Chief Economist & Political Strategist, CrossASEAN Research

Prasenjit K. Basu

Chief Economist & Political Strategist

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

Macroeconomics

China's economy was virtually stagnant in September, and real GDP grew just 0.2% QoQ in 3Q 2021 as YoY growth slowed to 4.9% (from 7.9% in the previous quarter). Industrial output grew just 3.1% YoY and 0.1% MoM in September, while fixed asset investment (FAI), long the key driver of China's economic activity, declined 5.5% YoY in September 2021 (and fell 3.3% YoY in 3Q 2021). With rising political uncertainty, and heightened risk of expropriation of foreign bond-holders and successful local billionaires, real GDP is likely to contract QoQ in 4Q 2021, and grow just 3% YoY, as China's FAI finally declines after two decades of over-investment. 
With global trade volume slated to grow 10.8% in 2021 (twice the pace of global real GDP growth), China has one key remaining economic strength: like the rest of Asia, China's export sector remains robust. While imports too are growing (to feed import-intensive exports), slumping FAI will cause trade surpluses to widen in 4Q 2021. However, foreign reserves are likely to continue edging lower as capital flight accelerates. 
China's foreign reserves are down this year despite consistently large monthly trade surpluses -- and foreign reserves have been largely unchanged since 1Q 2016 despite large annual trade surpluses. In September 2021, net capital and services/income outflows were US$98 billion (the largest monthly outflow since capital controls were tightened in November 2016). In Jan-Sep 2021, net outflows have swelled to US$455 billion (much larger than the US$290 billion of net outflows in Jan-Sep 2020). If <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/evergrande-property-services" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:30921:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Property Services (6666 HK)</a> or its affiliate defaults on its foreign bonds (while local bond holders were paid last month), the discriminatory treatment is likely to spur larger capital outflows, and a flight from Chinese foreign-currency paper. We recommend staying Underweight China.

China's economy was virtually stagnant in September, and real GDP grew just 0.2% QoQ in 3Q 2021 as YoY growth slowed to 4.9% (from 7.9% in the previous quarter). Industrial output grew just 3.1% YoY and 0.1% MoM in September, while fixed asset investment (FAI), long the key driver of China's economic activity, declined 5.5% YoY in September 2021 (and fell 3.3% YoY in 3Q 2021). With rising political uncertainty, and heightened risk of expropriation of foreign bond-holders and successful local billionaires, real GDP is likely to contract QoQ in 4Q 2021, and grow just 3% YoY, as China's FAI finally declines after two decades of over-investment. 
With global trade volume slated to grow 10.8% in 2021 (twice the pace of global real GDP growth), China has one key remaining economic strength: like the rest of Asia, China's export sector remains robust. While imports too are growing (to feed import-intensive exports), slumping FAI will cause trade surpluses to widen in 4Q 2021. However, foreign reserves are likely to continue edging lower as capital flight accelerates. 
China's foreign reserves are down this year despite consistently large monthly trade surpluses -- and foreign reserves have been largely unchanged since 1Q 2016 despite large annual trade surpluses. In September 2021, net capital and services/income outflows were US$98 billion (the largest monthly outflow since capital controls were tightened in November 2016). In Jan-Sep 2021, net outflows have swelled to US$455 billion (much larger than the US$290 billion of net outflows in Jan-Sep 2020). If Evergrande Property Services (6666 HK) or its affiliate defaults on its foreign bonds (while local bond holders were paid last month), the discriminatory treatment is likely to spur larger capital outflows, and a flight from Chinese foreign-currency paper. We recommend staying Underweight China.  

China: Succumbing to Excess Capacity in Industry and Real-Estate, & Capital Flight

Technical Analyst, Vermilion Research

Joe Jasper

Technical Analyst

Technical and Quantitative Research

Vermilion Research

Vermilion’s objective is to deliver timely, actionable, and unique technical research to professional investors through the application of our various technical indicators.

Our research strategists seek to highlight securities which we believe are at major inflection points, based on our various technical and quantitative indicators, and offer asymmetric risk/return profiles. Our unique research methodology, centered on relative strength, enables our strategists to deliver superior investment recommendations.

Our process begins by organizing the universe of actively traded stocks into discrete sectors, then into industry groups. We then apply our technical and quantitative tools to identify developing price trends. Once attractive trends are identified within a selected sector or group, we screen for individual stocks which we believe offer the best risk/reward profile. We provide a historical perspective that often reveals, through our long-term charts, how price patterns often repeat themselves over time.

Technical Analysis

Market dynamics remain largely healthy, and new developments continue to point to improving risk appetites. Still, Energy (XOP, RYE) is the only cyclical value Sector that has been able to decisively break to new price highs, while others remain in congestion. Therefore, our outlook remains neutral yet constructive overall, and we see pullbacks as buying opportunities.Charts highlighted: XLF, Copper, IWM, MCHI, KRE, XLB, S&amp;P 500, CNQ, SU, IMO, CVE, OVV, COP, EOG, PXD, OXY, HES, DVN, CLR, CFR, PB, BOKF, IBTX, TBK, BSVN, BAC, WFC, USB, PNC, TFC, FITB, KEY, RF, and CMA

Market dynamics remain largely healthy, and new developments continue to point to improving risk appetites. Still, Energy (XOP, RYE) is the only cyclical value Sector that has been able to decisively break to new price highs, while others remain in congestion. Therefore, our outlook remains neutral yet constructive overall, and we see pullbacks as buying opportunities.Charts highlighted: XLF, Copper, IWM, MCHI, KRE, XLB, S&amp;P 500, CNQ, SU, IMO, CVE, OVV, COP, EOG, PXD, OXY, HES, DVN, CLR, CFR, PB, BOKF, IBTX, TBK, BSVN, BAC, WFC, USB, PNC, TFC, FITB, KEY, RF, and CMA

U.S. Equity Strategy: Risk Appetites Improving; Watching Financials, Copper, US Dollar

Cross Asset Strategy

13 months after its introduction, China's "Three Red Lines" (TRL) policy initiative (to reduce leverage, improve debt coverage and increase liquidity) for property companies is beginning to have a serious impact. A key contributory factor is that TSF (total social financing) has increased by a more moderate RMB21.68 trillion in Jan-Aug 2021 than last year (RMB25.97 trillion in Jan-Aug 2020), which still implies 10.3% YoY growth in the stock of TSF (to RMB306.83 trillion, or US$47.5 trillion), which is near the slowest-ever pace since TSF began to be published. The stock of M2, bank credit and TSF in China are at historic highs never reached by any other country, and the growth of all these aggregates continues, albeit at a marginally slower pace.Despite the abundance of liquidity (and the cut in RRR in mid-July), real GDP is growing barely over 5% YoY in 3Q 2021, with retail sales decelerating to 2.5% YoY growth and industrial production to 5.3% YoY growth in August 2021. The latter was largely export-driven (helped by a surge in global trade), as FAI (fixed asset investment) declined 2.1% YoY in May-August 2021. Such an economic deceleration in the year before an important leadership transition (i.e., rubber-stamping of continuity for Xi, change for others around him) will be met by further monetary easing in October 2021. That half of the 10 largest residential-property developers are Guangdong-based (a province traditionally known for both entrepreneurship and rebellion) makes them particularly vulnerable to the political crackdown on capitalists. The focus increasingly will be on cutting the costs of property, healthcare and education, not just tech titans.  However, moral hazard will be tightly managed. Onshore (local currency) bond holders will bear relatively few losses on high-profile names like Evergrande (although there will be credit events for bank loans), while offshore foreign-currency bond holders are likely to feel considerable pain (i.e., the partial end of the "moral hazard play"). The political crackdown on sundry capitalists -- tech titans, others seeking overseas listings, property developers, gaming companies -- will persist, adding more to the China Premium. We would recommend staying Underweight China equities amid the uncertainty generated by this political instability, which will result in a new equilibrium discount on Chinese valuations emerging by early 2022.

13 months after its introduction, China's "Three Red Lines" (TRL) policy initiative (to reduce leverage, improve debt coverage and increase liquidity) for property companies is beginning to have a serious impact. A key contributory factor is that TSF (total social financing) has increased by a more moderate RMB21.68 trillion in Jan-Aug 2021 than last year (RMB25.97 trillion in Jan-Aug 2020), which still implies 10.3% YoY growth in the stock of TSF (to RMB306.83 trillion, or US$47.5 trillion), which is near the slowest-ever pace since TSF began to be published. The stock of M2, bank credit and TSF in China are at historic highs never reached by any other country, and the growth of all these aggregates continues, albeit at a marginally slower pace.Despite the abundance of liquidity (and the cut in RRR in mid-July), real GDP is growing barely over 5% YoY in 3Q 2021, with retail sales decelerating to 2.5% YoY growth and industrial production to 5.3% YoY growth in August 2021. The latter was largely export-driven (helped by a surge in global trade), as FAI (fixed asset investment) declined 2.1% YoY in May-August 2021. Such an economic deceleration in the year before an important leadership transition (i.e., rubber-stamping of continuity for Xi, change for others around him) will be met by further monetary easing in October 2021. That half of the 10 largest residential-property developers are Guangdong-based (a province traditionally known for both entrepreneurship and rebellion) makes them particularly vulnerable to the political crackdown on capitalists. The focus increasingly will be on cutting the costs of property, healthcare and education, not just tech titans.  However, moral hazard will be tightly managed. Onshore (local currency) bond holders will bear relatively few losses on high-profile names like Evergrande (although there will be credit events for bank loans), while offshore foreign-currency bond holders are likely to feel considerable pain (i.e., the partial end of the "moral hazard play"). The political crackdown on sundry capitalists -- tech titans, others seeking overseas listings, property developers, gaming companies -- will persist, adding more to the China Premium. We would recommend staying Underweight China equities amid the uncertainty generated by this political instability, which will result in a new equilibrium discount on Chinese valuations emerging by early 2022.  

FAI (fixed asset investment) declined in 2Q 2021, a sensible response to China's massive industrial overcapacity. Net exports and consumption were the key drivers of 7.9% YoY real GDP growth in 2Q 2021, which took 1H 2021 growth to 12.7% YoY. TSF (total social financing) did decelerate in January-May 2021, but began re-accelerating in June 2021 as the PBOC turned more dovish, following through with an RRR cut (effective 15 July 2021). With China's monetary conditions easing, at a time when US monetary policy is gradually hardening, the RMB will depreciate further, continuing the trend depreciation that began at the start of June 2021. Even during the period of a strengthening RMB, China was experiencing large capital flight: in 1H 2021, China's foreign reserves declined (by a marginal US$3 billion) even as the trade surplus remained elevated at US$255 billion. Despite the persistence of capital controls, China's capital flight is likely to accelerate in the rest of 2021 as monetary policy eases. With limited support from easier monetary policy, FAI will continue to decline marginally, and private consumption will decelerate (as the underlying social causes of high savings remain). Net exports will be less helpful, as the impact of de-globalization and reshoring of manufacturing reduces the demand for China's exports. So real GDP will likely decelerate to 6.7% YoY in 3Q 2021, and to 5% YoY in 4Q 2021. Overcapacity issues will begin to exert a significant drag on bank asset quality by 4Q 2021. We would recommend being mildly underweight China equities, as political risk factors begin rising further.

FAI (fixed asset investment) declined in 2Q 2021, a sensible response to China's massive industrial overcapacity. Net exports and consumption were the key drivers of 7.9% YoY real GDP growth in 2Q 2021, which took 1H 2021 growth to 12.7% YoY. TSF (total social financing) did decelerate in January-May 2021, but began re-accelerating in June 2021 as the PBOC turned more dovish, following through with an RRR cut (effective 15 July 2021). With China's monetary conditions easing, at a time when US monetary policy is gradually hardening, the RMB will depreciate further, continuing the trend depreciation that began at the start of June 2021. Even during the period of a strengthening RMB, China was experiencing large capital flight: in 1H 2021, China's foreign reserves declined (by a marginal US$3 billion) even as the trade surplus remained elevated at US$255 billion. Despite the persistence of capital controls, China's capital flight is likely to accelerate in the rest of 2021 as monetary policy eases. With limited support from easier monetary policy, FAI will continue to decline marginally, and private consumption will decelerate (as the underlying social causes of high savings remain). Net exports will be less helpful, as the impact of de-globalization and reshoring of manufacturing reduces the demand for China's exports. So real GDP will likely decelerate to 6.7% YoY in 3Q 2021, and to 5% YoY in 4Q 2021. Overcapacity issues will begin to exert a significant drag on bank asset quality by 4Q 2021. We would recommend being mildly underweight China equities, as political risk factors begin rising further.  

China to Decelerate: Overcapacity Weakens FAI, Capital Flight Limits Monetary Ease

China's foreign reserves in May 2021 (US$3.22 billion) are the same as they were 5 years ago (in April 2016), although China has consistently had current account surpluses during those 5 years and been a net recipient of FDI inflows. Last year, the current account surplus was 1.9% of GDP, net FDI inflow was an estimated 1% of GDP, but foreign reserves increased by just US$109 billion (0.7% of GDP), implying that net capital flight was 2.2% of GDP in 2020. In 1Q 2021, the current account surplus was US$75 billion, but foreign reserves declined by US$47 billion -- implying net services and capital outflow of US$122 billion (3.5% of quarterly GDP). This is partly seasonal, but illustrates how difficult it will be for China to keep funding ambitious BRI projects. After the big devaluation (from RMB8.7/US$ to RMB5.8/US$) at the beginning of 1994, the RMB was pegged rigidly for 11 years (until 2005), then appreciated to RMB6.8/US$ by July 2008, staying pegged at that level until late-2010, and appreciating modestly to RMB6/US$ by April 2014. Foreign reserves peaked soon thereafter (at US$3.99 trillion in June 2014), and an implicit new peg (within a wide 8% fluctuation band on either side) at RMB6.7/US$ has existed for the past 5 years. This month is likely to witness mild RMB depreciation, after getting close to the top of the band in May. Mild RMB depreciation provides the only element of monetary easing that is possible currently. Anything more will lead to much larger capital flight. China is, anyway, benefitting currently from a powerful recovery in global trade (which has grown faster than global GDP in Jan-May 2021, after 3 years during which trade under-performed global GDP). Industrial growth will decelerate, especially in 2H 2021 as global (and Chinese) liquidity conditions tighten. FAI (the key driver of China's growth over the past 20 years, including in 2Q-4Q 2020) has already decelerated to 2.8% YoY growth in April 2021, and will likely remain sluggish for the rest of the year. We would recommend moving rotating away from the tech sector to consumer cyclicals in China.

China's foreign reserves in May 2021 (US$3.22 billion) are the same as they were 5 years ago (in April 2016), although China has consistently had current account surpluses during those 5 years and been a net recipient of FDI inflows. Last year, the current account surplus was 1.9% of GDP, net FDI inflow was an estimated 1% of GDP, but foreign reserves increased by just US$109 billion (0.7% of GDP), implying that net capital flight was 2.2% of GDP in 2020. In 1Q 2021, the current account surplus was US$75 billion, but foreign reserves declined by US$47 billion -- implying net services and capital outflow of US$122 billion (3.5% of quarterly GDP). This is partly seasonal, but illustrates how difficult it will be for China to keep funding ambitious BRI projects. After the big devaluation (from RMB8.7/US$ to RMB5.8/US$) at the beginning of 1994, the RMB was pegged rigidly for 11 years (until 2005), then appreciated to RMB6.8/US$ by July 2008, staying pegged at that level until late-2010, and appreciating modestly to RMB6/US$ by April 2014. Foreign reserves peaked soon thereafter (at US$3.99 trillion in June 2014), and an implicit new peg (within a wide 8% fluctuation band on either side) at RMB6.7/US$ has existed for the past 5 years. This month is likely to witness mild RMB depreciation, after getting close to the top of the band in May. Mild RMB depreciation provides the only element of monetary easing that is possible currently. Anything more will lead to much larger capital flight. China is, anyway, benefitting currently from a powerful recovery in global trade (which has grown faster than global GDP in Jan-May 2021, after 3 years during which trade under-performed global GDP). Industrial growth will decelerate, especially in 2H 2021 as global (and Chinese) liquidity conditions tighten. FAI (the key driver of China's growth over the past 20 years, including in 2Q-4Q 2020) has already decelerated to 2.8% YoY growth in April 2021, and will likely remain sluggish for the rest of the year. We would recommend moving rotating away from the tech sector to consumer cyclicals in China. 

China: Rising Capital Flight Suggests Limits to Further Monetary Stimulus This Year

China

iShares MSCI China ETF is an exchange-traded fund incorporated in the USA. The ETF seeks to track the performance of the MSCI China Index. The Index is a free float adjusted market cap weighted index designed to measure the performance of equity securities in the top 85% in market cap of Chinese equity markets, as represented by the A-Shares, H-Shares, B-Shares, Red Chips, & P-Chips.

iShares MSCI China ETF (MCHI US)

China: Succumbing to Excess Capacity in Industry and Real-Estate, & Capital Flight

China's economy was stagnant in Sep21 as FAI contracted 5.5%YoY (-3.3% in 3Q). Real GDP will decelerate to 3%YoY in 4Q21. Capital flight will...

Prasenjit K. Basu

U.S. Equity Strategy: Risk Appetites Improving; Watching Financials, Copper, US Dollar

Financials (XLF) are on the cusp of a breakout above $39, while copper is on the cusp of a breakout above $4.38; breakouts above resistance would...

Vermilion Research

China: The End of the Moral Hazard Play?

Moral hazard will be managed, not ended. Offshore bonds, local loans will bear pain. Property, health, education costs must fall. We recommend...

Prasenjit K. Basu

China to Decelerate: Overcapacity Weakens FAI, Capital Flight Limits Monetary Ease

Real GDP to decelerate to 5% YoY growth by 4Q 2021, as FAI (already down in 2Q2021) weakens further, and rising capital flight limits the PBOC's...

Prasenjit K. Basu

China: Rising Capital Flight Suggests Limits to Further Monetary Stimulus This Year

Foreign reserves up by just 0.7% of GDP in 2020, despite 1.9% of GDP current a/c surplus & net FDI inflow of 1% of GDP. Capital flight constrains...

Prasenjit K. Basu