Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/chinese-estates-holdings-limited" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK)</a> and its owners. </p>
<p>When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. </p>
<p>Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. </p>
<p>Then at the start of H2, with a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0701/2020070100031.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0813/2020081301678.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disclosed</a> it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0816/2020081600097.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">profit warning</a>, just before releasing H1 results. </p>
<p>Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-may-be-facing-a-funding-squeeze" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze</a>. </p>
<p>There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the <em>existence</em> of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares</a>).</p>
<p>I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started <em>buying back</em> shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-de-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares</a>. Then a couple weeks later, we saw <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing</a> so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. </p>
<p>There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-09/china-urged-evergrande-founder-to-find-quick-fix-for-debt-woes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. </p>
<p>Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. </p>
<h3>Yesterday, there was new news. </h3>
<p>The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. </p>
<section class="figure">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/218/832/original/Screenshot+2021-07-16+at+10.05.32+AM.png?1626401169" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="218832"></figure>
</section>
<p></p>
<p>My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.</p>
<p>The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.</p>
<p>The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to <em>Do Something</em> - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? </p>
<p>I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts. </p>
<p><br><br></p>

Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK) and its owners. 
When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. 
Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. 
Then at the start of H2, with a press release about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company disclosed it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a profit warning, just before releasing H1 results. 
Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze. 
There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the existence of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares).
I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started buying back shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares. Then a couple weeks later, we saw Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. 
There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An article on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. 
Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. 
Yesterday, there was new news. 
The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. 




My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.
The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.
The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to Do Something - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? 
I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts. 
  

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

David Blennerhassett

<div>
<p>A double-dose of StubWorld this week ...</p>
</div>
<div>
<div class="content-highlight">
<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hang-lung-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:50:1" rel="noopener">Hang Lung (10 HK)</a>'s is coming up expensive on my monitor,  yet at 0.3x P/B, against 0.47x for a basket of peers, HLG is one of the cheapest property plays in Hong Kong.</p>
</div>
<p>Preceding my comments on Hang Lung are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.</p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p>These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.</p>
</div>
</div>


A double-dose of StubWorld this week ...



Hang Lung (10 HK)'s is coming up expensive on my monitor,  yet at 0.3x P/B, against 0.47x for a basket of peers, HLG is one of the cheapest property plays in Hong Kong.

Preceding my comments on Hang Lung are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.



These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.



StubWorld: Hang Lung Group Is Still Cheap

Equity Bottom-Up

China Evergrande New Energy Vehicle / Equity Bottom-Up

China Evergrande New Energy Vehicle (708 HK)

<div>
<p>This week in StubWorld ...</p>
<div class="content-highlight">
<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> plumbs a new discount to NAV low after <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-new-energy-vehicle-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:713:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Auto (708 HK)</a>'s meteoric post-placement gain; <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/pccw-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:873:1" rel="noopener">PCCW Ltd (8 HK)</a> discount to NAV retraces, as expected; and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/lg-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:6653:1" rel="noopener">LG Corp (003550 KS)</a> still look cheap versus its sum of parts.</p>
</div>
</div>
<hr>
<div>
<p>Preceding my comments on these holdcos are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.</p>
</div>


This week in StubWorld ...

Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) plumbs a new discount to NAV low after Evergrande Auto (708 HK)'s meteoric post-placement gain; PCCW Ltd (8 HK) discount to NAV retraces, as expected; and LG Corp (003550 KS) still look cheap versus its sum of parts.




Preceding my comments on these holdcos are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.


These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.


StubWorld: Evergrande Auto, PCCW, LG Corp

<p>About 9-10 weeks ago, Chinese authorities called a dozen large real estate developers onto the carpet with very little lead time and <s>asked</s><s>proposed</s> mandated they participate in a "pilot programme" called<strong> Three Red Lines</strong>. </p><p>"Pilot programme" is a nice way of saying - <em>"Here are the new rules, and they apply to you first."</em></p><p>In this case, it meant there were three criteria, and if as a developer you met all three, your company could increase debt by 15% vs the previous year. If you met two, it was 10%, and if one, 5% was the cap. If you met none of them, you would not be allowed to increase debt. </p><p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/evergrande-real-estate-group-limited" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> was one of those twelve companies, and it met none of the criteria to allow it to increase debt. Given the company's funding costs and extraordinarily large supplier finance position, that leaves wiggle room only to the downside. The gross book has to shrink.</p><p>Five weeks after the meeting, it was reported in local media that the company had sent a letter asking for assistance to the Guangzhou government four days after the Three Red Lines intro meeting, warning of the possibility of funding difficulties and default, in part due to a RMB 130bn (+ redemption premium) redemption of private shares issuance due at the end of January 2021. When this came out, the company denied the existence of the letter, but various media outlets said they had seen it. This was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-may-be-facing-a-funding-squeeze" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43592" rel="noopener">Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze</a>.</p><p>The shares fell, and this was slightly problematic because despite having a buyback programme which allowed the company to buy back up to 10% of shares outstanding, under the HKEX Listing Rules, it only had room to buy about 20mm shares as of the end of its buyback splurge in May and June 2020.  Media outlets then reported that the company had obtained assistance in convincing many (but not all) of its investors in the Hengda Real Estate subsidiary to not ask for their money back 3 months hence. That sent the shares back up. </p><p>Then two weeks ago, the company announced a sale of up to US$1.3bn (including greenshoe) in shares at an 11.1-14.7% discount. I wrote about Evergrande's share sale in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:44137" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares</a>. It turns out the company could not place more than about half the base amount, at the widest discount in the range, which was 3% below the average price paid in the May-June buyback highlighted in yellow.</p><p>The shares fell sharply the next day (14 October), soundly breaking the offering price. The chart below is as of close of business post-placement.</p><section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/168/419/original/Screenshot%202020-10-30%20at%2011.50.38%20AM.png?1604029859" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="168419"></figure><p></p></section><p>The "musical shares" I saw implied in the placement was that the amount raised was immaterial to its prospects of having an equity buffer, or in raising funds to reduce debt. It was less than one-tenth the amount of Hengda which was left without a guarantee of a refinance or extension. It was well under one half of one percent of Evergrande debt.</p><p>The lack of success of the offering caused shares to drop further, reaching HK$14.20 on Wednesday 28 October and opening below HK$14.00 yesterday. </p><p>What the placement DID do was afford Evergrande more room to buy back shares. After the buyback at end June, the company had room to buy 20mm shares. Not enough to affect much. </p><div class="content-highlight"><p>How far the stock had to drop before Evergrande made use of its new buffer to buy back shares was answered yesterday.</p></div><p>Two weeks after the placement of shares at HK$16.50 caused the shares to fall sharply from the HK$19 area to which they had rebounded, the company <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/1029/2020102900815.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> they had bought back 900,000 shares. </p><p>This came earlier, and at a higher price, than I thought likely. Yesterday, the company bought back shares at a 10.6% discount to where they had just placed shares a week ago, and at a 7% premium to where they had been trading earlier in the day.</p><p>Subtlety is not the company's strong suit. </p><p>More discussion below the fold. </p>

About 9-10 weeks ago, Chinese authorities called a dozen large real estate developers onto the carpet with very little lead time and askedproposed mandated they participate in a "pilot programme" called Three Red Lines. "Pilot programme" is a nice way of saying - "Here are the new rules, and they apply to you first."In this case, it meant there were three criteria, and if as a developer you met all three, your company could increase debt by 15% vs the previous year. If you met two, it was 10%, and if one, 5% was the cap. If you met none of them, you would not be allowed to increase debt. Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) was one of those twelve companies, and it met none of the criteria to allow it to increase debt. Given the company's funding costs and extraordinarily large supplier finance position, that leaves wiggle room only to the downside. The gross book has to shrink.Five weeks after the meeting, it was reported in local media that the company had sent a letter asking for assistance to the Guangzhou government four days after the Three Red Lines intro meeting, warning of the possibility of funding difficulties and default, in part due to a RMB 130bn (+ redemption premium) redemption of private shares issuance due at the end of January 2021. When this came out, the company denied the existence of the letter, but various media outlets said they had seen it. This was discussed in Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze.The shares fell, and this was slightly problematic because despite having a buyback programme which allowed the company to buy back up to 10% of shares outstanding, under the HKEX Listing Rules, it only had room to buy about 20mm shares as of the end of its buyback splurge in May and June 2020.  Media outlets then reported that the company had obtained assistance in convincing many (but not all) of its investors in the Hengda Real Estate subsidiary to not ask for their money back 3 months hence. That sent the shares back up. Then two weeks ago, the company announced a sale of up to US$1.3bn (including greenshoe) in shares at an 11.1-14.7% discount. I wrote about Evergrande's share sale in Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares. It turns out the company could not place more than about half the base amount, at the widest discount in the range, which was 3% below the average price paid in the May-June buyback highlighted in yellow.The shares fell sharply the next day (14 October), soundly breaking the offering price. The chart below is as of close of business post-placement.The "musical shares" I saw implied in the placement was that the amount raised was immaterial to its prospects of having an equity buffer, or in raising funds to reduce debt. It was less than one-tenth the amount of Hengda which was left without a guarantee of a refinance or extension. It was well under one half of one percent of Evergrande debt.The lack of success of the offering caused shares to drop further, reaching HK$14.20 on Wednesday 28 October and opening below HK$14.00 yesterday. What the placement DID do was afford Evergrande more room to buy back shares. After the buyback at end June, the company had room to buy 20mm shares. Not enough to affect much. How far the stock had to drop before Evergrande made use of its new buffer to buy back shares was answered yesterday.Two weeks after the placement of shares at HK$16.50 caused the shares to fall sharply from the HK$19 area to which they had rebounded, the company announced they had bought back 900,000 shares. This came earlier, and at a higher price, than I thought likely. Yesterday, the company bought back shares at a 10.6% discount to where they had just placed shares a week ago, and at a 7% premium to where they had been trading earlier in the day.Subtlety is not the company's strong suit. More discussion below the fold. 

Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares

Equity Capital Markets

China Evergrande / Equity Capital Markets

<p>Media reports from Bloomberg and other sources suggest that <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/evergrande-real-estate-group-limited" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> has launched an equity placement - a so-called top-up placement - for 490 million shares at a price of HK$16.50-17.20, or an 11.1-14.7% discount to the last traded price of $19.34/share. There is apparently an upsize option of an additional 120mm shares.</p><p>This offer appears scheduled to raise up to US$1.043-1.087bn in funds with US$255mm more from the upsize option if done at the lower end of the range. </p><p>The news surrounding Evergrande recently has been less than salutary for investors. Despite highly bullish commentary around unofficial and unaudited figures in early July which appeared to have sent the shares soaring nearly 40% in 3 days to HK$28/share, several weeks later on 16 August the company released a profit warning and results came out the 31st of August. On the 13th Evergrande had sold a US$3bn stake in its property management vehicle, sold another block in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-new-energy-vehicle-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:713:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Auto (708 HK)</a>, was preparing a near-term listing of its property management entity and was looking to conduct a large offering for Evergrande Auto on the Star Board.  </p><p>Hints of further ugliness came out in the last days of August and early days of September when it was reported that a dozen real estate developers had been called into a meeting 20 August to let them know they had been chosen to participate (participation not optional) in a pilot programme which restricted lending growth to companies which did not cross Three Red Lines which were...</p><ol style="list-style-type: decimal;">
<li>a liability-to-asset ratio (excluding pre-sales) of 70%,</li>
<li>a net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and</li>
<li>cash holdings equal to 100% of short-term debt.</li>
</ol><p>Evergrande handily beats all three and therefore would be restricted from new borrowings (including increase outstanding debt to pay the coupons on existing debt). This means that Evergrande needs to de-lever. It reportedly has started doing so since earlier this year but it is not clear what the necessary reference points are and where Evergrande stands in relation to those reference points in terms of showing that it is making progress (if it doesn't meet the Three Red Lines thresholds, it needs to show it is making progress towards doing so in future). </p><p>The last straw was the <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/china-evergrande/chinas-no-2-developer-evergrande-pleads-for-government-support-to-avoid-cash-crunch-idINL3N2GL2H9" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> letter (which Evergrande <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0924/2020092401313.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">denied existed</a>) which had asked the Guangdong government for assistance in aligning its debt obligations and repayment schedule so that unwanted disruption and confusion in the marketplace did not occur (those tracking this story may have a slightly more blunt way of phrasing this). There was also the matter of the 3yr expiry of the Hengda equity putback coming in January 2021 if that business were not listed. This too caused consternation in the market. All of this was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-may-be-facing-a-funding-squeeze" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43592" rel="noopener">Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze</a> on 27 September.</p><p>Following the news coverage, shares dropped sharply, the bonds traded weaker, but a few days later Evergrande somehow <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0929/2020092900829.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">managed to convince</a> a large chunk of the equity financiers of Hengda to roll their ownership/funding for another year. That helped keep the wolves at bay for Jan 2021 but Evergrande still has a long way to go to be able to cross the Three Red Lines in the other direction. Asset sales and equitization are paramount, and along those lines, on 29 September Evergrande <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0929/2020092901436.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">submitted its listing application</a> to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to list Evergrande Property Services Group. More money is on the way. </p><h2>Today's NEW News</h2><p>Evergrande has announced an equity offering to raise cash for "refinancing and working capital." The thing is, US$1.1bn or even US$1.35bn won't cut it. Evergrande has RMB 820+bn of short-term and long-term interest-bearing debt, extended accounts payable, and the Hengda contingent liability floating around. This is nothing. </p><p>So why are they doing it?</p><p>That's the thing. There IS a reason. It appears obvious to me. And it doesn't make the stock more investible. </p><p>More below the fold. </p>

Media reports from Bloomberg and other sources suggest that Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) has launched an equity placement - a so-called top-up placement - for 490 million shares at a price of HK$16.50-17.20, or an 11.1-14.7% discount to the last traded price of $19.34/share. There is apparently an upsize option of an additional 120mm shares.This offer appears scheduled to raise up to US$1.043-1.087bn in funds with US$255mm more from the upsize option if done at the lower end of the range. The news surrounding Evergrande recently has been less than salutary for investors. Despite highly bullish commentary around unofficial and unaudited figures in early July which appeared to have sent the shares soaring nearly 40% in 3 days to HK$28/share, several weeks later on 16 August the company released a profit warning and results came out the 31st of August. On the 13th Evergrande had sold a US$3bn stake in its property management vehicle, sold another block in Evergrande Auto (708 HK), was preparing a near-term listing of its property management entity and was looking to conduct a large offering for Evergrande Auto on the Star Board.  Hints of further ugliness came out in the last days of August and early days of September when it was reported that a dozen real estate developers had been called into a meeting 20 August to let them know they had been chosen to participate (participation not optional) in a pilot programme which restricted lending growth to companies which did not cross Three Red Lines which were...
a liability-to-asset ratio (excluding pre-sales) of 70%,
a net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and
cash holdings equal to 100% of short-term debt.
Evergrande handily beats all three and therefore would be restricted from new borrowings (including increase outstanding debt to pay the coupons on existing debt). This means that Evergrande needs to de-lever. It reportedly has started doing so since earlier this year but it is not clear what the necessary reference points are and where Evergrande stands in relation to those reference points in terms of showing that it is making progress (if it doesn't meet the Three Red Lines thresholds, it needs to show it is making progress towards doing so in future). The last straw was the reported letter (which Evergrande denied existed) which had asked the Guangdong government for assistance in aligning its debt obligations and repayment schedule so that unwanted disruption and confusion in the marketplace did not occur (those tracking this story may have a slightly more blunt way of phrasing this). There was also the matter of the 3yr expiry of the Hengda equity putback coming in January 2021 if that business were not listed. This too caused consternation in the market. All of this was discussed in Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze on 27 September.Following the news coverage, shares dropped sharply, the bonds traded weaker, but a few days later Evergrande somehow managed to convince a large chunk of the equity financiers of Hengda to roll their ownership/funding for another year. That helped keep the wolves at bay for Jan 2021 but Evergrande still has a long way to go to be able to cross the Three Red Lines in the other direction. Asset sales and equitization are paramount, and along those lines, on 29 September Evergrande submitted its listing application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to list Evergrande Property Services Group. More money is on the way. Today's NEW NewsEvergrande has announced an equity offering to raise cash for "refinancing and working capital." The thing is, US$1.1bn or even US$1.35bn won't cut it. Evergrande has RMB 820+bn of short-term and long-term interest-bearing debt, extended accounts payable, and the Hengda contingent liability floating around. This is nothing. So why are they doing it?That's the thing. There IS a reason. It appears obvious to me. And it doesn't make the stock more investible. More below the fold. 

Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares

Hong Kong

Chinese Estates Holdings Limited is an investment holding company primarily engaged in property investment for rental and property development. The company develops mid to high-end commercial and residential properties and manages investment properties including retail and office assets. It also has interests in building and property management, securities investment, money lending, and cosmetics distribution. The company is headquartered in Hong Kong and was founded in 1986.

Price Gauge
52-week Range	0.00 - 0.00
Market Cap (USDm)	0.00
P/E	0.00
Dividend (Yield)	0.00

Chinese Estates (127 HK)

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

Evergrande has been in a world of hurt, actively selling down assets. It has repaid some short-term bonds, but commercial bills remain an issue. So...

Travis Lundy

StubWorld: Hang Lung Group Is Still Cheap

I cannot envisage HLG privatising HLP given the pricing (P/B) disparity. I think Ronnie Chan should follow the Woo/Wheelock (20 HK) template, and...

David Blennerhassett

StubWorld: Evergrande Auto, PCCW, LG Corp

Chine Evergrande (3333 HK) looks "cheap" and Evergrande Auto (708 HK) frothy, suggesting a set-up here. Personally, I would avoid both.

David Blennerhassett

Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares

Evergrande bought back shares in May-June, leaving little room to buy back more. Debt ructions caused share price fluctuations. The company issued...

Travis Lundy

Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares

Media reports say Evergrande launched an Equity Offering to raise US$1.1bn. This is not enough to pay down RMB 450bn in debt overall or pay back...

Travis Lundy

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)