DHICO rights offer 1st round pricing was fixed at ₩5,550. This ₩5,550 will serve as the ceiling. It is nearly guaranteed that the final offer price will be fixed somewhere between ₩5,000 and ₩5,550. It can not go lower than the face value ₩5,000.
Today (Mar 26) is the last day to get subscription rights. Subscription rights will be then tradable on Apr 19~25. The 4 bookrunners will buy all forfeited shares at a 15% discount to final offering price. There is no cancellation risk.
Local arb traders made their move yesterday. Foreign arb traders entered as well. Past tendency shows buying earlier would pay off more handsomely than waiting longer. DHICO’s fundamentals isn’t showing any positive sign yet. Deal structure isn’t helping improve street sentiments either. This event needs a lot of arb traders to hit the target. This is another relief point for those making early trades.
The market misinterpreted Amazon’s server DRAM demand cut in 4Q18. It wasn’t a sign of falling demand. There isn’t still any convincing sign of server DRAM falling demand. By the time SamE gets the optimization issue right, server DRAM demand of Amazon and Google will come. This will stabilize DRAM price as well. Micron’s production reduction will help it.
There seem to be several signs that it will be over much sooner than initially feared. I expect it to be over by the end of 2Q. This will lead to a ₩4tril addition quarterly to the current street consensus. At this, current PER falls to 9x.
On Monday the 18th of March, Yoshiaki Murakami-associated companies announced they had raised their stake in Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) above 10%. That stake raise happened at a price ABOVE where Bain Capital Japan’s bidding entity had set its “final” Tender Offer Price of ¥700/share beforehand, indicating there was no way Murakami-associated companies would accept Bain’s price.
On the 20th, Minami Aoyama Fudosan – another Murakami-associated company heretofore uninvolved – announced a Tender Offer for a minimum of 50.00% of Kosaido (and up to 100% of the shares out) at ¥750/share (and announced they had bought more bringing their stake to 13.47% in total).
The shares reacted strongly Friday the 22nd after a market holiday Thursday, rising 16.6% to close 14.5% through the Murakami-fund terms.
After the close on Friday, the Murakami-affiliated company Reno KK which has been the lead entity to date in the effort – announced a larger position (as I noted on the 19th was likely). Also after the close, Kosaido itself made three public releases.
It is worth reading them, and it is worth thinking about what the company’s options are.
For Recent Insights on the Kosaido Situation Published on Smartkarma…
This was the basis of the trade. Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) has been susceptible to pressure for a bump since even before the Tender Offer was announced because of the proxy fight at last year’s board meeting for management rights. Hitachi supported the incumbent who consequently retired as chairman, but kept the continuity. The board was split 6:3.
Since late January or early February when it became clear that board support for the deal was still split 6:3 and one of the points in a couple of the independent directors’ comments as reasons why the deal was not supported was that Hitachi’s bid at NT$60/share did not match an informal offer from Otis at $63/share, it has been clear that one way to extinguish that criticism was to bid NT$63 or higher.
And now Hitachi has. After the close on Friday, a release from Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) hit the mops system saying that Hitachi had amended the Public Purchase statement by raising the Purchase Price to NT$65/share. This is closer to the high end of the original valuations provided by the law firm and public accountancy firms of NT$40.27-68.31 and NT$55.15-67.83. Taiwan Hitachi Elevator released a press release carried by the ChinaTimes here.
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The market misinterpreted Amazon’s server DRAM demand cut in 4Q18. It wasn’t a sign of falling demand. There isn’t still any convincing sign of server DRAM falling demand. By the time SamE gets the optimization issue right, server DRAM demand of Amazon and Google will come. This will stabilize DRAM price as well. Micron’s production reduction will help it.
There seem to be several signs that it will be over much sooner than initially feared. I expect it to be over by the end of 2Q. This will lead to a ₩4tril addition quarterly to the current street consensus. At this, current PER falls to 9x.
On Monday the 18th of March, Yoshiaki Murakami-associated companies announced they had raised their stake in Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) above 10%. That stake raise happened at a price ABOVE where Bain Capital Japan’s bidding entity had set its “final” Tender Offer Price of ¥700/share beforehand, indicating there was no way Murakami-associated companies would accept Bain’s price.
On the 20th, Minami Aoyama Fudosan – another Murakami-associated company heretofore uninvolved – announced a Tender Offer for a minimum of 50.00% of Kosaido (and up to 100% of the shares out) at ¥750/share (and announced they had bought more bringing their stake to 13.47% in total).
The shares reacted strongly Friday the 22nd after a market holiday Thursday, rising 16.6% to close 14.5% through the Murakami-fund terms.
After the close on Friday, the Murakami-affiliated company Reno KK which has been the lead entity to date in the effort – announced a larger position (as I noted on the 19th was likely). Also after the close, Kosaido itself made three public releases.
It is worth reading them, and it is worth thinking about what the company’s options are.
For Recent Insights on the Kosaido Situation Published on Smartkarma…
This was the basis of the trade. Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) has been susceptible to pressure for a bump since even before the Tender Offer was announced because of the proxy fight at last year’s board meeting for management rights. Hitachi supported the incumbent who consequently retired as chairman, but kept the continuity. The board was split 6:3.
Since late January or early February when it became clear that board support for the deal was still split 6:3 and one of the points in a couple of the independent directors’ comments as reasons why the deal was not supported was that Hitachi’s bid at NT$60/share did not match an informal offer from Otis at $63/share, it has been clear that one way to extinguish that criticism was to bid NT$63 or higher.
And now Hitachi has. After the close on Friday, a release from Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) hit the mops system saying that Hitachi had amended the Public Purchase statement by raising the Purchase Price to NT$65/share. This is closer to the high end of the original valuations provided by the law firm and public accountancy firms of NT$40.27-68.31 and NT$55.15-67.83. Taiwan Hitachi Elevator released a press release carried by the ChinaTimes here.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas has now signed a Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium, which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper. The Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
At an equity valuation of A$2.1bn, this is being done at a TTM EV/EBITDA of ~15.5x (and probably around 0.8 turns less for FY19 forecast, which is healthy, but the company spins off prodigious cashflow, which makes it doable for private equity with leverage.
Given the lack of any real news or rumour of competing offer in the last five months, or in the period since the lockup, Travis Lundy doesn’t think it likely we will see one. Because he thinks this deal has very few hurdles, expect it to trade tight.
Harbin Electric’s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation, an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final and the IFA considers the offer fair & reasonable. The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit, and the lack of possibility of a competitive bidder emerging suggests this Offer falls over the line.
Seeing it blocked at the H-share meeting is a risk, although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal. The tendering acceptance condition in this two-step hybrid Offer of 90% of H shares out, has been seen in prior PRC-incorporated takeovers.
However, I still consider a “fair” price to be something like the distribution of net cash (~$3.48/share by my calcs) to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents from discussions with both the PRC and HK tribunals, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment.
Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/54.5%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 45%. Not an attractive risk/reward.
On March 6th, a day before Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)‘s Tender Offer for a minimum of just over a third of Yungtay was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, as Taiwan regulators (MEIC and FTC) had not signed off. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
An EGM called by independent director Chen – who has been against the deal – was expected to take place on the 18 April. It was not clear the underlying purpose of the EGM other than to change the directors in place and gain management rights for the Baojia Group and Hsu Tso-Ming. Perhaps IF the board were to be renewed with less support for Hitachi, then the board could change its support/opinion and that might affect retail investor support for the deal. Retail tends to vote with management. In any event Hitachi filed an injunction to stop the EGM.
IF Hitachi is unlikely to get the required number of shares, then it could easily be the case that they lose board and management control. If they do get the support, they will effectively control the board and management for the foreseeable future.
Travis’ expectation was that this deal was still “Safe” and would get done, most likely at NT$60 but with the option of a “kiss” to NT$63 or so in the case of more public awareness and castigation of Hitachi and the board for ignoring competing indications at higher prices.
Helpfully, after the close on Friday, Hitachi gave it a kiss, raising the Tender Offer price to NT$65/share.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights.
On the 8th of March, Bain Capital raised the Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. So, on the 21 March, Murakami-san launched a Tender Offer of his own.
Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK’s Tender Offer at ¥750/share is to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%). That minimum should be easier than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares at ¥700/share under Bain Capital’s offer.
There is a theoretical possibility that Japanese retail investors decide to tender their shares into Bain’s bid because it is supported by management rather than sell to a higher bid which is not. Travis doubted it will go this way but stranger things have happened. Bain should be willing to walk.
After Travis wrote the first two insights listed below with the content above, the stock soared 16.5% on Friday and ended at a 14.5% premium to the Murakami tender of ¥750/share (i.e. closed at ¥859/share). The company maintained its support for the Bain Capital bid at ¥700/share, but withdrew its recommendation that investors tender into it. The company did not yet offer a real opinion on Murakami-san’s offer. That must come in the next 9 business days.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights below.
Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU)announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.
During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.
Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. VLW has also recently bought back and cancelled 1.76mn shares or ~1.4% of shares out. The highest price paid was $2.09.
AVID’s offer looks opportunistic and it’s doubtful VLW will want to engage. VLW is trading below its book, paying out one of the highest yields among its peers, and with ~21% of the share register potentially defending their position- the largest shareholder actively buying – there’s likely upside from here. Shares closed Friday at $2.24.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with the AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the bidding. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital. Aveo’s share price is up ~11% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids – and closing at $1.97 on Friday – having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
The partial offer has successfully closed, with no major surprise in the expected pro-ration and the back end traded higher than one’s purchase price – not down. Some of this may be due to lack of stock borrow, and conversely, some of the strength may be due to those who had shorted their borrow buying back their short.
That left us with a question – do we want to own a residual here? Or instantiate a new position? The current post-tender price was 35.7% higher than the undisturbed price.
Travis could not recommend an outright buy on fundamental reasons. He thinks the Itochu story is reasonably compelling, or will be, but the lack of near-term observable fundamental turnaround may disappoint some. There may not be a lot of IR or analyst coverage of the situation either. For that, if you have a residual trade, he would sell it here.
This is not a short recommendation. This is a “It was a good arb trade and now the arb trade is over so don’t become a long-term investor just because it is doing better than you thought.”
CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the battery supplier industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that CATL could power Tesla Motors (TSLA US)’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai.
However, the news lacks credibility as neither company has commented on the matter, while Tesla has already agreed with Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its Chinese Plant.
But if true, Tesla would be the key one to benefit, while CATL could be taking up a considerable share of risk in terms of stable future orders.
The boards of Medco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ) and Ophir have agreed to increase the Offer price to £0.575 from £0.55, representing a 73.2% premium to the undisturbed price. All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer, declared it has no intention to bid. Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Petrus, which previously estimated a £0.64 – £1.42/share range – just for Ophir’s SEA investments, has yet to respond to the Offer increase; but it’s wholly doubtful their position has altered. Shortly before the bump, it said it would vote its 3.95% stake against the scheme.
While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. Shares closed at £0.569 on Friday.
CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP)has 89.47% of CEVA and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April. CEVA’s board of directors have reversed their earlier opinion and recommend shareholders to tender.
If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.
Depending on the final tendered %, the squeeze-out will occur via the simpler market squeeze-out process if CMA gets 98%+; or the more complex off-market merger/squeeze out route if the % tendered is between 90%-98%.
Ecopro BM is up 48% since its IPO on March 5th. Ecopro, which holds 56% in Ecopro BN is up just 1%. That stake is now worth 115% of its market cap.
The stub assets primarily comprise a 100% stake in Ecopro Innovation, which is involved in the processing of lithium for lithium ion batteries. Innovation’s net profit increased to ₩26.3bn in the 1Q-3Q18 from ₩10.4bn in 2017. Innovation’s book value also increased to ₩35.3bn at the end of 3Q18 from ₩7.4bn at end of 2017.
Douglas Kim recommended going long Ecopro Co and shorting Ecopro BM. Plugging in his numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 55%. Both legs are pretty liquid.
Curtis Lehnert closes this set-up trade as levels have reverted to the average. Both companies recently reported so-so results, suggesting the core business continues to face declining revenue from “roadshop” brands aimed at the lower-end of the market.
More surprising was the stock buyback announced at both companies 20 days after the earnings announcement, which spurred a 15% rally in the Group’s share price while Corp rallied nearly 11%. The buyback announcement seems to have caught the market by surprise and also caused the stub to revert to its 6-month average level of ~16% discount to NAV.
Douglas recommended closing the Hyosung unwind trade, which has returned ~8.2% before comms and borrowing cos.
The reason for Hyosung TNC’s recent move upwards? Right place, right time it would seem, as its trading value substantially increased, touching ₩8.9bn on the 19 March, the highest level this year, and the highest level since August 22nd, 2018.
On November 13th last year, Linkbal announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. Then it fell a lot. On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. This would get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way.
An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.
The company’s market cap is not large enough to warrant analyst coverage, and float will remain relatively small. I expect the stock to get re-evaluated by small-cap managers. There are some. There probably should be more.
Travis recommended investors buy the stock – which traded over 2% of shares outstanding at -2% in the first five minutes, and 3% of outstanding in the first 20 minutes, before rising to close +13.6% on Wednesday. The stock fell 6% on Friday.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s “Egregiously Bad” scheme has passed with 96.27% of disinterested shareholders approving the resolution. Shares will now be suspended at the close of trading on the 17 April. Cheques are expected to be dispatched on the 14 April. Seems like I’m not the only one as David Webb was also unimpressed with the Offer.
After Eclipx (ECX AU) announced a 42.4% decline in NPATA in the first five months vs. FY18, and other significant issues in the Right2Drive and Grays divisions, Mcmillan Shakespeare (MMS AU)said it did “not believe it will be possible to complete the proposed scheme“. Eclipx closed down 60% on the week.
Brookfield has received FIRB approval in its tilt for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). The AFR is reporting (paywalled) that BGH is now out of the running for Healthscope. Which leaves Brookfield’s twin bids ($2.50 via a scheme or $2.40 via an off-market takeover) as the expected winner. Norges Bank announced it now holds 5.08%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = my estimates; C =confirmed
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On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Issuance of the new shares and common stock to be delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
C
Japan
Descente
Off-Mkt
14-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
JIEC
Off-Mkt
18-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
Veriserve
Off-Mkt
18-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
ND Software
Off-Mkt
25-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
Showa Shell
Scheme
1-Apr
Close of merger
E
Japan
U-Shin
Off-Market
17-Apr
Tender Offer Close Date
C
NZ
Trade Me Group
Scheme
5-Mar
First Court Date
C
Singapore
Courts Asia Limited
Scheme
15-Mar
Offer Close Date
C
Singapore
M1 Limited
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Closing date of offer
C
Singapore
PCI Limited
Scheme
February
Release of Scheme Booklet
E
Taiwan
Yungtay Engineering
Off Mkt
17-Mar
Closing date of offer
C
Thailand
Delta Electronics
Off Mkt
26-Feb
Tender Offer Open
C
Finland
Amer Sports
Off Mkt
7-Mar
Offer Period Expires
C
Norway
Oslo Børs VPS
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Nasdaq Offer Close Date
C
Switzerland
Panalpina Welttransport
Off Mkt
27-Feb
Binding offer to be announced
E
US
Red Hat, Inc.
Scheme
March/April
Deal lodged for approval with EU Regulators
C
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Issuance of the new shares and common stock to be delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
C
Japan
Descente
Off-Mkt
14-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
JIEC
Off-Mkt
18-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
Veriserve
Off-Mkt
18-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
ND Software
Off-Mkt
25-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
Showa Shell
Scheme
1-Apr
Close of merger
E
Japan
U-Shin
Off-Market
17-Apr
Tender Offer Close Date
C
NZ
Trade Me Group
Scheme
5-Mar
First Court Date
C
Singapore
Courts Asia Limited
Scheme
15-Mar
Offer Close Date
C
Singapore
M1 Limited
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Closing date of offer
C
Singapore
PCI Limited
Scheme
February
Release of Scheme Booklet
E
Taiwan
Yungtay Engineering
Off Mkt
17-Mar
Closing date of offer
C
Thailand
Delta Electronics
Off Mkt
26-Feb
Tender Offer Open
C
Finland
Amer Sports
Off Mkt
7-Mar
Offer Period Expires
C
Norway
Oslo Børs VPS
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Nasdaq Offer Close Date
C
Switzerland
Panalpina Welttransport
Off Mkt
27-Feb
Binding offer to be announced
E
US
Red Hat, Inc.
Scheme
March/April
Deal lodged for approval with EU Regulators
C
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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The market misinterpreted Amazon’s server DRAM demand cut in 4Q18. It wasn’t a sign of falling demand. There isn’t still any convincing sign of server DRAM falling demand. By the time SamE gets the optimization issue right, server DRAM demand of Amazon and Google will come. This will stabilize DRAM price as well. Micron’s production reduction will help it.
There seem to be several signs that it will be over much sooner than initially feared. I expect it to be over by the end of 2Q. This will lead to a ₩4tril addition quarterly to the current street consensus. At this, current PER falls to 9x.
On Monday the 18th of March, Yoshiaki Murakami-associated companies announced they had raised their stake in Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) above 10%. That stake raise happened at a price ABOVE where Bain Capital Japan’s bidding entity had set its “final” Tender Offer Price of ¥700/share beforehand, indicating there was no way Murakami-associated companies would accept Bain’s price.
On the 20th, Minami Aoyama Fudosan – another Murakami-associated company heretofore uninvolved – announced a Tender Offer for a minimum of 50.00% of Kosaido (and up to 100% of the shares out) at ¥750/share (and announced they had bought more bringing their stake to 13.47% in total).
The shares reacted strongly Friday the 22nd after a market holiday Thursday, rising 16.6% to close 14.5% through the Murakami-fund terms.
After the close on Friday, the Murakami-affiliated company Reno KK which has been the lead entity to date in the effort – announced a larger position (as I noted on the 19th was likely). Also after the close, Kosaido itself made three public releases.
It is worth reading them, and it is worth thinking about what the company’s options are.
For Recent Insights on the Kosaido Situation Published on Smartkarma…
This was the basis of the trade. Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) has been susceptible to pressure for a bump since even before the Tender Offer was announced because of the proxy fight at last year’s board meeting for management rights. Hitachi supported the incumbent who consequently retired as chairman, but kept the continuity. The board was split 6:3.
Since late January or early February when it became clear that board support for the deal was still split 6:3 and one of the points in a couple of the independent directors’ comments as reasons why the deal was not supported was that Hitachi’s bid at NT$60/share did not match an informal offer from Otis at $63/share, it has been clear that one way to extinguish that criticism was to bid NT$63 or higher.
And now Hitachi has. After the close on Friday, a release from Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) hit the mops system saying that Hitachi had amended the Public Purchase statement by raising the Purchase Price to NT$65/share. This is closer to the high end of the original valuations provided by the law firm and public accountancy firms of NT$40.27-68.31 and NT$55.15-67.83. Taiwan Hitachi Elevator released a press release carried by the ChinaTimes here.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas has now signed a Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium, which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper. The Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
At an equity valuation of A$2.1bn, this is being done at a TTM EV/EBITDA of ~15.5x (and probably around 0.8 turns less for FY19 forecast, which is healthy, but the company spins off prodigious cashflow, which makes it doable for private equity with leverage.
Given the lack of any real news or rumour of competing offer in the last five months, or in the period since the lockup, Travis Lundy doesn’t think it likely we will see one. Because he thinks this deal has very few hurdles, expect it to trade tight.
Harbin Electric’s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation, an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final and the IFA considers the offer fair & reasonable. The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit, and the lack of possibility of a competitive bidder emerging suggests this Offer falls over the line.
Seeing it blocked at the H-share meeting is a risk, although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal. The tendering acceptance condition in this two-step hybrid Offer of 90% of H shares out, has been seen in prior PRC-incorporated takeovers.
However, I still consider a “fair” price to be something like the distribution of net cash (~$3.48/share by my calcs) to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents from discussions with both the PRC and HK tribunals, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment.
Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/54.5%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 45%. Not an attractive risk/reward.
On March 6th, a day before Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)‘s Tender Offer for a minimum of just over a third of Yungtay was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, as Taiwan regulators (MEIC and FTC) had not signed off. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
An EGM called by independent director Chen – who has been against the deal – was expected to take place on the 18 April. It was not clear the underlying purpose of the EGM other than to change the directors in place and gain management rights for the Baojia Group and Hsu Tso-Ming. Perhaps IF the board were to be renewed with less support for Hitachi, then the board could change its support/opinion and that might affect retail investor support for the deal. Retail tends to vote with management. In any event Hitachi filed an injunction to stop the EGM.
IF Hitachi is unlikely to get the required number of shares, then it could easily be the case that they lose board and management control. If they do get the support, they will effectively control the board and management for the foreseeable future.
Travis’ expectation was that this deal was still “Safe” and would get done, most likely at NT$60 but with the option of a “kiss” to NT$63 or so in the case of more public awareness and castigation of Hitachi and the board for ignoring competing indications at higher prices.
Helpfully, after the close on Friday, Hitachi gave it a kiss, raising the Tender Offer price to NT$65/share.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights.
On the 8th of March, Bain Capital raised the Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. So, on the 21 March, Murakami-san launched a Tender Offer of his own.
Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK’s Tender Offer at ¥750/share is to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%). That minimum should be easier than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares at ¥700/share under Bain Capital’s offer.
There is a theoretical possibility that Japanese retail investors decide to tender their shares into Bain’s bid because it is supported by management rather than sell to a higher bid which is not. Travis doubted it will go this way but stranger things have happened. Bain should be willing to walk.
After Travis wrote the first two insights listed below with the content above, the stock soared 16.5% on Friday and ended at a 14.5% premium to the Murakami tender of ¥750/share (i.e. closed at ¥859/share). The company maintained its support for the Bain Capital bid at ¥700/share, but withdrew its recommendation that investors tender into it. The company did not yet offer a real opinion on Murakami-san’s offer. That must come in the next 9 business days.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights below.
Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU)announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.
During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.
Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. VLW has also recently bought back and cancelled 1.76mn shares or ~1.4% of shares out. The highest price paid was $2.09.
AVID’s offer looks opportunistic and it’s doubtful VLW will want to engage. VLW is trading below its book, paying out one of the highest yields among its peers, and with ~21% of the share register potentially defending their position- the largest shareholder actively buying – there’s likely upside from here. Shares closed Friday at $2.24.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with the AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the bidding. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital. Aveo’s share price is up ~11% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids – and closing at $1.97 on Friday – having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
The partial offer has successfully closed, with no major surprise in the expected pro-ration and the back end traded higher than one’s purchase price – not down. Some of this may be due to lack of stock borrow, and conversely, some of the strength may be due to those who had shorted their borrow buying back their short.
That left us with a question – do we want to own a residual here? Or instantiate a new position? The current post-tender price was 35.7% higher than the undisturbed price.
Travis could not recommend an outright buy on fundamental reasons. He thinks the Itochu story is reasonably compelling, or will be, but the lack of near-term observable fundamental turnaround may disappoint some. There may not be a lot of IR or analyst coverage of the situation either. For that, if you have a residual trade, he would sell it here.
This is not a short recommendation. This is a “It was a good arb trade and now the arb trade is over so don’t become a long-term investor just because it is doing better than you thought.”
CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the battery supplier industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that CATL could power Tesla Motors (TSLA US)’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai.
However, the news lacks credibility as neither company has commented on the matter, while Tesla has already agreed with Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its Chinese Plant.
But if true, Tesla would be the key one to benefit, while CATL could be taking up a considerable share of risk in terms of stable future orders.
The boards of Medco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ) and Ophir have agreed to increase the Offer price to £0.575 from £0.55, representing a 73.2% premium to the undisturbed price. All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer, declared it has no intention to bid. Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Petrus, which previously estimated a £0.64 – £1.42/share range – just for Ophir’s SEA investments, has yet to respond to the Offer increase; but it’s wholly doubtful their position has altered. Shortly before the bump, it said it would vote its 3.95% stake against the scheme.
While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. Shares closed at £0.569 on Friday.
CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP)has 89.47% of CEVA and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April. CEVA’s board of directors have reversed their earlier opinion and recommend shareholders to tender.
If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.
Depending on the final tendered %, the squeeze-out will occur via the simpler market squeeze-out process if CMA gets 98%+; or the more complex off-market merger/squeeze out route if the % tendered is between 90%-98%.
Ecopro BM is up 48% since its IPO on March 5th. Ecopro, which holds 56% in Ecopro BN is up just 1%. That stake is now worth 115% of its market cap.
The stub assets primarily comprise a 100% stake in Ecopro Innovation, which is involved in the processing of lithium for lithium ion batteries. Innovation’s net profit increased to ₩26.3bn in the 1Q-3Q18 from ₩10.4bn in 2017. Innovation’s book value also increased to ₩35.3bn at the end of 3Q18 from ₩7.4bn at end of 2017.
Douglas Kim recommended going long Ecopro Co and shorting Ecopro BM. Plugging in his numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 55%. Both legs are pretty liquid.
Curtis Lehnert closes this set-up trade as levels have reverted to the average. Both companies recently reported so-so results, suggesting the core business continues to face declining revenue from “roadshop” brands aimed at the lower-end of the market.
More surprising was the stock buyback announced at both companies 20 days after the earnings announcement, which spurred a 15% rally in the Group’s share price while Corp rallied nearly 11%. The buyback announcement seems to have caught the market by surprise and also caused the stub to revert to its 6-month average level of ~16% discount to NAV.
Douglas recommended closing the Hyosung unwind trade, which has returned ~8.2% before comms and borrowing cos.
The reason for Hyosung TNC’s recent move upwards? Right place, right time it would seem, as its trading value substantially increased, touching ₩8.9bn on the 19 March, the highest level this year, and the highest level since August 22nd, 2018.
On November 13th last year, Linkbal announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. Then it fell a lot. On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. This would get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way.
An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.
The company’s market cap is not large enough to warrant analyst coverage, and float will remain relatively small. I expect the stock to get re-evaluated by small-cap managers. There are some. There probably should be more.
Travis recommended investors buy the stock – which traded over 2% of shares outstanding at -2% in the first five minutes, and 3% of outstanding in the first 20 minutes, before rising to close +13.6% on Wednesday. The stock fell 6% on Friday.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s “Egregiously Bad” scheme has passed with 96.27% of disinterested shareholders approving the resolution. Shares will now be suspended at the close of trading on the 17 April. Cheques are expected to be dispatched on the 14 April. Seems like I’m not the only one as David Webb was also unimpressed with the Offer.
After Eclipx (ECX AU) announced a 42.4% decline in NPATA in the first five months vs. FY18, and other significant issues in the Right2Drive and Grays divisions, Mcmillan Shakespeare (MMS AU)said it did “not believe it will be possible to complete the proposed scheme“. Eclipx closed down 60% on the week.
Brookfield has received FIRB approval in its tilt for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). The AFR is reporting (paywalled) that BGH is now out of the running for Healthscope. Which leaves Brookfield’s twin bids ($2.50 via a scheme or $2.40 via an off-market takeover) as the expected winner. Norges Bank announced it now holds 5.08%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The news released on the 11th of March, about Tesla Motors (TSLA US) choosing CATL (A) (300750 CH) as battery supplier has focused much attention on the two companies and other battery suppliers. CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that, CATL could power Tesla’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai. Following the release of this supposed deal, the stocks of the two companies moved positively, with CATL surging by almost 6.7% while Tesla rose by almost 2.4% during the day. However, both parties have not commented on this news yet or made any formal announcement regarding such a potential deal. In our Insight, Tesla Drifting Away Could Leave Panasonic Struggling to Gain Traction in China, we mentioned that Tesla was looking to locally source its batteries in China and that CATL could potentially be one such supplier. However, in January this year, it was reported that Tesla had signed a preliminary agreement with China’s Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its new Shanghai car factory, making the current news look less believable. Although it seems like the ongoing news about a Tesla-CATL pair up lacks integrity, with CATL sort of denying its intend to work with Tesla (according to an updated news release), the news does look interesting and its effect upon the related companies seems noteworthy.
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Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest (DCG LN) today announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement which the two parties say is likely to close in Q2 2019.
Saputo is a Canada-listed dairy company which has grown through serial acquisition – more than 30 acquisitions in the last twenty years – but curiously none of the acquisitions have left it with any operations in the UK. Dairy Crest is a leading UK-based dairy and cooking staples company whose best-known products are Cathedral City Cheddar Cheese, Clover margarine, Country Life butter, and Frylight cooking oil as well as other minor butter-similars and butter-replacement spreads.
This would be Saputo’s largest purchase in ten years – by a factor of three over their second largest – the purchase of Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory in Q1 2014.
Shares are trading through terms early, perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At a decent premium (13.9x TTM EV/EBITDA at 620p) to where the rest of the smaller-cap dairy products sector trades (below 10x on a median basis), and the highest EV/Revenue or EV/EBITDA multiple that I can find Saputo having paid, asking for more may not get you more, but investors clearly think it worth a try.
An extra 10% would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. It would put March 2019 PER at just under 20x and just under 13.9x March 2019 expected EV/EBITDA.
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On Monday the 18th of March, Yoshiaki Murakami-associated companies announced they had raised their stake in Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) above 10%. That stake raise happened at a price ABOVE where Bain Capital Japan’s bidding entity had set its “final” Tender Offer Price of ¥700/share beforehand, indicating there was no way Murakami-associated companies would accept Bain’s price.
On the 20th, Minami Aoyama Fudosan – another Murakami-associated company heretofore uninvolved – announced a Tender Offer for a minimum of 50.00% of Kosaido (and up to 100% of the shares out) at ¥750/share (and announced they had bought more bringing their stake to 13.47% in total).
The shares reacted strongly Friday the 22nd after a market holiday Thursday, rising 16.6% to close 14.5% through the Murakami-fund terms.
After the close on Friday, the Murakami-affiliated company Reno KK which has been the lead entity to date in the effort – announced a larger position (as I noted on the 19th was likely). Also after the close, Kosaido itself made three public releases.
It is worth reading them, and it is worth thinking about what the company’s options are.
For Recent Insights on the Kosaido Situation Published on Smartkarma…
This was the basis of the trade. Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) has been susceptible to pressure for a bump since even before the Tender Offer was announced because of the proxy fight at last year’s board meeting for management rights. Hitachi supported the incumbent who consequently retired as chairman, but kept the continuity. The board was split 6:3.
Since late January or early February when it became clear that board support for the deal was still split 6:3 and one of the points in a couple of the independent directors’ comments as reasons why the deal was not supported was that Hitachi’s bid at NT$60/share did not match an informal offer from Otis at $63/share, it has been clear that one way to extinguish that criticism was to bid NT$63 or higher.
And now Hitachi has. After the close on Friday, a release from Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) hit the mops system saying that Hitachi had amended the Public Purchase statement by raising the Purchase Price to NT$65/share. This is closer to the high end of the original valuations provided by the law firm and public accountancy firms of NT$40.27-68.31 and NT$55.15-67.83. Taiwan Hitachi Elevator released a press release carried by the ChinaTimes here.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas has now signed a Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium, which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper. The Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
At an equity valuation of A$2.1bn, this is being done at a TTM EV/EBITDA of ~15.5x (and probably around 0.8 turns less for FY19 forecast, which is healthy, but the company spins off prodigious cashflow, which makes it doable for private equity with leverage.
Given the lack of any real news or rumour of competing offer in the last five months, or in the period since the lockup, Travis Lundy doesn’t think it likely we will see one. Because he thinks this deal has very few hurdles, expect it to trade tight.
Harbin Electric’s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation, an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final and the IFA considers the offer fair & reasonable. The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit, and the lack of possibility of a competitive bidder emerging suggests this Offer falls over the line.
Seeing it blocked at the H-share meeting is a risk, although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal. The tendering acceptance condition in this two-step hybrid Offer of 90% of H shares out, has been seen in prior PRC-incorporated takeovers.
However, I still consider a “fair” price to be something like the distribution of net cash (~$3.48/share by my calcs) to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents from discussions with both the PRC and HK tribunals, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment.
Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/54.5%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 45%. Not an attractive risk/reward.
On March 6th, a day before Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)‘s Tender Offer for a minimum of just over a third of Yungtay was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, as Taiwan regulators (MEIC and FTC) had not signed off. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
An EGM called by independent director Chen – who has been against the deal – was expected to take place on the 18 April. It was not clear the underlying purpose of the EGM other than to change the directors in place and gain management rights for the Baojia Group and Hsu Tso-Ming. Perhaps IF the board were to be renewed with less support for Hitachi, then the board could change its support/opinion and that might affect retail investor support for the deal. Retail tends to vote with management. In any event Hitachi filed an injunction to stop the EGM.
IF Hitachi is unlikely to get the required number of shares, then it could easily be the case that they lose board and management control. If they do get the support, they will effectively control the board and management for the foreseeable future.
Travis’ expectation was that this deal was still “Safe” and would get done, most likely at NT$60 but with the option of a “kiss” to NT$63 or so in the case of more public awareness and castigation of Hitachi and the board for ignoring competing indications at higher prices.
Helpfully, after the close on Friday, Hitachi gave it a kiss, raising the Tender Offer price to NT$65/share.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights.
On the 8th of March, Bain Capital raised the Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. So, on the 21 March, Murakami-san launched a Tender Offer of his own.
Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK’s Tender Offer at ¥750/share is to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%). That minimum should be easier than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares at ¥700/share under Bain Capital’s offer.
There is a theoretical possibility that Japanese retail investors decide to tender their shares into Bain’s bid because it is supported by management rather than sell to a higher bid which is not. Travis doubted it will go this way but stranger things have happened. Bain should be willing to walk.
After Travis wrote the first two insights listed below with the content above, the stock soared 16.5% on Friday and ended at a 14.5% premium to the Murakami tender of ¥750/share (i.e. closed at ¥859/share). The company maintained its support for the Bain Capital bid at ¥700/share, but withdrew its recommendation that investors tender into it. The company did not yet offer a real opinion on Murakami-san’s offer. That must come in the next 9 business days.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights below.
Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU)announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.
During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.
Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. VLW has also recently bought back and cancelled 1.76mn shares or ~1.4% of shares out. The highest price paid was $2.09.
AVID’s offer looks opportunistic and it’s doubtful VLW will want to engage. VLW is trading below its book, paying out one of the highest yields among its peers, and with ~21% of the share register potentially defending their position- the largest shareholder actively buying – there’s likely upside from here. Shares closed Friday at $2.24.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with the AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the bidding. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital. Aveo’s share price is up ~11% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids – and closing at $1.97 on Friday – having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
The partial offer has successfully closed, with no major surprise in the expected pro-ration and the back end traded higher than one’s purchase price – not down. Some of this may be due to lack of stock borrow, and conversely, some of the strength may be due to those who had shorted their borrow buying back their short.
That left us with a question – do we want to own a residual here? Or instantiate a new position? The current post-tender price was 35.7% higher than the undisturbed price.
Travis could not recommend an outright buy on fundamental reasons. He thinks the Itochu story is reasonably compelling, or will be, but the lack of near-term observable fundamental turnaround may disappoint some. There may not be a lot of IR or analyst coverage of the situation either. For that, if you have a residual trade, he would sell it here.
This is not a short recommendation. This is a “It was a good arb trade and now the arb trade is over so don’t become a long-term investor just because it is doing better than you thought.”
CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the battery supplier industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that CATL could power Tesla Motors (TSLA US)’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai.
However, the news lacks credibility as neither company has commented on the matter, while Tesla has already agreed with Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its Chinese Plant.
But if true, Tesla would be the key one to benefit, while CATL could be taking up a considerable share of risk in terms of stable future orders.
The boards of Medco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ) and Ophir have agreed to increase the Offer price to £0.575 from £0.55, representing a 73.2% premium to the undisturbed price. All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer, declared it has no intention to bid. Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Petrus, which previously estimated a £0.64 – £1.42/share range – just for Ophir’s SEA investments, has yet to respond to the Offer increase; but it’s wholly doubtful their position has altered. Shortly before the bump, it said it would vote its 3.95% stake against the scheme.
While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. Shares closed at £0.569 on Friday.
CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP)has 89.47% of CEVA and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April. CEVA’s board of directors have reversed their earlier opinion and recommend shareholders to tender.
If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.
Depending on the final tendered %, the squeeze-out will occur via the simpler market squeeze-out process if CMA gets 98%+; or the more complex off-market merger/squeeze out route if the % tendered is between 90%-98%.
Ecopro BM is up 48% since its IPO on March 5th. Ecopro, which holds 56% in Ecopro BN is up just 1%. That stake is now worth 115% of its market cap.
The stub assets primarily comprise a 100% stake in Ecopro Innovation, which is involved in the processing of lithium for lithium ion batteries. Innovation’s net profit increased to ₩26.3bn in the 1Q-3Q18 from ₩10.4bn in 2017. Innovation’s book value also increased to ₩35.3bn at the end of 3Q18 from ₩7.4bn at end of 2017.
Douglas Kim recommended going long Ecopro Co and shorting Ecopro BM. Plugging in his numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 55%. Both legs are pretty liquid.
Curtis Lehnert closes this set-up trade as levels have reverted to the average. Both companies recently reported so-so results, suggesting the core business continues to face declining revenue from “roadshop” brands aimed at the lower-end of the market.
More surprising was the stock buyback announced at both companies 20 days after the earnings announcement, which spurred a 15% rally in the Group’s share price while Corp rallied nearly 11%. The buyback announcement seems to have caught the market by surprise and also caused the stub to revert to its 6-month average level of ~16% discount to NAV.
Douglas recommended closing the Hyosung unwind trade, which has returned ~8.2% before comms and borrowing cos.
The reason for Hyosung TNC’s recent move upwards? Right place, right time it would seem, as its trading value substantially increased, touching ₩8.9bn on the 19 March, the highest level this year, and the highest level since August 22nd, 2018.
On November 13th last year, Linkbal announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. Then it fell a lot. On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. This would get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way.
An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.
The company’s market cap is not large enough to warrant analyst coverage, and float will remain relatively small. I expect the stock to get re-evaluated by small-cap managers. There are some. There probably should be more.
Travis recommended investors buy the stock – which traded over 2% of shares outstanding at -2% in the first five minutes, and 3% of outstanding in the first 20 minutes, before rising to close +13.6% on Wednesday. The stock fell 6% on Friday.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s “Egregiously Bad” scheme has passed with 96.27% of disinterested shareholders approving the resolution. Shares will now be suspended at the close of trading on the 17 April. Cheques are expected to be dispatched on the 14 April. Seems like I’m not the only one as David Webb was also unimpressed with the Offer.
After Eclipx (ECX AU) announced a 42.4% decline in NPATA in the first five months vs. FY18, and other significant issues in the Right2Drive and Grays divisions, Mcmillan Shakespeare (MMS AU)said it did “not believe it will be possible to complete the proposed scheme“. Eclipx closed down 60% on the week.
Brookfield has received FIRB approval in its tilt for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). The AFR is reporting (paywalled) that BGH is now out of the running for Healthscope. Which leaves Brookfield’s twin bids ($2.50 via a scheme or $2.40 via an off-market takeover) as the expected winner. Norges Bank announced it now holds 5.08%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The news released on the 11th of March, about Tesla Motors (TSLA US) choosing CATL (A) (300750 CH) as battery supplier has focused much attention on the two companies and other battery suppliers. CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that, CATL could power Tesla’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai. Following the release of this supposed deal, the stocks of the two companies moved positively, with CATL surging by almost 6.7% while Tesla rose by almost 2.4% during the day. However, both parties have not commented on this news yet or made any formal announcement regarding such a potential deal. In our Insight, Tesla Drifting Away Could Leave Panasonic Struggling to Gain Traction in China, we mentioned that Tesla was looking to locally source its batteries in China and that CATL could potentially be one such supplier. However, in January this year, it was reported that Tesla had signed a preliminary agreement with China’s Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its new Shanghai car factory, making the current news look less believable. Although it seems like the ongoing news about a Tesla-CATL pair up lacks integrity, with CATL sort of denying its intend to work with Tesla (according to an updated news release), the news does look interesting and its effect upon the related companies seems noteworthy.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has now signed a Board-recommended Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper.
The agreed Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
This history is that the consortium came in at A$5.50 (plus another cash+RollCo scrip offer), a month or so later the company effectively rejected it by not allowing the consortium to do due diligence after management lifted earnings guidance. This upset a number of shareholders. In November the share price ranged from A$4.95-5.25 or so and Chairman Tracey Horton got only 51% support at the AGM that month. The shares fell briefly below A$4.70 in early January this year before BGH came back in mid-January with a “revised indicative offer” of A$5.825 whereupon the shares bounced from about A$4.90 to about A$5.50 then climbed to A$5.60+ on 10mm shares volume in 3 days.
The shares hovered around A$5.58-5.62 for 6-7 weeks until the beginning of March, briefly traded into the A$5.70s, and then traded back down the last few days this week to the A$5.59-5.63 area.
On Thursday 21 March the shares were halted for the day, StreetTalk had an article about the deal being imminent, and late in the afternoon, the BGH SID was announced.
Now we start the official process. The Scheme document is expected to be dispatched in May 2019 with a deal completed by end-June or early July. I expect this deal gets up.
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On Friday 22 February 2019 after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)announced (J) a Secondary Shares Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding.
Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe.
On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33 billion worth (whichever is reached first) to last from the business day immediately following the delivery date of the Offering shares (practically speaking, a day on or between 13 March and 18 March 2019) to 12 April 2019. Based on an average daily volume traded of 2.2mm shares, 10% participation would mean the buyback would take 5 days to complete. 5% would take 9 days. The company also announced (E) it would cancel 10 million shares on 29 March 2019. That may only be 45% of the post-buyback treasury share position, but it leads to another event investors should watch.
This is the first buyback Nintendo has announced in five years. The Nikkei article discussing the situation suggests that the possibility of supply/demand being weak is the reason for the buyback. The stated reason for the Offering as proposed by Nintendo in its Offering announcement, suggested a goal of increasing and diversifying the shareholder base.
The fact that JPX was selling the shares was not important. The reasoning was. And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight).
My words then still stand.
And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight). The ramifications are significant.
The ramifications of this Offering are significant too. This is a lot more than just an offering by entities looking to take profits.
On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest (DCG LN) today announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement which the two parties say is likely to close in Q2 2019.
Saputo is a Canada-listed dairy company which has grown through serial acquisition – more than 30 acquisitions in the last twenty years – but curiously none of the acquisitions have left it with any operations in the UK. Dairy Crest is a leading UK-based dairy and cooking staples company whose best-known products are Cathedral City Cheddar Cheese, Clover margarine, Country Life butter, and Frylight cooking oil as well as other minor butter-similars and butter-replacement spreads.
This would be Saputo’s largest purchase in ten years – by a factor of three over their second largest – the purchase of Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory in Q1 2014.
Shares are trading through terms early, perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At a decent premium (13.9x TTM EV/EBITDA at 620p) to where the rest of the smaller-cap dairy products sector trades (below 10x on a median basis), and the highest EV/Revenue or EV/EBITDA multiple that I can find Saputo having paid, asking for more may not get you more, but investors clearly think it worth a try.
An extra 10% would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. It would put March 2019 PER at just under 20x and just under 13.9x March 2019 expected EV/EBITDA.
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After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas has now signed a Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium, which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper. The Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
At an equity valuation of A$2.1bn, this is being done at a TTM EV/EBITDA of ~15.5x (and probably around 0.8 turns less for FY19 forecast, which is healthy, but the company spins off prodigious cashflow, which makes it doable for private equity with leverage.
Given the lack of any real news or rumour of competing offer in the last five months, or in the period since the lockup, Travis Lundy doesn’t think it likely we will see one. Because he thinks this deal has very few hurdles, expect it to trade tight.
Harbin Electric’s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation, an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final and the IFA considers the offer fair & reasonable. The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit, and the lack of possibility of a competitive bidder emerging suggests this Offer falls over the line.
Seeing it blocked at the H-share meeting is a risk, although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal. The tendering acceptance condition in this two-step hybrid Offer of 90% of H shares out, has been seen in prior PRC-incorporated takeovers.
However, I still consider a “fair” price to be something like the distribution of net cash (~$3.48/share by my calcs) to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents from discussions with both the PRC and HK tribunals, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment.
Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/54.5%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 45%. Not an attractive risk/reward.
On March 6th, a day before Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)‘s Tender Offer for a minimum of just over a third of Yungtay was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, as Taiwan regulators (MEIC and FTC) had not signed off. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
An EGM called by independent director Chen – who has been against the deal – was expected to take place on the 18 April. It was not clear the underlying purpose of the EGM other than to change the directors in place and gain management rights for the Baojia Group and Hsu Tso-Ming. Perhaps IF the board were to be renewed with less support for Hitachi, then the board could change its support/opinion and that might affect retail investor support for the deal. Retail tends to vote with management. In any event Hitachi filed an injunction to stop the EGM.
IF Hitachi is unlikely to get the required number of shares, then it could easily be the case that they lose board and management control. If they do get the support, they will effectively control the board and management for the foreseeable future.
Travis’ expectation was that this deal was still “Safe” and would get done, most likely at NT$60 but with the option of a “kiss” to NT$63 or so in the case of more public awareness and castigation of Hitachi and the board for ignoring competing indications at higher prices.
Helpfully, after the close on Friday, Hitachi gave it a kiss, raising the Tender Offer price to NT$65/share.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights.
On the 8th of March, Bain Capital raised the Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. So, on the 21 March, Murakami-san launched a Tender Offer of his own.
Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK’s Tender Offer at ¥750/share is to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%). That minimum should be easier than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares at ¥700/share under Bain Capital’s offer.
There is a theoretical possibility that Japanese retail investors decide to tender their shares into Bain’s bid because it is supported by management rather than sell to a higher bid which is not. Travis doubted it will go this way but stranger things have happened. Bain should be willing to walk.
After Travis wrote the first two insights listed below with the content above, the stock soared 16.5% on Friday and ended at a 14.5% premium to the Murakami tender of ¥750/share (i.e. closed at ¥859/share). The company maintained its support for the Bain Capital bid at ¥700/share, but withdrew its recommendation that investors tender into it. The company did not yet offer a real opinion on Murakami-san’s offer. That must come in the next 9 business days.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights below.
Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU)announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.
During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.
Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. VLW has also recently bought back and cancelled 1.76mn shares or ~1.4% of shares out. The highest price paid was $2.09.
AVID’s offer looks opportunistic and it’s doubtful VLW will want to engage. VLW is trading below its book, paying out one of the highest yields among its peers, and with ~21% of the share register potentially defending their position- the largest shareholder actively buying – there’s likely upside from here. Shares closed Friday at $2.24.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with the AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the bidding. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital. Aveo’s share price is up ~11% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids – and closing at $1.97 on Friday – having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
The partial offer has successfully closed, with no major surprise in the expected pro-ration and the back end traded higher than one’s purchase price – not down. Some of this may be due to lack of stock borrow, and conversely, some of the strength may be due to those who had shorted their borrow buying back their short.
That left us with a question – do we want to own a residual here? Or instantiate a new position? The current post-tender price was 35.7% higher than the undisturbed price.
Travis could not recommend an outright buy on fundamental reasons. He thinks the Itochu story is reasonably compelling, or will be, but the lack of near-term observable fundamental turnaround may disappoint some. There may not be a lot of IR or analyst coverage of the situation either. For that, if you have a residual trade, he would sell it here.
This is not a short recommendation. This is a “It was a good arb trade and now the arb trade is over so don’t become a long-term investor just because it is doing better than you thought.”
CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the battery supplier industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that CATL could power Tesla Motors (TSLA US)’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai.
However, the news lacks credibility as neither company has commented on the matter, while Tesla has already agreed with Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its Chinese Plant.
But if true, Tesla would be the key one to benefit, while CATL could be taking up a considerable share of risk in terms of stable future orders.
The boards of Medco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ) and Ophir have agreed to increase the Offer price to £0.575 from £0.55, representing a 73.2% premium to the undisturbed price. All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer, declared it has no intention to bid. Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Petrus, which previously estimated a £0.64 – £1.42/share range – just for Ophir’s SEA investments, has yet to respond to the Offer increase; but it’s wholly doubtful their position has altered. Shortly before the bump, it said it would vote its 3.95% stake against the scheme.
While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. Shares closed at £0.569 on Friday.
CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP)has 89.47% of CEVA and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April. CEVA’s board of directors have reversed their earlier opinion and recommend shareholders to tender.
If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.
Depending on the final tendered %, the squeeze-out will occur via the simpler market squeeze-out process if CMA gets 98%+; or the more complex off-market merger/squeeze out route if the % tendered is between 90%-98%.
Ecopro BM is up 48% since its IPO on March 5th. Ecopro, which holds 56% in Ecopro BN is up just 1%. That stake is now worth 115% of its market cap.
The stub assets primarily comprise a 100% stake in Ecopro Innovation, which is involved in the processing of lithium for lithium ion batteries. Innovation’s net profit increased to ₩26.3bn in the 1Q-3Q18 from ₩10.4bn in 2017. Innovation’s book value also increased to ₩35.3bn at the end of 3Q18 from ₩7.4bn at end of 2017.
Douglas Kim recommended going long Ecopro Co and shorting Ecopro BM. Plugging in his numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 55%. Both legs are pretty liquid.
Curtis Lehnert closes this set-up trade as levels have reverted to the average. Both companies recently reported so-so results, suggesting the core business continues to face declining revenue from “roadshop” brands aimed at the lower-end of the market.
More surprising was the stock buyback announced at both companies 20 days after the earnings announcement, which spurred a 15% rally in the Group’s share price while Corp rallied nearly 11%. The buyback announcement seems to have caught the market by surprise and also caused the stub to revert to its 6-month average level of ~16% discount to NAV.
Douglas recommended closing the Hyosung unwind trade, which has returned ~8.2% before comms and borrowing cos.
The reason for Hyosung TNC’s recent move upwards? Right place, right time it would seem, as its trading value substantially increased, touching ₩8.9bn on the 19 March, the highest level this year, and the highest level since August 22nd, 2018.
On November 13th last year, Linkbal announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. Then it fell a lot. On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. This would get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way.
An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.
The company’s market cap is not large enough to warrant analyst coverage, and float will remain relatively small. I expect the stock to get re-evaluated by small-cap managers. There are some. There probably should be more.
Travis recommended investors buy the stock – which traded over 2% of shares outstanding at -2% in the first five minutes, and 3% of outstanding in the first 20 minutes, before rising to close +13.6% on Wednesday. The stock fell 6% on Friday.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s “Egregiously Bad” scheme has passed with 96.27% of disinterested shareholders approving the resolution. Shares will now be suspended at the close of trading on the 17 April. Cheques are expected to be dispatched on the 14 April. Seems like I’m not the only one as David Webb was also unimpressed with the Offer.
After Eclipx (ECX AU) announced a 42.4% decline in NPATA in the first five months vs. FY18, and other significant issues in the Right2Drive and Grays divisions, Mcmillan Shakespeare (MMS AU)said it did “not believe it will be possible to complete the proposed scheme“. Eclipx closed down 60% on the week.
Brookfield has received FIRB approval in its tilt for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). The AFR is reporting (paywalled) that BGH is now out of the running for Healthscope. Which leaves Brookfield’s twin bids ($2.50 via a scheme or $2.40 via an off-market takeover) as the expected winner. Norges Bank announced it now holds 5.08%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The news released on the 11th of March, about Tesla Motors (TSLA US) choosing CATL (A) (300750 CH) as battery supplier has focused much attention on the two companies and other battery suppliers. CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that, CATL could power Tesla’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai. Following the release of this supposed deal, the stocks of the two companies moved positively, with CATL surging by almost 6.7% while Tesla rose by almost 2.4% during the day. However, both parties have not commented on this news yet or made any formal announcement regarding such a potential deal. In our Insight, Tesla Drifting Away Could Leave Panasonic Struggling to Gain Traction in China, we mentioned that Tesla was looking to locally source its batteries in China and that CATL could potentially be one such supplier. However, in January this year, it was reported that Tesla had signed a preliminary agreement with China’s Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its new Shanghai car factory, making the current news look less believable. Although it seems like the ongoing news about a Tesla-CATL pair up lacks integrity, with CATL sort of denying its intend to work with Tesla (according to an updated news release), the news does look interesting and its effect upon the related companies seems noteworthy.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has now signed a Board-recommended Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper.
The agreed Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
This history is that the consortium came in at A$5.50 (plus another cash+RollCo scrip offer), a month or so later the company effectively rejected it by not allowing the consortium to do due diligence after management lifted earnings guidance. This upset a number of shareholders. In November the share price ranged from A$4.95-5.25 or so and Chairman Tracey Horton got only 51% support at the AGM that month. The shares fell briefly below A$4.70 in early January this year before BGH came back in mid-January with a “revised indicative offer” of A$5.825 whereupon the shares bounced from about A$4.90 to about A$5.50 then climbed to A$5.60+ on 10mm shares volume in 3 days.
The shares hovered around A$5.58-5.62 for 6-7 weeks until the beginning of March, briefly traded into the A$5.70s, and then traded back down the last few days this week to the A$5.59-5.63 area.
On Thursday 21 March the shares were halted for the day, StreetTalk had an article about the deal being imminent, and late in the afternoon, the BGH SID was announced.
Now we start the official process. The Scheme document is expected to be dispatched in May 2019 with a deal completed by end-June or early July. I expect this deal gets up.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU), an Australian-listed education company, entered into a binding agreement to be acquired by the BGH Consortium. As a reminder on 15 January 2019, the BGH Consortium bid against itself by offering a revised proposal of A$5.825 cash per share, 6% higher than its previous rejected offer.
Navitas’ board have unanimously recommended the scheme. We believe that BGH Consortium’s proposal is attractive and shareholders should accept the offer.
All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
On Petrus
Petrus has yet to respond to the Offer increase; however, it would be surprising if its stance against the takeover has altered.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco – excluding the Tanzanian and Mexican investments – with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis.
Shortly before the increase, Petrus was quoted (paywalled) it would vote its 3.95% against the takeover, while adding “Our satisfaction with the value our board deems as satisfactory has decreased further“, with reference to the release of Ophir’s full-year results on the 12 March.
On Sand Grove/Coro
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer on the 8 March, declared it has no intention to bid.
Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Trading Tight – Upside Less Assured
Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Of note, the next three largest shareholders behind Sand Grove have reduced their holdings since end-December 2018.
The gross/annualised spread is tight at 0.7%/2.6%, assuming early-July payment. The risk/reward in punting at or just below terms is now less attractive following this Offer Price increase and the irrevocable undertaking.
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This is a total ₩608.4bil rights offer. This is larger than initially expected. A projected ₩543bil will be raised through common share issuance. The other ₩65bil will be raised in the form of RCPS. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase with a 42.05% share dilution.
80% will be allocated to the stockholders. Per share allocation for the stockholders is 0.58. Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25 only for Common. May 2 is for final pricing. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
Offering size is much larger than initially expected. In the short-term, DHICO shares will likely take a harsh beating. At this point, we’d better stay away from it for now.
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