We have spent more than ten days in Uttar Pradesh in the second half of December 2018 and tried to assess the chances for BJP and how it could perform in 2019 Lok Sabha elections. Of course the number of seats which each party could win depends more on coalitions, the vote share will remain important nonetheless. We were trying to understand the voting preference of people and the political choices they will be making next year.
First, the good news for BJP is that Prime Minister continues to enjoy almost similar level of popularity as 2014 (the previous Lok Sabha elections) and 2017 (previous Assembly elections in the state). There is also perception that BJP Governments are in general much less corrupt than administration provided by other political parties including Congress. BJP is by far the No. 1 political entity in the state because of Modi’s leadership.
But there is also important bad news, a) the level of satisfaction with state Govt is much lower, b) issues such as cow protection have become nuisance for many people, farmers for example, c) there is a perception that BJP’s simple majority at the Centre and 3/4th majority in state made accountability more difficult and that was the reason governance also suffered in a big way, and, d) people also think that BJP’s elected representatives are not qualitatively different vs. other parties.
The NPA growth cycle affects credit growth cycle negatively. The recent farm waivers announced by many state governments and the speculations of a nationwide farm loan waiver by the Central government do not augur well for the banks’ credit space in India.
The year 2018 has proven tumultuous for global markets. Rapidly changing geopolitical priorities of the US, an erstwhile hegemon, have played a role no less significant than the withdrawal of liquidity by leading central banks or US monetary policy tightening. The US has openly declared that it is in a state of “cold war” with China. Despite the recent truce, signs are abundant that the confrontation between the two global superpowers will continue into 2019 and beyond. In 2019, we expect more countries to find themselves in a position where they must choose who they want to side with, the US or China. There are other tectonic shifts, too, which are causing re-alignment of global geopolitical alliances.
Direct income transfers to farmers are likely to become reality as competitive loan waivers are fast becoming a norm than an exception and every party is offering a larger waiver.
Direct income transfers have been quite successful in the South Indian state of Telangana with KCR promising one at the national level if the Federal front (that he is proposing) is voted to power in the general elections.
Cost of each of the measures (from loan waivers to universal basic income for all Indians) is between 0.7% to 2.7% of GDP with Universal Basic Income (Rs 7620/individual for 75% of Indians) costing the highest.
Even as initial fiscal costs are alarming, a gradual scale up (like in the Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) and transfer of reserves from RBI in tranches could mitigate some fiscal impact. We expect the expert committee of the govt and the RBI to identify transferable reserves between Rs 1.0trn – 3.0trn.
Overall, the freebies to Rural India will certainly power the consumption story strongly in 2019 with products sold in rural areas like FMCG, tractors and motorcycles expected to gain.
Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) has reported the new orders worth only Rs95 bn after 2Q FY19 results (reported on 31st October 2018). This is much lower run rate as compared to 2Q FY19 (Rs419 bn) or 1H FY19 (Rs781 bn). All these orders by Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) have been received from construction segment where margins are relatively poor e.g. the construction and infrastructure segment of Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) in 2H FY19 has reported 6.8% EBITDA margin, much lower than 11.8% for the company on an overall basis.
Unless new orders pick up in next few weeks, there is a strong likelihood that there could be a negative surprise in 3Q results on order inflow for Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) . This is despite the fact that overall number reported for a quarter for order inflow is a bit higher than the sum of individual orders announced and reported by the company. While the market has not noticed decline in new orders so far and may have been still hopeful about a recovery in order wins, it is highly unlikely that this will continue to get ignored by investors if the trend doesn’t change and get better in next couple of weeks.
Prabhat Dairy Ltd’s quarterly result is in line with our expectation. In Q2 FY19, the company registered a growth of 8.53% YoY, EBITDA margin was 9.4% improving by 119 bps since the same period last year, EBITDA grew by 24.2% YOY; the profit margin was at 2.95% improving by 60 bps YoY, Net Income grew by 35.86% YOY. For more details about the company, please refer to our initiation report Prabhat Dairy Ltd – An Emerging Star in the Indian Milky Way. B2B business contributed to 70% of revenue and the remaining 30% was driven by B2C business. Value Added Products contributed to 25% of revenue in Q2FY19.
The stock is trading at 16.3x its TTM EPS, 13.8x its FY19F EPS. Margins have improved over the past quarters due to lower cost of raw materials, we expect raw materials to continue to be lower than their historic average in short term. Lower cost of raw material along with the improving contribution from B2C will lead to higher margins in medium to long term. The company also wants to increase its B2C contribution aggressively from the current 30% to 50% by 2020.
We will monitor the stock closely to firm up our views further, albeit we remain positive on the long-term prospects of the company.
Alkem Laboratories (ALKEM IN) produces branded generics, generic drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients and neutraceuticals, which it markets in India and over 50 countries internationally. With a portfolio of over 700 brands covering all the major therapeutic segments and a pan-India sales and distribution network, Alkem has been ranked amongst the top ten pharmaceutical companies in India by sales for the past 13 years.
We are optimistic about Alkem because-
Alkem continues to grow significantly ahead of the segment growth rate of ~16% in the chronic therapy areas of Cardiac, Antidiabetic, Neuro / Central nervous system (CNS) and Derma. Alkem continues grow in the acute therapy areas of Anti-infective, Gastro-intestinal, Pain/ Analgesic and Vitamins / Minerals /Nutrients.
We expect India revenues to grow at CAGR 13% (FY18-21E) to Rs 64,687 mn in FY21E from Rs 44,900 mn in FY18. We expect US revenues to grow at CAGR 31% (FY18-21E) to Rs 30,438 mn from Rs 13,667 mn in FY18 and other international business revenues to grow at CAGR 11% (FY18-21E) to Rs 6,443 mn in FY21E from Rs 4,670 mn in FY18.
We expect EBITDA to grow at CAGR 21% (FY18-21E) to Rs 18,638 mn in FY21E from Rs 10,566 mn in FY18 and EBITDA margins to expand by ~ 190 bps to 18.4% in FY21E from 16.5% in FY18. We expect PAT to grow at CAGR 27% (FY18-21E) to Rs. 12,979 mn in FY21E from Rs 6,289 mn in FY18 and we expect PAT margins to expand by ~ 300 bps to 12.8% in FY21E from 9.8% in FY18.
We expect RoE to expand by ~530 bps to 19.0% in FY21E from 13.7% in FY18 and RoCE to expand by ~390 bps to 21.1% in FY21E from 17.2% in FY18
We initiate coverage on Alkem with fair value of Rs. 2,260/- representing a potential upside of 21% in the next 12 months. We arrived at the fair value by applying 22x multiple to September 20E EPS of Rs 102. Currently, the stock trades at 21x and 17x its earnings estimates for FY20E and FY21E respectively. After a very volatile 2018, we believe Alkem share price may have smooth upwards move in 2019 driven by strong PAT growth in the next 3 quarters.
Particulars (Rs mn, Y/E March)
Net sales
EBITDA
PAT
EPS
ROE
ROCE
PE(x)
FY18
64,137
10,566
6,289
52.6
13.7%
17.2%
35
FY19E
74,075
12,406
8,130
68.0
16.0%
16.8%
27
FY20E
87,716
15,659
10,772
90.1
18.4%
20.4%
21
FY21E
1,01,568
18,638
12,979
108.6
19.0%
21.1%
17
Source- Alkem Annual Report FY18, Trivikram Consultants Research as on 27/12/2018
Swaraj Engines (SWE IN) (SEL)is primarily manufacturing diesel engines for fitment into Swaraj tractors manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (M&M). The Company is also supplying engine components to SML Isuzu Ltd used in the assembly of commercial vehicle engines. SEL was started as a joint venture between Punjab Tractor Ltd (now acquired by M&M Ltd) and Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. M&M holds 33.3% stake in SEL and is its key client.
We are positive about the business because:
SEL’s growth is correlated with M&M’s tractor business growth. SEL supplies engines to the Swaraj division of M&M. M&M expects tractor growth to be around 12% YoY in FY19E. We forecast SEL’s tractor engine volumes will grow at a CAGR of 12% for FY18-21E.
The growth of the company is dependent on the monsoon and rural sentiments. We expect the profitability to improve with normal rainfall and government initiatives towards the rural sector. We expect the revenue/ EBITDA/ PAT CAGR for FY18-21E to be 14%/ 15%/ 14% respectively.
SEL is debt free and a cash generating company. It has a healthy and stable ROCE and ROE. SEL has increased its capacity from 75,000 engines in FY16 to 120,000 engines in FY18. We expect the capacity utilisation to reach 97% by FY20E from 90% in 1HFY19. SEL funds its capex through internal accruals. We forecast a capex of Rs 600 mn for FY19E to FY21E considering the requirement of the additional capacity, R&D and testing costs for new and higher HP engines & for upgradation of engines according to the TREM IV emission norms for >50 HP engines.
We initiate coverage on SEL with a fair value objective of Rs 1,655/- over the next 12 months. This represents a potential upside of 15% from the closing price of Rs 1,435/- (as on 26-12-2018). We arrive at the fair value by applying PE multiple of 18x to EPS of Rs 87/- to the year ending December-20E and add cash of Rs 82/- per share. While the business outlook is good, we think the upside in the share price is limited due to rich valuation.
Particulars (Rs mn) (Y/E March)
FY18
FY19E
FY20E
FY21E
Revenue
7,712
9,210
10,478
11,525
PAT
801
906
1,063
1,190
EPS (Rs)
64.5
74.8
87.6
98.1
PE (x)
22.3
19.2
16.4
14.6
Source: SEL Annual Report FY18, Trivikram Consultants Research as on 26-12-2018
The hyper-competitive Indian payments industry is changing. New regulations are increasing the cost operations, NPCI (National Payments Corporation of India) & Reserve Bank of India (RBI) are breaking all barriers to entry enabling a level playing field that ensures no competitive moats exist. Although there are volumes, profitability remains a distant dream and likely to remain so making Indian payments a bad business to be invested in.
Shaktikanta Das has been appointed as the new governor of India’s central bank. The new appointment comes as a major boost to the economy and has driven a rebound in the financial markets as well as the Indian rupee. The country’s current account deficit remains a major concern, although these recent developments further affirm India’s attractiveness as an investment destination.
After months of skirting around inventory build-up and a weakening demand outlook, Micron used their latest earnings report to call closing time on a revenue and profitability party that began in Q4 2016 and just got better and better with each passing quarter.
Micron reported Q1 FY2019 results on December 18’th and while revenues were largely in line with recently lowered guidance from the company, their outlook for both Q2 and 2019 as a whole was worse than even the most bearish of expectations.
Citing high inventory levels at key customers, Micron guided Q2 FY2019 revenues for $6 billion at the midpoint, down a staggering $1.9 billion, 24% QoQ and 18% YoY. At the same time, Micron revised down their CY2019 bit demand growth forecast for both DRAM (from 20% to 16%) and NAND (35%, the bottom of the previously forecasted range). The company plans to adjust both CapEx and bit supply output downwards to match.
In the wake of their guidance bombshell, Micron’s share price closed down almost 8% the following day to end the session at $31.41, a level last seen in August 2017. Micron is unique in reporting out of sync with its industry peers, making it the proverbial canary in a coal mine. The company’s gloomy outlook and clarion call for further CapEx reductions in a bid to rebalance supply and demand spells troubled times ahead for an already beleaguered semiconductor segment ahead of the upcoming earnings season.
The Indian indices have been seeing an ebb and flow with bearish indicators accounting for market dips with a recovery towards the end of the period. Overall the Indian indices have outperformed the global market this month with positive returns across sectors except for pharma and the metal sector.
After months of skirting around inventory build-up and a weakening demand outlook, Micron used their latest earnings report to call closing time on a revenue and profitability party that began in Q4 2016 and just got better and better with each passing quarter.
Micron reported Q1 FY2019 results on December 18’th and while revenues were largely in line with recently lowered guidance from the company, their outlook for both Q2 and 2019 as a whole was worse than even the most bearish of expectations.
Citing high inventory levels at key customers, Micron guided Q2 FY2019 revenues for $6 billion at the midpoint, down a staggering $1.9 billion, 24% QoQ and 18% YoY. At the same time, Micron revised down their CY2019 bit demand growth forecast for both DRAM (from 20% to 16%) and NAND (35%, the bottom of the previously forecasted range). The company plans to adjust both CapEx and bit supply output downwards to match.
In the wake of their guidance bombshell, Micron’s share price closed down almost 8% the following day to end the session at $31.41, a level last seen in August 2017. Micron is unique in reporting out of sync with its industry peers, making it the proverbial canary in a coal mine. The company’s gloomy outlook and clarion call for further CapEx reductions in a bid to rebalance supply and demand spells troubled times ahead for an already beleaguered semiconductor segment ahead of the upcoming earnings season.
Recapping the original plan: when Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP)(“FM”) sold the remaining 60% of UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (DQ), it entered into an agreement to buy 20+% in DQ, for one of two reasons; 1) a company wants to prove to the employees of a division being sold that they are maintaining a watchful eye over them, or (as is now evident) 2) the buyer wants to gain an equity method affiliate and the income from it (including the placeholder for frontrunner status to future capital events).
FM launched a Partial Tender Offer at a 20% premium to last in order to buy these shares, and in the MOU to launch the tender offer there was a clause which said that if FM did not reach the full 20%, it had made arrangements to borrow shares in order to get to 20% of the voting rights. And if FM did not manage to get to the full 20%, there was an agreement between DQ which allowed FM to buy shares in the market to get to a 20% (but not larger) position.
If FM managed to get the shares, it was going to buy from the weak hands. Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. DQ is still growing, and with UNY, DQ may grow faster than previously expected. The upshot is that everyone decided they’d stand pat – FM got nothing in the tender (0.08% of the total desired).
Shares in DQ could fall because of a lack of hard strategy announced by FM to buy all the shares at a higher price immediately. That shouldn’t be a big worry – it wasn’t going to happen.
Travis Lundy sees DQ having a performance skew which includes a “cushion of sorts” in the ¥5500-6600/share zone where he would expect FM to acquire shares. He does not see a cushion for the shares of FM, and expects them to be volatile.
It is possible this suspension is not in relation to a takeover, but a major sale of assets, for example, from the parent to the sub. This would make sense given the recent share purchase by HEC (completed in January this year), and the fact HE is playing catch-up to Dongfang Electric Corporation (1072 HK)& Shanghai Electric Group Company (2727 HK). Arguably, launching a takeover shortly after subscribing for more shares is unusual. Then again, when the two SOE railway behemoths CNR and CSR merged in 2015, a merger was disputed (at the time) when both were suspended on account of the fact CNR was only listed (on the HK exchange) in 2Q14.
HE has perennially traded at discount to net cash. As at its last traded price, the discount to net cash (using the 2018 interim figure of HK$12.4bn, or HK$7.27/share) was 65%.
“Fair” pricing to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on PER. I simply don’t see this happening. And if it doesn’t, the fiduciary duty of independent directors will be tested/scrutinised if they recommend an offer to shareholders at any price less than the net cash/share of the company.
Reportedly Motherson has entered merger/acquisition talks withLeoni AG (LEO GR), a leading provider of cables and cable systems for the automotive sector and other industries. Motherson has made four acquisitions so far in this business segment with the latest being PKC in 2017.
Motherson has always aimed at strengthening this business area internationally, therefore the news about a merger with Leoni comes as no surprise and was mentioned as a potential acquisition target in LightStream Research‘s earlier insight Two More Acquisitions on the Way for Motherson Sumi.
Motherson has a strong balance sheet that could support this acquisition, although its ability to make further acquisitions in the short-to-medium term may be hampered – Leoni would be at the higher end of the price range for recent acquisitions. Should the acquisition go through, the company will be very well positioned to reach its US$18bn revenue target by 2020E, given that the combined revenue for FY2017 alone is ~US$13bn.
Currently, Motherson is trading at an FY1 EV/EBITDA of 10x, slightly above peers such as Mahindra Cie Automotive (MACA IN)(9x) and below peers such as Bosch Ltd (BOS IN) (25x). If the deal goes through, Motherson’s FY1 EV/EBITDA of ~12x would be at a slight premium to local players, but still reasonable compared to international players.
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts reduced its indicative offer to $3.40 from $3.77 on Thursday after sifting through MYOB’s books, with MYOB announcing:
Following completion of due diligence and finalisation of debt funding commitments, KKR has revised the offer price to $3.40 per share. … The board has informed KKR that it is not in a position to recommend the revised proposal, however it remains in discussions with KKR regarding its proposal. (my emphasis)
KKR’s revised non-binding proposal expired at 5pm on Friday, which came and went without any ASX announcement. Presumably, an announcement will be made before the market opens tomorrow (rendering this commentary redundant) with either MYOB grudgingly accepting the lower offer, or MYOB rejecting and KKR walking away (for now), or going hostile.
The Nikkei carried an article noting that the Japanese government’s FY2019 budget currently being formed proposes a sale of ¥160bn of shares in NTT to help fund any revenue impact from the upcoming consumption tax rate hike from 8% to 10% next October. The article helpfully notes that they plan on selling when NTT is buying back shares. One of the longstanding features of buybacks for NTT is that NTT is subject to the NTT Law which requires (for the moment) that the government hold at least one-third of the shares outstanding in NTT.
Travis estimates NTT has ~1.95bn shares outstanding, or ~1.917bn shares outstanding ex-Treasury shares, after recent buybacks. If NTT cancelled the shares it has bought back prior to buying back shares from the government, this would allow NTT to buy back 59mm shares from the government (assuming those shares are also cancelled). If it did not, it would mean NTT could only buy back about 42-43mm shares. 59mm shares backs out ¥250bn; 43mm shares at a 10% discount would be ¥180bn. That means there is about 10% leeway in stock price to buy ¥160bn from the government IF shares repurchased under the current buyback are not cancelled.
But that also means that there would be no more buybacks from the government after that until the company buys back more shares from the market. If the company wanted to buy back another ¥200bn from the government, ceteris paribus it would have to buy back something like ¥400-450bn first from the market in order to reduce the denominator. Travis concludes there is still more on-market buying to do.
At an NTT/ NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) ratio of 1.80x, buybacks coming, expected ongoing strong dividend policy (and lots of headroom to do so, unlike perhaps Softbank Corp (9434 JP)), and investor suspicion of what comes next for Docomo, NTT is the home of the cashflow.
The IPO of Softbank Corp and the Merger of Takeda and Shire Pharmaceuticals create significant changes in TOPIX, MSCI, and FTSE because of the addition of roughly ¥5tn of “new” market capitalization in major Japan indices. Pure passive investors have something like ¥1.35tn of Softbank Corp and Takeda Pharmaceutical to buy.
However, after Travis’ initial note (Softbank Corp, Takeda, and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion), TSE unhelpfully changed their mind on timing (for Takeda) based on an unhelpful change by the LSE. With the changes at FTSE and now TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400, we no longer have quite the same clarity of forces on the bodies, and therefore less clarity on the resulting motion. The LSE’s announced market change appears to have led the MSCI to change its deletion date for Shire as well, now also (along with FTSE) deleting Shire at the close of the 21st. The new schedule is:
Index Deletion
Shire (shs mm)
Index Inclusion
Takeda (shs mm)
Index Effect (US$ bn)
Net Delta (US$bn)
21 Dec
MSCI
-50
MSCI JP
+75
– $0.3bn
+$1.3bn
21 Dec
FTSE UK, All-Share,
-100-130
FTSE JP
+15
-$5.2bn+
– $2.1bn
rest of December – end of a pretty bad year for hedge funds, but illiquid
all of January
30 Jan
TOPIX
-$1.9bn
TOPIX, JPXN400
+60
+$2.1bn
+$2.1bn
30 Jan
TOPIX
-$3.5bn
TOPIX
Softbank
+$3.5bn
+$3.5bn
all of February
27 Feb
TOPIX, JPXN400
+60
+$2.1bn
+$2.1bn
It doesn’t change the amounts but a lot more time allows for more risk and preparation and there will no longer be any potential settlement issues on the TOPIX side. There is still the same amount of Takeda to buy in TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400.
In principle, Travis would want to be long Takeda at the close of the year of 2018, but given the LSE and TSE changes there is less support to give and the payoff is substantially more distant.
Speciality steel maker Nisshin Steel (5413 JP)is slated to merge with parent company Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal (5401 JP)as of January 1, 2019. For that, Nisshin Steel will be delisted on December 26th (i.e. the last day of trading is the 25th) and that means the Nikkei Inc was obliged to choose a replacement for Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei 225 and other indices. On December 11th, the Nikkei Inc announcedItoham Yonekyu Holdings Inc (2296 JP) would take Nisshin’s place in the Nikkei 500 Index; announced that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would join the Nikkei 300 Index; and announced thatDic Corp (4631 JP)would replace Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei Stock Average, better known as the Nikkei 225.
Nisshin Steel’s deletion is a nothing-burger.
The possibility of a DIC addition was well-flagged as early as May when sell-side brokers started compiling Annual and Ad Hoc Review lists for the Nikkei 225 changes to come in September and as a result of the Nisshin Steel merger. Travis would rather be long DIC than short DIC through the close of December 21st or probably December 25th.
YP appeared “cheap” back in April when I last discussed this Holdco, and is now cheaper, with its holding in KZ accounting for near-on 200% of its market cap. I can’t think of any other parent/subsidiary relationship – one which is essentially a single stock structure – with such a deep discount. Especially one where the stub ops operate in a similar space to that of the listed holding.
On the negative front, an investigation into YP’s Seokpo zinc smelter remains ongoing on account of perceived environmental transgressions. The Seokpo smelter is located in a national park on the Nakdong river. Wastewater containing above-legal limits of certain chemicals (fluoride and selenium) allegedly flowed downstream to residents, who are heavily reliant on this water.
YP’s stub and KZ are in the same business, but there are differences. YP does not have a balanced product mix as KZ does, with around 84% of its revenue coming from zinc-related production (for the 9M18 period), compared to 42.5% (on a revenue basis) for KZ, followed by lead (20.4%), silver (20.2%), and gold (7.6%).
However, YP and KZ remain inextricably intertwined and the current discount is unjustifiably steep. Just that YP’s liquidity, uncertainty on Seokpo, and lack of a near-term catalyst make for a difficult stub set-up.
A forgettable trading debut for Japan’s largest-ever IPO, with Softbank Corp,closing at ¥1,282/share, down from the IPO price of ¥1,500, and closing at ¥1,316/share on Friday, the same day as its FTSE inclusion.
At around 22% of NAV and 16% of GAV – by my calcs – Corp is a material % of Softbank Group (9984 JP). However as repeatedly seen when a conglomerate adds yet another listco to its stable (in Hong Kong, Wheelock & (20 HK)and Great Eagle Holdings (41 HK) spring to mind), a sustained narrowing in the holdco discount is often not the end result. Nor should it be. Softbank is effectively swapping shares for cash.
With seven stocks promoted/reassigned from TSE2, MOTHERS, and JASDAQ in November 2018 leading to the same seven stocks being included in TOPIX at the end of December, Travis tested 340+ TOPIX inclusions over the past five years to see what really happens around TOPIX inclusions?
If you own all but the smallest stocks (with a market cap of less than ¥15bn), odds are that, ON AVERAGE, they will underperform TOPIX from inclusion date or the day after, for many months.
The larger the market cap, the more marked the AVERAGE underperformance immediately following inclusion.
For names in the ¥25-50bn sweet spot of “large enough to be “small cap” with somebody paying attention to it”, outperformance vs underperformance in the next 10 days is a 47/53 proposition. That is a bigger risk. It may be data-idiosyncratic, but it is not clear.
In the case of the 7 names going into TOPIX at month-end this month, the averages would suggest one could still be long the four largest (at the time of Travis’ insight), but one would not want to be long the others; and one could sell long positions in all the names as of the close of the 27th or 28th and have it be an ex-ante expected net positive outcome vs TOPIX over the following 10-60 trading days.
CJ Corp (001040 KS) announced both Common and Pref will get 0.15 class B pref shares for each share they already own. This new class B pref is convertible to Common with a 10-year duration, and it provides an extra 2% of the face value to what Common gets. Price ratio wise, 1P is currently close to the 2Y mean. This stock dividend should push 1P up, as should CJ’s announcement it would pay a cash dividend. The current div yield difference is a historic high at 1.53%. (link to Sanghyun Park ‘s insight: CJ Corp Share Class: Huge Net Gain Difference Between Common & Pref from Stock Dividend)
LCY Chemical Corp (1704 TT). MOEA (Ministry of Economic Affairs) approval has now been received and LCY has applied for the delisting from the TWSE. The last trading day is the 23 Jan 2019 and the stock delists on the 30 Jan. The settlement is expected to take place mid-Feb.
Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). In an ASX announcement on Friday Brookfield said: “based on its enquiries and financing discussions to date, it has no reason to believe it will not be willing and able to proceed with the proposal“. The exclusivity provisions have been extended to 18 January. Separately, Healthscope has also received correspondence from the BGH-AustralianSuper Consortium that it has indicated it is able to commence due diligence immediately. HSO’s board stated it will consider the correspondence. These are both positive developments.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
After months of skirting around inventory build-up and a weakening demand outlook, Micron used their latest earnings report to call closing time on a revenue and profitability party that began in Q4 2016 and just got better and better with each passing quarter.
Micron reported Q1 FY2019 results on December 18’th and while revenues were largely in line with recently lowered guidance from the company, their outlook for both Q2 and 2019 as a whole was worse than even the most bearish of expectations.
Citing high inventory levels at key customers, Micron guided Q2 FY2019 revenues for $6 billion at the midpoint, down a staggering $1.9 billion, 24% QoQ and 18% YoY. At the same time, Micron revised down their CY2019 bit demand growth forecast for both DRAM (from 20% to 16%) and NAND (35%, the bottom of the previously forecasted range). The company plans to adjust both CapEx and bit supply output downwards to match.
In the wake of their guidance bombshell, Micron’s share price closed down almost 8% the following day to end the session at $31.41, a level last seen in August 2017. Micron is unique in reporting out of sync with its industry peers, making it the proverbial canary in a coal mine. The company’s gloomy outlook and clarion call for further CapEx reductions in a bid to rebalance supply and demand spells troubled times ahead for an already beleaguered semiconductor segment ahead of the upcoming earnings season.
2018 MARKET REVIEW – In this Insight, we shall review the performance of the Japanese stock market, during 2018 and look forward to the coming year. We shall look back at the year from a Sectors, Peer Group and Company perspective in separate Insights to follow next week.
Source: Japan Analytics
BEAR MARKET RALLY AHEAD – From the January 23rd peak to the December 25th low, the All Market Composite declined 24.5% in Yen terms and 24.9% in US$ terms placing Japan in a bear market for the seventh time since the bursting of the 1989 stock market ‘bubble’. The average stock is now 35% below its one-year high compared with just 10% below at the beginning of the year. Total Market Value is still ¥123t above the low of 12th February 2016, and the question remains – are we replaying March 2008 or February 2016? In both cases, there were bear market rallies (25% and 17%) before the final downward leg – which entailed further declines of 50% and 13%, respectively. In our recent Insight on 21st December – Ticking the Bear Market Boxes – we commented that it was too early for contrarians to start ‘nibbling’. The 1,000 point Nikkei 225 (NKY INDEX) decline the next trading day, and the rebound into the year-end suggests that a case can now be made for, at least, a short-term rally. In the charts in the DETAIL below, we shall explore the case for (✓) and against (✕), and attempt to answer the question of the 2008 or 2016 reprise.
Just how will Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s independent directors justify recommending an Offer to shareholders at a price which gave cash less cavalier than cash?
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)‘s directors grudgingly yet understandably enter an agreed deal with KKR.
As previously discussed in Harbin Electric Expected To Be Privatised, Harbin Electric (HE) has now announced a privatisation Offer from parent and 60.41%-shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (“HEC”) by way of a merger by absorption. The Offer price of $4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close, is bang in line with that paid by HEC in January this year for new domestic shares. The Offer price has been declared final.
Of note, the Offer price is a 37% discount to HE’s net cash of $7.27/share as at 30 June 2018. Should the privatisation be successful, this Offer will cost HEC ~HK$3.08bn, following which it can pocket the remaining net cash of $9.3bn PLUS the power generation equipment manufacturer business thrown in for free.
On pricing, “fair” to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. That is not happening. It will be difficult to see how independent directors (and the IFA) can justify recommending an Offer to shareholders at any price below the net cash/share, especially when the underlying business is profit-generating.
Dissension rights are available, however, there is no administrative guidance on the substantive as well as procedural rules as to how the “fair price” will be determined under PRC and HK Law.
Trading at a gross/annualised spread of 15%/28% assuming end-July completion, based on the average timeline for merger by absorption precedents. As HEC is only waiting for approval from independent H-shareholders suggests this transaction may complete earlier than precedents.
KKR and MYOB entered into Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) at $3.40/share, valuing MYOB, on a market cap basis, at A$2bn. MYOB’s board unanimously recommends shareholders to vote in favour of the Offer, in the absence of a superior proposal. The Offer price assumes no full-year dividend is paid.
On balance, MYOB’s board has made the right decision to accept KKR’s reduced Offer. The argument that MYOB is a “known turnaround story” is challenged as cloud-based accounting software providers Xero Ltd (XRO AU)and Intuit Inc (INTU US) grab market share. This is also reflected in MYOB’s forecast 7% revenue growth in FY18 and follows a 10% decline in first-half profit, despite a 61% jump in online subscribers.
And there is justification for KKR’s lowering the Offer price: the ASX is down 10% since KKR’s initial tilt, the ASX technology index is off by ~14%, a basket of listed Aussie peers are down 17%, while Xero, the most comparable peer, is down ~20%. The Scheme Offer is at a ~27% premium to the estimated adjusted (for the ASX index) downside price of $2.68/share.
Bain was okay selling at $3.15/share to KKR and will be fine selling its remaining ~6.5% stake at $3.40. Presumably, MYOB sounded out the other major shareholders such as Fidelity, Yarra Funds Management, Vanguard etc as to their read on the revised $3.40 offer, before agreeing to the SIA with KKR.
If the markets avoid further declines, this deal will probably get up. If the markets rebound, the outcome is less assured. This Tuesday marks the beginning of a new year and a renewed mandate for investors to take risk, especially an agreed deal; but the current 5.3% annualised spread is tight.
The Ministry of Finance, the major shareholder of TMB, confirmed that both Krung Thai Bank Pub (KTB TB)and Thanachart Capital (TCAP TB)had engaged in merger talks with TMB. Considering an earlier KTB/TMB courtship failed, it is more likely, but by no means guaranteed, that the deal with Thanachart will happen. Bloomberg is also reporting that Thanachart and TMB want to do a deal before the next elections, which is less than two months away.
TMB is much bigger than Thanachart and therefore it may boil down to whether TMB wants to be the target or acquirer. In Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA‘s view, a deal with Thanachart would leave TMB as the acquirer rather than the target. But Thanachart’s management has a better track record than TMB.
Both banks have undergone extensive deals before this one: 1) TMB acquired DBS Thai Danu and IFCT; and 2) Thanachart engineered an acquisition of the much bigger, but struggling, SCIB.
A merger between the two would still leave them smaller than Bank Of Ayudhya (BAY TB) and would not change the bank rankings; but it would give TMB a bigger presence in asset management, hire-purchase finance and a re-entry into the securities business.
Mando accounts for 45% of Halla’s NAV, which is currently trading at a 50% discount. Sanghyun Park believes the recent narrowing in the discount may be due to the hype attached to Mando-Hella Elec, which he believes is overdone; and recommends a short Holdco and long Mando. Using Sanghyun’s figures, I see the discount to NAV at 51%, 2STD above the 12-month average of ~47%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The year 2018 has proven tumultuous for global markets. Rapidly changing geopolitical priorities of the US, an erstwhile hegemon, have played a role no less significant than the withdrawal of liquidity by leading central banks or US monetary policy tightening. The US has openly declared that it is in a state of “cold war” with China. Despite the recent truce, signs are abundant that the confrontation between the two global superpowers will continue into 2019 and beyond. In 2019, we expect more countries to find themselves in a position where they must choose who they want to side with, the US or China. There are other tectonic shifts, too, which are causing re-alignment of global geopolitical alliances.
How can we explain the fact that in the five years from 2012 the number of tourist visits to China fell from 11.6 to 10.5 million per year? True, business and family reunion visits have risen, but such a culturally rich country should have more tourists.
Relative strength for MSCI EM is bottoming vs. MSCI EAFE despite continued global equity market weakness. Although the MSCI EM’s price index remains in a downtrend, we are seeing signs of outperformance ona a relative strength basis and would add incremental exposure. In this report we highlight attractive and actionable themes within EM.
The outsized daily swings in the major U.S. equity averages tell the classic story of a bear market. Normal bull markets simply do not experience consecutive multiple daily moves of 2% or more.
The market’s panicked price action is highly reminiscent of past panics in 1962, 2002 and 2015. In those cases, the market bounced, and made a lower low several months later. In all cases, stock prices were higher a year later. Our base case scenario calls for an initial low, rally, followed by choppy price action, and a final low in 6-8 months.
Our analysis finds that the technical price action of the market is consistent with a bear market. We offered a checklist of events that occur at market bottoms, but we do not know where the market may bottom out. Much depends on the fundamental drivers of the bear market, policy risks from the White House and the Federal Reserve, and how they are ultimately resolved.
Although Uber aims to be an Amazon for transport, we will focus on the ride-hailing market in part 3 of this series. Here, we try to answer the following questions:
What are the indicative ride-hailing market shares of Uber vs Lyft in North America?
What is Uber’s share in other key countries?
What are the lawsuits investors should watch out for?
How do Uber’s revenue drivers compare with Lyft’s?
What are the timelines and key figures for both companies’ IPOs?
This is the third note in a series about the expected 2019 IPO of global ride-hailing giant Uber Technologies (0084207D US) and Lyft. Please read the earlier two pieces in the series for better contexts:
The year 2018 has proven tumultuous for global markets. Rapidly changing geopolitical priorities of the US, an erstwhile hegemon, have played a role no less significant than the withdrawal of liquidity by leading central banks or US monetary policy tightening. The US has openly declared that it is in a state of “cold war” with China. Despite the recent truce, signs are abundant that the confrontation between the two global superpowers will continue into 2019 and beyond. In 2019, we expect more countries to find themselves in a position where they must choose who they want to side with, the US or China. There are other tectonic shifts, too, which are causing re-alignment of global geopolitical alliances.
Waymo CEO John Krafcik made some bold decisions after taking the helm at Alphabet‘s self-driving project in September 2015. Chief among them was the fact that the company abandon its plans for Level 3 automated driving and focus exclusively on levels 4 & 5. Furthermore, he decreed that Waymo would no longer manufacture its own vehicles but would instead integrate their technology into those of other automakers. Three years later, those decisions would appear to be finally paying off.
On October 10 2018, Waymo reached a significant milestone having completed 10 million self-driving miles across 25 cities in the US. While their first million self-driving miles took 18 months to complete, Waymo now clocks up over a million self-driving miles per month. The company also recently announced the launch of its robo taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona and looks set to quickly follow suit in California. Plans to extend its self-driving technology beyond robotaxis, most notably for trucks and last-mile transportation solutions are also in the works. Furthermore, the company has begun laying down a framework of innovative B2B revenue models which should help accelerate the speed with which they can eventually monetize their technology.
It hasn’t been smooth sailing all the way for Waymo however. Earlier this year, the company was derided for the driving style of its autonomous vehicles and faced the criticism that its driverless cars continue to have safety drivers. There was also an embarrassing incident where one of those very safety drivers caused the self-driving car he was monitoring to hit a motorcyclist when he attempted to take control of the vehicle. According to Waymo’s own analysis of the vehicle log files, the accident would not have happened had he not intervened.
With ten million self-driving miles under their belt and a thoughtful, strategic approach to monetizing their technology beginning to emerge, Waymo remains firmly ahead of their peers in leading the autonomous driving charge.
As the colder winter weather is felt and the icy blast of industry tariff cuts continues to chill sentiment, we seek some respite (at least mentally) in the warmer climes of Okinawa. Okinawa Cellular is a unique company. It’s a small cap telecom network operator in Japan with a focus on the sub-tropical islands of Okinawa Prefecture. As part of the KDDI group, the company benefits from its parent’s economies of scale, but with its local presence, it also benefits from being the hometown hero.
Because the stock is relatively small, from an investment perspective it runs into liquidity constraints that the other telcos do not have, so it’s a different type of investment but one that we think is worth looking at. Over the past 12 months Okinawa Cellular’s stock has fallen by 12.3%, but over the past year the stock has delivered a return in the middle of its peer group and has outperformed the broad TOPIX by about 5.5%. Like most telcos, Okinawa Cellular is also ramping its dividend payments, and the current yield is about 3.5%.
THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.
VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
‘CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.
OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505.
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.
In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP
BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT
VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME
CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.
Waymo CEO John Krafcik made some bold decisions after taking the helm at Alphabet‘s self-driving project in September 2015. Chief among them was the fact that the company abandon its plans for Level 3 automated driving and focus exclusively on levels 4 & 5. Furthermore, he decreed that Waymo would no longer manufacture its own vehicles but would instead integrate their technology into those of other automakers. Three years later, those decisions would appear to be finally paying off.
On October 10 2018, Waymo reached a significant milestone having completed 10 million self-driving miles across 25 cities in the US. While their first million self-driving miles took 18 months to complete, Waymo now clocks up over a million self-driving miles per month. The company also recently announced the launch of its robo taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona and looks set to quickly follow suit in California. Plans to extend its self-driving technology beyond robotaxis, most notably for trucks and last-mile transportation solutions are also in the works. Furthermore, the company has begun laying down a framework of innovative B2B revenue models which should help accelerate the speed with which they can eventually monetize their technology.
It hasn’t been smooth sailing all the way for Waymo however. Earlier this year, the company was derided for the driving style of its autonomous vehicles and faced the criticism that its driverless cars continue to have safety drivers. There was also an embarrassing incident where one of those very safety drivers caused the self-driving car he was monitoring to hit a motorcyclist when he attempted to take control of the vehicle. According to Waymo’s own analysis of the vehicle log files, the accident would not have happened had he not intervened.
With ten million self-driving miles under their belt and a thoughtful, strategic approach to monetizing their technology beginning to emerge, Waymo remains firmly ahead of their peers in leading the autonomous driving charge.
Our review of ten Asian gaming companies forward prospects for 2019 yielded our top five picks. Two of those comprise this insight. Three more will follow in Part Two. There is, in our opinion, some disconnect between continuing macro headwinds in both the VIP and mass sectors and a more bullish tone based on a recent upside trend in Macau, strong results in the Philippines and Cambodia. Given the battering of the market in general, the already 8 month old bearish tone to the sector and the current pricing of the two stocks noted here, we see significant upside opportunity as we near the beginning of 2019.
During the second half of December 2018, Japan saw two telecom companies list on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: Softbank Corp (9434 JP) and ARTERIA Networks (4423 JP). After years of industry consolidation, which saw several stocks delist, this felt like a Christmas miracle (at least for those watching the sector’s stocks).
It would be hard to find two companies in the same industry that are so different – both in their business models as well as in how their IPOs were positioned to investors. One stock is 100 times larger than the other, but this is not a story of David and Goliath. It is two unique stories in parallel.
While each company took a very different approach to selling its stock, both have suffered from the subsequent broader market weakness, irrespective of company specifics. We can’t say it has been the worst of times, but it certainly has been a tough time with SoftBank Corp down 13% and Arteria down 20% from their IPO prices.
In this Insight we explore how each company approached its IPO and how each has fared since.
Right before Christmas, the Ministry of Finance confirms that both Thanachart and KTB were in talks to merge with TMB. We note that:
Considering that KTB’s earlier courtship failed once, it is more likely, but by no means guaranteed, for the deal with Thanachart to happen.
A deal with Thanachart would leave TMB as the acquirer rather than the target. Thanachart’s management has better track record than TMB.
Both banks have undergone extensive deals before this one: 1) TMB acquired DBS Thai Danu and IFCT; and 2) Thanachart engineered an acquisition of the much bigger, but struggling, SCIB.
A merger between the two would still leave them smaller than BAY and not really change the bank rankings, but it would give TMB a bigger presence in asset management and hire-purchase finance and an re-entry into the securities business.
