Orion Holdco/Sub duo is now above +2σ on a 20D MA. They made nearly 2σ jump in just two trading days. Price ratio is currently at a 120D high. Holdco discount to NAV dropped 4%p from 50% to 46% since last time we checked on Jan 24.
China easing wind began to blow into Korea since late last year. This China expectation had pushed up both Holdco and Sub. Sub had reacted more sensitively to it. Sub has undergone a price correction lately. Holdco has done a lot of catching up during this period. Now, Holdco surpassed Sub in terms of price return. Holdco climbed 32% from its 52W low. Sub went up 30% from its 52W low.
Holdco is preparing its own business operation, water purifier, in China. This may act as a divergence factor. But at this point, Holdco’s own business in China has no meaningful substance that can shake its NAV radically. They must be reverted back to mean. Their price return got reversed in favor of Holdco. Holdco’s price catching up should be done now. It is time to go long Sub and short Holdco.
Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU)‘s ability to generate shareholder value remains in doubt as LTAP enters its fourth month of due diligence. Yesterday, GrainCorp announced the first result (but overdue) of its portfolio review – the deal to sell its Australian bulk liquid terminals business to ANZ Terminals for A$350 million.
The option with the highest potential to unlock shareholder value remains the LTAP bid. The sale of the Australian bulk liquid terminals business would represent 13% of the current EV which in the absence of an LTAP bid, is unlikely to sustain GrainCorp’s current rating. However, we believe that the proposed sale is a necessary step to push LTAP towards a binding proposal.
POSCO Chemtech (003670 KS) is to merge with one of the affiliated companies, POSCO ESM through stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. It will change its corporate name from POSCO Chemtech to POSCO Chemical. It is also planning KOSPI move.
KOSPI 200 inclusion is a done deal. Just, timing is in question. New passive money flowing into POSCO Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bil. This represents 1.69% of MC and 4.82% of float MC. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
If KOSPI 200 inclusion happens for this annual rebalancing cycle, it will be June. If not, we will have to wait another year. This explains current ‘dull’ price movement. I’d keep an eye on this event. ₩68bil passive money would still become a price shaker.
Korea’s local news house Hankyung reported the names that should be included in the short list. They are Kakao, MBK Partners (with NetMarble), Tencent, Bain Capital and another foreign PE whose name isn’t disclosed. Apparently, Amazon, Comcast and EA, didn’t make the short list. Those in the short list now get a chance to do due diligence. They will then participate in the main bidding round that is scheduled for early April.
It is being reported that only Kakao and NetMarble (with MBK Partners) are truly interested in taking over Nexon’s management right. Tencent is expected to join either Kakao or NetMarble-led consortium in the end. Bain is looking into possible investment opportunities that may be created if this sale leads to a mandatory tender offer to Nexon minority shareholders. It seems safe to say that this comes down to a two-horse race: either Kakao or NetMarble.
Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
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Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU)‘s ability to generate shareholder value remains in doubt as LTAP enters its fourth month of due diligence. Yesterday, GrainCorp announced the first result (but overdue) of its portfolio review – the deal to sell its Australian bulk liquid terminals business to ANZ Terminals for A$350 million.
The option with the highest potential to unlock shareholder value remains the LTAP bid. The sale of the Australian bulk liquid terminals business would represent 13% of the current EV which in the absence of an LTAP bid, is unlikely to sustain GrainCorp’s current rating. However, we believe that the proposed sale is a necessary step to push LTAP towards a binding proposal.
POSCO Chemtech (003670 KS) is to merge with one of the affiliated companies, POSCO ESM through stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. It will change its corporate name from POSCO Chemtech to POSCO Chemical. It is also planning KOSPI move.
KOSPI 200 inclusion is a done deal. Just, timing is in question. New passive money flowing into POSCO Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bil. This represents 1.69% of MC and 4.82% of float MC. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
If KOSPI 200 inclusion happens for this annual rebalancing cycle, it will be June. If not, we will have to wait another year. This explains current ‘dull’ price movement. I’d keep an eye on this event. ₩68bil passive money would still become a price shaker.
Korea’s local news house Hankyung reported the names that should be included in the short list. They are Kakao, MBK Partners (with NetMarble), Tencent, Bain Capital and another foreign PE whose name isn’t disclosed. Apparently, Amazon, Comcast and EA, didn’t make the short list. Those in the short list now get a chance to do due diligence. They will then participate in the main bidding round that is scheduled for early April.
It is being reported that only Kakao and NetMarble (with MBK Partners) are truly interested in taking over Nexon’s management right. Tencent is expected to join either Kakao or NetMarble-led consortium in the end. Bain is looking into possible investment opportunities that may be created if this sale leads to a mandatory tender offer to Nexon minority shareholders. It seems safe to say that this comes down to a two-horse race: either Kakao or NetMarble.
Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK), an infrastructure and property developer, is subject to a privatisation proposal from its Chairman, Sir Gordon Wu. The privatisation price of HK$38.80 cash per share is a 46.7% premium over the closing price on 30 November 2018, the day before the announcement of the privatisation proposal.
While predicting the success of Hong Kong privatisations is a challenge due to the high threshold of shareholder approval, we believe that the Hopewell privatisation proposal has a good chance of success as it offers a reasonable (but not great) exit for shareholders.
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POSCO Chemtech (003670 KS) is to merge with one of the affiliated companies, POSCO ESM through stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. It will change its corporate name from POSCO Chemtech to POSCO Chemical. It is also planning KOSPI move.
KOSPI 200 inclusion is a done deal. Just, timing is in question. New passive money flowing into POSCO Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bil. This represents 1.69% of MC and 4.82% of float MC. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
If KOSPI 200 inclusion happens for this annual rebalancing cycle, it will be June. If not, we will have to wait another year. This explains current ‘dull’ price movement. I’d keep an eye on this event. ₩68bil passive money would still become a price shaker.
Korea’s local news house Hankyung reported the names that should be included in the short list. They are Kakao, MBK Partners (with NetMarble), Tencent, Bain Capital and another foreign PE whose name isn’t disclosed. Apparently, Amazon, Comcast and EA, didn’t make the short list. Those in the short list now get a chance to do due diligence. They will then participate in the main bidding round that is scheduled for early April.
It is being reported that only Kakao and NetMarble (with MBK Partners) are truly interested in taking over Nexon’s management right. Tencent is expected to join either Kakao or NetMarble-led consortium in the end. Bain is looking into possible investment opportunities that may be created if this sale leads to a mandatory tender offer to Nexon minority shareholders. It seems safe to say that this comes down to a two-horse race: either Kakao or NetMarble.
Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK), an infrastructure and property developer, is subject to a privatisation proposal from its Chairman, Sir Gordon Wu. The privatisation price of HK$38.80 cash per share is a 46.7% premium over the closing price on 30 November 2018, the day before the announcement of the privatisation proposal.
While predicting the success of Hong Kong privatisations is a challenge due to the high threshold of shareholder approval, we believe that the Hopewell privatisation proposal has a good chance of success as it offers a reasonable (but not great) exit for shareholders.
HDC Holdco and its major Sub HDC-OP are now at 247% of σ on a 20D MA for the first time since mid Nov last year. On a 120D, their current price ratio is substantially higher than the mean. Holdco discount is now 40% to NAV. This is nearly a 10%p drop since early Jan.
My previous stub trade on the HDC duo again paid off very nicely. I went long Holdco and short Sub on Jan 11. This trade is now delivering a 15% return. During this period, Holdco climbed 23%. Sub went up 8%. They created a 15%p gap in price performance. Holdco’s 23% running was mainly attributable to re-rating of some of its major unlisted holdings.
Sub also has several key assets that could equally be re-rated. Much of Holdco’s assets that have presumably undergone re-ratings lately are business wise closely correlated with Sub. A 15%p price yield gap should be too harsh on Sub. I expect their price ratio will be challenged downwardly at this level on a short term time horizon.
I’d close my previous position. I’d initiate a new trade. I’d go long Sub and short Holdco. I’d close this trade at < 50% of σ. Given the fluctuation level of this duo, this’d give nearly a 8% yield.
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Korea’s local news house Hankyung reported the names that should be included in the short list. They are Kakao, MBK Partners (with NetMarble), Tencent, Bain Capital and another foreign PE whose name isn’t disclosed. Apparently, Amazon, Comcast and EA, didn’t make the short list. Those in the short list now get a chance to do due diligence. They will then participate in the main bidding round that is scheduled for early April.
It is being reported that only Kakao and NetMarble (with MBK Partners) are truly interested in taking over Nexon’s management right. Tencent is expected to join either Kakao or NetMarble-led consortium in the end. Bain is looking into possible investment opportunities that may be created if this sale leads to a mandatory tender offer to Nexon minority shareholders. It seems safe to say that this comes down to a two-horse race: either Kakao or NetMarble.
Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK), an infrastructure and property developer, is subject to a privatisation proposal from its Chairman, Sir Gordon Wu. The privatisation price of HK$38.80 cash per share is a 46.7% premium over the closing price on 30 November 2018, the day before the announcement of the privatisation proposal.
While predicting the success of Hong Kong privatisations is a challenge due to the high threshold of shareholder approval, we believe that the Hopewell privatisation proposal has a good chance of success as it offers a reasonable (but not great) exit for shareholders.
HDC Holdco and its major Sub HDC-OP are now at 247% of σ on a 20D MA for the first time since mid Nov last year. On a 120D, their current price ratio is substantially higher than the mean. Holdco discount is now 40% to NAV. This is nearly a 10%p drop since early Jan.
My previous stub trade on the HDC duo again paid off very nicely. I went long Holdco and short Sub on Jan 11. This trade is now delivering a 15% return. During this period, Holdco climbed 23%. Sub went up 8%. They created a 15%p gap in price performance. Holdco’s 23% running was mainly attributable to re-rating of some of its major unlisted holdings.
Sub also has several key assets that could equally be re-rated. Much of Holdco’s assets that have presumably undergone re-ratings lately are business wise closely correlated with Sub. A 15%p price yield gap should be too harsh on Sub. I expect their price ratio will be challenged downwardly at this level on a short term time horizon.
I’d close my previous position. I’d initiate a new trade. I’d go long Sub and short Holdco. I’d close this trade at < 50% of σ. Given the fluctuation level of this duo, this’d give nearly a 8% yield.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK), an infrastructure and property developer, is subject to a privatisation proposal from its Chairman, Sir Gordon Wu. The privatisation price of HK$38.80 cash per share is a 46.7% premium over the closing price on 30 November 2018, the day before the announcement of the privatisation proposal.
While predicting the success of Hong Kong privatisations is a challenge due to the high threshold of shareholder approval, we believe that the Hopewell privatisation proposal has a good chance of success as it offers a reasonable (but not great) exit for shareholders.
HDC Holdco and its major Sub HDC-OP are now at 247% of σ on a 20D MA for the first time since mid Nov last year. On a 120D, their current price ratio is substantially higher than the mean. Holdco discount is now 40% to NAV. This is nearly a 10%p drop since early Jan.
My previous stub trade on the HDC duo again paid off very nicely. I went long Holdco and short Sub on Jan 11. This trade is now delivering a 15% return. During this period, Holdco climbed 23%. Sub went up 8%. They created a 15%p gap in price performance. Holdco’s 23% running was mainly attributable to re-rating of some of its major unlisted holdings.
Sub also has several key assets that could equally be re-rated. Much of Holdco’s assets that have presumably undergone re-ratings lately are business wise closely correlated with Sub. A 15%p price yield gap should be too harsh on Sub. I expect their price ratio will be challenged downwardly at this level on a short term time horizon.
I’d close my previous position. I’d initiate a new trade. I’d go long Sub and short Holdco. I’d close this trade at < 50% of σ. Given the fluctuation level of this duo, this’d give nearly a 8% yield.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
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Hopewell Holdings (54 HK), an infrastructure and property developer, is subject to a privatisation proposal from its Chairman, Sir Gordon Wu. The privatisation price of HK$38.80 cash per share is a 46.7% premium over the closing price on 30 November 2018, the day before the announcement of the privatisation proposal.
While predicting the success of Hong Kong privatisations is a challenge due to the high threshold of shareholder approval, we believe that the Hopewell privatisation proposal has a good chance of success as it offers a reasonable (but not great) exit for shareholders.
HDC Holdco and its major Sub HDC-OP are now at 247% of σ on a 20D MA for the first time since mid Nov last year. On a 120D, their current price ratio is substantially higher than the mean. Holdco discount is now 40% to NAV. This is nearly a 10%p drop since early Jan.
My previous stub trade on the HDC duo again paid off very nicely. I went long Holdco and short Sub on Jan 11. This trade is now delivering a 15% return. During this period, Holdco climbed 23%. Sub went up 8%. They created a 15%p gap in price performance. Holdco’s 23% running was mainly attributable to re-rating of some of its major unlisted holdings.
Sub also has several key assets that could equally be re-rated. Much of Holdco’s assets that have presumably undergone re-ratings lately are business wise closely correlated with Sub. A 15%p price yield gap should be too harsh on Sub. I expect their price ratio will be challenged downwardly at this level on a short term time horizon.
I’d close my previous position. I’d initiate a new trade. I’d go long Sub and short Holdco. I’d close this trade at < 50% of σ. Given the fluctuation level of this duo, this’d give nearly a 8% yield.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close. This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:
ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.
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HDC Holdco and its major Sub HDC-OP are now at 247% of σ on a 20D MA for the first time since mid Nov last year. On a 120D, their current price ratio is substantially higher than the mean. Holdco discount is now 40% to NAV. This is nearly a 10%p drop since early Jan.
My previous stub trade on the HDC duo again paid off very nicely. I went long Holdco and short Sub on Jan 11. This trade is now delivering a 15% return. During this period, Holdco climbed 23%. Sub went up 8%. They created a 15%p gap in price performance. Holdco’s 23% running was mainly attributable to re-rating of some of its major unlisted holdings.
Sub also has several key assets that could equally be re-rated. Much of Holdco’s assets that have presumably undergone re-ratings lately are business wise closely correlated with Sub. A 15%p price yield gap should be too harsh on Sub. I expect their price ratio will be challenged downwardly at this level on a short term time horizon.
I’d close my previous position. I’d initiate a new trade. I’d go long Sub and short Holdco. I’d close this trade at < 50% of σ. Given the fluctuation level of this duo, this’d give nearly a 8% yield.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close. This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:
ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.
On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.
This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.
More below the fold.
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Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close. This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:
ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.
On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.
This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.
SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.
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In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close. This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:
ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.
On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.
This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.
SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.
On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.
However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.
According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.
The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.
The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.
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Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close. This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:
ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.
On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.
This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.
SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.
On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.
However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.
According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.
The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.
The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.
This insight is a kind of public service announcement for investors looking at the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) situation as it might affect the likely upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting that the Ernst Göhner Foundation requested of Panalpina, and to which Panalpina has acquiesced. The agenda item of the EGM requested is to implement a “One Share One Vote” system.
Activist Cevian has come out against the proposal by the Ernst Göhner Foundation. This sounds counterintuitive except for one odd legal angle.
The Foundation’s ostensible goal is to ensure that the vote is “fair” so that Cevian and Artisan Partners can vote their full stake after having been capped at 5% for many years because of Article 5 in the Panalpina Articles of Association. The more cunning aspect of this is that, as per the Panalpina announcement…
In a letter addressed to Panalpina’s Board of Directors, minority shareholder Cevian had recently questioned the practice to fully admit EGF with all its voting rights at the Company’s shareholders’ meetings. Cevian took the position that the voting restriction of 5% must be applied to all shareholders and, hence the voting power of EGF must be reduced to 5%. An ad hoc board of independent directors (BoiD) consisting of five directors (without representatives of EGF and Cevian) and chaired by Thomas E. Kern, is currently evaluating the situation based on expert opinions submitted by each of EGF and Cevian and based on independent expert advice obtained by the BoiD.
The Foundation knows that their position may be legally weak, and their position could be capped at 5% rather than grandfathered. Indeed, the “independent expert advice” obtained by Cevian includes the opinions of “four leading Swiss stockbrokers” who had come to the conclusion that the Foundation had been unlawfully excluded from the 5% cap, according to this Reuters article on the 26th. The company states that the Ernst Göhner Foundation is and has been exempted from this rule because of “grandfathering” because it owned the shares before the implementation of the rule, but there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants the EGF that exemption. The full Cevian press releases in English and German are available through their spokesperson and are attached below (at the bottom of the insight).
Another Reuters article discussed the situation, with quotes from Cevian, and added this tidbit at the end.
An ad hoc board of independent directors consisting of five directors, without representatives of EGF and Cevian…will review the proposal and decide how the voting on it will take place at the extraordinary general meeting,” spokeswoman Edna Ayme-Yahil said.
Investors should note…..
The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Panalpina Articles of Association says “No entries shall be made in the register of shareholders following the dispatch of the convocation to the Shareholders’ Meeting until the day after the Shareholders’ Meeting.” This is a little different than is the case for many large Swiss companies where they give the convocation and investors may subsequently register their shares.
For Novartis AG (NOVN SW), which held its AGM today (28 Feb 2019), the deadline for registering shares was 3 days prior to the AGM as shown on p6 in the Organizational Notes on the AGM Notice.
Temenos Group Ag (TEMN SW) last year set their registration deadline 13 days ahead of the AGM, which is further away, but the Convocation Notice had been sent 47 days before the AGM.
In Panalpina’s case, if you are not registered by the time the company sends out the convocation, there is no requirement for the company to admit your shares to the register even if there is plenty of time to do so (though the Board can make exceptions to the entry restriction).
For investors interested in or concerned about the situation, there are measures which may be advisable to implement ASAP to ensure you can vote.
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