Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

When one looks upon the landscape of Japan's oil refineries - a delightful vista of 20th century industrialisation being left by the wayside in the move to EVs, solar power, "green" investment, etc, one small refinery stands out - the Keihin refinery of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toa-oil-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11021:1" rel="noopener">Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP)</a>. 
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Toa Oil's Keihin Refinery has a Nelson Complexity Index higher than any other refinery in Japan to my knowledge (the Nelson Complexity Index provides a measure of the ability of a refinery to process inputs into lighter product. The lighter the end product, the higher the complexity score on that particular line/output (crude goes into an atmospheric distillation process and comes out as several products which are subsequently treated by hydro- or merox treaters, subject to secondary distillation, or gas processing, then subject to FCC feeds, cokers, hydrocracking, isomerization, reformer stages, etc). The complexity score of a refinery is the weighted average complexity of its output lines. Toa Oil is in the very high teens whereas most major refiners just get to double digits or slightly above.
Generically, a refinery's Nelson Complexity Index/Score is a measure of the value of the refinery - both in cost terms and in terms of value-add. 
Toa Oil effectively sold itself to Showa Shell in 1979 then Showa Shell consolidated it in 2005 when activists were knocking on the door of cheap stocks and Toa placed shares with Showa Shell taking their ownership to 50.1%. Since then, Showa Shell (and now Idemitsu) has effectively used it as an outsourced capital asset. Huge sums were invested, and subsequently depreciated, and now the "book value" of the assets is effectively below 20% of the investment cost, and the book value of the refinery portion (not including the land or some of the financial assets related to the oil business in Japan (oil refining taxes stream through companies like this as both assets and liabilities because of the methodology applied)) is probably on the order of 10-15% of its replacement value. 
But Showa Shell used it, and now Idemitsu uses it, as a rented asset. Toa sells 90% of its output to Idemitsu, and generates electricity with much of the rest, which it sells to TEPCO. The business with Idemitsu is just a tolling charge. Idemitsu supplies crude, uses the refinery for a fee, then takes the product. If spreads are good, Idemitsu benefits. If spreads are low, Idemitsu effectively has the low-cost producer on tap at a low price. How is that tolling charge set? It's not clear. The arithmetic doesn't add up to arms' length or market pricing. The board of Toa is a couple of inexpert independents, a former customer (who is described as independent), one or two internal people, and four people from Idemitsu and Showa Shell. It would be surprising if it were NOT Idemitsu determining for Toa how much Toa was going to charge. Toa could, of course, negotiate fiercely. The CEO (a former Idemitsu man) who gets paid by the board (full of Idemitsu people) to rent its asset to Idemitsu at a rate which is completely uneconomic long-term and ignores the value built up over the years by shareholders. 
Today, after years of speculation, Idemitsu announced that it would launch a Tender Offer for Toa Oil to take out the minorities. It comes at ¥2450/share which is a 23% premium to last, a slight premium to book, a discount to the land value under the refinery, and a tiny fraction of the replacement value of the asset, but the "fair value" assessed by the independent valuation agent based on numbers supplied by the Target Company based on its contract with the parent company shows that the price is not too far off "fair", as long as the contract with its parent is fair, and one ignores what the real world value is.
The Tender Offer starts today and goes for 30 days. 
Because this was a clear situation of informational edge owned by the Acquiror, who controls the company and its board, in a highly technical industry, with highly-regulated processes and somewhat complex valuation methodologies, it would make total sense that the inexpert independent board members seek out expert help to value the complex asset in a complex business. Obviously, with the social demands of the Corporate Governance Code and last year's METI Fair M&amp;A Guidelines weighing heavily on the Toa directors, they would have ensured that they were extra careful to establish a fair process, including a market check, expert valuation, a majority of minority investor agreement, and separate advisors for the Special Committee. They would have gotten a fairness opinion.
Toa Oil minority shareholders, unfortunately, are left without any of that. 
There is a large foreign shareholder who has been buying who, given their buying activity, and their long-term average purchase price, is unlikely to be ecstatic with this price. But to see this get a bump, it probably needs more people getting upset.

When one looks upon the landscape of Japan's oil refineries - a delightful vista of 20th century industrialisation being left by the wayside in the move to EVs, solar power, "green" investment, etc, one small refinery stands out - the Keihin refinery of Toa Oil Co Ltd (5008 JP). 



Toa Oil's Keihin Refinery has a Nelson Complexity Index higher than any other refinery in Japan to my knowledge (the Nelson Complexity Index provides a measure of the ability of a refinery to process inputs into lighter product. The lighter the end product, the higher the complexity score on that particular line/output (crude goes into an atmospheric distillation process and comes out as several products which are subsequently treated by hydro- or merox treaters, subject to secondary distillation, or gas processing, then subject to FCC feeds, cokers, hydrocracking, isomerization, reformer stages, etc). The complexity score of a refinery is the weighted average complexity of its output lines. Toa Oil is in the very high teens whereas most major refiners just get to double digits or slightly above.
Generically, a refinery's Nelson Complexity Index/Score is a measure of the value of the refinery - both in cost terms and in terms of value-add. 
Toa Oil effectively sold itself to Showa Shell in 1979 then Showa Shell consolidated it in 2005 when activists were knocking on the door of cheap stocks and Toa placed shares with Showa Shell taking their ownership to 50.1%. Since then, Showa Shell (and now Idemitsu) has effectively used it as an outsourced capital asset. Huge sums were invested, and subsequently depreciated, and now the "book value" of the assets is effectively below 20% of the investment cost, and the book value of the refinery portion (not including the land or some of the financial assets related to the oil business in Japan (oil refining taxes stream through companies like this as both assets and liabilities because of the methodology applied)) is probably on the order of 10-15% of its replacement value. 
But Showa Shell used it, and now Idemitsu uses it, as a rented asset. Toa sells 90% of its output to Idemitsu, and generates electricity with much of the rest, which it sells to TEPCO. The business with Idemitsu is just a tolling charge. Idemitsu supplies crude, uses the refinery for a fee, then takes the product. If spreads are good, Idemitsu benefits. If spreads are low, Idemitsu effectively has the low-cost producer on tap at a low price. How is that tolling charge set? It's not clear. The arithmetic doesn't add up to arms' length or market pricing. The board of Toa is a couple of inexpert independents, a former customer (who is described as independent), one or two internal people, and four people from Idemitsu and Showa Shell. It would be surprising if it were NOT Idemitsu determining for Toa how much Toa was going to charge. Toa could, of course, negotiate fiercely. The CEO (a former Idemitsu man) who gets paid by the board (full of Idemitsu people) to rent its asset to Idemitsu at a rate which is completely uneconomic long-term and ignores the value built up over the years by shareholders. 
Today, after years of speculation, Idemitsu announced that it would launch a Tender Offer for Toa Oil to take out the minorities. It comes at ¥2450/share which is a 23% premium to last, a slight premium to book, a discount to the land value under the refinery, and a tiny fraction of the replacement value of the asset, but the "fair value" assessed by the independent valuation agent based on numbers supplied by the Target Company based on its contract with the parent company shows that the price is not too far off "fair", as long as the contract with its parent is fair, and one ignores what the real world value is.
The Tender Offer starts today and goes for 30 days. 
Because this was a clear situation of informational edge owned by the Acquiror, who controls the company and its board, in a highly technical industry, with highly-regulated processes and somewhat complex valuation methodologies, it would make total sense that the inexpert independent board members seek out expert help to value the complex asset in a complex business. Obviously, with the social demands of the Corporate Governance Code and last year's METI Fair M&amp;A Guidelines weighing heavily on the Toa directors, they would have ensured that they were extra careful to establish a fair process, including a market check, expert valuation, a majority of minority investor agreement, and separate advisors for the Special Committee. They would have gotten a fairness opinion.
Toa Oil minority shareholders, unfortunately, are left without any of that. 
There is a large foreign shareholder who has been buying who, given their buying activity, and their long-term average purchase price, is unlikely to be ecstatic with this price. But to see this get a bump, it probably needs more people getting upset. 

Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008)

Neither "Murakami Fund" group company Office Support KK nor any other Murakami-affiliated company seems to have announced a Tender Offer for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toshiba-machine-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7943:1" rel="noopener">Toshiba Machine (6104 JP)</a> on the 20th as promised. Instead, we jump right to the Tender Offer launch, as <a href="https://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/E01EW/BLMainController.jsp?uji.verb=W00Z1020initialize&amp;uji.bean=ek.bean.EKW00Z1020Bean&amp;TID=W00Z1020&amp;PID=W1E63041&amp;SESSIONKEY=1579573756181&amp;lgKbn=2&amp;dflg=0&amp;iflg=&amp;row=100&amp;idx=0&amp;str=&amp;kbn=1&amp;flg=&amp;syoruiKanriNo=S100HRXX" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disclosed</a> (Japanese only link) on EDINET this morning, by City Index Elevens KK which is 100% owned by two Murakami group companies.The Tender Offer is for a minimum of 3.5mm shares and a maximum of 7.5mm shares, and if successful at the top end, it will mean Murakami-affiliated companies will own a total of 43.82% of voting rights and 35.28% of shares outstanding (because they own a combined 3.076mm shares as of the launch of the Tender).This Tender Offer price is lower, and for a lower number of shares than I thought. The Tender Offer price of ¥3,456 is symbolic. The document says it is "about one time net assets." It is, in fact, exactly 1.00x book value as of 30 September, which was when <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nuflare-technology-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9635:1" rel="noopener">Nuflare Technology (6256 JP)</a> was trading at a lower price (the Tender Offer was 55% higher than the end-Sep mark price on their balance sheet). By my calculations, ¥3,456/share is about 0.92-0.95x run-rate book value.This is a deliberately low hurdle set by Murakami-san, and he explicitly says so in the document. It is a gift to Toshiba Machine. He effectively suggests what the right answer is for Toshiba Machine to double ROE. And he invites Toshiba Machine to work hand-in-hand with him to get it done.<div class="content-highlight">I URGE all interested readers and investors in Toshiba Machine to have a good long read of the <a href="https://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/E01EW/BLMainController.jsp?uji.verb=W00Z1020initialize&amp;uji.bean=ek.bean.EKW00Z1020Bean&amp;TID=W00Z1020&amp;PID=W1E63041&amp;SESSIONKEY=1579583506955&amp;lgKbn=2&amp;dflg=0&amp;iflg=&amp;row=100&amp;idx=0&amp;str=&amp;kbn=1&amp;flg=&amp;syoruiKanriNo=S100HRXX" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tender Offer Document</a> released by the Bidder.</div>More below, including pro-ration estimates and Arb Grids - both Regular Type and Funky Type.

Neither "Murakami Fund" group company Office Support KK nor any other Murakami-affiliated company seems to have announced a Tender Offer for Toshiba Machine (6104 JP) on the 20th as promised. Instead, we jump right to the Tender Offer launch, as disclosed (Japanese only link) on EDINET this morning, by City Index Elevens KK which is 100% owned by two Murakami group companies.The Tender Offer is for a minimum of 3.5mm shares and a maximum of 7.5mm shares, and if successful at the top end, it will mean Murakami-affiliated companies will own a total of 43.82% of voting rights and 35.28% of shares outstanding (because they own a combined 3.076mm shares as of the launch of the Tender).This Tender Offer price is lower, and for a lower number of shares than I thought. The Tender Offer price of ¥3,456 is symbolic. The document says it is "about one time net assets." It is, in fact, exactly 1.00x book value as of 30 September, which was when Nuflare Technology (6256 JP) was trading at a lower price (the Tender Offer was 55% higher than the end-Sep mark price on their balance sheet). By my calculations, ¥3,456/share is about 0.92-0.95x run-rate book value.This is a deliberately low hurdle set by Murakami-san, and he explicitly says so in the document. It is a gift to Toshiba Machine. He effectively suggests what the right answer is for Toshiba Machine to double ROE. And he invites Toshiba Machine to work hand-in-hand with him to get it done.I URGE all interested readers and investors in Toshiba Machine to have a good long read of the Tender Offer Document released by the Bidder.More below, including pro-ration estimates and Arb Grids - both Regular Type and Funky Type.

Murakami Hands Toshiba Machine A Gimme - A TOB Designed To Fail and for Machine To Show Its Value

David Blennerhassett

This insight briefly summarises the 93 M&amp;A transactions, with a collective deal size of ~US$215bn, published on Smartkarma in  2018.
Transactions discussed were typically Asia-Pacific-centric or concerned an outbound transaction initiated from an Asia-Pacific-listed company. The majority of these deals involved a market cap/deal size in excess of US$100mn.
The mega deals of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/11747" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11747:1">Takeda Pharmaceutical (4502 JP)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/22142" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22142:1">Shire PLC (SHP LN)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/921" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:921:1">Sprint Corp (S US)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/922" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:922:1">T Mobile Us Inc (TMUS US)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/1064" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1064:1">Intl Business Machines (IBM US)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/4024" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:4024:1">Red Hat Inc (RHT US)</a> were first discussed in May, June and November respectively.
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/074/882/original/M&amp;A%201.PNG?1546905127" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="74882"></figure>
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<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/074/884/original/M&amp;A%203.PNG?1546905144" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="74884"></figure>
<ul>
<li>
The most generous country? The average premium for Australian and Hong Kong deals was almost identical at 38%.</li>
<li>
The stingiest? Singapore with 16%.</li>
<li>
The graveyard award? 49 deals were completed with 35 ongoing. Australia had four deals (out of a total of 29, the most for any country) that were abandoned for various reasons - such as CKI getting dinged by FIRB in its tilt for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/18658" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18658:1">APA Group (APA AU)</a>. But in terms of outright fails, Hong Kong takes home that award following the failures in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/17477" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17477:1">Pou Sheng Intl Holdings (3813 HK)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/5290" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5290:1">Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/19888" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19888:1">Spring Real Estate Investment Trust (1426 HK)</a>.</li>
</ul>
During the year a number of large, high profile transactions were completed that were also extensively analysed and discussed on Smartkarma. However, if the initial discussions between the two parties (acquirer &amp; target) took place pre-2018, they are not included in the charts above. A selection of these include (in no particular order): 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/999" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:999:1">Broadcom Corp Cl A (BRCM US)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/969" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:969:1">Qualcomm Inc (QCOM US)</a> <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/12001" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12001:1">Alps Electric (6770 JP)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/2704" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2704:1">Alpine Electronics (6816 JP) </a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/896" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:896:1">Westfield Corp (WFD AU)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/24846" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24846:1">Unibail-Rodamco SE (UL FP) </a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/109" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1">Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)</a>/<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/108" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:108:1">Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002 JP) </a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/801" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:801:1">Orient Overseas International (316 HK)</a>

This insight briefly summarises the 93 M&amp;A transactions, with a collective deal size of ~US$215bn, published on Smartkarma in  2018.
Transactions discussed were typically Asia-Pacific-centric or concerned an outbound transaction initiated from an Asia-Pacific-listed company. The majority of these deals involved a market cap/deal size in excess of US$100mn.
The mega deals of Takeda Pharmaceutical (4502 JP)/Shire PLC (SHP LN), Sprint Corp (S US)/T Mobile Us Inc (TMUS US) and Intl Business Machines (IBM US)/Red Hat Inc (RHT US) were first discussed in May, June and November respectively.





The most generous country? The average premium for Australian and Hong Kong deals was almost identical at 38%.

The stingiest? Singapore with 16%.

The graveyard award? 49 deals were completed with 35 ongoing. Australia had four deals (out of a total of 29, the most for any country) that were abandoned for various reasons - such as CKI getting dinged by FIRB in its tilt for APA Group (APA AU). But in terms of outright fails, Hong Kong takes home that award following the failures in Pou Sheng Intl Holdings (3813 HK), Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK) and Spring Real Estate Investment Trust (1426 HK).

During the year a number of large, high profile transactions were completed that were also extensively analysed and discussed on Smartkarma. However, if the initial discussions between the two parties (acquirer &amp; target) took place pre-2018, they are not included in the charts above. A selection of these include (in no particular order): 
Broadcom Corp Cl A (BRCM US)/Qualcomm Inc (QCOM US) Alps Electric (6770 JP)/Alpine Electronics (6816 JP) Westfield Corp (WFD AU)/Unibail-Rodamco SE (UL FP) Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)/Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002 JP) Orient Overseas International (316 HK)  

(Mostly Asia) M&A in 2018: What Was Hot, And What Was Not

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Thomas Schroeder

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Our methodology fuses global market variables and isolates drivers in trends. We specialize in FX, index trade in NY and Asia with a focus on Asian stocks. 

Technical Analysis

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/109" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1">Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)</a> decline is nearing exhaustion support and sets up a tactical trade higher.MACD breach of floor support now turns this key pivot level into a cap resistance on a recovery cycle. It also calls for a new and lower trading range.Macro support breaks must be mended to turn the cycle from bearish back to neutral and will require a series of positive rally cycles for basing to unfold.Tactical buy supports are outlined along with our tactical rally target, macro pivot resistance and the stop level.

Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP) decline is nearing exhaustion support and sets up a tactical trade higher.MACD breach of floor support now turns this key pivot level into a cap resistance on a recovery cycle. It also calls for a new and lower trading range.Macro support breaks must be mended to turn the cycle from bearish back to neutral and will require a series of positive rally cycles for basing to unfold.Tactical buy supports are outlined along with our tactical rally target, macro pivot resistance and the stop level.

Idemitsu Kosan Tactical Support with Macro Cycle Drag

After 3+ years of negotiating with shareholders, capital partners, the government and anti-trust regulators, and then their shareholders again, in July <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/108" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:108:1">Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/109" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:109:1">Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)</a> came to an agreement with the Idemitsu family to obtain family support for a merger as long as certain promises were made. 14 weeks later, on October 16th, the two companies announced they had decided on a scrip ratio which came out at 0.41 shares of Idemitsu for every share of Showa Shell held. The dividend split is also quite remarkable because of the proposed change in fiscal year-end for Showa, so one cannot trade the ratio at 0.41.My opinion was that the ratio should have been lower. Idemitsu shareholders have given up serious value. Interestingly, as soon as the ratio was announced, both stocks cratered 10%, before rebounding most of the way. But the end of the week, however, Idemitsu was down 12+%. Since then, the shares are down further. Idemitsu is down more than a third in six weeks and Showa Shell shares are down similarly. This is despite significant buybacks providing more accretion.On Monday, both companies announced that their respective shareholder meetings would be on the 18th of December (where if approved, the companies would merge April 1 2019). The record date for these meetings was at the beginning of the month so there is no real appeal to changing one's position here because of more knowledge about the meeting date.<div class="content-highlight">Also on Monday, for the first time Showa Shell traded through terms on a cum-dividend basis. There are three good reasons for that.</div>The three possible reasons are...<ol>
<li>
A Deal-Break Bet: Since shares have fallen sharply, some investors expect there is significant risk that investors on one side will decide to not vote for the deal, meaning that on deal break, Showa Shell would significantly outperform Idemitsu.</li>
<li>
A Financing Spread Bet (which I don't see): Net financing costs favor going long Showa and short Idemitsu to lend out Showa shares at a significant borrow fee premium at term. Investors expect the deal to go through and are locking in the spread (which I cannot see the existence of, but it is theoretically possible).</li>
<li>The only reason why I would do this trade.</li>
</ol>

After 3+ years of negotiating with shareholders, capital partners, the government and anti-trust regulators, and then their shareholders again, in July Showa Shell Sekiyu Kk (5002 JP) and Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP) came to an agreement with the Idemitsu family to obtain family support for a merger as long as certain promises were made. 14 weeks later, on October 16th, the two companies announced they had decided on a scrip ratio which came out at 0.41 shares of Idemitsu for every share of Showa Shell held. The dividend split is also quite remarkable because of the proposed change in fiscal year-end for Showa, so one cannot trade the ratio at 0.41.My opinion was that the ratio should have been lower. Idemitsu shareholders have given up serious value. Interestingly, as soon as the ratio was announced, both stocks cratered 10%, before rebounding most of the way. But the end of the week, however, Idemitsu was down 12+%. Since then, the shares are down further. Idemitsu is down more than a third in six weeks and Showa Shell shares are down similarly. This is despite significant buybacks providing more accretion.On Monday, both companies announced that their respective shareholder meetings would be on the 18th of December (where if approved, the companies would merge April 1 2019). The record date for these meetings was at the beginning of the month so there is no real appeal to changing one's position here because of more knowledge about the meeting date.Also on Monday, for the first time Showa Shell traded through terms on a cum-dividend basis. There are three good reasons for that.The three possible reasons are...

A Deal-Break Bet: Since shares have fallen sharply, some investors expect there is significant risk that investors on one side will decide to not vote for the deal, meaning that on deal break, Showa Shell would significantly outperform Idemitsu.

A Financing Spread Bet (which I don't see): Net financing costs favor going long Showa and short Idemitsu to lend out Showa shares at a significant borrow fee premium at term. Investors expect the deal to go through and are locking in the spread (which I cannot see the existence of, but it is theoretically possible).
The only reason why I would do this trade.


Three Reasons Showa/Idemitsu Should Trade Through Terms

Japan

Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. explores, imports, refines, and distributes petroleum and its related products.  The Company also manufactures and sells petrochemical products.

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Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP)

Idemitsu Launches Lowball Tender Offer for Subsidiary Toa Oil (5008)

Idemitsu is 90% of revs, 50% of the ownership of Toa Oil. The business is not conducted at an arms' length basis so value has been transferred. Now...

Travis Lundy

Murakami Hands Toshiba Machine A Gimme - A TOB Designed To Fail and for Machine To Show Its Value

Neither "Murakami Fund" group company Office Support KK nor any other Murakami-affiliated company seems to have announced a Tender Offer for...

Travis Lundy

(Mostly Asia) M&A in 2018: What Was Hot, And What Was Not

This insight briefly summarises the 93 M&A transactions, with a collective deal size of ~US$215bn, published on Smartkarma in ...

David Blennerhassett

Idemitsu Kosan Tactical Support with Macro Cycle Drag

Idemitsu Kosan (5019 JP) decline is nearing exhaustion support and sets up a tactical trade higher.MACD breach of floor support now turns this key...

Thomas Schroeder

Three Reasons Showa/Idemitsu Should Trade Through Terms

After 3+ years of negotiating with shareholders, capital partners, the government and anti-trust regulators, and then their shareholders again, in...

Travis Lundy

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