the automotive sector and other industries. Motherson has made four acquisitions so far in this business segment with the latest being PKC in 2017.

  • Motherson has always aimed at strengthening this business area internationally, therefore the news about a merger with Leoni comes as no surprise and was mentioned as a potential acquisition target in LightStream Research‘s earlier insight Two More Acquisitions on the Way for Motherson Sumi
  • Motherson has a strong balance sheet that could support this acquisition, although its ability to make further acquisitions in the short-to-medium term may be hampered – Leoni would be at the higher end of the price range for recent acquisitions. Should the acquisition go through, the company will be very well positioned to reach its US$18bn revenue target by 2020E, given that the combined revenue for FY2017 alone is ~US$13bn.
  • Currently, Motherson is trading at an FY1 EV/EBITDA of 10x, slightly above peers such as Mahindra Cie Automotive (MACA IN) (9x) and below peers such as Bosch Ltd (BOS IN) (25x). If the deal goes through, Motherson’s FY1 EV/EBITDA of ~12x would be at a slight premium to local players, but still reasonable compared to international players. 

(link to Aqila Ali ‘s insight: Motherson In Merger Talks with One of Our Previously Short-Listed Candidates – Leoni)  


MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts reduced its indicative offer to $3.40 from $3.77 on Thursday after sifting through MYOB’s books, with MYOB announcing:

Following completion of due diligence and finalisation of debt funding commitments, KKR has revised the offer price to $3.40 per share. …  The board has informed KKR that it is not in a position to recommend the revised proposal, however it remains in discussions with KKR regarding its proposal. (my emphasis)

(link to my insight: Friday Deadline Looms As MYOB Snubs KKR’s Reduced Offer)

EVENTS

NTT (Nippon Telegraph & Telephone) (9432 JP) (Mkt Cap: $75bn; Liquidity: $181mn)

The Nikkei carried an article noting that the Japanese government’s FY2019 budget currently being formed proposes a sale of ¥160bn of shares in NTT to help fund any revenue impact from the upcoming consumption tax rate hike from 8% to 10% next October. The article helpfully notes that they plan on selling when NTT is buying back shares. One of the longstanding features of buybacks for NTT is that NTT is subject to the NTT Law which requires (for the moment) that the government hold at least one-third of the shares outstanding in NTT.

  • Travis estimates NTT has ~1.95bn shares outstanding, or ~1.917bn shares outstanding ex-Treasury shares, after recent buybacks. If NTT cancelled the shares it has bought back prior to buying back shares from the government, this would allow NTT to buy back 59mm shares from the government (assuming those shares are also cancelled). If it did not, it would mean NTT could only buy back about 42-43mm shares. 59mm shares backs out ¥250bn; 43mm shares at a 10% discount would be  ¥180bn. That means there is about 10% leeway in stock price to buy ¥160bn from the government IF shares repurchased under the current buyback are not cancelled.
  • But that also means that there would be no more buybacks from the government after that until the company buys back more shares from the market. If the company wanted to buy back another ¥200bn from the government, ceteris paribus it would have to buy back something like ¥400-450bn first from the market in order to reduce the denominator. Travis concludes there is still more on-market buying to do.
  • At an NTT/ NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) ratio of 1.80x, buybacks coming, expected ongoing strong dividend policy (and lots of headroom to do so, unlike perhaps Softbank Corp (9434 JP)), and investor suspicion of what comes next for Docomo, NTT is the home of the cashflow.

(link to Travis’ insight: NTT Buybacks Will Roll On)  


Takeda Pharmaceutical (4502 JP) Softbank Corp (9434 JP)

The IPO of Softbank Corp and the Merger of Takeda and Shire Pharmaceuticals create significant changes in TOPIX, MSCI, and FTSE because of the addition of roughly ¥5tn of “new” market capitalization in major Japan indices. Pure passive investors have something like ¥1.35tn of Softbank Corp and Takeda Pharmaceutical to buy.

  • However, after Travis’ initial note (Softbank Corp, Takeda, and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion), TSE unhelpfully changed their mind on timing (for Takeda) based on an unhelpful change by the LSE. With the changes at FTSE and now TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400, we no longer have quite the same clarity of forces on the bodies, and therefore less clarity on the resulting motion. The LSE’s announced market change appears to have led the MSCI to change its deletion date for Shire as well, now also (along with FTSE) deleting Shire at the close of the 21st. The new schedule is:
    Index DeletionShire
    (shs mm)
    Index InclusionTakeda
    (shs mm)
    Index Effect
    (US$ bn)
    Net Delta
    (US$bn)
    21 DecMSCI -50MSCI JP+75– $0.3bn+$1.3bn
    21 DecFTSE UK, All-Share,-100-130FTSE JP+15-$5.2bn+– $2.1bn

    rest of December – end of a pretty bad year for hedge funds, but illiquid

    all of January

    30 JanTOPIX-$1.9bnTOPIX, JPXN400

    +60

    +$2.1bn+$2.1bn
    30 JanTOPIX-$3.5bnTOPIXSoftbank+$3.5bn+$3.5bn
    all of February
    27 FebTOPIX, JPXN400+60+$2.1bn+$2.1bn
  • It doesn’t change the amounts but a lot more time allows for more risk and preparation and there will no longer be any potential settlement issues on the TOPIX side. There is still the same amount of Takeda to buy in TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400. 
  • In principle, Travis would want to be long Takeda at the close of the year of 2018, but given the LSE and TSE changes there is less support to give and the payoff is substantially more distant. 

links to Travis’ insights
Softbank Corp, Takeda, and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion
Takeda: Move Over Newton! Now It’s Spooky Action At a Distance


Dic Corp (4631 JP) (Mkt Cap: $2.8bn; Liquidity: $15mn)

Speciality steel maker Nisshin Steel (5413 JP) is slated to merge with parent company Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal (5401 JP) as of January 1, 2019. For that, Nisshin Steel will be delisted on December 26th (i.e. the last day of trading is the 25th) and that means the Nikkei Inc was obliged to choose a replacement for Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei 225 and other indices. On December 11th, the Nikkei Inc announced Itoham Yonekyu Holdings Inc (2296 JP) would take Nisshin’s place in the Nikkei 500 Index; announced that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would join the Nikkei 300 Index; and announced that Dic Corp (4631 JP) would replace Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei Stock Average, better known as the Nikkei 225.

  • Nisshin Steel’s deletion is a nothing-burger. 
  • The possibility of a DIC addition was well-flagged as early as May when sell-side brokers started compiling Annual and Ad Hoc Review lists for the Nikkei 225 changes to come in September and as a result of the Nisshin Steel merger. Travis would rather be long DIC than short DIC through the close of December 21st or probably December 25th. 

(link to Travis’ insight: Small Potatoes Nikkei 225 Changes on Christmas Day)

STUBS/HOLDCOS

Young Poong (000670 KS) / Korea Zinc (010130 KS)

YP appeared “cheap” back in April when I last discussed this Holdco, and is now cheaper, with its holding in KZ accounting for near-on 200% of its market cap.  I can’t think of any other parent/subsidiary relationship – one which is essentially a single stock structure – with such a deep discount. Especially one where the stub ops operate in a similar space to that of the listed holding. 

  • On the negative front, an investigation into YP’s Seokpo zinc smelter remains ongoing on account of perceived environmental transgressions. The Seokpo smelter is located in a national park on the Nakdong river. Wastewater containing above-legal limits of certain chemicals (fluoride and selenium) allegedly flowed downstream to residents, who are heavily reliant on this water.
  • YP’s stub and KZ are in the same business, but there are differences. YP does not have a balanced product mix as KZ does, with around 84% of its revenue coming from zinc-related production (for the 9M18 period), compared to 42.5% (on a revenue basis) for KZ, followed by lead (20.4%), silver (20.2%), and gold (7.6%).
  • However, YP and KZ remain inextricably intertwined and the current discount is unjustifiably steep. Just that YP’s liquidity, uncertainty on Seokpo, and lack of a near-term catalyst make for a difficult stub set-up.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Young Poong Blows Out, Again)  


Softbank Group (9984 JP) / Softbank Corp (9434 JP)

A forgettable trading debut for Japan’s largest-ever IPO, with Softbank Corp, closing at ¥1,282/share, down from the IPO price of ¥1,500, and closing at ¥1,316/share on Friday, the same day as its FTSE inclusion.

TOPIX INCLUSIONS!

With seven stocks promoted/reassigned from TSE2, MOTHERS, and JASDAQ in November 2018 leading to the same seven stocks being included in TOPIX at the end of December, Travis tested 340+ TOPIX inclusions over the past five years to see what really happens around TOPIX inclusions?

  • If you own all but the smallest stocks (with a market cap of less than ¥15bn), odds are that, ON AVERAGE, they will underperform TOPIX from inclusion date or the day after, for many months.
  • The larger the market cap, the more marked the AVERAGE underperformance immediately following inclusion. 
  • For names in the ¥25-50bn sweet spot of “large enough to be “small cap” with somebody paying attention to it”, outperformance vs underperformance in the next 10 days is a 47/53 proposition. That is a bigger risk. It may be data-idiosyncratic, but it is not clear.
  • In the case of the 7 names going into TOPIX at month-end this month, the averages would suggest one could still be long the four largest (at the time of Travis’ insight), but one would not want to be long the others; and one could sell long positions in all the names as of the close of the 27th or 28th and have it be an ex-ante expected net positive outcome vs TOPIX over the following 10-60 trading days.

(link to Travis’ insight: Historical TOPIX Inclusions:  How Do They Do Around Inclusion Date?)

SHARE CLASSIFICATIONS

Ke Yan, CFA, FRM provided an update on the HK Connect/southbound flow. Fullshare Holdings (607 HK)Shandong Gold Mining Co Ltd (1787 HK) and Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) (2196 HK) rounded out the top three inflows relative to their free float in the past seven days.  Shandong Gold remained in the top inflow list for the third consecutive week. Top outflows relative to the free float are Wuxi Biologics (Cayman) Inc (2269 HK), China Southern Airlines (1055 HK) and Sino Biopharmaceutical (1177 HK)

(link to Ke Yan’s insight: Discover HK Connect: Mainlanders Are Buying Shandong Gold, and Pharmaceuticals (2018-12-17))  


Briefly …

OTHER M&A UPDATES

  • LCY Chemical Corp (1704 TT).  MOEA (Ministry of Economic Affairs) approval has now been received and LCY has applied for the delisting from the TWSE. The last trading day is the 23 Jan 2019 and the stock delists on the 30 Jan.  The settlement is expected to take place mid-Feb.
  • Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). In an ASX announcement on Friday Brookfield said: “based on its enquiries and financing discussions to date, it has no reason to believe it will not be willing and able to proceed with the proposal“. The exclusivity provisions have been extended to 18 January. Separately, Healthscope has also received correspondence from the BGH-AustralianSuper Consortium that it has indicated it is able to commence due diligence immediately. HSO’s board stated it will consider the correspondence. These are both positive developments.

CCASS

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

Name

% change

Into

Out of

Comment

11.53%
CMBC
China Sec
37.50%
Kingston
Outside CCASS
17.24%
UBS
Outside CCASS
Source: HKEx

Daily Consumer: Hyosung Holdings: 10%p Drop in Discount to NAV Should Be Reverted Soon and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. Hyosung Holdings: 10%p Drop in Discount to NAV Should Be Reverted Soon
  2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings
  3. Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer
  4. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations
  5. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich

1. Hyosung Holdings: 10%p Drop in Discount to NAV Should Be Reverted Soon

1

  • Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) had fallen 16% just in two days. Holdco is now at a 50% discount to NAV. This is a 10%p drop from 10 days ago (Dec 19). Holdco price must have been overly corrected. The ongoing police investigation on Cho Hyun-joon’s alleged crime won’t lead to a delisting. 10%p drop in discount to NAV must be a price divergence, not a sensible price correction.
  • Trade volume remained steady. Local hedge funds led the selling on Dec 27. Even they changed their position the following day. No short selling spike has been seen either. Hyosung is one of the highest yielding div holdco stocks. Hyosung Capital liquidation and Anyang Plant revaluation would be another short-term plus.
  • I’d exploit this price divergence. It would soon revert to the Dec 19 discount level. It should at least stay at the peer average.

2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings

Spins

Last Week in Event SPACE …

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

M&A – ASIA-PAC

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) (Mkt Cap: $546mn; Liquidity: $0.4mn)

As previously discussed in Harbin Electric Expected To Be Privatised, Harbin Electric (HE) has now announced a privatisation Offer from parent and 60.41%-shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (“HEC”) by way of a merger by absorption. The Offer price of $4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close, is bang in line with that paid by HEC in January this year for new domestic shares. The Offer price has been declared final. 

  • Of note, the Offer price is a 37% discount to HE’s net cash of $7.27/share as at 30 June 2018. Should the privatisation be successful, this Offer will cost HEC ~HK$3.08bn, following which it can pocket the remaining net cash of $9.3bn PLUS the power generation equipment manufacturer business thrown in for free.
  • On pricing, “fair” to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. That is not happening. It will be difficult to see how independent directors (and the IFA) can justify recommending an Offer to shareholders at any price below the net cash/share, especially when the underlying business is profit-generating.
  • Dissension rights are available, however, there is no administrative guidance on the substantive as well as procedural rules as to how the “fair price” will be determined under PRC and HK Law.
  • Trading at a gross/annualised spread of 15%/28% assuming end-July completion, based on the average timeline for merger by absorption precedents. As HEC is only waiting for approval from independent H-shareholders suggests this transaction may complete earlier than precedents. 

(link to my insight: Harbin Electric: The Price Is Not Right)  


MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

KKR and MYOB entered into Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) at $3.40/share, valuing MYOB, on a market cap basis, at A$2bn. MYOB’s board unanimously recommends shareholders to vote in favour of the Offer, in the absence of a superior proposal. The Offer price assumes no full-year dividend is paid.

  • On balance, MYOB’s board has made the right decision to accept KKR’s reduced Offer. The argument that MYOB is a “known turnaround story” is challenged as cloud-based accounting software providers Xero Ltd (XRO AU)  and Intuit Inc (INTU US) grab market share. This is also reflected in MYOB’s forecast 7% revenue growth in FY18 and follows a 10% decline in first-half profit, despite a 61% jump in online subscribers.
  • And there is justification for KKR’s lowering the Offer price: the ASX is down 10% since KKR’s initial tilt, the ASX technology index is off by ~14%, a basket of listed Aussie peers are down 17%, while Xero, the most comparable peer, is down ~20%. The Scheme Offer is at a ~27% premium to the estimated adjusted (for the ASX index) downside price of $2.68/share.
  • Bain was okay selling at $3.15/share to KKR and will be fine selling its remaining ~6.5% stake at $3.40. Presumably, MYOB sounded out the other major shareholders such as Fidelity, Yarra Funds Management, Vanguard etc as to their read on the revised $3.40 offer, before agreeing to the SIA with KKR.

  • If the markets avoid further declines, this deal will probably get up. If the markets rebound, the outcome is less assured. This Tuesday marks the beginning of a new year and a renewed mandate for investors to take risk, especially an agreed deal; but the current 5.3% annualised spread is tight.

(link to my insight: MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer)


TMB Bank PCL (TMB TB) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

The Ministry of Finance, the major shareholder of TMB, confirmed that both Krung Thai Bank Pub (KTB TB) and Thanachart Capital (TCAP TB) had engaged in merger talks with TMB. Considering an earlier KTB/TMB courtship failed, it is more likely, but by no means guaranteed, that the deal with Thanachart will happen. Bloomberg is also reporting that Thanachart and TMB want to do a deal before the next elections, which is less than two months away.

  • TMB is much bigger than Thanachart and therefore it may boil down to whether TMB wants to be the target or acquirer. In Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA‘s view, a deal with Thanachart would leave TMB as the acquirer rather than the target. But Thanachart’s management has a better track record than TMB.
  • Both banks have undergone extensive deals before this one: 1) TMB acquired DBS Thai Danu and IFCT; and 2) Thanachart engineered an acquisition of the much bigger, but struggling, SCIB.
  • A merger between the two would still leave them smaller than Bank Of Ayudhya (BAY TB) and would not change the bank rankings; but it would give TMB a bigger presence in asset management, hire-purchase finance and a re-entry into the securities business.

(link to Athaporn’s insight: Sathorn Series M: TMB-Thanachart Courtship)  

STUBS/HOLDCOS

Halla Holdings (060980 KS) / Mando Corp (204320 KS)

Mando accounts for 45% of Halla’s NAV, which is currently trading at a 50% discount. Sanghyun Park believes the recent narrowing in the discount may be due to the hype attached to Mando-Hella Elec, which he believes is overdone; and recommends a short Holdco and long Mando. Using Sanghyun’s figures, I see the discount to NAV at 51%, 2STD above the 12-month average of ~47%.

(link to Sanghyun’s insight: Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando)  

SHARE CLASSIFICATIONS

OTHER M&A UPDATES

CCASS

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

Name

% change

Into

Out of

Comment

Putian Communication (1720 HK)
69.75%
Shanghai Pudong
Outside CCASS
37.68%
China Industrial
Outside CCASS
16.23%
HSBC
Outside CCASS
Source: HKEx

3. Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer

Picture1

Hotel Properties (HPL SP)  (“HPL”) announced on Friday evening a significant change in its shareholdings relating to the HPL shares owned by 68 Holdings Pte Ltd. 

The restructuring of shareholding did not come as a surprise and was within expectations. 

Now, Wheelock holds only a significant minority interest of 22.53% and without a board seat in HPL. Wheelock’s influence in HPL has been reduced significantly. Without control, Wheelock’s investment in HPL is as good as any other non-strategic investment in quoted securities.

In the event that Wheelock Properties decides to sell its HPL shares, Mr Ong will be a likely buyer of the HPL shares. This will present a very good opportunity for Mr Ong to successfully privatise and delist HPL.

4. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations

Prabhat%20share%20holding%20pattern%20q2fy19

Prabhat Dairy Ltd’s quarterly result is in line with our expectation. In Q2 FY19, the company registered a growth of 8.53% YoY, EBITDA margin was 9.4% improving by 119 bps since the same period last year, EBITDA grew by 24.2% YOY; the profit margin was at 2.95%  improving by 60 bps YoY, Net Income grew by 35.86% YOY.  For more details about the company, please refer to our initiation report  Prabhat Dairy Ltd – An Emerging Star in the Indian Milky Way. B2B business contributed to 70% of revenue and the remaining 30% was driven by B2C business. Value Added Products contributed to 25% of revenue in Q2FY19.

The stock is trading at 16.3x its TTM EPS, 13.8x its FY19F EPS. Margins have improved over the past quarters due to lower cost of raw materials, we expect raw materials to continue to be lower than their historic average in short term. Lower cost of raw material along with the improving contribution from B2C will lead to higher margins in medium to long term. The company also wants to increase its B2C contribution aggressively from the current 30% to 50% by 2020.

We will monitor the stock closely to firm up our views further, albeit we remain positive on the long-term prospects of the company.

5. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich

Share%20price%2027 12 2018

Swaraj Engines (SWE IN) (SEL)is primarily manufacturing diesel engines for fitment into Swaraj tractors manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (M&M). The Company is also supplying engine components to SML Isuzu Ltd used in the assembly of commercial vehicle engines. SEL was started as a joint venture between Punjab Tractor Ltd (now acquired by M&M Ltd) and Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. M&M holds 33.3% stake in SEL and is its key client.  

We are positive about the business because:

  • SEL’s growth is correlated with M&M’s tractor business growth. SEL supplies engines to the Swaraj division of M&M. M&M expects tractor growth to be around 12% YoY in FY19E. We forecast SEL’s tractor engine volumes will grow at a CAGR of 12% for FY18-21E.
  • The growth of the company is dependent on the monsoon and rural sentiments. We expect the profitability to improve with normal rainfall and government initiatives towards the rural sector. We expect the revenue/ EBITDA/ PAT CAGR for FY18-21E to be 14%/ 15%/ 14% respectively.
  • SEL is debt free and a cash generating company. It has a healthy and stable ROCE and ROE. SEL has increased its capacity from 75,000 engines in FY16 to 120,000 engines in FY18. We expect the capacity utilisation to reach 97% by FY20E from 90% in 1HFY19. SEL funds its capex through internal accruals. We forecast a capex of Rs 600 mn for FY19E to FY21E considering the requirement of the additional capacity, R&D and testing costs for new and higher HP engines & for upgradation of engines according to the TREM IV emission norms for >50 HP engines.

We initiate coverage on SEL with a fair value objective of Rs 1,655/- over the next 12 months. This represents a potential upside of 15% from the closing price of Rs 1,435/- (as on 26-12-2018). We arrive at the fair value by applying PE multiple of 18x to EPS of Rs 87/- to the year ending December-20E and add cash of Rs 82/- per share. While the business outlook is good, we think the upside in the share price is limited due to rich valuation.

Particulars (Rs mn) (Y/E March)

FY18

FY19E

FY20E

FY21E

Revenue

 7,712

 9,210

 10,478

 11,525

PAT

 801

 906

 1,063

 1,190

EPS (Rs)

 64.5

 74.8

 87.6

 98.1

PE (x)

 22.3

 19.2

 16.4

 14.6

Source: SEL Annual Report FY18, Trivikram Consultants Research as on 26-12-2018

Note: E= Estimates

Daily Consumer: COM7 (COM7 TB): Acquisition to Support Aggressive Expansion and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. COM7 (COM7 TB): Acquisition to Support Aggressive Expansion
  2. TRACKING TRAFFIC/Chinese Express & Logistics: Parcel Pricing Weak, Again
  3. Last Week in Event SPACE: Familymart, Takeda, Harbin Electric, Motherson, Young Poong, NTT
  4. EM Relative Strength Is Bottoming: Overweight

1. COM7 (COM7 TB): Acquisition to Support Aggressive Expansion

  • Improving asset turnover, good risk adjusted price momentum, and relatively strong analyst recommendations relative to its sector
  • Larger distribution channel through acquisition of DNA Retail Link to add 95 more stores to current 518 stores
  • New mobile product launches in 4Q18 and COM7’s focus on high margin products, such as Android smartphones, should support high earnings growth which was up 56% YoY in 3Q18
  • Attractive at a 19CE* PEG of 0.9 versus ASEAN sector at a PEG of 2.7
  • Risks: Lower-than-expected demand for new IT products, slower-than-expected store expansions

* Consensus Estimates

2. TRACKING TRAFFIC/Chinese Express & Logistics: Parcel Pricing Weak, Again

Nov main exp

Tracking Traffic/Chinese Express & Logistics is the hub for our research on China’s express parcels and logistics sectors. Tracking Traffic/Chinese Express & Logistics features analysis of monthly Chinese express and logistics data, notes from our conversations with industry players, and links to company and thematic notes. 

This month’s issue covers the following topics:

  1. November express parcel pricing remained weak. Average pricing per express parcel fell by 7.8% Y/Y to just 11.06 RMB per piece. November’s average price represents a new all-time low for the industry, and November’s Y/Y decline was the steepest monthly decline in over two years (excluding Lunar New Year months, which tend to be distorted by the timing of the holiday).
  2. Express parcel revenue growth dipped below 15% last month. Weak per-parcel pricing pulled express sector Y/Y revenue growth down to just 14.6% in November, the worst on record (again excluding distorted Lunar New Year comparisons). Chinese e-commerce demand has slowed and we suspect ‘O2O’ initiatives, under which online purchases are fulfilled via local stores, are also undermining express demand growth. 
  3. Intra-city pricing (ie, local delivery) remains firm relative to inter-city. Relative to weak inter-city express pricing (where ZTO Express (ZTO US) and the other listed express companies compete), pricing for local, intra-city express deliveries remained firm. In the first 11 months of 2018, express pricing rose 1.7% Y/Y versus a -2.9% decline in inter-city shipments (international pricing fell sharply, -14.5% Y/Y). Relatively firm pricing on local shipments may make it hard for local food delivery companies like Meituan Dianping (3690 HK) and Alibaba Group Holding (BABA US) ‘s ele.me to beat down unit operating costs. 
  4. Underlying domestic transport demand held up well again in November. Although demand for speedy, relatively expensive express service (and air freight) appears to be moderating, demand for rail and highway freight transport has held up well. The relative strength of rail and water transport (slow, cheap, industry-facing) versus express and air freight (fast, expensive, consumer-oriented) suggests a couple of things: a) upstream industrial activity is stronger than downstream retail activity and b) the people in charge of paying freight are shifting to cheaper modes of transport when possible.

We retain a negative view of China’s express industry’s fundamentals: demand growth is slowing and pricing appears to be falling faster than costs can be cut. Overall domestic transportation demand, however, remains solid and shows no signs of slowing. 

3. Last Week in Event SPACE: Familymart, Takeda, Harbin Electric, Motherson, Young Poong, NTT

22%20dec%20%202018

Last Week in Event SPACE …

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

M&A – ASIA-PAC

Recapping the original plan: when Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP) (“FM”) sold the remaining 60% of UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (DQ), it entered into an agreement to buy 20+% in DQ, for one of two reasons; 1) a company wants to prove to the employees of a division being sold that they are maintaining a watchful eye over them, or (as is now evident) 2) the buyer wants to gain an equity method affiliate and the income from it (including the placeholder for frontrunner status to future capital events). 

  • FM launched a Partial Tender Offer at a 20% premium to last in order to buy these shares, and in the MOU to launch the tender offer there was a clause which said that if FM did not reach the full 20%, it had made arrangements to borrow shares in order to get to 20% of the voting rights. And if FM did not manage to get to the full 20%, there was an agreement between DQ which allowed FM to buy shares in the market to get to a 20% (but not larger) position. 
    • If FM managed to get the shares, it was going to buy from the weak hands.  Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. DQ is still growing, and with UNY, DQ may grow faster than previously expected. The upshot is that everyone decided they’d stand pat – FM got nothing in the tender (0.08% of the total desired).
  • Shares in DQ could fall because of a lack of hard strategy announced by FM to buy all the shares at a higher price immediately. That shouldn’t be a big worry – it wasn’t going to happen.
  • Travis Lundy sees DQ having a performance skew which includes a “cushion of sorts” in the ¥5500-6600/share zone where he would expect FM to acquire shares. He does not see a cushion for the shares of FM, and expects them to be volatile. 

(link to Travis’ insight: FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat)  


Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) (Mkt Cap: $546mn; Liquidity: $0.4mn)

Power generation equipment manufacturer Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) is currently suspended pursuant to Hong Kong’s Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-backs, suggesting a privatisation offer from parent Harbin Electric Corporation (“HEC”) is pending. As HE is PRC incorporated, a privatisation by way of a merger by absorption may be proposed, similar to Advanced Semiconductor Mfg Corp Ltd. (3355 HK) as discussed in ASMC’s Merger By Absorption. 

  • It is possible this suspension is not in relation to a takeover, but a major sale of assets, for example, from the parent to the sub. This would make sense given the recent share purchase by HEC (completed in January this year), and the fact HE is playing catch-up to Dongfang Electric Corporation (1072 HK) Shanghai Electric Group Company (2727 HK). Arguably, launching a takeover shortly after subscribing for more shares is unusual.  Then again, when the two SOE railway behemoths CNR and CSR merged in 2015, a merger was disputed (at the time) when both were suspended on account of the fact CNR was only listed (on the HK exchange) in 2Q14.
  • HE has perennially traded at discount to net cash. As at its last traded price, the discount to net cash (using the 2018 interim figure of HK$12.4bn, or HK$7.27/share) was 65%.
  • “Fair” pricing to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on PER. I simply don’t see this happening. And if it doesn’t, the fiduciary duty of independent directors will be tested/scrutinised if they recommend an offer to shareholders at any price less than the net cash/share of the company.

(link to my insight: Harbin Electric Expected To Be Privatised)  


Motherson Sumi Systems (MSS IN) (Mkt Cap: $7.7bn; Liquidity: $1.6mn)

Reportedly Motherson has entered merger/acquisition talks with Leoni AG (LEO GR), a leading provider of cables and cable systems for the automotive sector and other industries. Motherson has made four acquisitions so far in this business segment with the latest being PKC in 2017.

  • Motherson has always aimed at strengthening this business area internationally, therefore the news about a merger with Leoni comes as no surprise and was mentioned as a potential acquisition target in LightStream Research‘s earlier insight Two More Acquisitions on the Way for Motherson Sumi
  • Motherson has a strong balance sheet that could support this acquisition, although its ability to make further acquisitions in the short-to-medium term may be hampered – Leoni would be at the higher end of the price range for recent acquisitions. Should the acquisition go through, the company will be very well positioned to reach its US$18bn revenue target by 2020E, given that the combined revenue for FY2017 alone is ~US$13bn.
  • Currently, Motherson is trading at an FY1 EV/EBITDA of 10x, slightly above peers such as Mahindra Cie Automotive (MACA IN) (9x) and below peers such as Bosch Ltd (BOS IN) (25x). If the deal goes through, Motherson’s FY1 EV/EBITDA of ~12x would be at a slight premium to local players, but still reasonable compared to international players. 

(link to Aqila Ali ‘s insight: Motherson In Merger Talks with One of Our Previously Short-Listed Candidates – Leoni)  


MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts reduced its indicative offer to $3.40 from $3.77 on Thursday after sifting through MYOB’s books, with MYOB announcing:

Following completion of due diligence and finalisation of debt funding commitments, KKR has revised the offer price to $3.40 per share. …  The board has informed KKR that it is not in a position to recommend the revised proposal, however it remains in discussions with KKR regarding its proposal. (my emphasis)

(link to my insight: Friday Deadline Looms As MYOB Snubs KKR’s Reduced Offer)

EVENTS

NTT (Nippon Telegraph & Telephone) (9432 JP) (Mkt Cap: $75bn; Liquidity: $181mn)

The Nikkei carried an article noting that the Japanese government’s FY2019 budget currently being formed proposes a sale of ¥160bn of shares in NTT to help fund any revenue impact from the upcoming consumption tax rate hike from 8% to 10% next October. The article helpfully notes that they plan on selling when NTT is buying back shares. One of the longstanding features of buybacks for NTT is that NTT is subject to the NTT Law which requires (for the moment) that the government hold at least one-third of the shares outstanding in NTT.

  • Travis estimates NTT has ~1.95bn shares outstanding, or ~1.917bn shares outstanding ex-Treasury shares, after recent buybacks. If NTT cancelled the shares it has bought back prior to buying back shares from the government, this would allow NTT to buy back 59mm shares from the government (assuming those shares are also cancelled). If it did not, it would mean NTT could only buy back about 42-43mm shares. 59mm shares backs out ¥250bn; 43mm shares at a 10% discount would be  ¥180bn. That means there is about 10% leeway in stock price to buy ¥160bn from the government IF shares repurchased under the current buyback are not cancelled.
  • But that also means that there would be no more buybacks from the government after that until the company buys back more shares from the market. If the company wanted to buy back another ¥200bn from the government, ceteris paribus it would have to buy back something like ¥400-450bn first from the market in order to reduce the denominator. Travis concludes there is still more on-market buying to do.
  • At an NTT/ NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) ratio of 1.80x, buybacks coming, expected ongoing strong dividend policy (and lots of headroom to do so, unlike perhaps Softbank Corp (9434 JP)), and investor suspicion of what comes next for Docomo, NTT is the home of the cashflow.

(link to Travis’ insight: NTT Buybacks Will Roll On)  


Takeda Pharmaceutical (4502 JP) Softbank Corp (9434 JP)

The IPO of Softbank Corp and the Merger of Takeda and Shire Pharmaceuticals create significant changes in TOPIX, MSCI, and FTSE because of the addition of roughly ¥5tn of “new” market capitalization in major Japan indices. Pure passive investors have something like ¥1.35tn of Softbank Corp and Takeda Pharmaceutical to buy.

  • However, after Travis’ initial note (Softbank Corp, Takeda, and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion), TSE unhelpfully changed their mind on timing (for Takeda) based on an unhelpful change by the LSE. With the changes at FTSE and now TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400, we no longer have quite the same clarity of forces on the bodies, and therefore less clarity on the resulting motion. The LSE’s announced market change appears to have led the MSCI to change its deletion date for Shire as well, now also (along with FTSE) deleting Shire at the close of the 21st. The new schedule is:
    Index DeletionShire
    (shs mm)
    Index InclusionTakeda
    (shs mm)
    Index Effect
    (US$ bn)
    Net Delta
    (US$bn)
    21 DecMSCI -50MSCI JP+75– $0.3bn+$1.3bn
    21 DecFTSE UK, All-Share,-100-130FTSE JP+15-$5.2bn+– $2.1bn

    rest of December – end of a pretty bad year for hedge funds, but illiquid

    all of January

    30 JanTOPIX-$1.9bnTOPIX, JPXN400

    +60

    +$2.1bn+$2.1bn
    30 JanTOPIX-$3.5bnTOPIXSoftbank+$3.5bn+$3.5bn
    all of February
    27 FebTOPIX, JPXN400+60+$2.1bn+$2.1bn
  • It doesn’t change the amounts but a lot more time allows for more risk and preparation and there will no longer be any potential settlement issues on the TOPIX side. There is still the same amount of Takeda to buy in TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400. 
  • In principle, Travis would want to be long Takeda at the close of the year of 2018, but given the LSE and TSE changes there is less support to give and the payoff is substantially more distant. 

links to Travis’ insights
Softbank Corp, Takeda, and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion
Takeda: Move Over Newton! Now It’s Spooky Action At a Distance


Dic Corp (4631 JP) (Mkt Cap: $2.8bn; Liquidity: $15mn)

Speciality steel maker Nisshin Steel (5413 JP) is slated to merge with parent company Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal (5401 JP) as of January 1, 2019. For that, Nisshin Steel will be delisted on December 26th (i.e. the last day of trading is the 25th) and that means the Nikkei Inc was obliged to choose a replacement for Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei 225 and other indices. On December 11th, the Nikkei Inc announced Itoham Yonekyu Holdings Inc (2296 JP) would take Nisshin’s place in the Nikkei 500 Index; announced that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would join the Nikkei 300 Index; and announced that Dic Corp (4631 JP) would replace Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei Stock Average, better known as the Nikkei 225.

  • Nisshin Steel’s deletion is a nothing-burger. 
  • The possibility of a DIC addition was well-flagged as early as May when sell-side brokers started compiling Annual and Ad Hoc Review lists for the Nikkei 225 changes to come in September and as a result of the Nisshin Steel merger. Travis would rather be long DIC than short DIC through the close of December 21st or probably December 25th. 

(link to Travis’ insight: Small Potatoes Nikkei 225 Changes on Christmas Day)

STUBS/HOLDCOS

Young Poong (000670 KS) / Korea Zinc (010130 KS)

YP appeared “cheap” back in April when I last discussed this Holdco, and is now cheaper, with its holding in KZ accounting for near-on 200% of its market cap.  I can’t think of any other parent/subsidiary relationship – one which is essentially a single stock structure – with such a deep discount. Especially one where the stub ops operate in a similar space to that of the listed holding. 

  • On the negative front, an investigation into YP’s Seokpo zinc smelter remains ongoing on account of perceived environmental transgressions. The Seokpo smelter is located in a national park on the Nakdong river. Wastewater containing above-legal limits of certain chemicals (fluoride and selenium) allegedly flowed downstream to residents, who are heavily reliant on this water.
  • YP’s stub and KZ are in the same business, but there are differences. YP does not have a balanced product mix as KZ does, with around 84% of its revenue coming from zinc-related production (for the 9M18 period), compared to 42.5% (on a revenue basis) for KZ, followed by lead (20.4%), silver (20.2%), and gold (7.6%).
  • However, YP and KZ remain inextricably intertwined and the current discount is unjustifiably steep. Just that YP’s liquidity, uncertainty on Seokpo, and lack of a near-term catalyst make for a difficult stub set-up.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Young Poong Blows Out, Again)  


Softbank Group (9984 JP) / Softbank Corp (9434 JP)

A forgettable trading debut for Japan’s largest-ever IPO, with Softbank Corp, closing at ¥1,282/share, down from the IPO price of ¥1,500, and closing at ¥1,316/share on Friday, the same day as its FTSE inclusion.

TOPIX INCLUSIONS!

With seven stocks promoted/reassigned from TSE2, MOTHERS, and JASDAQ in November 2018 leading to the same seven stocks being included in TOPIX at the end of December, Travis tested 340+ TOPIX inclusions over the past five years to see what really happens around TOPIX inclusions?

  • If you own all but the smallest stocks (with a market cap of less than ¥15bn), odds are that, ON AVERAGE, they will underperform TOPIX from inclusion date or the day after, for many months.
  • The larger the market cap, the more marked the AVERAGE underperformance immediately following inclusion. 
  • For names in the ¥25-50bn sweet spot of “large enough to be “small cap” with somebody paying attention to it”, outperformance vs underperformance in the next 10 days is a 47/53 proposition. That is a bigger risk. It may be data-idiosyncratic, but it is not clear.
  • In the case of the 7 names going into TOPIX at month-end this month, the averages would suggest one could still be long the four largest (at the time of Travis’ insight), but one would not want to be long the others; and one could sell long positions in all the names as of the close of the 27th or 28th and have it be an ex-ante expected net positive outcome vs TOPIX over the following 10-60 trading days.

(link to Travis’ insight: Historical TOPIX Inclusions:  How Do They Do Around Inclusion Date?)

SHARE CLASSIFICATIONS

Ke Yan, CFA, FRM provided an update on the HK Connect/southbound flow. Fullshare Holdings (607 HK)Shandong Gold Mining Co Ltd (1787 HK) and Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) (2196 HK) rounded out the top three inflows relative to their free float in the past seven days.  Shandong Gold remained in the top inflow list for the third consecutive week. Top outflows relative to the free float are Wuxi Biologics (Cayman) Inc (2269 HK), China Southern Airlines (1055 HK) and Sino Biopharmaceutical (1177 HK)

(link to Ke Yan’s insight: Discover HK Connect: Mainlanders Are Buying Shandong Gold, and Pharmaceuticals (2018-12-17))  


Briefly …

OTHER M&A UPDATES

  • LCY Chemical Corp (1704 TT).  MOEA (Ministry of Economic Affairs) approval has now been received and LCY has applied for the delisting from the TWSE. The last trading day is the 23 Jan 2019 and the stock delists on the 30 Jan.  The settlement is expected to take place mid-Feb.
  • Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). In an ASX announcement on Friday Brookfield said: “based on its enquiries and financing discussions to date, it has no reason to believe it will not be willing and able to proceed with the proposal“. The exclusivity provisions have been extended to 18 January. Separately, Healthscope has also received correspondence from the BGH-AustralianSuper Consortium that it has indicated it is able to commence due diligence immediately. HSO’s board stated it will consider the correspondence. These are both positive developments.

CCASS

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

Name

% change

Into

Out of

Comment

11.53%
CMBC
China Sec
37.50%
Kingston
Outside CCASS
17.24%
UBS
Outside CCASS
Source: HKEx

4. EM Relative Strength Is Bottoming: Overweight

Untitled

Relative strength for MSCI EM is bottoming vs. MSCI EAFE despite continued global equity market weakness.  Although the MSCI EM’s price index remains in a downtrend, we are seeing signs of outperformance ona a relative strength basis and would add incremental exposure. In this report we highlight attractive and actionable themes within EM.

Daily Consumer: Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings
  2. Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer
  3. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations
  4. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich
  5. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings

Spins

Last Week in Event SPACE …

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

M&A – ASIA-PAC

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) (Mkt Cap: $546mn; Liquidity: $0.4mn)

As previously discussed in Harbin Electric Expected To Be Privatised, Harbin Electric (HE) has now announced a privatisation Offer from parent and 60.41%-shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (“HEC”) by way of a merger by absorption. The Offer price of $4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close, is bang in line with that paid by HEC in January this year for new domestic shares. The Offer price has been declared final. 

  • Of note, the Offer price is a 37% discount to HE’s net cash of $7.27/share as at 30 June 2018. Should the privatisation be successful, this Offer will cost HEC ~HK$3.08bn, following which it can pocket the remaining net cash of $9.3bn PLUS the power generation equipment manufacturer business thrown in for free.
  • On pricing, “fair” to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. That is not happening. It will be difficult to see how independent directors (and the IFA) can justify recommending an Offer to shareholders at any price below the net cash/share, especially when the underlying business is profit-generating.
  • Dissension rights are available, however, there is no administrative guidance on the substantive as well as procedural rules as to how the “fair price” will be determined under PRC and HK Law.
  • Trading at a gross/annualised spread of 15%/28% assuming end-July completion, based on the average timeline for merger by absorption precedents. As HEC is only waiting for approval from independent H-shareholders suggests this transaction may complete earlier than precedents. 

(link to my insight: Harbin Electric: The Price Is Not Right)  


MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

KKR and MYOB entered into Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) at $3.40/share, valuing MYOB, on a market cap basis, at A$2bn. MYOB’s board unanimously recommends shareholders to vote in favour of the Offer, in the absence of a superior proposal. The Offer price assumes no full-year dividend is paid.

  • On balance, MYOB’s board has made the right decision to accept KKR’s reduced Offer. The argument that MYOB is a “known turnaround story” is challenged as cloud-based accounting software providers Xero Ltd (XRO AU)  and Intuit Inc (INTU US) grab market share. This is also reflected in MYOB’s forecast 7% revenue growth in FY18 and follows a 10% decline in first-half profit, despite a 61% jump in online subscribers.
  • And there is justification for KKR’s lowering the Offer price: the ASX is down 10% since KKR’s initial tilt, the ASX technology index is off by ~14%, a basket of listed Aussie peers are down 17%, while Xero, the most comparable peer, is down ~20%. The Scheme Offer is at a ~27% premium to the estimated adjusted (for the ASX index) downside price of $2.68/share.
  • Bain was okay selling at $3.15/share to KKR and will be fine selling its remaining ~6.5% stake at $3.40. Presumably, MYOB sounded out the other major shareholders such as Fidelity, Yarra Funds Management, Vanguard etc as to their read on the revised $3.40 offer, before agreeing to the SIA with KKR.

  • If the markets avoid further declines, this deal will probably get up. If the markets rebound, the outcome is less assured. This Tuesday marks the beginning of a new year and a renewed mandate for investors to take risk, especially an agreed deal; but the current 5.3% annualised spread is tight.

(link to my insight: MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer)


TMB Bank PCL (TMB TB) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

The Ministry of Finance, the major shareholder of TMB, confirmed that both Krung Thai Bank Pub (KTB TB) and Thanachart Capital (TCAP TB) had engaged in merger talks with TMB. Considering an earlier KTB/TMB courtship failed, it is more likely, but by no means guaranteed, that the deal with Thanachart will happen. Bloomberg is also reporting that Thanachart and TMB want to do a deal before the next elections, which is less than two months away.

  • TMB is much bigger than Thanachart and therefore it may boil down to whether TMB wants to be the target or acquirer. In Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA‘s view, a deal with Thanachart would leave TMB as the acquirer rather than the target. But Thanachart’s management has a better track record than TMB.
  • Both banks have undergone extensive deals before this one: 1) TMB acquired DBS Thai Danu and IFCT; and 2) Thanachart engineered an acquisition of the much bigger, but struggling, SCIB.
  • A merger between the two would still leave them smaller than Bank Of Ayudhya (BAY TB) and would not change the bank rankings; but it would give TMB a bigger presence in asset management, hire-purchase finance and a re-entry into the securities business.

(link to Athaporn’s insight: Sathorn Series M: TMB-Thanachart Courtship)  

STUBS/HOLDCOS

Halla Holdings (060980 KS) / Mando Corp (204320 KS)

Mando accounts for 45% of Halla’s NAV, which is currently trading at a 50% discount. Sanghyun Park believes the recent narrowing in the discount may be due to the hype attached to Mando-Hella Elec, which he believes is overdone; and recommends a short Holdco and long Mando. Using Sanghyun’s figures, I see the discount to NAV at 51%, 2STD above the 12-month average of ~47%.

(link to Sanghyun’s insight: Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando)  

SHARE CLASSIFICATIONS

OTHER M&A UPDATES

CCASS

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

Name

% change

Into

Out of

Comment

Putian Communication (1720 HK)
69.75%
Shanghai Pudong
Outside CCASS
37.68%
China Industrial
Outside CCASS
16.23%
HSBC
Outside CCASS
Source: HKEx

2. Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer

Picture1

Hotel Properties (HPL SP)  (“HPL”) announced on Friday evening a significant change in its shareholdings relating to the HPL shares owned by 68 Holdings Pte Ltd. 

The restructuring of shareholding did not come as a surprise and was within expectations. 

Now, Wheelock holds only a significant minority interest of 22.53% and without a board seat in HPL. Wheelock’s influence in HPL has been reduced significantly. Without control, Wheelock’s investment in HPL is as good as any other non-strategic investment in quoted securities.

In the event that Wheelock Properties decides to sell its HPL shares, Mr Ong will be a likely buyer of the HPL shares. This will present a very good opportunity for Mr Ong to successfully privatise and delist HPL.

3. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations

Pledged%20shares%20prabhat%20dairy%20q2fy19

Prabhat Dairy Ltd’s quarterly result is in line with our expectation. In Q2 FY19, the company registered a growth of 8.53% YoY, EBITDA margin was 9.4% improving by 119 bps since the same period last year, EBITDA grew by 24.2% YOY; the profit margin was at 2.95%  improving by 60 bps YoY, Net Income grew by 35.86% YOY.  For more details about the company, please refer to our initiation report  Prabhat Dairy Ltd – An Emerging Star in the Indian Milky Way. B2B business contributed to 70% of revenue and the remaining 30% was driven by B2C business. Value Added Products contributed to 25% of revenue in Q2FY19.

The stock is trading at 16.3x its TTM EPS, 13.8x its FY19F EPS. Margins have improved over the past quarters due to lower cost of raw materials, we expect raw materials to continue to be lower than their historic average in short term. Lower cost of raw material along with the improving contribution from B2C will lead to higher margins in medium to long term. The company also wants to increase its B2C contribution aggressively from the current 30% to 50% by 2020.

We will monitor the stock closely to firm up our views further, albeit we remain positive on the long-term prospects of the company.

4. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich

Profitability%20chart

Swaraj Engines (SWE IN) (SEL)is primarily manufacturing diesel engines for fitment into Swaraj tractors manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (M&M). The Company is also supplying engine components to SML Isuzu Ltd used in the assembly of commercial vehicle engines. SEL was started as a joint venture between Punjab Tractor Ltd (now acquired by M&M Ltd) and Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. M&M holds 33.3% stake in SEL and is its key client.  

We are positive about the business because:

  • SEL’s growth is correlated with M&M’s tractor business growth. SEL supplies engines to the Swaraj division of M&M. M&M expects tractor growth to be around 12% YoY in FY19E. We forecast SEL’s tractor engine volumes will grow at a CAGR of 12% for FY18-21E.
  • The growth of the company is dependent on the monsoon and rural sentiments. We expect the profitability to improve with normal rainfall and government initiatives towards the rural sector. We expect the revenue/ EBITDA/ PAT CAGR for FY18-21E to be 14%/ 15%/ 14% respectively.
  • SEL is debt free and a cash generating company. It has a healthy and stable ROCE and ROE. SEL has increased its capacity from 75,000 engines in FY16 to 120,000 engines in FY18. We expect the capacity utilisation to reach 97% by FY20E from 90% in 1HFY19. SEL funds its capex through internal accruals. We forecast a capex of Rs 600 mn for FY19E to FY21E considering the requirement of the additional capacity, R&D and testing costs for new and higher HP engines & for upgradation of engines according to the TREM IV emission norms for >50 HP engines.

We initiate coverage on SEL with a fair value objective of Rs 1,655/- over the next 12 months. This represents a potential upside of 15% from the closing price of Rs 1,435/- (as on 26-12-2018). We arrive at the fair value by applying PE multiple of 18x to EPS of Rs 87/- to the year ending December-20E and add cash of Rs 82/- per share. While the business outlook is good, we think the upside in the share price is limited due to rich valuation.

Particulars (Rs mn) (Y/E March)

FY18

FY19E

FY20E

FY21E

Revenue

 7,712

 9,210

 10,478

 11,525

PAT

 801

 906

 1,063

 1,190

EPS (Rs)

 64.5

 74.8

 87.6

 98.1

PE (x)

 22.3

 19.2

 16.4

 14.6

Source: SEL Annual Report FY18, Trivikram Consultants Research as on 26-12-2018

Note: E= Estimates

5. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

2018 12 24 18 45 47

Source: Japan Analytics

THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.

  • VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
  • ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
  • CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.

OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.

CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 

RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.

In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-

I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP

  • BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
  • BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL

III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS

IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE

V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT

  • VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
  • VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME

CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.

Daily Consumer: FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat

1. FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat

Familymartdq%20strategy

In October, the Nikkei leaked and Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP) immediately thereafter announced that Familymart would sell the rest of its GMS (and financing) subsidiary UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (which bought 40% of the company in 2017) and would conduct a Tender Offer later in 2018 at a 20% premium to the then-current price to buy a stake in Don Quijote of just over 20%. The Tender Offer was announced November 6th. Familymart had arranged to borrow shares it did not manage to buy in the tender so that at the next record date it will have 20% of the voting rights by hook or by crook. 

Don Quijote shares jumped to the Tender Offer price the same day and then spent a day there before investors decided that the news and structure of the deal was better news for Don Quijote than Familymart had priced in. 

Results of the Tender Offer have just been announced. Familymart had been trying to buy 32,108,700 shares for JPY 212 billion. They just missed. They got 0.08% of the total desired, or 24,721 shares for just over JPY 163 million.

THEY GOT NOTHING.

I expect Familymart had zero idea this would happen. I expect their bankers are surprised as well. They should not have been. They analysed this badly. There was a decent chance they would find it difficult to dislodge shares from owners. 

In FamilyMart Tender for Don Quijote – Elmer vs Mr. Partridge? I recalled how “Old Turkey” (from Edwin Lefevre’s Reminiscences of a Stock Operator) did not want to lose his position while Elmer was eager to take profits.

I couldn’t think of selling that stock.” “You couldn’t?” asked Elmer, beginning to look doubtful himself. It is a habit with most tip givers to be tip takers. “Why not?” And Elmer drew nearer. “Why, this is a bull market!” The old fellow said it as though he had given a long and detailed explanation. 

Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. Don Quijote is still growing. And with UNY, Don Quijote may grow faster than previously expected. 

The announcement at the end of the Tender Offer Results announcement is also VERY telling. There was a plan to make Don Quijote an equity-method affiliate by buying in the Tender Offer, buying in the market, or borrowing lots of shares. There was a plan for Familymart to appoint directors to DQ.

There was a clearly-available trading strategy based on that. 

The new announcement puts that strategy into question. And Mr. Partridge might not be so inclined to call it a bull market. Since the launch of the deal, the markets have started the trip to Gehenna in a trug. From the one-month average prior to the Familymart bid news, Don Quijote is up 25%. Familymart is up 40%, the Nikkei 225 is down 10.7%, the TOPIX retail sector is down 5.5% but Familymart and Don Quijote have influenced that performance (without those two names, average performance is worse).

Daily Consumer: Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando
  2. GUNKUL (GUNKUL TB): Solar to Drive Top-Line Growth
  3. ASAP: Weak Profitability Priced In, While Growth Still Intact
  4. New Pride Rights Offer: Tempting but Tricky
  5. Maruti Suzuki- Q2FY19 Results Update

1. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando

4

  • Halla Holdings is falling nearly 5% today. Holdco said it’d give a ₩2,000 div per share. This is about 4.5% div yield at yesterday’s closing price. 5% drop today shouldn’t be much as an ex-dividend date price drop. Mando fell 5%. Mando was oversold relative to the other local auto stocks, particularly to Halla Holdings. They are still close to +1 σ on a 20D MA.
  • Mando-Hella Elec has been another reason behind Holdco’s valuation divergence against Mando lately. I believe Mando-Hella is being overhyped. Mando-Hella-caused divergence should no longer be effective. I expect ‘downwardly’ mean reversion from now on. I’d go short Holdco and long Mando at this point.

2. GUNKUL (GUNKUL TB): Solar to Drive Top-Line Growth

  • Good payout ratio, good growth in core profit, and strong long-term sales growth relative to its sector
  • Acquisition of 49% stake in a 30MW solar farm in Malaysia with a commercial operation date (COD) set for 1Q20 to support revenue growth
  • High volume of solar rooftop installation projects planned for Charoen Pokphand Foods Pub (CPF TB) and other private firms to boost GUNKUL’s construction revenue
  • Attractive at 19CE* PEG ratio of 0.5 relative to ASEAN Industry at 1.6
  • Risk: Lower than expected electricity demand, unfavorable weather conditions

* Consensus Estimates

3. ASAP: Weak Profitability Priced In, While Growth Still Intact

Picture4

We maintain a BUY rating on ASAP with new 2019E target price of Bt3.80 (from Bt6.50), derived from 19.6xPE, which is 1.0x PEG of earnings growth in 2019-20E.

The story:

  • Trimmed 2018-20F earnings forecast by 35%
  • Not a falling knife, but fallen angel
  • Potential disruptor in car rental industry
  • Expect a 20% CAGR for earnings in 2019-20E

Risks:

  • Contract termination of airport space leases
  • Participating in a highly competitive industry
  • Cash-flow management will be a challenge in a growth phase

4. New Pride Rights Offer: Tempting but Tricky

1

  • New Pride Corp (900100 KS) announced a ₩36.2bil rights offer. This is a public offering, so there won’t be subscription rights to trade. Pricing will be done as 3-day VWAP on Jan 9~11 at a 30% discount.
  • Supposedly, we can have ample opportunity to arb trade. This may be what the company is hoping. Simply, we wait until Jan 16~17 (subscription period) and see the spread. At this much discount, there must be a huge spread opening.
  • Proration risk can be much more annoying than a usual stockholder offering. In the previous public offering event by New Pride, subscription rate went as high as 370 to 1. It should be way much lower this time. But still this is risky enough.

5. Maruti Suzuki- Q2FY19 Results Update

Trend%20in%20model

Maruti Suzuki’s Q2FY19 results were below our expectations. Sales grew by only 2% YoY in Q2FY19 led by a 3.7% increase in realization per unit. But the volumes declined by 1.5% YoY in the same period. We analyze the results.

Daily Consumer: Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer
  2. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations
  3. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich
  4. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?
  5. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando

1. Hotel Properties Ltd– Dissolution of Wheelock-OBS Partnership Could Pave Way for Privatization Offer

Picture1

Hotel Properties (HPL SP)  (“HPL”) announced on Friday evening a significant change in its shareholdings relating to the HPL shares owned by 68 Holdings Pte Ltd. 

The restructuring of shareholding did not come as a surprise and was within expectations. 

Now, Wheelock holds only a significant minority interest of 22.53% and without a board seat in HPL. Wheelock’s influence in HPL has been reduced significantly. Without control, Wheelock’s investment in HPL is as good as any other non-strategic investment in quoted securities.

In the event that Wheelock Properties decides to sell its HPL shares, Mr Ong will be a likely buyer of the HPL shares. This will present a very good opportunity for Mr Ong to successfully privatise and delist HPL.

2. Prabhat Dairy Ltd – Update: Revenues and Margins Continues to Increase in Line with Our Expectations

Smp%205%20years

Prabhat Dairy Ltd’s quarterly result is in line with our expectation. In Q2 FY19, the company registered a growth of 8.53% YoY, EBITDA margin was 9.4% improving by 119 bps since the same period last year, EBITDA grew by 24.2% YOY; the profit margin was at 2.95%  improving by 60 bps YoY, Net Income grew by 35.86% YOY.  For more details about the company, please refer to our initiation report  Prabhat Dairy Ltd – An Emerging Star in the Indian Milky Way. B2B business contributed to 70% of revenue and the remaining 30% was driven by B2C business. Value Added Products contributed to 25% of revenue in Q2FY19.

The stock is trading at 16.3x its TTM EPS, 13.8x its FY19F EPS. Margins have improved over the past quarters due to lower cost of raw materials, we expect raw materials to continue to be lower than their historic average in short term. Lower cost of raw material along with the improving contribution from B2C will lead to higher margins in medium to long term. The company also wants to increase its B2C contribution aggressively from the current 30% to 50% by 2020.

We will monitor the stock closely to firm up our views further, albeit we remain positive on the long-term prospects of the company.

3. Swaraj Engines: Positive Outlook But Growth Is Slowing and Valuation Is Rich

Profitability%20chart

Swaraj Engines (SWE IN) (SEL)is primarily manufacturing diesel engines for fitment into Swaraj tractors manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (M&M). The Company is also supplying engine components to SML Isuzu Ltd used in the assembly of commercial vehicle engines. SEL was started as a joint venture between Punjab Tractor Ltd (now acquired by M&M Ltd) and Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. M&M holds 33.3% stake in SEL and is its key client.  

We are positive about the business because:

  • SEL’s growth is correlated with M&M’s tractor business growth. SEL supplies engines to the Swaraj division of M&M. M&M expects tractor growth to be around 12% YoY in FY19E. We forecast SEL’s tractor engine volumes will grow at a CAGR of 12% for FY18-21E.
  • The growth of the company is dependent on the monsoon and rural sentiments. We expect the profitability to improve with normal rainfall and government initiatives towards the rural sector. We expect the revenue/ EBITDA/ PAT CAGR for FY18-21E to be 14%/ 15%/ 14% respectively.
  • SEL is debt free and a cash generating company. It has a healthy and stable ROCE and ROE. SEL has increased its capacity from 75,000 engines in FY16 to 120,000 engines in FY18. We expect the capacity utilisation to reach 97% by FY20E from 90% in 1HFY19. SEL funds its capex through internal accruals. We forecast a capex of Rs 600 mn for FY19E to FY21E considering the requirement of the additional capacity, R&D and testing costs for new and higher HP engines & for upgradation of engines according to the TREM IV emission norms for >50 HP engines.

We initiate coverage on SEL with a fair value objective of Rs 1,655/- over the next 12 months. This represents a potential upside of 15% from the closing price of Rs 1,435/- (as on 26-12-2018). We arrive at the fair value by applying PE multiple of 18x to EPS of Rs 87/- to the year ending December-20E and add cash of Rs 82/- per share. While the business outlook is good, we think the upside in the share price is limited due to rich valuation.

Particulars (Rs mn) (Y/E March)

FY18

FY19E

FY20E

FY21E

Revenue

 7,712

 9,210

 10,478

 11,525

PAT

 801

 906

 1,063

 1,190

EPS (Rs)

 64.5

 74.8

 87.6

 98.1

PE (x)

 22.3

 19.2

 16.4

 14.6

Source: SEL Annual Report FY18, Trivikram Consultants Research as on 26-12-2018

Note: E= Estimates

4. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

2018 12 22 15 13 05

Source: Japan Analytics

THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.

  • VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
  • ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
  • CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.

OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.

CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 

RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.

In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-

I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP

  • BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
  • BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL

III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS

IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE

V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT

  • VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
  • VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME

CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.

5. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando

2

  • Halla Holdings is falling nearly 5% today. Holdco said it’d give a ₩2,000 div per share. This is about 4.5% div yield at yesterday’s closing price. 5% drop today shouldn’t be much as an ex-dividend date price drop. Mando fell 5%. Mando was oversold relative to the other local auto stocks, particularly to Halla Holdings. They are still close to +1 σ on a 20D MA.
  • Mando-Hella Elec has been another reason behind Holdco’s valuation divergence against Mando lately. I believe Mando-Hella is being overhyped. Mando-Hella-caused divergence should no longer be effective. I expect ‘downwardly’ mean reversion from now on. I’d go short Holdco and long Mando at this point.

Daily Consumer: BAUTO (BAUTO MK): New Models to Keep Strong Sales Momentum and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. BAUTO (BAUTO MK): New Models to Keep Strong Sales Momentum
  2. Anmol Industries Pre-IPO Quick Take – No Growth, Generous Payments to Founders
  3. LG Holdings Stub Trade: Current Status & Trade Approach
  4. Belluna: Growing by Selling Gentility to the Expanding Older Market in Japan

1. BAUTO (BAUTO MK): New Models to Keep Strong Sales Momentum

  • Improving asset turnover, relatively strong analyst recommendations, and slow asset growth relative to its sector
  • New launches in FY2019-20 e.g. CX-3 facelift and 7-seat SUV CX-8 should stimulate sales going forward. Sales were up by 24% in 1QFY19 YoY
  • Equity income from JV with Mazda Motor (7261 JP) should increase as production volume ramps up to meet strong ASEAN demand. Production up by 40% YoY in FY2018
  • Attractive at a 19CE* 0.4 PEG ratio versus ASEAN Consumer Discretionary at a PEG of 0.9 and BAUTO is net cash
  • Risks: Regulations and sluggish consumer demand, FX risk JPY and PHP

* Consensus Estimates

2. Anmol Industries Pre-IPO Quick Take – No Growth, Generous Payments to Founders

Sales%20dependance%20on%20bihar%20up%20odisha

Anmol Industries (ANMOL IN) plans to raise US$100m+ in its India IPO via a sell-down of secondary shares. As per Frost & Sullivan, Anmol is the fourth largest biscuit manufacturer in India, behind the likes of Britannia Industries (BRIT IN), Parle and Sunfeast (owned by ITC Ltd (ITC IN)).

In FY17, the company undertook a restructuring wherein it merged three of its operating entities and demerged its treasury operations. Owing to this one can’t really come up with a clear picture of its past performance.

The picture on the demerger is a lot clearer though, as it led to the founders getting US$38m worth of liquid investments. Furthermore, the founder’s employment arrangements seem to be designed in such a way to let them take 12% of the PATMI each year, with no strings attached and additional 13% of FY17 PATMI as salary.

3. LG Holdings Stub Trade: Current Status & Trade Approach

4

  • LG Holdings (003550 KS) is mainly made up of LG Group’s 4 major listed subsidiaries. The four account for 76.85% of NAV, and 90.18% of holdings assets. The MC scatter chart shows that Holdings and the four are integrated.
  • I initiated a stub trade on Sep 26, LG Group Restructuring: Holdings a CLEAR ‘LONG’ & LGE ‘Short’ in Market Neutral Setup. I went long Holdings and short Elec. This trade is delivering a 8.40% yield. Short-term wise on a 20D MA, a reverse stub trade seems to make sense. Holdings is now at +1 σ.
  • I’d rather hunt for mean reversion on a longer horizon. Holdings breakup is now a distant possibility. Yearend dividend factor should be another plus. As a hedge, I’d go short Chem. It has fallen relatively less. Struggle in the Chinese battery market will be getting more attention.

4. Belluna: Growing by Selling Gentility to the Expanding Older Market in Japan

Image2 1

While Nissen and Senshukai (8165 JP) have hit new lows in the past five years, Belluna (9997 JP) has gone from strength to strength by sticking with printed catalogues and tying these to e-commerce and retail store expansion.

The company’s strategy is also helped by the core customer demographic being women over the age of 50, one of the few population segments that is still growing.

As a result, group sales have risen by 28.8% in five years and operating profit has almost doubled from ¥7.8 billion to ¥13 billion.

The acquisition of Sagami, a kimono retailer that suffered from lack of attention under Uny’s management, could also result in a boost to profits in the next year.

Daily Consumer: GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated? and more

By | Consumer

In this briefing:

  1. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?
  2. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando
  3. GUNKUL (GUNKUL TB): Solar to Drive Top-Line Growth
  4. ASAP: Weak Profitability Priced In, While Growth Still Intact
  5. New Pride Rights Offer: Tempting but Tricky

1. GMO Internet (9447 JP) – Grossly or Modestly Overrated?

2018 12 25 15 22 37

Source: Japan Analytics

THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.

  • VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
  • ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
  • CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.

OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.

CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505. 

RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.

In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-

I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP

  • BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
  • BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL

III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS

IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE

V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT

  • VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
  • VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME

CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.

2. Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando

7

  • Halla Holdings is falling nearly 5% today. Holdco said it’d give a ₩2,000 div per share. This is about 4.5% div yield at yesterday’s closing price. 5% drop today shouldn’t be much as an ex-dividend date price drop. Mando fell 5%. Mando was oversold relative to the other local auto stocks, particularly to Halla Holdings. They are still close to +1 σ on a 20D MA.
  • Mando-Hella Elec has been another reason behind Holdco’s valuation divergence against Mando lately. I believe Mando-Hella is being overhyped. Mando-Hella-caused divergence should no longer be effective. I expect ‘downwardly’ mean reversion from now on. I’d go short Holdco and long Mando at this point.

3. GUNKUL (GUNKUL TB): Solar to Drive Top-Line Growth

  • Good payout ratio, good growth in core profit, and strong long-term sales growth relative to its sector
  • Acquisition of 49% stake in a 30MW solar farm in Malaysia with a commercial operation date (COD) set for 1Q20 to support revenue growth
  • High volume of solar rooftop installation projects planned for Charoen Pokphand Foods Pub (CPF TB) and other private firms to boost GUNKUL’s construction revenue
  • Attractive at 19CE* PEG ratio of 0.5 relative to ASEAN Industry at 1.6
  • Risk: Lower than expected electricity demand, unfavorable weather conditions

* Consensus Estimates

4. ASAP: Weak Profitability Priced In, While Growth Still Intact

Picture4

We maintain a BUY rating on ASAP with new 2019E target price of Bt3.80 (from Bt6.50), derived from 19.6xPE, which is 1.0x PEG of earnings growth in 2019-20E.

The story:

  • Trimmed 2018-20F earnings forecast by 35%
  • Not a falling knife, but fallen angel
  • Potential disruptor in car rental industry
  • Expect a 20% CAGR for earnings in 2019-20E

Risks:

  • Contract termination of airport space leases
  • Participating in a highly competitive industry
  • Cash-flow management will be a challenge in a growth phase

5. New Pride Rights Offer: Tempting but Tricky

1

  • New Pride Corp (900100 KS) announced a ₩36.2bil rights offer. This is a public offering, so there won’t be subscription rights to trade. Pricing will be done as 3-day VWAP on Jan 9~11 at a 30% discount.
  • Supposedly, we can have ample opportunity to arb trade. This may be what the company is hoping. Simply, we wait until Jan 16~17 (subscription period) and see the spread. At this much discount, there must be a huge spread opening.
  • Proration risk can be much more annoying than a usual stockholder offering. In the previous public offering event by New Pride, subscription rate went as high as 370 to 1. It should be way much lower this time. But still this is risky enough.